Ambassador Ortiz Sanz, U.N. Representative for the implementation of the New York Agreement on West Irian, has just returned from an orientation visit of one month in West Irian. A fair amount of publicity has surrounded Ortiz Sanz since his arrival in Indonesia, much of it sponsored by ultra nationalist groups voicing apprehensions that Ortiz Sanz has come to Indonesia to "interfere" in Indonesia's internal affairs. This reflects the fairly widely held view in military and other circles in Indonesia that West Irian is a sovereign part of Indonesia and that therefore there is no need for any determination of popular wishes. Underlying this sentiment, of course, is the multi-year agitation during the Sukarno period against the New York Agreement and any outside intervention in West Irian affairs.

Ortiz Sanz has handled his role adroitly. He made it clear to the press on his arrival and in subsequent publicly reported statements that he was in Indonesia solely to assist the Indonesian Government in fulfilling the obligations it had undertaken under the New York Agreement. He has been circumspect in his comments and has earned the respect of most of the officials with whom he is dealing. In private, he has sought to impress upon the Indonesians the necessity, from the point of view of Indonesian interests, for a sincere and
honest implementation of the New York Agreement that will withstand the scrutiny of the United Nations and international opinion. He has moreover pointed to the almost certain prospect of continuing insurrection and international agitation against Indonesia if the GOI should flaunt the intent of the New York Agreement and seek arbitrarily to impose its will upon the Irianese people.

Ortiz Sanz has established close rapport and a commendable degree of mutual understanding on the means to be employed in the implementation of the New York Agreement with President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik, and other top officials of the GOI. He recognizes, however, the importance of oppositionist elements, principally concentrated in the Indonesian military, and he is sensitive to the political pressures that will be brought against President Suharto and the Foreign Minister in the critical year to come. He is therefore attempting to devise a formula for an "act of free choice" in West Irian which will result in affirmation of Indonesian sovereignty but which will also represent a fair reflection of the people's desires and will stand the test of international opinion. The achievement of this difficult objective will require inter alia some kind of arrangement for continuing international support of the social and economic development of the Irianese people.

On October 2, U.N. Representative Ortiz Sanz gave me a rundown on his activities and his thinking in connection with his role in West Irian. Ortiz has just returned from his initial visit to West Irian and about October 7 will be going back there accompanied by his wife and staff for a stay of four months, during which he hopes to explore means of carrying out the "act of free choice".

Ortiz is determined to arrange a credible "act of free choice" in West Irian that will meet the obligations of the U.N. and stand the scrutiny of international opinion. He has convinced at least certain important elements in the GOI that only such a procedure could result in the kind of solution of the West Irian problem that the GOI itself expects. Any deviation from a credible implementation of the New York Agreement will almost certainly, in his opinion, present the GOI with a serious problem of internal subversion in Irian itself, not to mention the discredit that the country will earn in the international community.

Ortiz Sanz says there are two principal schools of thought in the GOI regarding the "act of free choice". A small group of top leaders headed by Adam Malik, including Ambassador Soedjarwo, and President Suharto agree with Ortiz that a straightforward and sincere implementation of the New York Agreement is required and Ortiz claims they are lending their full support to an effort to assure that this is obtained. The other school of thought, represented by "the military", regards West Irian as
having already returned to Indonesian sovereignty and that therefore any further determination of the people regarding their future is irrelevant. The latter point of view is also sustained by radical Muslim groups, residual Sukarnoist forces, and some nationalists. The position of the Malik forces supporting a credible act of free choice is made delicate by the uncertain degree of calculated risk in GOI acceptance of an open expression of choice on the part of the Irian people. Malik is prepared to accept this risk but is of course eager to see the margin of uncertainty reduced as much as possible through the formula that will be devised to register the peoples' choice.

Ortiz has had some difficulty in establishing terms of reference for his activities. The New York Agreement calls upon him to identify eligible voters, both male and female, and to see that their expression of "free choice" is implemented "in accordance with international practices". He said this is obviously an absurdity because at the present stage of development of the West Irian people, no procedure of voting can really accord with international precedents or practices. The Agreement, furthermore, calls for him to "participate" in the act, which he has defined as meaning (a) that he is present in the area one year prior to the implementation of the act of choice and (b) that he undertakes to "improve" to the extent possible the procedures designed by the Indonesian Government to fulfill their responsibilities under the New York Agreement.

He intends to exert influence on the Indonesian Government by presenting recommendations in various levels of acceptability. He first intends to recommend that the GOI implement the act through a formula of one man, one vote in the inhabited coastal areas of West Irian, and by testing tribal sentiment through a carefully supervised process of musjawarah (reasoning together toward a consensus) in each tribal area. He does not believe the GOI will accept this and he is prepared next to recommend the formation of a constituent assembly to be composed of the members of the present local councils (there are eight councils with 25 members each), supplemented by (a) a one percent representation of the population at large, namely 700, or (b) a one-half percent representation, or 350. He believes an assembly in the neighborhood of 500 to 600 members would constitute a representative body for the Irian population as a whole. He expects some difficulty in selling this concept to the GOI but he noted that Soedjarwo is in agreement in principle, and has already conceded that perhaps a body of as many as 200 representatives might be required to represent the population. Soedjarwo initially suggested the Provincial Legislative Council which numbered 60.

Ortiz would be prepared to accept election to this Constituent Assembly on the basis of musjawarah in the populated coastal areas with the addition
to the Assembly of already recognized tribal leaders from the highland areas. He will recommend that the entire process of selection of the members of the assembly be implemented in the full glare of publicity with adequate representation of the U.N. at hand at every step as well as members of the international press. The act of choice, itself, he believes, should take place in greatest solemnity and with full international publicity so that there would be no question that the GOI had sincerely discharged its responsibility to test the wishes of the West Irian people.

Ortiz recognizes that the problem facing both him and the GOI is the risk that the Irian representatives, however they might be constituted, would vote against remaining in Indonesia. He concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interests of the U.N. as well as GOI, that a result other than the continuance of West Irian within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge. As he said, "Who else wants to take on the West Irian problem?" To perhaps guide the West Irian representatives towards an acceptance of their destiny within the Indonesian nation, Ortiz believes there must be some formula for a continuing international contribution to the social and economic development of the West Irian people. Ortiz said he was deeply moved by his contacts with the primitive Irianese and he feels that the international community cannot renounce its responsibility for assisting them in years to come.

His present plan is to shoot for the "act of free choice" no later than September 1969. The New York Agreement required his presence in West Irian one year before the act was to take place; he arrived in Irian on August 23, 1968, therefore he believes that September would be an appropriate time for implementation. He would thereafter complete his report for the UNSYG and U.N. General Assembly and would recommend to the SYG that the report be submitted to the GA sometime towards the end of the 1969 session in order to avoid continuing, possibly contentious, debate if the report were delivered earlier in the UNGA session.

Ortiz has achieved good working relations with Ambassador Soedjarwo. When he first arrived in Indonesia there was an effort to restrict him to Djakarta. Indeed the GOI embarrassed him by providing two large buildings for his use: (1) a residence much too large for him and his wife, and (2) an office building which Ortiz said "could accommodate the American Embassy". He immediately made it clear, however, that he intended to spend most of his time in West Irian itself, a position that was accepted by Malik and Soedjarwo.
Ortiz regards his assignment as clearly the most difficult he has ever faced; not only must he try to fulfill his responsibilities to the U.N. but he must maintain his bona fides with the GOI. He is sensitive to the political pressures that are exerted on the GOI on the emotional West Irian issue and recognizes that while President Suharto for the time being is supporting Malik and Ortiz in their general approach to the problem, circumstances could change which would swing the President to the other side. Ortiz would regard this as a calamity. He entered a plea that all friendly missions with interest in West Irian and with access to Indonesian leaders should try to exert constructive influence in underlining to the Indonesians the vital importance from the point of view of their own basic interest of a credible implementation of the New York Agreement.

COMMENT: Ortiz has made an excellent impression in the Indonesian community. He is clearly a man of stature and understanding. While straightforward, he has managed to establish his credentials as being basically a friend of Indonesia, acting on behalf of the GOI to achieve a solution for a knotty problem that will be acceptable not only to the GOI and the West Irian people but will sustain the international reputation of Indonesia. Ortiz' plans, as reported in this airgram, should be carefully protected. They must not, under any circumstances, be revealed to Indonesians.

LYDMAN