TELCON
Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger
11:45 a.m., October 10, 1973

K: Anatol, I just wanted to tell you the following. We are having a major domestic problem, which as you will see, even you will recognize it's major, which is coming to a head early this afternoon.

D: Yeah.

K: And so there will be decisional delay until I can get you -- But you will get your formal answer.

D: You mean it happens today or tomorrow?

K: By the end of the day I will give you an answer.

D: By the end of the day.

K: I just want you to know. You will see that this is not a delaying tactic.

D: Yeah. But what is the crisis? Could you tell me that?

K: Well, it concerns the Vice President.

D: Oh, I see.

K: So I wanted you to know that and I'll be in touch with you around 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock this afternoon.

D: 4:00 or 5:00.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: We are thinking very seriously about what you said.

D: No, I think this is really a chance for both of us.

K: No, no, I recognize it. Now, may I urge you, however, really both you and your friends, not to force us into anything prematurely.

D: But what really our friends could force you, really? I don't -- Could you really mention what our friends could force you, for example?
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K: Well, for example, give us a chance to have a meeting on the subject here.

D: But what they could do up till 5 o'clock, nothing?

K: I don't know what they could --

D: Neither do I.

K: They crossed the Suez Canal, maybe they'll cross the Hudson River.

D: Oh, this is another story. This is another story. (laughs) Well, as for us, there will be no trouble. But as for them, well, I couldn't give a guarantee. They have a Minister here sitting so he knows better than I do. But, speaking theoretically, I do not see any way in which they could force you to do something.

K: No, no. Well, they can't force us but we would like not to be forced into verbal battles.

D: No, no, I understand.

K: No, we can't be forced. You've experienced that often enough.

D: No, no, I know. But as of now, what we are doing there will be no statement from our representative. We will not be eager at all to have another Security Council. So on this side, it's safe. On our side, you're not going to say anything which could --

K: Well, then we will not say anything and I'll be in touch with you around 5 o'clock.

D: Yeah. And we didn't tell anyone about what [we] mentioned to you . . .

K: And just for your information, we have not told anyone. And I repeat anyone.

D: I understand. And Malik has the same instruction. Except he might be in contact with -- He has instruction, I am telling you off-the-record, that if this thing will come, it's settled okay. And it will come Security Council. Then he has instruction to come to Scali before the meeting and tell him how he will vote.

K: Good. But let him not go to Scali either now. Make sure he doesn't go to Scali.
D: Okay. I will mention to him specifically.

K: Okay. Good.

D: Because his instruction now is before he has to notify because he will make a statement against -- on a principle position about, not touching you at all, but about Israel, that kind of thing, but at the same time he will not tell him that it doesn't matter . . . . [obscure thing].

K: Right.

D: Okay?

K: Right.

D: So I will just warn him not to tell anything to Scali, as I understand you want it. Or is it better not to tell them ........ they'll be sitting there -- I don't know, what do you think?

K: Tell them not to go to Scali because Scali doesn't know anything about it and he's very excitable.

D: (laughs) I understand.

K: And we have told -- The only' people who know up to now are the President.

D: I understand.

K: And, as you will see very soon, the President cannot possibly address this question for a couple of hours.

D: I understand.

K: But what I've told you about this domestic situation, Anatol, is a sign of my great confidence in you.

D: No, no, no. I understand. But does this coming affect in any way --

K: It affects nothing.

D: Nothing. I mean, from the point of view of foreign policy.

K: In terms of foreign policy, it, if anything, strengthens our abilities.

D: I speak in a sense of ability not a public relations because sometimes
K: In terms of our foreign policy, it either affects it not at all or strengthens it.

D: Okay.

K: But in terms of making a decision and in terms of getting time with the President, that is now very difficult until into the afternoon.

D: I understand. Okay. Well, until the end of the day.

K: And, therefore, we don't want to get anything started with a lot of other countries.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much. I will await your call.

K: And we have emphatically not yet discussed it with the Israelis.

D: I understand.

K: Because we do not want their lobby to start working here.

D: Yeah, I think this is the wise thing.

K: Before we have a chance to ....

D: To make your own decision.

K: To make our own decisions on how to handle it.

D: I understand.

K: Good.

D: All right.