REleased in part

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: They believe that the importance of Mubarak's visit to Iraq was almost totally symbolic. They agree that Saddam Hussein was quite moved by the gesture. Both credit Iraq with having played a very positive behind-the-scenes role in encouraging the agreement concluded between King Hussein and Arafat. Saddam Hussein's intervention with Mubarak contributed to Mubarak's decision not to leave the PLO to its own devices. Both men share the belief that Iraq's current pragmatism and moderation reflect Saddam Hussein's convictions and represent a long-term shift in Iraq's policies that will outlast the war. Neither sees an Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation in the cards. Both men suggested that Iraq would have embraced moderate positions more quickly and confidentially.

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WITH GREATER ENTHUSIASM IF THE LEADERSHIP WAS NOT CONCERNED
WITH LOOKING WEAK WHILE THE WAR CONTINUED. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING A MARCH 26 MEETING WITH CHARGE, [CONFIRMED THAT THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF LAST WEEK'S
VISIT OF KING HUSSEIN AND PRESIDENT MUBARAK TO BAGHDAD WAS]
THAT IT OCCURRED AT ALL. HE CLAIMED THAT RESUMPTION OF
RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT AND IRAQ HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED,
BUT THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD BEEN MOVED BY THE GESTURE OF
SUPPORT. HE FURTHER INDICATED THAT IRAQ, ALTHOUGH INITIALLY
UNHAPPY ABOUT THE SILENCE OF THE GULF STATES DURING THE
BATTLE IN THE MARSHES, WAS NOW VERY PLEASED WITH THE "UN-
PRECEDENTED" STATEMENT OF SUPPORT THE GCC HAD GIVEN IRAQ.
THE IRAQIS, HE SAIID, FELT THAT THE IRANIANS COULD NOT HELP
BUT NOTE THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO NEUTRALIZE BULF SUPPORT FOR
IRAQ HAD FAILED ABJECTLY. WHENEVER THE IRANIANS LAUNCH A
MAJOR OFFENSIVE, HE OBSERVED, THE GULF STATES QUICKLY LOSE
THEIR COMPLACENCY ABOUT THE WAR AND RECALL THAT THE ONLY
THING THAT STANDS BETWEEN THEM AND DISASTER IS IRAQ.

4. IN DISCUSSING ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE, [SAID HE
DID NOT EXPECT IRAQ TO GO PUBLIC WITH ITS SUPPORT FOR A
HUSSEIN-ARAFAT AGREEMENT NOR DID HE EXPECT THAT THE IRAQIS
WOULD PUSH PLO LEADERS SUCH AS THE RECENT VISITING SALAH
KHALAF (ABU IYAD) TO TAKE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE WITH
JORDAN. HE SAID THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT IRAQ
HAD COME A LONG WAY BUT THAT BAATHIST PRINCIPLES STILL
PERSISTED AND THAT IRAQ DID NOT WISH TO APPEAR TO BE TAKING
MEASURES CONTRARY TO ITS FORMER POLICIES OUT OF WEAKNESS.
(AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION [EXPRESSED SEVERE
DISAPPOINTMENT WITH WHAT HE CHARACTERIZED AS A LACK OF U.S.
SUPPORT FOR HUSSEIN AND ARAFAT IN VIEW OF THE CONSIDERABLE
RISKS THEY WERE TAKING. HIS CRITICISMS AND CHARGE'S
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REBUTTALS WERE ALONG THE FAMILIAR LINES OF SUCH CONVERSATIONS. CHARGE JOIKED THAT DURING THE MARCH 25 MEETING HELD
BETWEEN SECRETARY SHULTZ AND TARIQ AZIZ, EACH MAY HAVE
URGED THE OTHER TO BE MORE SUPPORTIVE OF THE KING'S INITIATIVE.)

5. [CONFIRMED THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN HAD TOLD MUBARAK
AND HUSSEIN THAT IRAN HAD R-17 MISSILES AND ASKED CHARGE IF
HE KNEW WHAT THAT MEANT. CHARGE REPLIED THAT THESE WERE
SCUD-B MISSILES. ALSO AFFIRMED THAT THEY HAD BEEN TOLD BY SADDAM THAT SIX SUCH MISSILES HAD BEEN ACQUIRED FROM LIBYA. HOWEVER, IN STATING THIS, KABARATI MENTIONED IN PASSING THE POSSIBILITY THAT NORTH KOREA WAS A SUPPLIER BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.

6. IN RESPONSE TO CHARGE'S QUERY INDICATED THAT BASED ON EVERYTHING HE HAD SEEN AND HEARD DURING HIS TIME IN BAGHDAD, HE WAS CONVINCED THAT SO LONG AS SADDAM WAS RULING THE COUNTRY, IRAQ WOULD CONTINUE ON ITS PRESENT PRAGMATIC COURSE. HE BELIEVED THIS WOULD BE TRUE EVEN AFTER THE WAR ENDED. IN HIS OPINION THERE WAS NO FORESEEABLE POSSIBILITY OF IRAQI-SYRIAN RECONCILIATION. IRAQ WAS WILLING TO CONSIDER A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS ON A STATE-TO-STATE BASIS, BUT SYRIA'S INSISTENCE ON STARTING WITH UNIFICATION OF THE TWO WINGS OF THE PARTY ONLY DEMONSTRATED ITS LACK OF INTEREST IN ANY SUCH IMPROVEMENT.

7. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION ON MARCH 27 WITH CHARGE COVERED MUCH THE SAME GROUND. AFTER MUBARAK DEPARTED SADDAM HUSSEIN SEEMED ALMOST EUPHORIC.

8. HE COULD NOT HELP BUT BELIEVE THIS GESTURE WOULD FURTHER ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO RE-ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH EGYPT IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. HE CONFIRMED PREVIOUS REPORTS THAT THE TALKS HAD LARGELY INVOLVED SADDAM
HUSSAIN'S RECOUNTING OF THE BATTLES WHICH HAD JUST BEEN
FOUGHT N THE MARSHES AND A REVIEW OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR
IRAQ'S WAR EFFORT. SADDAM BITTERLY CRITICIZED ASSAD AND
QADHAFI AND PREDICTED THAT THEY WOULD SOON PASS FROM THE
POLITICAL SCENE. THE IRAQIS
had been somewhat disappointed about gulf arab support
for IRAQ AS OF THE TIME OF THE VISIT. HE SAID T WAS
his feeling that the pro-IRAQI GCC RESOLUTION ISSUED THE
DAY FOLLOWING THE MUBARAK-HUSSEIN VISIT IN LARGE MEASURE
was influenced by the visit itself and IRAQ was now pleased.

4. IN QUERLING [______ ABOUT ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS
CHARGE CHARACTERIZED IRAQ'S POSITION AS ONE OF "QUIET
SUPPORT". DISAGREED, SAYING IT WAS ONE OF
"ACTIVE SUPPORT". IRAQ, HE SAID, WAS PLAYING A MUCH MORE
POSITIVE ROLE THAN WAS REALIZED. HE CITED SEVERAL
EXAMPLES TO SUPPORT HIS CONTENTION.
FURTHER CLAIMED THAT IRAQ EARLIER HAD PLAYED A
VERI IMPORTANT ROLE IN ENCOURAGING ARAFATT TO BE FORTH-
COMING IN HIS TALKS WITH KING HUSSEIN.

SAID THAT THE IRAQIS WERE SURPRISINGLY
MODERATE. ONLY HALF JOKINGLY, HE SAID AT TIMES HE FOUND
HIMSELF FEELING THAT THE IRAQI LEADERS WITH WHOM HE
SPOKE WERE MORE DOVISH THAN HE. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING
THAT SADDAM HUSSEIN BELIEVED THAT HE ARABS HAD TO SEIZE
THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN NOW WHAT WAS POSSIBLE. CHARGE
SAID IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT IRAQ ARGUED THERE WAS
NO REASON FOR IT TO DEAL WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 242 AND
338 SINCE IT DID NOT HAVE A COMMON BORDER WITH ISRAEL.
AGREED BUT SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD IRAQI OFFICIALS
SPEAK POSITIVELY OF BOTH RESOLUTIONS.

9. ALSO TOOK THE POSITION THAT IRAQ'S PRAGMATIC
POLICIES WOULD OUTLIVE THE WAR. IN FACT, HE
ASSERTED, IRAQ WOULD HAVE MOVED MORE QUICKLY TO EMBRACE
MODERATE ARAB POSITIONS HAD IT NOT BEEN FOR THE WAR WITH
IRAN. THE IRAQIS, HE OBSERVED, WERE VERY CONCERNED NOT
TO APPEAR TO BE ACTING OUT OF WEAKNESS AND THIS HAD
SOMETIMES CAUSED THEM TO HOLD BACK. HE DID NOT SEE ANY
PROSPECTS FOR A SYRIAN-IRAQI RAPPROCHEMENT BUT BLAMED
THIS ON SYRIA RATHER THAN IRAQ.

10. COMMENT: BOTH

AMONG THE BEST

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COMMENTS CONCERNING IRAQ'S ROLE IN
THE PEACE PROCESS WHICH TEND TO GIVE THE IRAQIS MUCH MORE
CREDIT THAN THEY WOULD GIVE THEMSELVES. WE SUSPECT AN
ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF IRAQ'S TRUE ROLE LIES SOMEWHERE
BETWEEN THE VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THESE TWO MEN.

CLEAR IS THAT BOTH KATTOUF

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