Mr. Byron Engle, Director, OPS

January 4, 1966

To: Mr. Stephen J. Morgan, Chief Public Safety Advisor, Venezuela

OAS, November 27, through December 7, 1965.

I had the pleasure of meeting with the Ambassador to discuss the possibility of making a trip to Guyana to discuss the problem of narcotics trafficking. As we exchanged views, the Ambassador felt that it would be helpful if I could visit his government to familiarize myself with the problem of narcotics trafficking and suggest countermeasures that might be effective.

In compliance with your instructions, there follows my preliminary report concerning plans and recommendations made to counter the problem of narcotics trafficking.

In response to your request, I met with the Embassy to discuss the problem of narcotics trafficking. It was agreed that I would meet immediately with the Directors of the National Police, Judicial Police, and Treasury Police to determine what progress had been made on a joint operational plan.

(1) That I meet immediately with the Directors of the National Police, Judicial Police, and Treasury Police to determine what progress had been made on a joint operational plan.

(2) That we approach the problem utilizing both overt and covert means. I outlined briefly the methods we were using in Guyana, and the Chief of Station, as well as the DG, stated that they would like to see the same tactics used in Guatemala.

(3) I proposed and others present agreed that I draw up immediate and long-range plans, both covert and overt. Upon receiving these recommendations, the country team or the Ambassador would pass these recommendations through appropriate channels to Col. Peralta, Chief of Government.

After several meetings held in a safe house with the Chiefs of the three previously mentioned GOC police agencies, it became obvious that because of rivalry, non-cooperation, and distrust between these three agencies, there was in fact no coordinated plan or operation. I immediately informed Ambassador Mein that we would have to go to the very top government level to coordinate properly.

Ambassador Mein and I met with Col. Peralta on November 30, and discussed the problem in generalities, but at that time did not get down to specifics. At the end of the meeting, it was still agreed that I would make my recommendations to appropriate Embassy officials.

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Covert - Immediate

who would pass them to the proper GOG officials. However, two days later when I talked with the Ambassador, he suggested that I go directly to the Palace and discuss the problem. This was done and Col. Peralta designated Mr. Jose Louis Aguilar de Leon, his private secretary, to coordinate all activities concerning extortions and kidnappings. At this point, my plans were not yet recorded on paper. We did discuss my recommendations in detail and the Presidential Secretary made a number of notes, after which he immediately took them into Col. Peralta who issued an order that the recommendations be formulated into plans and translated into actions immediately. From this moment on I was involved in setting up plans for both the covert and overt operations. After talking with Ambassador Mein, it was decided to change our original plans; whereby I would make the recommendations and he would pass them to the proper GOG officials. Instead, I would work with GOG officials and put the plan into immediate operation.

However, before coming over here I had never spoken to them. Basically, the plan was as follows: one and up a master plan to carry out plans for the covert front.

Overt - Immediate

Additional Comments:

Combined, uniformed police raids in Guatemala City. These raids were to be coordinated at top government level and the raiding forces were not to be notified of the areas to be raided until they were on their way to the site. They were given detailed instructions on how to seal off given areas. (Frozen area plan diagram attached to Mr. Costello's report.) In connection with these raids, all police roadblocks (garitas) leading from the city were to be closed and surprise roadblocks were to be set up in Guatemala City. The idea behind this was to force some of the wanted communists out of hiding and into police hands, as well as to convince the Guatemalan public that the authorities were doing something to control the situation.

As a first priority, on the night of December 7 with Col.

Overt - Long-Range

We have moved on work on the extortions/kidnap problem. We are extremely up to date in our work. Sir: To have Mr. Costello, the new Chief Public Safety Advisor, establish rapport with the various police agencies that would lead to U.S. advisors being able to influence GOG police officials and give them day-to-day operational advice. Future ability of U.S. advisors to influence police operations in Guatemala is, in my opinion, a "must."
Covert - Immediate

That a safe house be immediately set up and all information concerning extortions and kidnappings be sent here. All police agencies are penetrated by the communists. Obviously, a safe house-type operation was the only answer. A room was immediately prepared in the Palace for this purpose and as pointed out in Mr. Costelló's report, Guatemalans were immediately designated to put this operation into effect. From the outset I made it very clear that the overt and covert operations should be separated, with the following through on the covert and the Chief Public Safety Advisor following through on the overt operation.

Covert - Long Range

This, of course, will be worked out in detail by

However, before leaving Guatemala they had sent messages through their channels laying the groundwork for personnel and equipment needed to carry this phase of the program forward.

Additional Comments

As we discussed, there are, of course, no complete packaged solutions for the type of problems facing Guatemala and I realize that the foregoing is rather nebulous as to just what my recommendations consisted of. I noticed AIDTO 267, dated December 11, 1965, has asked Guatemala for details on my recommendations. Mr. Costelló's report, dated December 17, 1965, contains additional information, although it isn't boiled down as to just what my recommended plan was. I do believe his report adequately sums up the chronology of events as well as the complete names and titles of the people we dealt with.

At a final meeting on the night of December 7 with Col. Peralta and those he had chosen to work on the extortion-kidnapping problem, he was outspoken in his appreciation for the help and interest of the U. S. Government. Some of the officials present attempted to enumerate equipment needs. Col. Peralta stated that he did not want to waste time talking about, to submit their needs in writing and what was needed would be bought. I am convinced he meant this as four new patrol cars for the Judicial Police were purchased and in their possession by noon of the following day.

Col. Peralta also told me at this meeting that he planned to go on television on a nation-wide hook up the following night (December 8) and explain the situation to the nation. At previous
meetings certain recommendations along those line had been made. He did not elaborate on the details of his speech, but he did say that he would assure the country that his government had the situation under control, that elections would be held and that the international criminal-communist conspiracy threatening his country would be dealt with appropriately. He specifically mentioned that he would offer a cash reward for top communist leaders. The reward to be for their arrest or their death.

Note: Dictated and reviewed in draft, except for last paragraph, by Mr. Longan.