GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
on
ARMS CONTROL and DISARMAMENT.

FRIDAY MORNING SESSION

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THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen: The first subject is the non-proliferation problem, and the speaker is Charles Van Doren, Assistant Director, ACDA, Non-Proliferation Bureau. Mr. Van Doren.

MR. VAN DOREN: Thank you very much, sir.

I think it would be silly to start with some of our general prescriptions without talking about the specific cases that are the toughest problems right at the moment, so while I will go and give you a status report a little later on our general approach to this problem and how we are faring on that, I think probably of greater interest and more immediate concern are the immediate, tough cases, which I can only discuss on a highly-classified basis, notwithstanding the fact that it was just remarked that some of the classified briefings appeared in the paper the next day -- through no fault of this Committee -- but some of this is sensitive on the particular cases, and has drawn on intelligence information, so I think with that caveat, I can plunge in.

First, the obvious case of greatest concern is Pakistan. After the Indian explosion of 1974, there were
immediate rumblings that Pakistan wanted to get some plutonium; they sought it from several sources and were turned down, fortunately. But then they tried to get a reprocessing plant. Their efforts to get a reprocessing plant burgeoned into the French contract, which the French wisely turned off without admitting fully that they had done so, but they had turned it off for a year and a half to a year ago, and the Paks went [ ] to get an enrichment capability. They did so -- a lot of this has been in the papers, but I think I ought to review the facts [ ].

When we did get word of this, we went to the other suppliers of key components of this thing, rang the alarm bell, and said, "We've got to tighten up on our export
controls even of components, "not of things that we had thought before were the kind of full units or full plans that might be sent, but in this case we were dealing with components, some of which had dual uses. This presented some very hard problems for a number of the expert controllers, but we have managed to slow down the acquisition by Pakistan of some of the wherewithal to complete this rather ambitious enrichment program.

The Pakistanis obviously claim that the enrichment program is for peaceful purposes but it has no relevance whatever to their current nuclear program. [crossed out]

[redacted]
We are worried about their importation of some unsafeguarded nuclear materials for it.
So, on the export control side, we have tightened up a great deal. We have gone to the other suppliers and have had quite a bit of success in getting them to pledge to tighten up. There have been some delays in this, and the Pakistanis have quite a bit. So, with respect to their indigenous production of weapons usable material which is the pacing item for them, we believe, of making at least a simple explosive device, we are tightening up. We may be a little late. I think we are slowing down that process. And I think the public statements that it would be -- the estimate is 2 to 4 years before they could have enough material from this indigenous production, unsafeguarded production. And there have been repeated rumors that, for political purposes since the Zia government faces reelection in November -- if they go through with their having elections -- that, politically, it would be handy for them to have some great show of strength at that time. So we are concerned that they may, in fact,
try to pull off an explosion there. So we are getting increasingly concerned that this may happen sooner than we thought. But still, I think the prevailing opinion will probably further off than -- (inaudible)

One approach to this, as I have said, is trying to tighten up on a supplier control, but that is at best a delaying factor. We have tried to. We have, under our legislation, been required to cut off military and economic assistance to Pakistan, which was not very extensive in any event. I won't go into the wisdom of that law, but we had no choice but do that. It certainly has caused so very bad blood with Pakistan, and it may be counter-productive in our efforts to work out a solution, but we didn't have any choice because, literally, the terms of the law were triggered.
The only way that can be waived by the President is if he gets reliable assurances that Pakistan is not pursuing any key weapons option. The emphasis there is on "reliable," because while they have asserted that they are not pursuing nuclear weapons, their actions are totally inconsistent with that.

They, undoubtedly, are going to claim that it is a peaceful nuclear explosion, as the Indians did. We have worked world-wide to minimize that excuse and to make it not a credible excuse, but nevertheless, they are still hiding behind that, I believe.
So we see the makings, and quite a bit more than the makings, of another Indian disaster coming up. Any suggestions would be welcome. We are looking at all the possible ways in the way of carrot-and-stick approaches, of multi-lateral approaches, of getting a gag-cornering support in the rest of the world for concern over this, and for making statements that a breach of this barrier, a test by the Pakistanis meant very serious consequences not only to Pakistan but also on international nuclear commerce, which I believe really is the case. I think that the Indian explosion set back international nuclear commerce by many, many fathoms, if I may say so. It was an extremely serious setback. It led to very restrictive legislation; it led to a holding back by many, many suppliers of both uranium and equipment. It led to the shaking of public confidence. A repetition of the Indian explosion would be fairly disastrous, not only to our non-proliferation policy, but also to international nuclear commerce.

MR. DOTY: Is there very much linkage to the Indian attitude if they did four-square future explosions? Would that make a difference -- more believable -- or is that all past?
MR. VAN DOREN: No. This is a railroad train that is going down the track very fast, and I am not sure anything will turn it off. Our first approach was to try to see if we couldn't get some regional solution, to try to get mutual restraint.
So, we have both a regime of uncertain duration in India -- in fact, I think the elections are going to be in November. We don't know who the successor will be. It's almost certain to be somebody more hawkish on this than Desai and who will not be as receptive to our overtures, and we don't have much to work with.

We don't have much to work with under the present government in Pakistan because they have declared that they are going to have elections in November, and they are not taking any major steps meanwhile; so we are working toward longer-term solutions, but we don't have any beautiful answers.

MR. DOTY: No preemption plans?

MR. VAN DOREN: We have categorically denied that we were discussing preemption plans.

MR. AGNEW: Who is Pakistan allied with, Iran, Libya?

MR. PANOFSKY: China.

MR. AGNEW: What about South Africa?

MR. VAN DOREN: No.

MR. AGNEW: That you're sure of?

MR. VAN DOREN: No, but I don't think there is any connection between those programs. I'm more concerned about
the other Arab countries getting into this act. The Pakistanis have firmly denied that they have any deal with the other Arab countries, and I think we have no --

MR. AGNEW: But who has material other than South Africa? Israel and South Africa?

MR. VAN DOREN: Well, there is some under the fuel fabrication facilities in Europe, which if they happen to get lost or --

MR. AGNEW: No, I meant.

MR. VAN DOREN: I'm talking about having material that may not be missed. I have heard that such a thing happened once before in the United States, so I don't think we can rule out absolutely the possibility that they got either some plutonium, some highly-mixed uranium from a source that we don't know about, because of poor accounting or because of some kind of deal. We have no evidence of that, so I'm not prepared to say it's likely but it isn't impossible.

MR. BUNDY: Do you share estimates on this with other friendly countries and are there differences of judgment?

MR. VAN DOREN: We do share evidence of this with
several of the friendly countries, and I don't think there is any difference in judgment. We're all deeply concerned about it and most of us are scratching our head over what is the best thing to do -- we're all trying to do everything we can.

MR. BUNDY: Is it the sort of thing one can talk to the Chinese about?

MR. VAN DOREN: We have, in a way. We have approached them several times within the last year. They don't want to get actively involved in stopping this, but I think they are not in favor of a Pakistini nuclear explosive program, and I don't think they are doing anything to help it.

But they advise us to, for goodness sake, to help out the Pakistini conventional nuclear capability against the Soviet peril, and that we shouldn't be "cutting off our nose to spite our -- " 
MR. PANOFSKY: Conventional, not --

MR. BUNDY: Conventional.

MR. VAN DOREN: Conventional. In other words, they say, "It's foolish to enforce your law there and to cut off this protection against the Soviet threat when that's what you should be doing, so don't use that sanction." But that's the only advice they've given us and they haven't played an active role.

MR. DOTY: The Israelis are the most highly motivated of our friends -- with respect to doing something? Certainly, that's what I get informally.

MR. VAN DOREN: We get that informally, in the newspapers, but we don't have any direct --

MR. BUNDY: Say again, the Israelis are what, Paul?

MR. VAN DOREN: The most highly motivated to do something about this, he says. [censored] certainly, they are concerned about it. But, what they are going to do about it --

MS. PFEIFFER: May I ask you, unless you are almost willing to go in and stop something, is it realistic to think
that you can do anything about Pakistan, or any other
country that begins to get started? I think it's nice
to delay suppliers and I think it's nice to do all these
things, but I wonder if that's -- I guess I keep wondering
is there a window in time when you can stop something
and that window isn't open very long, and if you don't do
that, you'll never stop them?

MR. DOTY: That's essentially what the Israelis are
saying when they speak about Entebbe Two.

MR. BUNDY: Can't hear you, Paul.

MR. DOTY: I say that that's what the Israelis say,
informally, and they speak of Entebbe Two.

GENERAL SCOWCROFT: [redacted]

MR. AGNEW: The Russians have said the same thing
about China.

MR. BUNDY: They know what it is that has to be stopped

MR. VAN DOREN: Well, we have a couple of rather pallid
tools here: One is the safeguard system. The problem in
Pakistan, as in India, is that they seem to be avoiding
having safeguards in the facilities concerned.

With respect to the nuclear material that would go
into this facility, they seemed to have imported some from
Niger, but under an agreement which they agreed with the International Atomic Energy that any imports of uranium from Niger would be safeguarded, I don't think that it is going to stop the program, but I think it would head off some of the posturing the Pakistanis are doing about, "There's nothing here but us chickens." But that is not a solution.

I would welcome advice on what to do. We're struggling with this problem. We have a great deal of talent within the U.S. Government scratching its head. We're looking at possibilities; we're discussing it with other suppliers, not just on the supply side but on the possible indication in advance of sanctions, both on the economic and trading side, that might follow a Pakistan explosion, but nothing at the moment looks immensely promising, so I don't know.
MS. PFEIFFER: Entebbe Two, I think, is --

MR. VAN DOREN: Well, we were a little bit hindered in that by the fact that Mr. Burke of The New York Times thought of that solution, dreamed it up and put it in The New York Times article which played in the Pakistini press very hard, and led some in this government to immediately deny that that was under consideration. In fact, it wasn't under active consideration, so our denial was true. But it makes it harder to consider that as an option when Mr. Burke thought it up and publicly exposed it, and had it categorically denied.

MS. WILSON: Is the lack of safeguards, inability or indifference? What is the reason?

MR. VAN DOREN: I think it's very deliberate. They are determined to avoid the system, and to develop a nuclear explosive capability. I think there's no question about that.

MR. DOTY: Are there decisive embargo items, oil and so forth?

MR. VAN DOREN: I'm not sure that we could get all the exporters to go along with that. [redacted] the oil embargo weapon doesn't seem to be the most promising.