GUATEMALA'S GUERRILLAS RETREATING IN THE FACE OF GOVERNMENT PRESSURE

Summary

Since the beginning of 1983 Guatemala has enjoyed a respite from the insurgency which has engulfed the country for more than four years. Government success with several political and military strategies has forced the guerrillas to pause to reconsider the manner in which they have been operating. The government has demonstrated to rural Guatemalans, most of whom are Indians, that their interests are best served by supporting it.

President Rios Montt has characterized his approach to the insurgency as one of "rifles and beans." Those who are perceived to support the government are rewarded with food for work, housing if they have been displaced, and other forms of government largesse. Those perceived not to be in support of the government are met with whatever force is considered necessary.

Rios has moved deftly to draw the Indian card from the guerrillas by emphasizing the "beans" portion of his policy. He has attempted to rectify the longstanding political marginalization of the Indians by naming 10 of them to the 30-member Council of State, which advises him on legislative matters. To improve their economic condition, he has organized Local Development Councils in the principal cities of the Department of El Quiché (see map, p. 2), where the guerrillas historically have been strongest. Similarly, his "3Ts" ("Techo, Trabajo, Tortilla" or "Housing, Jobs, Food"), policy has involved the government heavily in social programs throughout the highlands (altiplano).

Organization of even the most remote villages' Indian population into Civil Defense Forces (CDFs)

Declassify: CADR (multiple sources)
is the key to the government's recent military progress. Previous military tactics were characterized by large-scale sweeps through villages, then reabandonment to the guerrillas. The Indians had no choice but to aid whichever force was in their region at the time. Current tactics are to keep government forces always present, either CDFs or small units on patrol from many newly established bases.

The presence of CDFs, coupled with the government's civic action programs, has impinged seriously upon the Indians' willingness to extend logistical support, safe haven, and good will to the insurgents.

Although Cuba and Nicaragua have supplied the insurgents with some weapons, and other bloc countries have supplied training, the insurgent groups are essentially Guatemalan in character. The Cuban-line Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), which has 1,000-1,300 combatants, operates primarily in the northern portion of the altiplano and until recently was considered the strongest guerrilla organization. Its place is currently being challenged by the professional and less Marxist Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), which has 600-800 combatants and operates primarily in the southern portion of the altiplano.

Because the army is focusing its efforts on controlling the EGP and ORPA, the Marxist-Leninist Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) also has seized the opportunity to challenge the EGP's recent supremacy. The FAR has between 150 and 300 very effective combatants located primarily in El Peten Department.

The only other group that has attempted to operate on any significant scale is the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT-D). The PGT-D has been almost destroyed by the army; it currently numbers far fewer than the 200 combatants it had in the summer of 1982.

These four groups in January 1982 formed an alliance known as the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union. Beset by factional strife, it remains mostly a paper organization. Two other groups, the Guatemalan Communist Party (PGT-O), and the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP), play minor roles in the insurgency.

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URNG Alliance

Non-Functioning URNG Formed in Havana in 1982

The titular coordinating organization of the Guatemalan guerrilla groups, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union (URNG), is little more than a paper organization. Bickering among its four members has consistently blocked any chance it might have had for development. The present decline in strength of the guerrilla groups has increased the strain within the URNG. It is unlikely that the URNG will ever act as a true command and control element for the Guatemalan guerrillas.

Union of the four guerrilla groups was first contemplated seriously in October 1980 in Managua. The Managua meeting established the URN, which was reworked into the URNG in Havana in January 1982.

The impetus for organization of the URNG was the Cuban desire to unify the Guatemalan armed left into a coherent national command structure similar to that of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador.

The URNG has not lived up to the expectations of its founders. Most URNG actions are so labeled after the fact; they are generally carried out by one of the groups without the assistance or foreknowledge of the others.

URNG's Four Member Organizations

The four insurgent organizations that make up the URNG are the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the dissident wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-D).

The EGP operates primarily in the altiplano of the Departments of Huehuetenango and El Quiché. ORPA forces are concentrated to the south of the EGP in the mountains of San Marcos, Solola, and southwestern coastal Departments. The FAR focuses its attention on the northern Department of El Petén, and the PGT-D has operated primarily in Chimaltenango Department and Guatemala City.
SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
Command Structure Stillborn

The insurgents' goal of organizing a tactical command structure similar to the Managua-based United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) headquarters of the Salvadoran guerrillas never got beyond the planning stages. The URN/URNG's tactical command structure was to have been known as the General Revolutionary Command (CGR), comprising the leaders of each of the four member groups. Although the leaders have met occasionally in Managua, the CGR cannot be said to have become an organizational reality.

The reluctance of ORPA leader "Comandante Gaspar" (Rodrigo Asturias Amado) to attend regular meetings has made them impossible. FAR attendance has also been sporadic. As a result, the URNG has formed a Managua-based "commission" to act as its secretariat between meetings of the leaders. But no evidence has been received which would indicate that the URNG uses a dedicated radio network for transmission of orders from Nicaragua to Guatemala. Nor does it appear that URNG decisions promulgated in Managua (no matter how transmitted to the member organizations) are respected by the Guatemalan guerrillas.

In-Country Guerrillas Questioned CGR Right To Exist

The CGR's failure to become viable can be traced to guerrilla reluctance to receive direction from leaders who exchanged armed struggle in the field for the revolutionary good life in Managua or Mexico City. ORPA leaders and the in-country leadership of the EGP immediately questioned the decisions of the CGR and even its right to exist. Similarly, the political commission of the PGT-D questioned the right of its members to represent the PGT-D in the CGR.

Thus, the persons who organized the URN in 1980 and the URNG in 1982 have been de facto removed from authority for having deserted the field of battle. EGP leader "Rolando Moran" (Ricardo Armando Ramirez de Leon) and PGT-D leader "Mario" (Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar) were "promoted" to the status of accredited representatives to Nicaragua, without any real command function. A similar fate could be in store for FAR leader "Pablo Monsanto" (Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia).

Personalismo Causes URNG Disunity

ORPA leader Asturias has been a primary contributor to the URNG's lack of success. Asturias is the only insurgent leader who has returned to the field since the 1980 Managua talks. His
impatience with his URNG colleagues is such that he has repeatedly threatened to pull ORPA out of the URNG and go it alone. Nonetheless, he realizes the virtues of a unified armed opposition.

Asturias is not the URNG’s only troublemaker. The official leaders of the three other guerrilla organizations, like Asturias, are classic Latin American caudillos. They are petty, brutal, egotistical strongmen who brook no dissent against their whims. The desire of each to be the Fidel Castro of Guatemala has made compromise and coalition extremely difficult.

URNG Member Groups Originated From PGT

All four URNG member groups trace their origins to the original Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT, now known as the orthodox wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-O). Nonetheless, their success as guerrilla organizations has been measured, at least until recently, by the distance they have come from the PGT on the issue of armed revolution and organization of the masses.

The PGT has always been an orthodox, Soviet-style communist party. It has consistently opposed armed struggle in Guatemala on the grounds that the masses “are not yet ready.” It has not exploited the Indian issue or been successful in creating a mass base.

The PGT-D has moved one step away from the PGT-O by embracing armed struggle. It has, however, made little progress in the areas of Indian exploitation and mass support. The FAR has moved well forward with regard to mass support, but less so with regard to the Indian issue. ORPA has both integrated Indians into its units and obtained high levels of mass support.

The EGP until recently was clearly the leader among the insurgent groups because it has involved in its struggle all aspects of the Indian and rural societies. Only the EGP employs both Indian combatants and large groups of Local Irregular Forces (FILs) for logistical support. Also unique is its use of Indian languages for tactical communication. This integration of the Indian into EGP forces, while clearly the key to past successes, has turned out to be a double-edged sword. Recent government successes in regaining Indian support have injured the guerrilla groups in direct proportion to the extent to which they had depended on the Indians. Consequently, the EGP has been hurt most of all.
The first group to split from the PGT was the FAR, in 1968. FAR leaders objected to PGT demands that the party's military wing (the FAR) be subordinate to the party's Central Committee, which felt that armed struggle was counterproductive if embarked upon prior to gaining sufficient mass support through political work. EGP founders split from the FAR the same year to form their organization "abroad" (the EGP returned to Guatemala in 1972). They had decided that the FAR's lack of appreciation of the Indian issue would always limit the possibilities for success. ORPA split from the FAR for similar reasons at about the same time, although it appears that ORPA leader Asturias also objected to the thorough-going Marxism of the FAR and the nascent EGP. The PGT-D, the most recent splinter group, separated from the PGT-O in 1978. The PGT-D's reasons for splitting off mirror those of the FAR; the PGT-D is, however, much less doctrinaire.

Weapons Obtained From Security Forces, Foreign Supporters

Guatemalan insurgents obtain many of their weapons through attacks on isolated national police posts and in-transit army units. Others are obtained from abroad. The type of weapon recovered from the guerrillas says a great deal about its source. Their attacks on the police would generally net them US-made M-1 rifles; their attacks on the army would yield Israeli-made Galil rifles.

American-made M-16 rifles are not used by the Guatemalan security services; hence, the guerrillas are clearly imported. A few of them were in the US inventory in Vietnam. The Vietnamese probably did not ship these weapons directly to the insurgents. More likely, Cuba obtained them from Vietnam and then transferred them to the guerrillas. It is also possible that Vietnam sold some of them to international arms merchants to obtain foreign exchange and had no control over their subsequent transfer. Nonetheless, most M-16s probably are obtained by Cuba on the world arms market.

A Guatemalan Army report noting the number of weapons lost and recovered in recent months indicated that 30 "assault" rifles were recovered in the accounting period while 31 "Galil" rifles were lost. (The report does not indicate whether the rifles recovered were M-16s or Galils.) The same report notes that 15 M-1 rifles were lost and 3 recovered. Similarly, 83 grenades were lost and 129 recovered. In short, there appears to be a rough equilibrium between weapons lost by the government and recovered from the guerrillas.
Numerous reports, particularly from government sources, state that imported guerrilla weaponry entered Guatemala from two primary supply lines, both originating in Cuba. One route is said to traverse Mexico, where it splits in two before entering Guatemala. The northern portion of this route would enter Guatemala in El Petén near the confluence of the Rio Usumacinta and the Rio de la Pasion, where weapons could be transferred to FAR guerrillas. The southern portion would enter Guatemala at several points, primarily in Huehuetenango, in order to supply EGP and ORPA guerrillas operating in the altiplano.

The other primary route, like the FMLN supply line, is believed to traverse Nicaragua and Honduras before entering Guatemala from the east. Although the British Forces Belize have stated repeatedly that no weapons enter Guatemala from Belize, it remains possible that a small number do, following shipment from Cuba or Nicaragua.

Two other sources of rifles for the insurgents have been the US and Mexico. In July 1982, the Guatemalan Army captured two American-made M-14 rifles. It was not possible to determine whether they came from Vietnam stocks. In August 1982, an attack on an ORPA camp netted several rifles of Mexican Army origin.

Government forces in the summer of 1981 attacked a Guatemala City arms trafficking center jointly administered by ORPA and the EGP. Documents found during the raid indicated that 28 vehicles modified to conceal weapons had been used by the insurgents to import weapons from Nicaragua and Mexico; the vehicles found at the scene obviously had traveled through both countries. Weapons found included US-made AR-15 rifles and Soviet grenades. All five guerrillas killed had been armed with M-16 rifles. Some of the center's weapons had been destined for the FAR.

**Insurgents Regularly Use Mexican Territory for Supply, R&R**

Three URNG member organizations make regular use of Mexican territory for supply and for rest and recuperation. In November 1982, a combined army/CDF patrol followed a guerrilla trail a short distance into Mexico and surprised 125 guerrillas in the act of unloading supplies from a twin-engine aircraft. Captured EGP documents included instructions on how to behave in Mexico in order not to jeopardize this safe haven.

Geographic proximity is the primary reason for the Guatemalan guerrillas' use of Mexican territory. All URNG members except the PGT-D operate in territory bordering Mexico.
Ideology also helps explain guerrilla use of Mexican territory. For several years, Mexico has supported Central American “liberation movements” in international forums; recent information indicates that this policy will continue under President de la Madrid.

Guatemalan officials, including Rios Montt, regularly assert that Mexico condones large levels of arms smuggling through and guerrilla training centers on its territory. Repeated Guatemalan incursions into Mexico, however, have yet to yield solid evidence of this. What the Guatemalans consider guerrilla training centers are described by American Embassy personnel and international observers as refugee camps. It is likely that guerrillas residing in refugee camps cache their weapons in Guatemala and engage in training only at safe distances from the camps.

In January 1982, five FAR members were detained by the Mexican Army in the area of La Libertad, Chiapas State. Four of them were involved in purchasing food and medicine in Mexico and transporting it to El Peten. The fifth had entered Mexico to test the FAR’s radio network to determine whether command and control could be established in Mexico should that become necessary.

The source of many problems related to the refugee camps has been their proximity to the border. Some are located within a few hundred yards of Guatemala. The Mexican authorities have started to reduce the potential for incidents by moving the camps back from the border.

**Rifles and Beans Policy Guides Counterinsurgency**

Since Rios Montt came to power on March 23, 1982, the government’s counterinsurgency operations have been guided by his rifles and beans policy. Under this policy, persons who support the government are rewarded with food, work, and housing assistance from the National Reconstruction Committee. Those who oppose the government are met with force.

In much of 1982 the army guided its operations by labeling villages white, pink, and red. Friendly villages were white, enemy villages were red, and villages of uncertain allegiance were pink. Residents of red villages were warned to move to “strategic villages” or face the consequences when army operations were conducted in the area. This phase of the army’s counterinsurgency operations has come almost to an end. The emphasis recently has been to move villagers back to the abandoned villages; the government hopes to finish the moves before the 1983 spring planting.
In recent months the army has effectively blended food aid, civic action, and the formation of CDFs into its strategy for dealing with the various types of villages. Civic action programs and CDFs are readily organized in the "white" villages. In "pink" ones, exceptional care is spent in determining who should hold CDF leadership positions. Residents of the few remaining "red" villages no doubt would do well to leave them.

Both Sides Have Engaged in Massacres

Allegations that the army has regularly massacred every man, woman, and child in "red" villages are countless. Many of these reports are fabricated. Nonetheless, government responsibility for at least two such incidents is well established.

In September 1982, about 70 civilians, including women and children, were killed by army troops near La Estancia de la Virgen in Chimaltenango. In December, troops killed every one of the several hundred inhabitants of the region known as Los Dos R's in El Peten, including members of the recently formed CDF.

The guerrillas have committed similar atrocities. In June in El Quiche the EGP killed 120 men, women, and children in the village of Chacalte. In May, EGP members killed 20 people in the Alta Verapaz village of Salacuin; and a like number were massacred in April by insurgents in the Chimaltenango village of Chipiacul. Numerous other such incidents have been documented.

Both Sides Are Responsible for Depopulated Areas

Both the government and the guerrillas have carried out programs designed to depopulate contested areas. The army has often notified residents of remote villages that they must move to the nearest "strategic village" or be considered guerrilla sympathizers and face the consequences. The guerrillas likewise have ordered people to leave their villages and move to areas beyond the army's reach.

Recent government tactics, however, have aimed at repopulating villages abandoned during the fighting. This policy follows several months of repeated government successes in counterinsurgency operations. But when the government recently urged the 1,600 former residents of Barrillas, a village in northwestern Huehuetenango, to return to their homes, the EGP countered with propaganda urging the people to fight alongside the EGP.
against their brothers. Only some 60 people returned to their homes in the two weeks following this interchange.

Insurrection Led by EGP in Recent Years

EGP Most Hurt by Army Gains

In the past few years the most powerful Guatemalan insurgent organization was the Cuban-line Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP). Army gains in 1982, however, harmed the EGP more than its URNG comrades. As a result, ORPA appears to be the government's chief threat in 1983.

Although also active elsewhere, the EGP is based in the altiplano Departments of El Quiche and Huehuetenango. The EGP's 1,000-1,300 combatants are organized in six fronts (see chart, p. 10). Local Irregular Forces (FILS) of Indians and campesinos provide logistical support; some of them have received training in the use of firearms.

The EGP's success in recent years led the army during 1982 to focus most of its resources on containing EGP fronts. The Tigres task force was deployed in northern El Quiche and the Gumarcaj task force in the southern part of the province to deal with the Ho Chi Minh front. The last of the three original task forces, the iximche task force, was deployed in Chimaltenango to combat the Sandino front. The task force concept, and the small-unit patrolling that accompanies it, has been so successful that the government has recently created two more to contain ORPA and another to deal with the FAR.

Inclusion of Indians Key to EGP Successes and Failures

The EGP has emphasized the value to the insurgency of the Indian and has occasionally used Indian languages in its tactical communications and propaganda. It has made considerable propaganda headway with its claims that the government is engaged in a campaign of genocide against the Indians.

As the government has gained Indian supporters through its rifles and beans policy, however, the EGP's dependency on the Indians has become a liability. EGP infrastructure has withered.
away as the Indians have enrolled in CDFs and received government largesse. Villages with competent CDFs have been particularly ill-advised targets for the EGP.

**EGP Governed by National Directorate**

The EGP has been governed since 1974 by a National Directorate. The Directorate is known to include Silvia Solorzano Poppa ("Rita" or "La Chapurra"), Victor Manuel Lopez Vasquez ("Vicente"), Jovita Isabel Ayula de Lopez ("Josefina"), and "Juan Jose." The Guatemalan Government believes that all members of the Directorate have fled Guatemala in the face of the army's 1982 offensive.

Julio Cesar Macias Mayora ("Cesar Montes"), age 40, founder of the EGP, was reported to have retired to Mexico in 1979 when his health failed after years of guerrilla life. The current official leader of the EGP, 52-year-old Ricardo Arnoldo Ramirez de Leon ("Rolando Moran"), has not returned to Guatemala since attending the 1980 Managua talks. The EGP's forces are currently led by "Comandante Manolo," whose true name is not known.

**EGP Headquarters Could Be in Ixil Triangle or Mexico**

Little information has been received on the location of the EGP's operational headquarters, although it is well known that the EGP initiated its organizational phase near the Ixcan River in northeastern Huehuetenango Department in 1972. Considering the losses recently taken by the EGP, it is possible that its operational headquarters has been moved to Mexico.

Until recently, the EGP's strength was greatest in northern El Quiche. EGP headquarters probably was, and may still be, located there in the region known as the Ixil Triangle.

**EGP Actions Began in 1975**

EGP cadre spent three years organizing before their first combat action. On May 28, 1975, the EGP military phase began in earnest when cadre killed military commissioner Guillermo Monzon. This was followed in June by the killing of Luis Arenas, labeled by EGP forces as the "Tiger of Ixcan." The EGP asserts that marimbas were brought out in celebration of Arenas' death.

The Ixil Triangle takes its name from the Ixil Indians who people the area. The points of the triangle are formed by the cities of Nebaj, San Juan Cotzal, and Chajul. The Guatemalan Army
has deployed troops in all three cities, imposed curfews, and issued special ID cards. It sends numerous patrols into the outlying districts. Pacification of the area has proved difficult to achieve, however, and resupply of the garrisons is accomplished by helicopter or heavily guarded convoys. Although the army has made great progress in this region, its patrols regularly engage EGP opposition.

Six EGP Fronts, Named for Revolutionaries, Span Guatemala

The EGP has organized guerrilla fronts in almost every department in the country. Its strength is concentrated, however, in the Mexican border departments of Huehuetenango and El Quiche.

All EGP fronts historically were governed by the "Front Directorate." A recent report indicates that each front now has been assigned a military command which reports directly to the EGP National Directorate rather than the Front Directorate.

"Che" Guevara Front Once Effectively Controlled 75 Percent of Huehuetenango. The Che Guevara front poses one of the strongest guerrilla threats to the government. Although the army's 1982 offensive pushed the front into Huehuetenango's northern reaches, it continues to attack villages considered friendly to the government and to harass government forces. As recently as spring 1982 the front was considered to control 75 percent of the Department.

The Che Guevara front is divided into three columns. The strongest column operates in the Cuchumatanes Mountains north of the city of Huehuetenango, between the border with El Quiche Department and the Pan American Highway. The rough terrain has helped it inflict heavy casualties on village CDFs. To aid the CDFs in these confrontations, the army recently has given them M-1 carbines.

The front's other two columns operate near Barrillas and Nentón. Although the government believes these two columns are very weak as a result of army actions, the people near Barrillas have yet to comply with the government request to move back to their village. Their refusal probably is related in part to EGP exhortations.

El Quiche's Ho Chi Minh Front Is EGP's Strongest. The Ho Chi Minh front, founded on January 19, 1972, is the oldest and strongest EGP front. It is under the command of former Jesuit priest Fernando Hoyos Rodriguez ("Carlos"). The front's area of
operations includes "Indochina" (the frontier with Mexico), "Vietnam" (the eastern part of El Quiche), and "Hanoi" (the southern region of El Quiche which borders on the Sandino front).

Together with the Che Guevara front in neighboring Huehuetenango, the Ho Chi Minh front forms the backbone of the EGP. These two fronts are thought to comprise about 70 percent of the EGP's 1,000-1,300 combatants.

The Ho Chi Minh front is Guatemala's only insurgent organization to have mounted a sustained attack on a well-defended army post. Ho Chi Minh front forces killed three officers and nine soldiers in their January 1982 attack on the army post in San Juan Cotzal.

The low casualty figures of the San Juan Cotzal attack belie its importance. The government's immediate reaction was the Army Chief of Staff's decision to go to the scene personally to direct the defense effort. For the longer term, the lesson learned entered into the army's current strategy of deploying new task forces throughout the altiplano to combat the guerrilla threat through aggressive small-unit patrolling.

Chimaltenango's Sandino Front Currently in Decline. The army's 1982 offensive dealt the EGP severe blows in Chimaltenango. Here, as elsewhere, the formation of CDFs has been very effective in denying insurgents the logistical support they require, and the government's civic action program has shown villagers that the government is able to deliver on promises of food, housing assistance, etc. The level of army brutality toward villages considered to "belong" to the EGP and other insurgents also could have affected the decisions of villagers about which side to support. In any event, by the fall of 1982 EGP fortunes in Chimaltenango had waned to such an extent that the EGP requested the assistance of a FAR unit from El Peten.

The EGP front in Chimaltenango is named for Augusto Cesar Sandino. The EGP formed the front at the height of its fortunes on July 19, 1981. At the time, control of Chimaltenango, which lies between the capital and the altiplano, was the logical next step in the EGP's drive to take power.

The Chimaltenango Department is a difficult zone for guerrilla warfare because it has characteristics of all three of the politico/military/geographic environments into which EGP planners have divided Guatemala: urban, mountainous, and flatland. Its
proximity to the capital permits relatively swift reaction by government forces. Similarly, the Department's deforested state grants greater mobility to the forces already there. Finally, the diversified labor force makes propagation of class consciousness difficult because of the varying interests of the workers.

Yet the EGP believed that certain factors in Chimaltenango would act in its favor. The dispersed population pattern of Chimaltenango is similar to that found in the altiplano; the isolated farms are good targets; and the excellent transportation facilities permit guerrilla units to use whatever level of logistical support is available from insurgents based in the capital. Most of all, the EGP hoped it could incite the largely Indian population into revolt merely by fanning traditional feelings of discrimination, without having to introduce the sometimes alienating Marxist-Leninist concept of class struggle.

Recent reports indicate that guerrilla activity in Chimaltenango has abated substantially. The EGP is now occupied with defending its home base in Huehuetenango and El Quiche.

Yon Sosa Front Targets Oilfields, Hydro Projects. The Yon Sosa front is found in Alta Verapaz Department, Baja Verapaz Department, and the southwestern corner of El Petén. The front is believed to have about 100 combatants and is active. The army has not yet deployed a task force to combat Yon Sosa, leaving the responsibility to the forces regularly stationed in the Coban military zone.

Yon Sosa is commanded by Mario Alberto Domínguez Morales ("Atilio"). Its primary mission is harassment and sabotage of the petroleum industry. It regularly burns farms in the area surrounding the Departmental Capital of Coban and threatens work on the region's hydroelectric projects.

The front is named for Lt. Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, a participant in the coup attempt of November 13, 1960. In that incident, dissident junior officers attempted to overthrow the government because of its rampant corruption and support of the use of Guatemalan territory for training the Bay of Pigs invaders. Rather than lay down his arms when it became apparent the coup was doomed, Yon Sosa organized an insurgency and fought the government in the eastern provinces.

In 1966 Julio Méndez Montenegro campaigned for the presidency as the candidate of liberal democracy. The guerrillas decided to
support him, at the behest of the moderate communist party (PGT). The night before the election, however, the police arrested 26 communists, including the leader of the party, and tortured and killed them.

Upon taking office, Mendez quickly destroyed the by-then disorganized guerrilla resistance. Yon Sosa escaped to Mexico, only to be killed by Mexican internal security agents.

Turcios Lima Front Operates on South Coast. The "Luis Augusto Turcios Lima" front is found in the south coast Departments of Escuintla, Suchitepequez, and Retalhuleu. Although it conducts regular actions in Escuintla, including assassinations of government officials and the burning of public buildings, it numbers no more than 50-75 combatants and is not a great threat to the government.

The front is named for 2d Lt. Turcios who, like Yon Sosa, left the army for the insurgency in 1960. Turcios was killed in a sportscar accident in October 1966.

Castillo Front in Capital. Guatemala City is supposed to be the territory of the Otto Rene Castillo front. Heavy security, however, has kept the front from carrying out many actions in recent years. Its decline resulted initially from the EGP decision to detail the front's militants to Chimaltenango in the summer of 1981 to help inaugurate the Sandino front.

EGP operatives in the capital have not been completely inactive, however. On November 7, 1982, for example, two guerrillas attempted to bomb a police vehicle. The army killed one and captured the other. Both were armed with M-16 rifles.

The Castillo front is led by Mario de Jesus Payeras Solares ("Rogue"), known as a founder of the EGP and the author of such EGP publications as The Days of the Jungle. Its political sector is led by Gustavo Adolfo Meana Brener ("Manolo").

Otto Rene Castillo was an acclaimed Guatemalan poet who was killed by the government in March 1967.

EGP Ideology Emphasizes Prolonged Struggle

The EGP views insurgency, which it calls Popular Revolutionary War, as a long-term struggle to bleed the strength from the government. Its strategy emphasizes simultaneous efforts of
military action, mass organization, and mobilization of international support in four successive stages of warfare.

The first stage of the EGP's in-country activities was carried out near the Ixcan River in northern Huehuetenango between 1972 and 1975. EGP founders reentered Guatemala from exile and began to establish a base among the Indians. During this period, the EGP engaged only in political work following its inaugural act in 1972 of burning an airplane.

The second stage of the war, which began in 1975, was armed. Early EGP attacks were of a low-level nature, such as the burning of farm buildings and the murder of administrative personnel.

The third phase of the war was initiated in the late 1970s, when the EGP began to attack army units and convoys. This stage is still in effect. The EGP makes no attempt to hold territory or engage government forces in large-scale battles.

Only during the fourth and final stage of war does EGP doctrine call for the declaration of liberated zones and an attempt to hold them from government troops. In light of the EGP's current strategic retreat, it is not likely to call soon for a shift to the tactics prescribed for the final stage of the struggle.

Guerrillas View Present "Coyuntura" as Favorable

The EGP believes that the present conjunction of circumstances (coyuntura) in the class struggle is highly favorable to the insurgency. Profound Guatemalan social transformations have taken place over the past 20 years. The EGP feels that the introduction of new agricultural technology has increased the exploitation of rural workers.

Many small landholders have been fraudulently deprived of their land. Similarly, the unchecked population explosion among the Indians has caused the size of Indian landholdings to dwindle to the point where self-sufficiency is not possible.

EGP ideology calls for spreading the war throughout the country and inflicting the greatest number of casualties on government forces by creating new guerrilla fronts in new territory whenever possible. EGP organizational work among the masses aims at their broad participation in the insurrection. Its propaganda emphasizes the government's discrimination against and oppression of the Indians, workers' grievances, and the people's right to the land.
EGP Tactics Call for Increasingly More Devastating Attacks

EGP military doctrine emphasizes small unit actions against targets from which the attacking unit can disengage at will and on short notice. In practice, this means that most EGP and other insurgent actions are more "terrorist" than "military" in nature. Most guerrilla attacks are made from hidden positions upon unsuspecting targets, such as convoys. The guerrillas seldom attack army patrols in the field.

The simplest guerrilla action is "armed propaganda," which means coercing villagers by force of arms to attend propaganda meetings. The next action is sabotage, wherein farm machinery and buildings owned by the large agri-business operations are burned or bombed.

Next are "military takings" of farms or towns. Generally, EGP forces will kill the owner of such a farm, an administrator "known for oppressing the workers," a spy, or a "hated" mayor, etc. These murders are termed "doing justice."

Attacks against military units are usually made while a unit is in transit. These are known as "ambushes" or "harassment attacks." Occasionally, EGP tacticians decide they have such an advantage of terrain, numbers, or surprise that they will undertake an "annihilation attack."

Foe of North American "Imperialism."

Anti-Americanism is a fundamental EGP tenet. EGP propaganda states that:

"After ten years of struggle we recognize all the more that North-American imperialism is our historic common enemy. We know that it will continue its attempt to drown the legitimate aspirations of our people for liberty and sovereignty in blood. But we are confident of victory and the justice of our struggle. For these reasons we demand that everyone continue doing what they can to further the cause of our people, whose solidarity is increasing at all levels, which contributes directly to the highlighting of the genocidal intentions of North-American imperialism and the governments which serve as its instruments. The victory of the Guatemalan people will be the victory over exploitation, oppression, discrimination, and repression."
Less Marxist ORPA. Approaching EGP in Strength

ORPA Based in San Marcos

The blows the EGP received from the army in 1982 have caused the traditionally second-ranked ORPA to be considered an equal threat to the government. While the EGP has been retreating into the remote regions of northern Huehuetenango and El Quiche, ORPA has continued to harass army forces throughout San Marcos, Quetzaltenango, and the Lake Atitlan area of Solola. Nonetheless, ORPA did make an unprecedented public acknowledgment of its setbacks at the hands of government forces in Mexico City in October. In any event, the army has considered ORPA’s threat great enough to merit the deployment of two new task forces to counter it.

ORPA is believed to have 600-800 well-armed combatants and numerous sympathizers. The region in which ORPA operates most freely is to the west and south of Lake Atitlan in Solola Department. Although it also has forces in the southeastern Department of Santa Rosa on the Tecuamburo Volcano, they recently have suffered great losses at the hands of the army. Although the ORPA contingent on Tecuamburo once agreed to provide leadership and logistical support for the PGT-D’s demoralized local contingent, it is now in like circumstances and has approached the PAR for assistance.

ORPA’s leadership split from the PAR in 1971 but did not engage in armed action against the government until 1979. Exactly when ORPA was formed is not clear. After 1979, however, it quickly grew into a formidable insurgent group. It operates in heavily armed columns of about 50 combatants, most of whom have been trained in Cuba.

Although it has been reported that almost all ORPA members have M-16s, in January 1983 ORPA was engaged in what it called “The Campaign of 100 Arms” to increase its firepower. Its goal was to obtain weapons from the army. To that end, one of the larger operations included the ambush of an army convoy south of Lake Atitlan on the road between Quetzaltenango and Retalhuleu. Fourteen soldiers were killed, and numerous government weapons were recovered. These would have been Galil rifles.

ORPA Less Marxist Than Other Groups

Although it is an offshoot of the PAR, ORPA is not considered by its three colleagues in the URNG to be a Marxist organization.
It is more a nationalist group that has vowed to cleanse the country of the "corrupt elite" which it alleges oppresses the people.

Under the leadership of Rodrigo Asturias Amado ("Comandante Gaspar"), ORPA has focused its opposition to the governing regime on corruption and other abuses rather than on ideology. This outlook is reflected in the propaganda that ORPA distributes to local Indians, none of which contains Marxist rhetoric.

Of the URNG member organizations, only ORPA's organizational logo lacks Marxist symbolism. It uses a depiction of an exploding volcano, compared with the EGP's likeness of Che Guevara and the FAR's and PGT-D's hammer and sickle.

An indication of Asturias' intention to avoid becoming a Marxist pawn was his veto of the dispatch of a URNG delegation to Europe in early 1982, because the trip was to have been sponsored by the communist front World Peace Council. His action was based on the ORPA belief that no one tendency within the URNG should be able to dominate foreign contacts merely because it could draw on the financial support of an external organization of a specific orientation.

ORPA Recently Reduced Primary Fronts to Two

Although ORPA has been doing better than the EGP in confrontations with government forces, it has taken its share of losses. As a result, it has reduced the number of its primary fronts to two. One of these commands operates in the vicinity of Lake Atilan; the other is active in San Marcos. A third front on the Tecuamburo Volcano in San Marcos is in very poor shape and under severe pressure from the army.

ORPA's headquarters probably is in Mexico. Its former headquarters on the slopes of the Tajumulco Volcano northeast of the city of San Marcos was overrun by army forces in August 1982. Asturias and most of his men were able to escape. But Asturias' deputy, "Comandante Manuel," was one of 11 ORPA combatants killed in the engagement.

Prior to the recent consolidation, two ORPA fronts operated from the Tajumulco Volcano. Each had about 50 well-armed, Cuban-trained combatants. These fronts probably continue to operate under the aegis of the newly consolidated command structure. One, known as "Diego Tzoc," is under the command of "Comandante Anibal." The other, known as "El Brote," is commanded by "Captain Nay."
ORPA's Lake Atitlán forces were led for quite some time by an allegedly brilliant mathematician named Ricardo "Dicky" Stein, whose father is a leading member of Guatemala's Jewish community. Although Stein may still lead a column in this vicinity, overall control is now in the hands of Pedro Pablo Palma Lau ("Poncho"). Palma is considered one of ORPA's best field commanders despite the fact that his chronic asthma weakens him to the extent that he needs assistance to leave the field following combat.

ORPA forces operating in San Marcos are led by "Comandante Isaias," an excellent tactician. His was the force that carried out the above-mentioned attack on the army convoy.

ORPA also has a limited urban front. It is led by "Raphael," whose true name is not known. His deputy is PNU Dary ("Agimael"), whose brother, Dr. Mario Dary, a former rector of the University of San Carlos, was killed in December 1982.

An indication of the level of army concern about the situation in the Lake Atitlán area was the January 1983 formation of a "regional command" in Retalhuleu under the direction of the army's Deputy Chief of Staff. This action had been preceded last fall by the formation of the "Quirigua" task force at Santa Ana Belin in San Marcos.

ORPA grew quickly following its inception in 1979. One of its early goals was to be able to operate in the capital as well as in rural areas. For this reason, ORPA embarked upon a rapid expansion of its urban safe-house network.

The speedy growth of ORPA's urban operation, however, was not accompanied by good security. As a result, in the summer of 1981 the army was able to destroy most of ORPA's urban apparatus with raids on more than 25 safe houses in which more than 30 cadre were killed. The army captured tons of weapons and supplies in that effort. By mid-1982 ORPA felt confident enough to attempt to reestablish its network of safe houses in the capital. This undertaking, however, has been rather effectively contained by heavy government security. Government control of traffic into and out of the city has made resupply of weapons from the few urban safe houses to rural cadre almost impossible.

Government successes against ORPA have also been quite marked in Chimaltenango. In the fall of 1981 ORPA had attempted to expand from its San Marcos base area into Chimaltenango. It took such heavy losses, however, that it was forced to leave Chimaltenango to the EGP's Sandino front.
ORPA's forces on the slopes of the Tecuamburo Volcano in Santa Rosa also have been seriously affected by army attacks. The ORPA column based there had 55 combatants in June 1982 and only 30 three months later. It has ceased operations and concealed its combatants within the coffee harvest workforce on the volcano.

**ORPA Leader Asturias Is Classic Caudillo Figure**

"Comandante Gaspar," the son of Nobel Prize-winning author Miguel Angel Asturias, is a strong and persuasive leader who has great difficulty cooperating with others. Since the beginning of attempts to unify the Guatemalan opposition, Asturias has been the stumbling block. He almost believes his repeated contention that ORPA can win the war without the help of the other insurgent organizations.

Asturias has a long history of involvement in left-wing struggles to overthrow the Guatemalan Government. He joined the PGT while still a student but broke away in the late 1960s following a dispute with the leadership over its refusal to adopt armed struggle.

Asturias joined the FAR in 1971 to take part in its insurgency in El Peten. Almost immediately he developed an intense personal dislike for FAR leader Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia ("Pablo Monsanto"). This dislike, no doubt influenced by Asturias' coveting of Soto's leadership position, was also based on strong differences of opinion over strategy.

Asturias believes firmly in incorporating the Indians into the guerrilla war as combatants. Soto, however, at least until recently, has felt that Indians are unfit to be revolutionaries because they have yet to pass through the "proletarian" phase of class development.

Asturias dislikes EGP official leader Ricardo Ramirez de Leon ("Rolando"). Ramirez is Asturias' primary competitor to be Guatemala's Fidel Castro. Additionally, the EGP has mounted terrorist attacks in Guatemala City without coordinating them with ORPA. Asturias believes this threatens the fragile unity of the guerrillas.

Despite his adoption of the revolutionary struggle, Asturias retains much of the bourgeois lifestyle he lived as a youth in Paris and other European capitals. He is fond of expensive cognac and scotch and has a well-known weakness for women. He has recognized the leadership position of his subordinate commanders by giving them expensive Rolex watches and mini Pentax cameras.

ORPA was created by Asturias as his personal vehicle; as such, it reflects his social beliefs and military strategy. Some clues...
to Asturias' beliefs, and hence those of ORPA, are given by Asturias' adoption of the name "Gaspar" as his nom de guerre. "Gaspar" was one of the protagonists of the novel *Hombres de Maiz* (The Corn Men) by Asturias' father. The novel concerns the harsh struggle of the campesinos to survive in the face of rampant government corruption and excesses.

**ORPA Uses Indian Combatants But Not Followers**

Asturias' long-held belief that Indians should be incorporated into the guerrilla movement as combatants was a factor contributing to his departure from the PAR. ORPA's use of Indians is tempered, however, by Asturias' view of ORPA as a disciplined military organization. ORPA troops are generally considered to be the best trained and armed in the guerrilla movement.

Because Asturias sees ORPA as a military organization, he does not permit the use of followers. Thus, ORPA has a much smaller base of supporters than the EGP, which makes extensive use of Indian logistical support. This smaller base is also due to ORPA's lack of a vision of a full-scale social movement akin to the Marxism of the EGP.

ORPA's Indian strategy, which once caused it to lag behind the EGP in strength, is currently enabling it to weather army pressure better than the EGP. Because ORPA did not depend on a broad-based network of Indian supporters for logistical needs, army neutralization of such supporters has hurt it less.

ORPA strongly objects to the current EGP strategy of attacking villages containing CDFs and engaging in wholesale human rights abuses. It is ORPA's view that such a policy will only cause more defections from the guerrilla cause. ORPA has continued its program of burning fincas, engaging in selective killings, and harassing the army and police. It does not single out CDFs as targets of opportunity. This aids its propaganda effort describing ORPA as the true friend of the people.

**Two ORPA Spinoff Groups Have Been Thorn in Government's Side**

The first group to split from ORPA was known as "Our Movement" (NM). It was led by current ORPA Comandante Pedro Palma's brother Edgar. Edgar Palma Lau, at one time also an ORPA comandante, left ORPA in 1979 with a third Palma brother, Minor, to found the NM. The brothers left ORPA because they felt it should have a political as well as military program. NM was thought to have gone into a dormant state after Edgar was killed by government forces in January 1982.
In October 1982 Minor Palma Lau and a former ORPA comandante called Efrain broke away from NM to form the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP). The MRP initiated its activities with the kidnapping of a nephew of Rios Montt. Its next action was the kidnapping of the Guatemalan daughter of Honduran President Suazo.

The MRP had hoped to use the kidnapping of the President's nephew to force the release of a fellow guerrilla, Ileana del Rosario Solares. But Ms. Solares died while in government hands. Before her death she provided considerable valuable information on the NM, which was larger and better organized than had been thought.

The President's nephew was released by a raid on the MRP safe house in which he was being held. The raid was planned by six Israeli advisers assigned to the Presidential Intelligence Service. The government's efforts to gain tactical intelligence through the interrogation of captured MRP cadre were directed by two of the Israeli advisers.

Two guerrillas were killed in the assault upon the safe house, and several weapons were captured. These included two Israeli-made Uzi submachineguns and three American-made Browning 9 mm pistols.

FAR Operates in El Peten

FAR Not Hurt by Current Offensive

Guatemala's intelligence community believes that the doctrinally pure Marxist-Leninist FAR is potentially the most dangerous of the Guatemalan guerrilla organizations. The FAR is a serious problem for government forces in El Peten and will continue to be so at least until the new task force recently organized to combat it becomes fully operational.

The FAR has engaged in relatively few military actions in the past three years compared with the EGP and ORPA. During this time it has built its forces to 150-300 combatants and sent many of them to Nicaragua and Cuba for training.

The FAR's El Peten forces have suffered little in the ongoing army offensive; reports are regularly received of FAR actions throughout the Department. Its success in El Peten led the FAR to detail a group of highly trained commandos to Chimaltenango to aid the EGP's ailing Sandino front.
The FAR has inflicted the greatest number of casualties on the army in a single engagement in the conflict. This occurred in October 1982 when it killed 19 troops in an ambush initiated by the explosion of a claymore mine. The FAR confiscated the weapons carried by the detachment, presumably Galil rifles, and withdrew.

Shortly after this attack, the army responded by burning the homes and crops of two nearby villagers for their support of FAR activities. The FAR retaliated with an attack on a neighboring village. The army's massacre of the people of Los Dos R's came shortly thereafter.

The government is taking the FAR threat seriously. The army's newly formed strategic reaction force has been assigned to a new task force in El Peten for just this reason. After the task force has had an opportunity to organize patrol bases in remote reaches of its area of operations and CDFs in nearby villages, it should have the success that has crowned similar efforts in the altiplano.

An important aspect of the government's recent program has been its emphasis on combatting the latent insurgency created by government and societal abuses of the population. If similar progress is to be made in El Peten, the army will have to prevent incidents like the one at Los Dos R's. In that instance even CDF members who had demonstrated their loyalty to the government were slaughtered. Such incidents, outrageous enough in the abstract, are particularly unwise considering the crucial role the CDFs have played in the government's successes to date.

**FAR Has Four Operational Zones**

The FAR's national directorate is located in Guatemala City. From there, the activities of the forces in the other three zones are directed. FAR's other zones are El Peten, Chimaltenango, and the Santa Rosa area.

The FAR denominates El Peten as the Captain Androcolos Hernández region, which has three fronts. The Raul Orlantes Trocoli front operates in central El Peten and near Melchor de Mencos on the border with Belize. The Feliciano Arqueta Rojas front operates in the region between Flores and Poptun. The most active El Peten front is the Lucio Ramirez front, which operates in the western part of the Department near the Mexican border. It is the Turcios Lima column of the Ramirez front that is thought to be responsible for the Sayaxché ambush and many other recent incidents near Las Cruces.
The focus of FAR’s activities in its central region has been Chimaltenango, the territory of the Tecum Uman front. The forces now constituting this front were transferred from El Petén’s Argueta Rojas front. The Tecum Uman front, though not as powerful as when it arrived, is the source of most of the army’s remaining problems in Chimaltenango; the EGP’s Sandino front has been effectively neutralized. The other FAR front in the central region is the Captain Sergio Aníbal Ramírez front, which operates sporadically in Guatemala City and surrounding villages. It is only a minor irritant to the government.

The southern region of the FAR includes the Departments of Escuintla and Santa Rosa. The Capt. Santos Salazar front which operates in this region has traditionally lacked the support of the top FAR leaders and has never been very active. However, the FAR may have decided recently to invigorate the front. One report indicates that 43 combatants who have just completed training in Cuba will be assigned to the Santa Rosa region.

Confident FAR Now Intriguing Against Declining EGP

Recent activities of the FAR indicate that it considers EGP power to be waning. It also appears to concur in the army’s assessment that ORPA is the greatest near-term threat to the government. As a result, it has sought to improve its position in Guatemala’s revolutionary ranking. Its most ambitious effort has been to marginalize the EGP front in Chimaltenango. At the same time, however, it is making overtures to its estranged parent organization, the PGT-O, and offering its “support” to struggling ORPA forces on the Tecuamburo Volcano in Santa Rosa, where it would send the Cuban-trained combatants.

The EGP feels threatened by FAR activities in Chimaltenango. Although both organizations have been punished by the army’s offensive, the FAR has been able to mount operations more easily than the EGP.

The FAR believes that the URNG will remain a paper organization until the members can learn to work together for their common good, presumably as defined by the FAR. Indeed, in the past the FAR has bowed to the ideal of URNG unity by refusing to have bilateral relations with the non-URNG member PGT-O, insisting that the PGT-O approach the URNG as a whole. In mid-December 1982, however, the FAR changed this policy and offered to establish bilateral relations with the PGT-O. The FAR cautioned the PGT-O not to make this approach known to the URNG.
FAR Led by "Pablo Monsanto"

Jorge Ismael Soto Garcia ("Pablo Monsanto"), age 42, has led the FAR since the late 1960s. Only sketchy information is available on other FAR personalities. "Comandante Ramon" is a member of the National Directorate and in charge of international relations. Soto recently ordered that Nicolas Sis, FAR's representative on the URNG, be replaced by Ramon Ortiz of the Guatemala City unit.

Soto, described as a ruthless Marxist-Leninist terrorist, is said to have become a guerrilla at the age of 15. He is a rather inflexible person not known for strategic vision; primarily he is a tactician who leans heavily upon subordinates for political and ideological advice. Nonetheless, Soto has differed with subordinates on the question of recruitment of Indians which, until recently at least, he opposed. He has argued that recruits should come exclusively from the proletariat and non-Indian peasantry.

The FAR has long been strongly anti-American. In 1968, its operative Leonardo Castillo Johnson led the group that killed two American military personnel, Col. Webber and Lt. Cdr. Munroe. Castillo was bent upon vengeance for the death of his girlfriend Rogelia Cruz, a former Miss Guatemala, who was killed by the security forces. The FAR is also responsible for the 1968 murder of US Ambassador John Gordon Mein.

The FAR was formed in 1962 as the military arm of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT). It split from the PGT in 1968 because of differences over the party's reluctance to enter armed struggle.

PGT-D Is Junior Member of URNG

PGT-D Crumbling Under Government Pressure

The National Direction Nucleus (i.e., dissident wing) of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-D) operates primarily in Guatemala City and Chimaltenango, although a bedraggled unit struggles to survive in Santa Rosa. The PGT-D has considerably fewer than the 200 combatants it was estimated to have in late 1982. It has had difficulty establishing meaningful contact with other Guatemalan guerrilla organizations, and by the end of 1982 was plaintively requesting aid from all comers, especially ORPA and the FAR. Its final humiliation, perhaps, is its indication that it is willing to merge once again with the PGT-D.
The PGT-D in 1981 sent 19 militants to Cuba for training. As of late July 1982, none had returned. Although the party knew that three of its members had been killed attempting to enter Mexico without documents, the fate of the others was unknown.

The PGT-D was reported to have had more than 400 active members in the spring of 1982, but by the end of the summer the government had reduced that number to 200. Of the 200, the majority were said to be in Chimaltenango and the remainder in the capital and Santa Rosa. Many former PGT-D militants in Chimaltenango reportedly have joined CDFs.

Cardoza Formed PGT-D in 1978

The PGT-D split from the orthodox wing of the party in 1978 because of continued PGT unwillingness to embrace armed struggle as the tonic for Guatemala's social ills. Personality conflicts also entered into the decision. The PGT-D's founder, longtime communist Jose Alberto Cardoza Aguilar, age 64, had lived in Mexico in the 1973-77 period. He had been upset that he was not given a responsible assignment upon his return to Guatemala.

Cardoza's colleagues within the PGT-D also have recently shoved him aside. They were angered because Cardoza had not returned to Guatemala since late 1980, when he went to Managua and Havana for the early talks on unification of Guatemala's guerrilla organizations. The central committee of the PGT-D voted on July 29, 1982, to name Manuel Contreras ("Comandante Tino") as permanent Secretary General of the PGT-D and offered Cardoza the post of Secretary General for International Affairs on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. It has also been reported, however, that the PGT-D is now led by Carlos Gonzalez.

The losses incurred by the PGT-D last summer have caused it to explore the possibility of reunification with the orthodox wing of the party, the PGT-O. The PGT-D is even willing to accept a secondary role in a reunited party. Cardoza's ouster makes it more likely that a reunification will occur.

PGT-O: "Moderate" Soviet-Line Party

PGT-O Historically Reluctant To Embrace Armed Struggle

The final actor on Guatemala's revolutionary stage is the orthodox wing of the Guatemalan Labor (Communist) Party (PGT-O). Although all four URNG member groups sprang from it, the PGT-O has
never become a member of URNG. It has not initiated a program of guerrilla warfare because it believes that politicization of the masses must precede armed struggle. A careful analysis of the PGT-O's actions, or inactions, reveals that by the standards of American constitutional law it is basically a democratic party in that it does not advocate "immediate" violence as the solution to the country's political problems.

The PGT-O has, however, begun preparation for combat. In December 1981, it organized its military arm, the Popular Forces of the People (CFPP). Currently it is engaged in extensive training operations. Whether it will soon enter combat and the URNG or choose to participate in elections will be determined by the fortunes of party leader Ricardo Rosales Roman as he attempts to bow to the militantes, with the support of military training, yet defer military action on the grounds that the time is not yet right.

Rosales no doubt will argue for participation in the elections. This could split the party again or terminate Rosales' career as leader.

**Communist Countries Train PGT-O Cadres**

As the "official" Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT-O has received a great deal of aid and training from the Soviet Union and other bloc countries. Rosales has visited the Soviet Union and other bloc countries on numerous occasions in search of military aid and training.

Ten PGT-O militants received three months of medical corps training in East Germany in the spring of 1982. In September, the party sent nine members to the Soviet Union for six months of military training at the captain level.

Cuba has also provided assistance for the PGT-O. Thirty PGT-O members began two months of military studies there in June 1982. In addition, Cuba gave six party leaders 40 days of training at the general staff level and offered to train 12 others as company leaders. Czechoslovakia has made a gesture of support for the PGT-O by sending it a large offset printing press for its propaganda operation in Mexico City.

Other guerrilla organizations in Central America have aided the PGT-O. The Salvadoran insurgents organized a program for training 14 PGT-O members at a time and suggested that the program be expanded to 30 students by January 1983. The Salvadoran Communist Party in 1982 hosted a six-week course in Managua for four PGT-O members on the production and handling of explosives and mines.
Sandinistas Cool to PGT-O

When Cuba directed several PGT-O members to avoid Mexico and travel through Nicaragua on their way to Havana in early 1982, the Nicaraguans refused to assist them, saying they had no lodging facilities. The Sandinistas have agreed, however, to permit Bulgarian arms to be transshipped from Cuba through Nicaragua to the PGT-O.

Nicaragua's unwillingness to be particularly helpful to the PGT-O was also illustrated in September 1981, when FSLN junta members Tomas Borge and Daniel and Humberto Ortega were unsuccessful in an attempt to aid the PGT-O. The Nicaraguan faction opposed to entry of the PGT-O into the guerrilla struggle was led by Jaime Wheelock. His faction supported ORPA, EGP, and FAR.

The PGT-O believes that this Nicaraguan preference for the other guerrilla organizations is based on the PGT-O's status as a party of intellectuals. PGT-O leaders believe that the Nicaraguans fear the PGT-O intellectuals would be able to dominate the other groups. More likely, however, the Nicaraguans fear that the action-oriented guerrilla organizations would be smothered into inaction by the tendentious rhetoric of the PGT-O.

PGT-O Sees Itself as Arbiter of Marxist Tenets

As the "orthodox" Communist Party of Guatemala, the PGT-O feels that it is the appointed interpreter of the Marxist gospel. It regards the other guerrilla forces as having combined a belief in old-fashioned communist dogma with only a half-understanding of Marxist-Leninist principles. This confusion, according to the PGT-O, results in internal frictions and the erroneous belief that socialist regimes can be established as soon as a military victory is achieved.

The PGT-O holds that there can be no instant socialism in Central America. Such fundamental social change can take place only after a long period of political indoctrination during good economic times. In order to build a strong economy in a revolutionary Guatemala, the PGT-O believes that aid and investment from the capitalist countries would have to be attracted. To do this, a policy of genuine nonalignment would have to be adopted.

Long discussions of Marxist philosophy appear to have energized the party. As noted above, it only recently came to the decision that the politicization of the masses may be nearing the point necessary for the initiation of armed struggle. Such a decision, if put into effect, would come at the wrong time,
considering the progress the Rios Montt government has made in social reform, i.e., in removing the root causes of the insurgency.

With just a few exceptions, perhaps including the kidnapping of newspaper owner Alvaro Contreras, the PGT-O has embarked only on training expeditions, not terrorism and guerrilla warfare.

PGT-O Leader Under Fire for Inaction

PGT-O leader Rosales is about 50 years of age. He is by nature a cautious and somewhat opportunistic person and is not considered to be a hardline Marxist-Leninist. He appears amenable to having correct, businesslike relations with the US should he come to power.

In June 1982 Rosales was the object of an intrigue led by Central Committee member Carlos Orantes Troccoli. The Orantes faction charged that Rosales had been delaying efforts to prepare the PGT-O to enter the military struggle in Guatemala. Rosales offered to resign if the committee so desired. That it did not make the request apparently was credited as much to Orantes' not being considered an able leader as to Rosales' popularity.

Rosales was once described by an Embassy Guatemala officer as a believer in "peaceful coexistence." He appears to have joined the JPT, a communist party youth group, in 1956. At any rate, he led it to victory in the student government elections at the University of San Carlos in 1962, when he was elected President of the University Student Association.

After the Revolution

URNG Statements on Postwar Government Positive

As recently as July 1982 the URNG was considered to have the capability to seize power by 1985. This no longer appears to be the case. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider statements by the URNG concerning the nature of the regime it proposes.

Most URNG propaganda focuses on the ongoing war rather than the nature of postwar society. When the URNG was formed in January 1982, however, it published its five-point program for a revolutionary government:

I. The revolution will put an end to the repression of the people and guarantee them life, peace, and the supreme rights of humanity.

SECRET/NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
NOT RELEASEABLE TO CONTRACTORS/CONSULTANTS
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION
CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR
II. The revolution will lay the foundation for solving the fundamental necessities of the grand majority of the people, to reach the economic and political levels of the great repressive rich people, Guatemalans and foreigners, that govern Guatemala.

III. The revolution guarantees the equality of indigenous peoples and ladinos, ending cultural oppression and discrimination.

IV. The revolution guarantees the creation of a new society in which all the patriotic, popular, and democratic sectors are represented.

V. The revolution guarantees the policy of nonalignment and international cooperation that all poor countries need to develop in today's world, pursuant to the guiding principle of self-determination.

Following each of the five points are paragraphs expanding upon them. The subparagraphs guarantee freedom of association, expression, thought, and religion. They state that the revolution will respect the right of the people to elect their local, municipal, and national authorities. They note that although the properties of the "great repressive rich" will be confiscated to help take care of the needs of the workers, small and medium-size entrepreneurs will be welcomed. Equal rights for women are guaranteed.

**URNG Government Likely To Emulate Sandinistas**

Despite the classically pluralistic and democratic promises of the URNG unity statement, it can be inferred that a URNG government would emulate the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. This observation stems primarily from consideration of the "anti-imperialist" rhetoric of the EGP, FAR, and PGT-D and their use of traditional Marxist symbolism. The EGP even decided to share a hero with the Sandinistas when it named its sixth front for Augusto Cesar Sandino.

There is of course the possibility that URNG non-Marxist supporters would be able to influence the course of a revolutionary government. For example, some member groups of the Democratic Front Against Repression (FDCR) and the persons who belong to the Guatemalan Committee of Patriotic Unity (CGUP) are not Marxists. Some of them represent religious groups. Again, the Nicaraguan model seems to argue powerfully against the ability of the
non-armed groups to moderate the demands of those accustomed to operating with the force of arms.

The role of the Indians in a post-revolutionary society is also a point of interest. Would these descendants of the Maya be able to exercise a moderating influence upon the ladino leaders of the guerrilla organizations? Would their traditional and mystic religiosity act as a brake on those in-power?

It is doubtful that the Indians could play such a role. To date they have been unable to mobilize their cultural resources in such a manner. If it is not the ladino military or finca owners who order them to behave in one manner or another, it is the ladino guerrilla leaders. Although the heritage of the Guatemalan Indians is dissimilar from that of the Nicaraguan Miskito, they do share the history of being an indigenous people caught in a civil war between warring groups of the dominant culture. Nothing in the post-revolutionary Nicaraguan experience suggests that such a group would play more than the most marginal role in a revolutionary society.

The member groups of the URNG have long accepted aid from East bloc countries and could be expected to continue to do so after gaining power. URNG leaders, as military people, could be expected to devote a considerable percentage of the national budget to the military. They would fend off calls for increased allocations to social programs with references to the imperialist threat, according to the Nicaraguan model.

The URNG achieved what political power it has from the barrels of guns. It would be naive to believe that the URNG would lay down its arms of its own accord and trust its fortunes to elections, particularly in light of the insurgent experience in the 1966 elections.

The Marxist tenet that religion is the opiate of the people would, however, pose a problem for a URNG government. Much of the URNG's support comes from Indians who believe strongly in their unique form of mystic Catholicism. Other supporters are more orthodox Catholics upset by government murder of their priests. A final group of Catholics are those who believe in the theology of liberation. Most evangelicals are thought to support the government.

It is highly unlikely that the URNG would be the first Marxist government to tolerate a center of power not coterminous with its own. Church-state relations in a revolutionary Guatemala
probably would be similar to those in other socialist countries. To return again to the Nicaraguan model, the church in that country is the backbone of the opposition. The government has been, with some exceptions, relatively cautious in the steps it has taken against the church. Nonetheless, the church has accomplished little in its skirmishes with the government. A similar fate would be in store for Guatemalan religious organizations in a post-revolutionary society.

The URNG could be expected to organize the rural economy along cooperative lines. The primary reason for this would be Guatemala's status as a Third World country sorely lacking in economic infrastructure. To form a heavily centralized state-run economy where every remote farm was a state enterprise and every campesino was a state employee entitled to numerous benefits would be impossible. A much simpler method of coming through on revolutionary rhetoric would be to confiscate large economic units, agricultural or industrial, and transfer them to the workers.

A URNG government probably would tread more softly near foreign-owned industries. Castro has advised the Sandinistas to move slowly in this area in order not to jeopardize the availability of credit from Western sources. He could be expected to so advise the URNG.

Prepared by Charles D. Herrington
632-2557

Approved by William E. Knepper
632-2229