TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:29 a.m., October 9, 1973

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you very much. Are you in White House now or you already have connections with State Department?

K: No, no, I'm in the White House. Anatol, I just got a message from Amman.

D: Yes, saying what? What's happening there?

K: Well, saying that your Charge -- Let me read it to you.

D: Okay.

K: "The Soviet Charge asked to see King and was received this morning. Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict with Israel. He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter battle now."

D: Soviet, what?

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab . . ."

D: Soviet Union?

K: Yes.

D: Thought or fought?

K: Recommending to the King.

D: Un-huh.

K: "King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into action."

D: We asked King to go into action?

K: Yeah.

D: Unbelievable story. Was it ours . . . I don't have any information at all. I could quite [readily accept] that we discuss with them and saying
D: (cont'd) that we _____ our support of Arab countries is nothing new. But as you said we asked King to send. ........ yes?

K: That's right.

D: I will check with Moscow right now. It was our initiative or it was --

K: No, it was your initiative.

D: It's an unbelievable story, I should say.

K: You know, I'm not drawing any conclusions but we really urge you to keep people calm.

D: No, no. May I have a second try once again?  Soviet Union thought . . .

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter the battle now."

D: Enter the battle?

K: Yes.

D: He actually mentioned to the King?

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will check this with Moscow right away. It's an unbelievable story.

K: Okay.

D: I'm sure on this country I should know. (laughs) I think this is really unbelievable, that he asked him to do this. He may just say in general. Well, I will check with Moscow, then I will be back with you, all right?

K: Okay, good.

D: There is for the time being nothing new I understand.

K: No. On my promise, we will make no move.

D: No.

K: Now, let me tell you something -- We're assuming when you say this and we're having this arrangement that we will not be confronted with an Egyptian move which you support.
D: Well, you see the situation, I don't want really to do this in any way because I don't know what Egyptians will do and quite frankly [as a matter of fact] sometimes even Moscow doesn't know. I don't want you to [later on] tell me I am sorry you give me a solemn promise which I couldn't keep. In a sense I couldn't keep, not deliberately; we have an agreement but simply Zayat is uncontrollable. Today he refused -- Yesterday he refused to come ............... which you mentioned when he spoke with _______. He was not intending to make a speech in Security Council but then he consented to make it. On the General Assembly again he refused to have it in the morning or to make his speech when we asked him to find out what he's going to say he was unavailable. So this is like you say he may come with a resolution or situation which overall the principal of support against the aggression and Mâlack will be forced to support. I'm speaking from this end. But Mâlack in a specific agreement to do something to put you in an embarrassing situation I......

K: You have to help us study the problem you know.

D: I know because with the telegram going to Moscow I tell you very frankly that we will prepare to keep our part of the bargain but sometimes it could happen that U.N. will allow something that I couldn't control in Moscow.

K: Anatol, we will keep our side of the promise.

D: We will do the same.

K: Move up the Israelis restraint in so far as we can.

D: Henry, this is the impression I get that they are beginning to bomb civilians. That's not a very good idea. I have instructions. My remarks are off. Damascus and somewhere in Cairo. It was an article that was published for the Republic of Science.

K: We'll wait until we hear from you. OK. Bye.