POL 19 WEST IRIAN

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State
XR SOC 14 INDO

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DJAKARTA 5130
4-27-67

SUBJECT: MALIK'S PRESS CONFERENCE ON WEST IRIAN

1. FOKMMIN MALIK HELD PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING DESIGNED TO SQUEEZE PERSISTENT RUMORS HERE AND ABROAD THAT RECENT INDONESIAN MILITARY ACTIONS IN IRIAN HAVE CAUSED DEATH OF 2,000 IRIANESE. FEATURED GUEST AT CONFERENCE WAS WEST IRIAN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDER,

BRIG. GEN. BINTORO, WHO PROVIDED FOLLOWING STORY AS FACT BEHIND THESE RUMORS:

A. A LEADER OF ARFAK TRIBE IN MANOKWARI AREA OF WEST IRIAN, IDENTIFIED AS LODEWIJK MANDADJAN, DISAPPEARED INTO MOUNTAINS NEAR MANOKWARI LAST JANUARY 3, LEADING APPROXIMATELY ONE THOUSAND FELLOW TRIBESMEN. THEY AND ESTIMATED 3,000 OTHERS FROM 14,000-MEMBER TRIBE REPORTEDLY WERE JEALOUS OF HIGHER LIVING STANDARDS ENJOYED BY LOCAL INDONESIAN OFFICIALS. ON JANUARY 5 A PATROL FROM GOI'S POLICE MOBILE BRIGADE WAS AMBUSHED BY DISSIDENT ARFAKS AND TWO TROOPERS WOUNDED SERIOUSLY.

B. SINCE ONLY ONE COMPANY OF INDONESIAN TROOPS WAS AVAILABLE IN MANOKWARI, GOI CALLED IN AIR FORCE BOMBER WHICH MADE THREE STRAFING RUNS AGAINST DISSIDENTS FROM JANUARY 16 TO JANUARY 28. FORTY TRIBESMEN WERE KILLED AND GOI THEN ATTEMPTED TO PERSUADE REMAINDER TO RETURN HOME. FOUR HUNDRED HAVE COMPLIED TO DATE AND OPERATIONS ARE CONTINUING. MANY PRISONERS NOW ARE BEING HELD BUT MOST

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WILL BE RELEASED. AN INSURGENT LEADER IDENTIFIED AS SIMBOL SALOSA WAS SHOT, ALLEGEDLY WHILE TRYING TO ESCAPE, BUT MANDADJAN STILL AT LARGE.

C. MOPPING-UP OPERATIONS HAVE NETTED 1,000 WORLD WAR II WEAPONS ALONG WITH DOCUMENTS PURPORTEDLY SHOWING MANDADJAN’S LINKS WITH OPERASI PAPUA MERDEKA, BUT BINTORO EMPHASIZED THAT “NO FOREIGN SUBVERSION” IS SUSPECTED.
(COMMENT: LATTER PHRASE MAY BE INTENDED TO MOLLIFY DUTCH, SINCE SOME QPM FIGURES ARE IN NETHERLANDS.)

2. IN QUESTION PERIOD FOLLOWING BINTORO’S STATEMENT, MALIK STRESSED GOI’S INTENTION TO PRESS ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF IRIAN AND REITERATED THAT “ONE DAY, (THE NEW YORK AGREEMENT) WILL BE FULFILLED BY GIVING IRIAN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DECLARE ITS POSITION WITH REGARD TO STAYING IN THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA OR NOT. THAT IS A COMMITMENT; THAT IS DEFINITE.” HE ALSO COMMENTED THAT UN TEAM WORKING ON UN WEST IRIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND IS EXPECTED TO ARRIVE TOMORROW.

3. COMMENT: MALIK AND BINTORO GAVE GOOD PERFORMANCE DESIGNED TO KILL PUBLIC SPECULATION ON IRIAN DEVELOPMENTS, BUT FAILED TO SATISFY REPORTERS COMPLETELY AS TO CAUSES OF DISTURBANCES AND PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION. MALIK ALSO REFUSED TO COMMIT HIMSELF ON DATE OR NATURE OF ASCERTAINMENT WHICH GOI CONTEMPLATES UNDER NEW YORK AGREEMENT.

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Department of State

POL 19 WEST IRIAN

XR SOC 14 INDON

POL 23-8 INDON

Djakarta 5595

5-18-67

May 19, 1967, 12:13 A.M.

SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN SECURITY SITUATION

1. Rev. Ronald Hill, member team group of American missionaries in West Irian (protect source), called on me May 16 on his way to us for leave, to discuss Irian situation.

2. Hill confirmed accounts of Arfak uprising in Manokwari area where his group active (see Djakarta's 5130). He said several hundred mountain tribesmen now operating in bush near Manokwari staging raids and ambushes. Seven Irianese highway laborers recently killed in ambush of truck they were riding on road to Manokwari airport. Missionaries not yet targets, according to Hill, but he could not be sure. They would not become so.

3. Source asserted there have been armed clashes in several parts of Irian including Sukarnopura area, south west coast, and Fak Fak district. Goi has been building up security forces. Hill watched approximately 600 troops in battle gear unload from military transport near his office in Manokwari late in March or early in April.

4. Uprising caused, Hill believes, by agitators for independence connected with Free Papua Organization (OPM) who have capitalized on widespread local resentment directed against Indonesians. Local population resents arrogance of Indonesian military and blames Indonesia officials for drastic shortages of goods and

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

-2- DJAKARTA 5595, 181105Z MAY 67

PAGE 3 RUMJBT 5595 CONFIDENTIAL
POOR LIVING STANDARDS NOW PREVAILING.

5. COMMENT: GOI NOW FULLY AWARE THAT IT HAS MAJOR PROBLEM ON
ITS HANDS IN IRIAN AND THAT FAST ACTION NEEDED TO IMPROVE LOCAL
ECONOMY. HILL AGREED THAT GOI DOING ALL IT COULD UNDER
CIRCUMSTANCES AND HE NOTED THAT SHOPS NOW ARE SOMewhat
BETTER STOCKED THAN THEY HAVE BEEN, SO RECENT GOI EFFORTS MAY BE
BEARING FRUIT. HOWEVER, IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHETHER RESULTS
WILL BE BIG ENOUGH AND SOON ENOUGH TO DAMPEN INSURGENCY.
AIRGRAM FOLLOWS.

GP-3.
GREEN
BT
TO: Department of State

INFO: CANBERRA, MEDAN, SURABAJA, THE HAGUE, USUN

FROM: Embassy DJAKARTA

DATE: October 18, 1967

SUBJECT: A Papuan in the Foreign Department

REF:

Upon returning from a tour of duty in the Indonesian Embassy, Canberra, Mr. Mozes Weron called to renew his acquaintance with the Charge, and he subsequently held additional discussions with the Political Counselor and the reporting officer. Mr. Weron has been assigned to the Foreign Department in Djakarta but, as a Papuan born in West Irian, expressed the desire to discuss West Irian affairs in particular.

His most interesting observation was that "99%" of the Papuan population favors independence from Indonesia, and Mr. Weron himself apparently is with the majority. He indicated that some thought is now being given within the Indonesian Government to a possible scheme for retaining control of West Irian for the next ten years under some sort of UN trusteeship arrangement - principally as a device to avoid holding a plebiscite and for ultimately retaining Irian within the Republic of Indonesia. He also shed some further light on factions among the Papuans residing in Djakarta: he placed himself in opposition to Nathaniel Ohay, who publicly proclaims a policy of cooperation with Djakarta but privately seems to be working mostly to advance his own political fortunes.

Enclosure: Memorandum of Conversation

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.
Mr. Kaisiepo explained that he had called to set forth the situation in West New Guinea (West Irian) and the wishes of the Papuan people. He proceeded to do so in fluent and erudite bahasa (which Kaisiepo referred to as the "Malayan" language). These were his main points:

a. The Papuan people were not consulted when agreement was reached in 1962 between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the transfer of administrative control over West New Guinea. Both the Netherlands and Indonesia are foreign countries and so regarded by the Papuan nation and people. Although they had not themselves been consulted, the Papuans recognized that a peaceful agreement was preferable to war as a means for settling disputes, and were reassured by the Article 18 commitment to hold a United Nations supervised ascertainment of the wishes of the Papuan people before the end of 1969 to determine their future political status. Today they continue to count heavily on the just implementation of this commitment.

b. The new Indonesian Government has this year made several statements acknowledging its responsibility under the New York Agreement to carry out a plebiscite. If heard only
in the context of international relations abroad, these
statements sound fine. If compared with Indonesian actions
within West New Guinea, however, they sound hollow.

c. The reality is grim. Indonesia is oppressing the Papuan
people. At the time the Dutch withdrew, there was freedom
of speech and movement, expanding educational opportunity,
and great hope for the future. Now there is no freedom of
speech, no freedom of movement, and forceful oppression is
the rule. The foreign Indonesian rulers tell the people
bluntly not to put any hope in a 1969 referendum. Any
Papuan who talks about the referendum is put in jail.

d. Last March Indonesia used a naval, air and land bombardment
against Papuan patriots in the Manokwari area. More than
2,000 were killed. The Indonesian Government pooh-poohed
this and claimed only 40 persons had died, but later admitted
that there were at least 1,000. Both physical and spiritual
oppression continue, robbing the Papuan people of their
spirit as well as their physical freedom.

e. All we ask for is that Indonesia honorably carry out her
obligation, as a member of the UN and as a signatory of
the New York Agreement, to make preparations for and conduct
an honest and fair referendum. No such preparations are
underway. Instead there are only oppression and threats.

f. Papuans do not want to be dominated by a foreign power, or
be sucked against their will into the intrigues of mainland
Asia via Indonesia. Papuans in West New Guinea feel a
natural affinity for their brothers to the East who are
approaching independence (with Australian assistance) and
look in the future to a united and free nation comprising
all of New Guinea and the adjacent Melanesian islands.
This desire for freedom and independent nationhood is
felt both by the educated and the uneducated, by the
coastal dweller and the more isolated peoples of the
mountains.

 g. We ask the attention of the United States Government to
this situation. We know that you have many other problems
to deal with, but as the mediator which brought the Nether-
lands and Indonesia to agreement in New York, as well as
a nation which respects democracy and shows humanity to others, we hope you will see to it that the New York agreement is implemented fairly.

Mr. Underhill thanked Mr. Kaisiepo for his clear presentation and made three points: 1) It is not possible now to say what position the United States will take on this situation; 2) Mr. Kaisiepo and his colleagues should look to Holland in the first instance for insuring the fair implementation of the New York Agreement since it is a signatory thereof and the United States is not; and 3) In attempting to bring influence to bear on Indonesia in this matter, it would be useful to get other Asian or African countries interested, since in any problem involving colonialism the views of the "white" nations would tend to be arbitrarily dismissed.

Kaisiepo said that the Dutch position was that they would insist on implementation of the New York Agreement and the holding of the referendum, but that they had taken no steps to insure that such a referendum was fairly conducted or that the Papuan people had the means for freely expressing themselves. The Front National Papua had done considerable lobbying with Asian and African delegations at the United Nations but was completely disillusioned of any hope that they might be helpful. The Afro-Asian nations were blinded by the 1955 Bandung meeting and would do nothing to criticize Indonesia. The Papuans had come to the conclusion that only the older democracies, with their commitment to principle and freedom, could offer the assurance that the voice of the Papuan people would be freely heard as had been promised.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 4917 290604Z

12

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DOD 00, 5PM 03, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSEA 00, NSC

P 04, RSC 01, SC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, 10 13, ACDA 10

AIC 28, RSR 01, 156 W

R 290604Z FEB 68

PM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5340

INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN 1270

AMCONSUL SURABAYA 1300

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 317

USUN 148

CINCPAC 839

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 4917

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN

1. NEWSPAPERS YESTERDAY REPORTED THREE-HOUR MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN AND INTERIOR MINISTERS ON SUBJECT OF WEST IRIAN. I ASKED MALIK ABOUT THIS. HE SAID HE WAS STRONGLY URGING

PAGE 2 RUMJBT 4917 CONFIDENTIAL

INTERIOR MINISTER BASUKI RACHMAT TO INTRODUCE MAJOR REFORMS IN ADMINISTRATION OF WEST IRIAN, STARTING WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF ONE-HALF OF 10,000 TROOPS NOW STATIONED THERE AND INVOLVING REMAINING 5,000 IN CIVIC ACTION ACTIVITIES THAT WOULD HELP DEVELOP POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR GOI AMONGST IRIANESE. TEN THOUSAND TROOPS ARE NOT NEEDED THERE. THEY ARE A DRAIN ON INDONESIA AND ESPECIALLY ON OVERSTRAINED WEST IRIAN ECONOMY. THEY DEVOTE NO TIME TO HELPING PEOPLE BUT MERELY ATTEND TO THEIR OWN WANTS AND COMFORTS (SUCH AS THEY ARE).

2. MALIK SPOKE HIGHLY OF GOVERNOR, WHO IS A CIVILIAN, BUT
PRESENT DEPUTY GOVERNOR SHOULD BE REPLACED BY SPECIALIST FROM INTERIOR MINISTRY. MALIK HAS ALSO RECOMMENDED TO HIS CLOSE FRIEND BASUKI THAT A LARGE GROUP OF YOUNGER TRAINED OFFICERS FROM INTERIOR AND FOREIGN MINISTRIES BE SENT TO WEST IRIAN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO WORK UNDER GOVERNOR AND DEPUTY IN PREPARING WAY FOR 1969 UN PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING CHOICE OF PEOPLE IN WEST IRIAN WITH REGARD TO THEIR FUTURE POSITION. MALIK DID NOT USE LANGUAGE OF ASCERTAINMENT OR PLEBESCITE BUT RATHER PHRASE "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" WITH REGARD TO UN.

PAGE 3 RUMJBT 4917 CONFIDENTIAL DETERMINATION.

3. MALIK HAS RECOMMENDED TO BASUKI RACHMAT AND REMAINDER OF CABINET THAT PREPARATIONS MUST BEGIN IMMEDIATELY FOR 1969. HE BELIEVES THAT BEST WAY TO DETERMINE THE WILL OF TRIBAL PEOPLES IS THROUGH THEIR CHIEFS. HE HAS SUGGESTED THAT SUPPORT OF THE SOME 60 TRIBAL CHIEFS OF WEST IRIAN BE GAINED THROUGH CAREFUL GROUNDWORK, INCLUDING FAVORS FOR THEM AND THEIR TRIBES AND INVITING CHIEFS TO SUKARNAPURA ONE BY ONE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH GOVERNOR AND STAFF, GAINING SUPPORT OF THESE TRIBAL CHIEFS AS WELL AS EQUAL NUMBER OF IRIANESE LEADERS DRAWN FROM NON-TRIBAL AREAS SHOULD SET STAGE FOR SUCCESSFUL "ACT OF FREE CHOICE". CERTAINLY TRIBAL CHIEFS COULD AND WOULD SPEAK FOR ALL THEIR PEOPLE.

4. MUCH HAS TO BE DONE BEFORE 1969. CURRENT SITUATION IS FAR FROM SATISFACTORY AND DETERIORATING, JUST AS IT HAS TO THE WEST OF WEST IRIAN IN AMBON WHERE BAD ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN ROOT CAUSE OF RECENT OUTBREAKS OF WHAT IN EFFECT WAS GANG WAREFARE BETWEEN MILITARY ELEMENTS ENGAGED IN SMUGGLING AND OTHER CORRUPT PRACTICES.

GP-3 GREEN
CONFIDENTIAL 357

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 6317 28/327

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15,10 13,GPM 04,CIAE 00,DODE 00, H 02,INR 07, L 03,NSAE 00,
NSC 10,P 04,RSC 01,SP 02, SS 20,USIA 12,E 15, AID 28,RSR 01,15

R 270645Z APR 68
FM AMBASSAD DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6012
INFO AMBASSAD CANBERRA
AMBASSAD THE HAUGE
AMBASSAD KUALA LUMPUR
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMBASSAD SINGAPORE
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMBASSAD TOKYO
CINCPAC 873
US MISSION USUN 155

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 6317

SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

1) I ASKED FONMIN MALIK ABOUT ITEM APPEARING IN LOCAL NEWS
SERVICE DATED APRIL 25 STATING THAT QUOTE PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN
WILL REJECT ACT OF FREE CHOICE AS PROVIDED IN THE NEW YORK AGREEMENT, ACCORDING TO FONMIN MALIK END QUOTE. NEWS ITEM ALSO

PAGE 2 RUMJOT 6317 CONFIDENTIAL

ATTRIBUTED TO MALIK COMMENT THAT CERTAIN QUOTE FOREIGN ELEMENTS
END QUOTE ARE INVOLVED IN RECENT TROUBLES IN WEST IRIAN.

2) MALIK REPLI E THAT WEST IRIAN REGIONAL LEGISLATURE HAD RECENTLY
SENT A RESOLUTION TO DJAKARTA ABOUT WEST IRIAN ALREADY BELONGING
TO THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA AND THAT ACT OF FREE CHOICE (PLEBISCITE)
UNNECESSARY. MALIK ALLOWED IN MY DISCUSSION WITH HIM THAT WEST
IRIAN LEGISLATURE, APPOINTED BY SUKARNO, SCARCELY REPRESENTATIVE
Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DJAKAR A6317 280327Z

OF FEELINGS OF IRIANESE. HE MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS NO CHANGE IN HIS POSITION OR THAT OF GOI REGARDING DETERMINATION TO PROCEED WITH UN-SUPERVISED ASCERTAINMENT IRIANESE PEOPLE’S WISHES REGARDING THEIR FUTURE.

3° AS TO MALIK’S REFERENCE IN NEWS ITEM RE QUOTE FOREIGN ELEMENTS END QUOTE, MALIK DIVULGED THAT HE WAS REFERRING TO SOME JAPANESE ADVENTURERS, WHO WERE EX MILITARY FORMERLY IN NEW GUINEA, WHO HAVE LINKED UP WITH EMIRGE PAPUAN MOVEMENT. FOLLOWING DUTCH CLAMP-DOWN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF DISSIDENT PAPUANS IN HOLLAND, TROUBLEMAKERS MOVED CENTER OF OPERATIONS TO JAPAN. HE SAID THAT SUHARTO HAD RECEIVED SOME THREATENING MESSAGES FROM THESE ELEMENTS WHEN HE RECENTLY VISITED JAPAN.

PAGE 3 RUMJBT 6317 CONFIDENTIAL

4° MALIK CONCERNED THAT STEPS BE TAKEN SOONEST TO DEVELOP GENUINE SUPPORT AMONGST WEST IRIAN TRIBAL LEADERS LOOKING TO ACT OF FREE CHOICE SCHEDULED FOR 1969. DURING FIRST WEEK OF MAY, SULTAN OF DJOGJAKARTA PROBABLY ACCOMPANIED BY MALIK AND OTHER DIGNITARIES, WILL VISIT WEST IRIAN FOR GENERAL LOOK AT SITUATION, AND THEY WILL HAVE THIS PROBLEM OF WINNING SUPPORT OF TRIBAL LEADERS VERY MUCH IN MIND. MALIK HAS SUGGESTED THAT C-130 TRANSPORTING PARTY CARRY SUBSTANTIVE GIFTS FOR KEY IRIAN TRIBAL LEADERS. ADDITIONALLY, HE IS ADVOCATING THAT COMPETENT FONOFF AND INTERIOR MINISTRY YOUNGER OFFICERS BE ASSIGNED TO WEST IRIAN FOR PURPOSE OF PROMOTING POSITIVE VIEWS AMONGST TRIBAL PEOPLES, ESPECIALLY LEADERS, FOR REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. MALIK FEELS THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY SHOULD BE LESS IN EVIDENCE AND THAT WITHDRAWING OF SOME OF MILITARY UNITS WOULD PERMIT GOI TO SPEND LESS ON MILITARY AND MORE ON ALLEVIATING VERY SERIOUS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN WEST IRIAN. THESE LATTER VIEWS MAKE MUCH SENSE TO ME.

GP=3
GREEN
CONFIDENTIAL 973

PAGE 21 DJAKAR 06444 021246Z

53 ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, ODOE 00, OPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 03, AID 28, COM 08, E 15, FRB 02,

TRSY 08, XMB 06, SEAP 03, IO 13, RSR 01, 1/182 W

R 021200Z MAY 68
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6075
INFO USUN 157
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 6444

REP: DJAKARTA 6317

SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN

1. GOI IS BELATEDLY AND ALMOST DESPERATELY SEEKING TO DEVELOP

PAGE 2 RUMJBT 6444 CONFIDENTIAL SUPPORT AMONGST PEOPLES OF WEU IRIAN FOR REPUBLIC OF IN- INDONESIA BEFORE "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" SCHEDULED FOR 1969 U MER UN SUPERVISION. FOLLOWING IS WHAT I LEARNED TODAY FROM MALIK ADDITIONAL TO THAT REPORTED REFTEL:

2. PRECEDING THE DEPARTURE MAY 1 OF SIX CABINET MINISTERS AND PARTY ABOARD FOKKER FRIENDSHIP FOR WEEK'S TRIP TO WEST IRIAN, GOI SENT C-130 LOADED WITH SUCH ITEMS AS CLOTHRS, FLASHLIGHTS, OPBACCO, BEAD NECKLACES, TIN GOODS, AND SAGO FOR DISTRIBUTION AMONGST TRIBAL LEADERS OF WEST IRIAN BY MINISTERIAL PARTY.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DJAKAR 6444 212446Z

3. MINISTRIES WILL ALSO INVITE KEY IRIANESE LEADERS TO DJAKARTA AND ATTORNEY GENERAL, WHO IS ACCOMPANYING PARTY, WILL GRANT AMNESTY FOR SIX LEADERS WHO HAVE BEEN UNDER ARREST ON CHARGES OF REBELLION.

4. MALIK DID NOT SUCCEED IN GETTING CABINET TO APPROVE A REDUCTION IN MILITARY PRESENCE IN WEST IRIAN BUT MINISTERIAL PARTY WILL INVESTIGATE POSSIBILITIES FOR CIVIC ACTION.

PAGE 3 RUMJBT 64444 CONFIDENTIAL

PROJECTS OF VISIBLE BENEFIT TO PEOPLE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT SOME ABLE YOUNGER OFFICERS FROM FOREIGN AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES WOULD BE SENT SHORTLY TO WEST IRIAN TO UNDERTAKE PROGRAM OF IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN GOI AND TRIBAL LEADERS AND PEOPLES.

5. MALIK HAD SUGGESTED TO INTERIOR MINISTER BASUKI RACHMA THAT HE PROCEED NEXT MONTH TO UN TO CONFER WITH UN STAFF AND KEY DELEGATIONS; MALIK FELT IT IMPORTANT THAT INDONESIA PROVIDE ADVANCE BRIEFINGS AND EXPLANATIONS BEFORE ADVANCE PARTY UN TEAM ARRIVES IN WEST IRIAN EARLY AUGUST IN CONNECTION WITH PREPARATIONS FOR "ACT OF FREE CHOICE". SUHARTO TURNED DOWN THIS PROPOSAL ON GROUNDS THAT JOB COULD BE DONE BY INDONESIA'S UN DELEGATE RUSLAN ABDULGANI.

GP 3 GREEN
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: CANBERRA, MEDAN, SURABAJA, USUN, ENCPAC FOR POLAD

FROM: Embassy DJAKARTA

SUBJECT: Consular Trip to West Irian, January 6 to February 2, 1968

SUMMARY

After several months of dealing with the Indonesian Government, permission was finally granted for a Consular officer and his wife to make a visit to West Irian. This trip began on January 2, 1968 and took them to the Island of Biak, the Senta-Sukarnapura area, the interior highlands and the south coast. The reporting officer spent three weeks in West Irian, visiting American missionaries and businessmen in fourteen locations. During this period, the reporting officer also had the opportunity to visit government and missionary installations and meet Indonesian and United Nations officials. On the return leg of the trip, the reporting officer also met with the Australian Administrator in Port Moresby and with officials at the American Consulate General in Sydney.

The reporting officer found that, while the general economic condition of the island has improved since previous reports, nonetheless the economy is stagnant and, with the exceptions of new United Nations projects and general interest shown by Japanese and American businessmen, no effort is being made to improve the situation. The Indonesian Government directs its main efforts toward maintaining existing facilities and suppressing political unrest. This unrest is a product of the widespread separatist movements which seek independence from Indonesia either through the 1969 "plebiscite" or through insurrection. These movements are presently dormant in most areas, but they may step up guerrilla activities before, during or after

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

CONFIDENTIAL

Drafted by: CONsytraymond

Clearances:
CONS: APIA; Porta: POL: EEMasters: ECON: PFMcCusker
the actual plebiscite. It is the opinion of most observers in the area that Indonesia will not accept independence for West Irian and will not permit a plebiscite which would reach such an outcome.

The following is a report of the principal highlights of this trip to West Irian, together with the impressions gained of the political and economic conditions there.

I. Preparations for Trip

Planning for this consular trip began in late October 1967 when the reporting officer initially received instructions on how to apply for permission to visit West Irian. The Embassy complied with these instructions, and on November 16 the Chief of the Consular Section was notified that an officer of the Army General Staff, Intelligence Section, had refused to approve the trip and therefore permission was denied. Written notification of this decision was requested and received.

The apparent reason for the refusal was suspicion of the motives of all foreigners seeking entry to West Irian. Consular files indicated that more than 250 American missionaries and their families and about 100 Americans employed by Freeport Indonesia, Inc. were in West Irian, all of whom potentially require consular services. Because of the number of persons involved and their basic right to free access to a consular officer, the Ambassador raised the issue first with Foreign Minister Malik, and then, at Mr. Malik's suggestion, with Interior Minister Lieutenant General Basoeki Rachmat who consented to the trip. The official purposes of the visit were to meet with Americans, perform any consular services which they might require, and to observe general conditions in West Irian.

Additionally, a stop at the Freeport site and a ceremonial book presentation for USIS to Universitas Negeri Tjenderawisih were planned. By exit through Australia, consultations with the Australian Administrator at Port Moresby and with the American Consulate General in Sydney, which has handled most consular work for West Irian, were included in the trip.

II. Physical Characteristics of West Irian

Flying from Djakarta via Makassar to Biak, one crosses first the Bird's Head (Vogelkop) of West Irian. The southern portion of this peninsula is dense jungle and swamp, while the northern portion is hilly and heavily forested. Other than the east coast, where scattered small villages are visible, there are virtually no signs of life.

Biak is a coral island offering little in the way of natural beauty, but there are some small, comfortable concrete-brick houses left by the Dutch; the town of Biak is basically one main street and perhaps 20 side streets.
V. Political Situation

A. The Indonesian Administration

The Indonesian government's presence in West Irian is expressed primarily in the form of the Army. The reporting officer met with the Regional Governing Council (Musjawarah Pimpinan Daerah or MUSPIDA), composed of Governor Kaisiepo, the Army Commander, Brig. Gen. Bintoro, representatives of the Navy and Police Commanders and the Chief Prosecutor. The Governor, who resembles a sun-dazed frog, made no effort to exert his theoretical leadership. On the other hand, General Bintoro made it obvious that he is, in fact, the government of West Irian. The police are second in importance, with the others distinctly less influential. At this meeting, conducted in Indonesian in deference to the Governor, the principal subject was the purpose of the reporting officer's visit; neither of the two government cables advising of this visit had arrived in Sukarnapura and consequently the local government was taken somewhat by surprise. The USIS book presentation for Tjenderawasih University also took place at this meeting, because Gen. Bintoro is also Rector and evidently did not wish to have a formal ceremony.

Other than the meeting with the MUSPIDA, the government in Sukarnapura paid very little attention to the visit and contacts with officials were minimal. They did provide reasonable accommodations in the new housing complex, a houseboy from the hotel, and a car and driver borrowed from the UN. Also, the central council for all women's groups in Sukarnapura held a party in honor of the reporting officer's wife. In the interior and on the south coast, the government was far more concerned with the reporting officer's presence. In the larger areas, the governmental head, either police or army, was found to be Indonesian while most subordinates other than army personnel were recruited from the sophisticated native tribes along the north and west coast of West Irian. At smaller posts, the sole government official was usually an Irianese.

No guard was provided to the reporting officer and no personnel appeared to be following or monitoring his activities. While in Sukarnapura, a minimum of attention was paid to him, and elsewhere he was received as a visiting dignitary. This experience is contrary to those of previous diplomatic visitors and UN personnel when they are outside of Sukarnapura whose activities were closely monitored. In Biak, a native visiting the missionary at whose home the reporting officer stayed informed him that no native had been allowed near any UN official and that the natives had been sent home prior to a visit by a UN employee to the harbor there.

The government or the army run separate schools in Sukarnapura and elsewhere for their own employees, that is, for the Indonesians as distinct from the
CONFIDENTIAL

local Irianese. They also have basic Indonesian literary programs throughout the island, the success of which varies; at least in Sukarnapura and the town of Biak, Indonesian is the spoken language of almost all persons. In the interior and on the south coast only the young children who have attended the three-grade schools can speak the language. Students at the one University, Tjenderawasih, are mostly children of government employees. The university is also a political indoctrination center for its West Irian students and, since Gen. Bintoro recently made himself Rector, the government must think it a potential source of difficulty for the regime.

In the cultural field, there is a government effort to set up a museum in Sukarnapura devoted to displaying artifacts of the Papuan cultures. This endeavor presently consists of collecting souveniers, without compensation, from missionaries and other visitors who must go through customs.

The activities of the government, except the schools in the interior and the general effort to spread the Indonesian language, are largely directed toward preserving the status quo and preventing civil unrest. Electrification, communication and transportation are virtually ignored except to maintain what few facilities already exist. Cables from Djakarta usually arrive three weeks late, delivered by plane. Telephone service, local and to Djakarta, is fair, but the only telephone book available was printed in 1963. Mail service is impossible. Electricity is available for only two-thirds of Sukarnapura at any given time. Without MAF radios and planes, no government communications or transport would be possible to most parts of the island.

There is a large army post in Sentani and a huge military police camp in Sukarnapura, but the only civic action efforts seen were related to maintaining roads. Army engineers were very efficient in erecting an improvised bridge after the original washed out in a flash flood. This efficiency was probably due to the fact that when the bridge washed out, a caravan of cars going to Sentani was cut in half; in that caravan were the highest officials in Sukarnapura plus Indonesia's Police Inspector General Hugeng, who had been there to install a new police chief for West Irian.

The military is relatively invisible in Sukarnapura, usually staying at their camps. The missionaries say that in other towns, particularly Merauke, they are very visible but exceedingly idle. In Merauke, it was said, the military's only activity is holding ceremonies, which are held on all of the national holidays and on the 17th of every month.

The military establishments observed consisted of the military police detachment in Sukarnapura, a navy base outside of Sukarnapura and the army camp.
at Sentani. The MP detachment is comprised of at least 1,000 officers and men, plus their families and has a large hospital. The Navy installation is apparently a leftover from World War II, is almost unoccupied and is in an advanced state of dilapidation. The Army camp is located at the site of Gen. MacArthur’s World War II headquarters. By its size, it appears to house between two brigades and a division of infantry troops (5,000 or more men).

The only military equipment seen, other than small arms and light trucks, were an Air Force DC-3 bringing supplies into Wamena, some road-grading equipment in the Sukarnapura/Sentani and Bia'k areas, an Army troop transport in Sukarnapura harbor, and a submarine chaser in Sukarnapura. The troop transport had brought in 300 persons, army personnel and their families, for whom there was no billeting available upon arrival. They first slept on the dock and were later moved into cramped bachelor quarters. The sub-chaser was purported to have been built in Surabaya, and was armed with a 40-mm deck gun forward and two depth-charge droppers aft. It was probably brought in to prevent smuggling, but is used frequently as a pleasure yacht.

Other military and police installations are scattered throughout the interior and south. The police are mainly West Irians, and the Army is there to keep the police in line and to protect other Indonesians from the police in the event of trouble. The missionaries find that Indonesians fear both the local natives and the police recruited in West Irian. According to the missionaries, the pressures from such fears, together with the isolation and unusual living conditions, have resulted in a high suicide rate among the Indonesians assigned to West Irian.

B. The 1969 “Plebiscite” and Prospects for Violence

The primary political factor in West Irian is the promised “plebiscite” to determine whether West Irian will become an integral part of Indonesia or independent. In this connection, the United Nations recently appointed a political observer and his team should be in West Irian by mid-1968. One of the first questions asked by the missionaries was what Indonesia plans to do, or more precisely, how they plan to conduct the election; a similar interest was expressed by the Australian territorial administrator, Mr. David O. Hayes.

The probable plans of the Indonesian government for 1969, as reported by Mr. Roed of FUNDWL, are as follows: the government will divide West Irian into a number of areas and select a slate of three to five persons from each area; a minority of each area's group may be chosen on the basis of local preference, but the majority will be Indonesian or Indonesian controlled; the groups thus constituted will convene as a whole and endorse union with Indonesia.

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A missionary in Jayawijaya gave a similar sketch of Indonesian plans and indicated that the selection process there has already begun.

All but one Westerner contacted were persistent in the belief that Indonesia could not win an open election. The lone exception pointed out that in the interior and on the south coast the natives are apolitical and primitive in outlook, with no idea of what an election is, and could easily be induced to opt for union with Indonesia. Behind either view is an acceptance of the antipathy or outright hatred believed to be harbored toward Indonesia and Indonesians by West Irians in the relatively developed and sophisticated areas. The open separatist factions are centered in and around the major coastal towns, such as Sukarnapura, Biak and Manokwari on the North, Sorong and Fakfak on the West, and Merauke on the South. It is generally believed that the separatists will not accept permanent union without a struggle.

The missionaries, UN employees and apparently some of the indigenous separatists assume that Indonesia will not give up West Irian willingly, and will arrange a form of plebiscite which will ensure a "vote" for union. The separatists and the Indonesian Government therefore find themselves on a collision course which makes it immaterial whether Indonesia rig the outcome of a plebiscite or wins a popular election by seducing the most backward element of West Irian's populace. Violence is inevitable, if this assessment is correct. The questions are when, where and how much violence will occur, and what its outcome will be.

To some extent, the first two questions have already been answered. The long-standing Arfak rebellion in the hills surrounding Manokwari has been reported previously, as have Indonesia's counter-measures, which early last year featured B-26 bombing forays and mortar attacks. While the situation is still tense, this rebellion apparently has subsided and some of the guerrillas are reported to be drifting back to their villages. Missionaries estimate that there are between 300 and 1,000 active rebels in the Manokwari area.

Political arrests of suspected rebels in Biak are an almost daily occurrence, according to the American missionary there. Mr. Roed visited Biak during the week of January 20 and reported a number of arrests were made the previous week. At least one suspected rebel, a prominent citizen named Mr. B. Mofu, was convicted of unknown crimes and given a five-year prison sentence. There are also stories of a raid on a naval armory in Biak last August in which small arms and machine guns were allegedly captured. This story was repeated by missionaries in Sukarnapura and by Mr. Roed, but the missionary in Biak said that the raid was small and disorganized and consequently was thwarted and all participants captured. That missionary also told of an
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unsuccessful attempt to poison the Biak water supply with the result that the pumping station is now guarded. It was also in Biak that the reporting officer personally heard the only derogatory comments made against the Indonesian government by a West Irianese. The District Chief, a Mr. Jappo, complained that the local government lacked funds for needed equipment. He attributed this to the large expenditures being made on an impressive new mosque in Biak. Mr. Jappo apparently mentioned the New York activities of the Papuan Freedom Movement after the reporting officer absented himself from the room.

Rumors of arrests in other major coastal towns are common among the missionaries, though the accuracy of the information is doubtful. One missionary in the interior reported that several hundred West Irians had been arrested in Sukarnapura in late November 1967 for planning a coup d'état scheduled for 1968. Purportedly, the plotters theorized that, by acting this year, the government would be caught unprepared. The missionary understood that a number of DPRD members (representatives to the regional parliament) were amongst those arrested. Mr. Roedden denied this and indicated that, although there had been some arrests in December, few of them could have been DPRD members because he attended its last session in December and no more than eight seats were unoccupied. The army is said to be holding an unknown number of political prisoners at their Sentani camp.

With the exception of the Manokwari area, there is no open warfare at present, but some prophylactic arrests are certainly being made. The size of the military establishment in West Irian (reportedly 10,000 troops) is probably a deterrent to the separatists and indicates that the government expects trouble in the future. Such trouble might come prior to the plebiscite, in a preemptive effort to expel the Indonesians. It will certainly come when the plebiscite is over.

The number of separatists is unknown. According to most missionaries, virtually the entire population of the developed areas should be counted as anti-Indonesian, but it is hard to imagine active opposition from more than 25,000 persons; the actual number would probably be much smaller. The separatists have no central leadership and no unifying principle other than independence. While each area has its local leaders and heroes, the tribes of each area are divided among themselves and hold deep animosities toward those of other areas. As a result, concerted, large-scale warfare seems unlikely.

The lack of central direction, coupled with the difficult terrain, the lack of communications and transportation, and a shortage of firearms mean that
A-641

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO: CANBERRA, MEDAN, SURABAYA, AND HAKUS, CINC PAC FOR POLAD

FROM: Amembassy DJAKARTA

DATE: June 18, 1968

SUBJECT: Some Proposals for Army Policy in West Irian, and for a UN Presence

REF:

From June 4 to June 12, 1968, a top-level delegation of Indonesian Army generals visited West Irian to investigate conditions there and decide what changes are needed in military staff and policies. Included in the group were Maj. Gen. Sumitro, Deputy for Operations to the Army Commander; Maj. Gen. Sutopo Juwono, Assistant for Intelligence to the Commander; Maj. Gen. Makmun Murad, Assistant for Operations; Maj. Gen. Mardanus, Assistant for Logistics; Maj. Gen. Suharto, Assistant for Territorial Affairs; and Maj. Gen. Askari, East Indonesia Inter-Regional Military Commander.

Upon his return Sutopo Juwono described to Lim Bian Kie, a member of Col. Ali Murtopo's staff, the proposals for policy changes which he is making to his Army superiors. These suggestions are:

1) Replace the Army commander in Irian, Brig. Gen. Bintoro. According to Bian Kie, Suharto himself has suggested that the present commander in North Sumatra, Brig. Gen. Sarwo Edhie, be considered a candidate for the job. Another possibility would be Brig. Gen. Witono, now commander in West Kalimantan, but he was the President's personal choice for his present assignment and so is unlikely to be moved.

2) Replace the present chief of staff in Irian, Lt. Col. Supomo. There are no candidates for his job as yet.

3) Reshuffle the rest of the Irian Command staff.

4) Replace the entire staff of the Directorate for Indochina Affairs in Jakarta, including its chief, Col. Marwoto.

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.
5) Confine military operations in Irian to the Vogelkop area in the western end of the territory, leaving the balance to civilian jurisdiction.

6) Issue orders to the Irian Command to work more closely with the influential Christian churches in Irian, consult with them more frequently, and bring them into Government planning more intimately.

7) Improve the treatment of political prisoners, and try to identify the 200 or so (out of a total of 400) who are not hard-core Papuan separatists and who might be induced to cooperate with Djakarta.

8) Replace about half the Indonesian troops now in Irian with others more acceptable to the local population.

Regarding the last point, Bia Kie explained that most of the soldiers now in Irian are Buginese or other militant Moslems from the "Hasanuddin" and "Merdeka" regional commands in, respectively, South and North Sulawesi. These are the troops who have been responsible for most of the brutality, looting and other offenses against the Papuan population, and they are hated as a consequence. Sutopo Juwono reportedly believes that they must be replaced with Javanese or Sundanese troops from the Brawijaja and Siliwangi commands on Java, since these two groups have acceptable reputations among the Papuans. Bia Kie added that a few detachments of fresh soldiers which were sent to Irian earlier this month, although coming from the Merdeka and Hasanuddin areas, actually were Javanese and Sundanese Raiders who originated from the Brawijaja and Siliwangi commands. This trend is to continue.

As for the total number of troops in Irian, Bia Kie estimates it at 4,000. In A-607 dated June 4, the Embassy reported that there are eight to ten thousand there. The latter figures came from a statement by Foreign Minister Adam Malik to the Ambassador (giving the 10,000 figure) and from a report by a reliable Australian Embassy source (mentioning 8,000); hence they were reported. Our own inclination is to accept the 4,000 figure, since we believe that the Indonesians would have great difficulty feeding, housing and otherwise caring for a much larger number in such a remote area. Furthermore, insurgent activity in Irian now seems to be sufficiently slight that four or five thousand troops should be able to control it.

As a postscript to this report, the head of the Indonesian Foreign Department's International Organizations Directorate on June 15 told an Embassy officer that his government has received a preliminary cable from its project officer for Irian affairs, Ambassador Sudjarwo. At Sudjarwo's recently-concluded meetings with UN officials in New York, it was agreed that the
CONFIDENTIAL

A-641, Djakarta

Secretary-General's personal representative for Irian, Bolivian Ambassador Ortiz Sanz, will arrive in Indonesia in August, will have a staff of five, and will operate out of Djakarta. On all three of these points the GOI thus achieved its objectives since originally the UN had proposed that Ortiz Sanz arrive in July, that he have a staff of eleven, and that he be based in Sukarnapura.

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PAGE 01 DJAKAR 08372 231131Z

ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 000, DOD 00, GPH 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

KSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SAH 02, AID 281013, ACDA 16, RSR 01/016

R 230931Z JUL 68

FM: AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC 6997

INFO: AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMCONSUL MEDAN

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

USIA

CINCPAC 929

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 8372

1. VOA AND RADIO AUSTRALIA REPORTED MORNING OF JULY 23 THAT
   2,000 ADDITIONAL INDONESIAN TROOPS HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED TO
   WEST IRIAN TO CONTROL UNREST THERE. REPORTS ALSO STATED THAT
   NEWLY-APPOINTED ARMY COMMANDER IN IRIAN, BRIG. GEN. SARWO
   EDHIE, URGED DISSATISFIED ELEMENTS THERE TO CEASE OPPOSING GOI
   OR FACE STRONG COUNTERMEASURES.

2. REPORTS OF TROOP TRANSFERS, SO FAR AS EMBASSY HAS BEEN ABLE
   TO DETERMINE, ORIGINATED WITH DJAKARTA CORRESPONDENTS OF AP AND
   AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING COMPANY (ABC) WHOREW ON ANTARA NEWS
   AGENCY STORY THAT FOUR BATTALIONS OF WEST JAVA SOLDIERS
   "RECENTLY" DEPARTED FOR IRIAN. NEITHER AP NOR ABC WERE CERTAIN
   WHETHER THESE MOVEMENTS REPRESENTED ADDITIONS TO GOI STRENGTH
   OR JUST REPLACEMENTS, OR EXACTLY WHEN THEY TOOK PLACE.

3. SARWO EDHIE COMMENT NOTED PARA. ONE ABOVE WAS PART OF STATE-
   MENT TO PRESS IN IRIAN THAT INDONESIA WILL HOLD "ACT OF FREE
   CHOICE" PER 1962 NEW YORK AGREEMENT, BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS
   IRIAN "UNCONDITIONALLY IS PART OF INDONESIA." HIS WARNING TO
   DISSIDENTS FORMED FINAL, AND SMALLEST, PART OF HIS STATEMENT.

4. COMMENT: EMBASSY IS CONCERNED AT TENDENCY TO OVER-DRAMATIZE
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TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO: EMBASSY YANGON, DJAKARTA
      EMBASSY CANBERRA

FROM: USUN New York
DATE: July 24, 1968

SUBJECT: SYG Representative to West Irian
          Ambassador Ortiz Sanz

REF:

Reporting Officer lunched July 23 with Ambassador Fernando
Ortiz Sanz, former Bolivian Permanent Representative to the
UN, and now Special Representative of the SYG for the West
Irian plebiscite. Ortiz Sanz will remain in New York
several weeks before departing for West Irian.

Ortiz Sanz is concerned that his mission be a success,
reflecting credit on the SYG whom he greatly admires and
on the United Nations. He has noted, however, that the role
of the SYG is not clearly defined since the election is to
be carried out by the Indonesian Government. Ortiz Sanz
suspects the Indonesians of having very little interest in
a free election, their main interest being to have the West
Irian Mandate become a part of Indonesia. Ortiz Sanz
stated that if in his opinion he cannot assure to the residents
of the area a completely free election, he will resign rather
than "preside over a farce".

Ortiz Sanz is greatly interested in what U.S. Ambassador
Bunker had in mind in drafting the language which seems to
leave full responsibility for the election in the hands of
the Indonesians. He is also most interested in that provision
in the agreement which called for the SYG's Representative to
be in the area a year in advance of the election. He wonders

GROUP 3
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USUN A–2054 CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

exactly what he is supposed to do. He is at a loss to understand how in a year you can convince a Stone Age group what democracy means and how to run an election.

Ortiz Sanz contrasts the Australian half of the Island which the Australians are rapidly moving toward complete independence.

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 08503 300356Z

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15/IO 13/NSA 02/CIAE 00/DODE 00/GPM 04/H 02/INR 07/L 03/

NSC 10/P 04/RSC 01/SP 02/SS 20/USIA 12/RSR 01/111 W

R 291130Z JUL 68
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7067
INFO AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
US MISSION USUN 162

CONFIDENTIAL 8503
SUBJECT: "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" IN IRIAN

REF: A. STATE 209491
     B. THE HAGUE 6267
     C. STATE 206214

1. DIFFERENCES IN EXPECTATION AND INTERPRETATION REGARDING NEXT YEAR'S "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" IN IRIAN, REFLECTED IN REFTELS, IN EMBASSY'S VIEW COULD LEAD TO UNFORTUNATE COMPLICATIONS, POSSIBLY INVOLVING US.

2. UN AMBASSADOR ORTIZ SANZ' ASSERTION THAT HE WILL PRESIDE OVER "A COMPLETELY FREE ELECTION" IN IRIAN OR RESIGN (REF A) RAISES LIKELIHOOD OF CONSIDERABLE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN HIM AND GOI AFTER HIS ARRIVAL DJAKARTA IN AUGUST. GOI IS FIRMLY PLEDGED TO HONOR ITS COMMITMENT UNDER NEW YORK AGREEMENT, BUT OFFICIAL INDONESIANS AT ALL LEVELS HAVE REPEATEDLY EXPRESSED CONVINCING THAT IRIAN IS IRREVOCABLY PART OF INDONESIAN TERRITORY AND WILL REMAIN SO AFTER "ACT." INDONESIANS DO NOT WANT "FARCE" ANY MORE THAN ORTIZ SANZ AND GOI IS NOW TAKING MANY STEPS TO IMPROVE CLIMATE IN IRIAN FOR CONDUCTING "ACT OF FREE CHOICE", BUT IT IS POLITICAL IMPERATIVE FOR PRESENT GOVERNMENT THAT IRIAN NOT SPLIT AWAY FROM REPUBLIC.

CONFIDENTIAL
3. BITTER MOOD OF FONMIN LUNS DESCRIBE REF B HAS NOT BEEN REVEALED TO INDONESIANS. ON CONTRARY, THEY BELIEVE THAT LUNS AND DUTCH ARE TAKING RELAXED ATTITUDE TOWARD IRIAN IN ORDER PROMOTE BETTER OVERALL GOI-GDN RELATIONS.

A. MALIK TOLD ME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, MOST RECENTLY ON JULY 27, THAT HIS MEETING WITH LUNS ON IRIAN ISSUE HAD SHOWN GOOD COMMON UNDER STANDING OF PROBLEM. MALIK CERTAINLY REGARDED LUNS AS SYMPATHETIC.

B. IN SAME VEIN, MALIK'S ASSISTANT ADHYATMAN TOLD POLITICAL COUNSELOR JULY 25 THAT GOI BELIEVES "HIGH DEGREE" OF UNDERSTANDING EXISTS BETWEEN INDONESIANS AND DUTCH ON THIS QUESTION. ADHYATMAN RECOUNTED THAT IN PRIVATE MEETING WITH MALIK DURING HIS RECENT VISIT HERE, LUNS EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE INDONESIA WILL ABIDE BY NEW YOURK AGREEMENT, ADDING THAT HE UNDERSTOOD NEED TO FIND WAY TO CARRY OUT AGREEMENT WITHOUT CREATING UNDUE DIFFICULTIES FOR GOI.

3. COMMENT: INDONESIANS ARE FULLY SENSITIVE TO FACT THAT IRIAN AND THEIR ACTIONS THERE ARE SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY. IN THIS CONNECTION, MALIK TOLD ME JULY 27 THAT TROOPS REPORTEDLY SENT TO IRIAN (DJAKARTA 83721) ARE REPLACEMENTS, NOT ADDITIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS WOULD MAKE GOI HESITATE ON EVE OF "ACT" TO MAKE SUBSTANTIAL TROOP BUILDUP.

4. HOWEVER, DIFFERENCES REGARDING MANNER IN WHICH "ACT" IS TO BE CONDUCTED, SUCH AS THOSE WHICH SEEM TO EXIST BETWEEN GOI AND ORTIZ SANZ, MIGHT WELL CREATE UNFORTUNATE COMPLICATIONS NEXT YEAR. THIS ALSO TRUE REGARDING DIFFERING IMPRESSIONS OF HIS VIEWS WHICH LUNS HAS CONVEYED. MALIK HAS REPEATEDLY ASSURED ME THAT GOI WILL CARRY OUT 1962 AGREEMENT AND I DO NOT BELIEVE THERE ANY REASON AT THIS TIME TO QUESTION HIS BONAFIDES. FOR THESE REASONS, I FULLY SHARE DEPARTMENT'S RESERVATIONS REGARDING ADVISABILITY OF ANY US APPROACH TO INDONESIANS ALONG LINES SUGGESTED BY DUTCH EMBASSY MINISTER (REF C).

UNLESS WE WATCH OUR STEP, RESULT COULD BE TO SET US UP AS "GUARANTOR" OF "ACT" OF FREE CHOICE. SEPTEL COVERS CONVERSATION WITH MY DUTCH COLLEAGUE ON THIS SUBJECT.
Subject: Implementation of 1962 Treaty on West Irian

Ref: A STATE 20624 4 B DJAKARTA 8503

1. As suggested reftel A, I consulted with my Dutch colleague (Schiff) who shares my view that it is unnecessary and unwise for me to exert influence with GOI on subject of implementing 1962 Treaty on West Irian. As Schiff put it, "there's no sense in kicking a horse that's already moving." Although this should not get back to Dutch Fonooff, Schiff also expressed concern that any representations we might make would undoubtedly be interpreted here as being made at behest of Dutch. This would jeopardize Dutch-Indo relations which have been improving so remarkably.

2. Schiff, who is leaving shortly to be Secretary General of Netherlands Fonooff, found merit in continuing the talks which he and I have had from time to time, separately of course, with Fonmin Malik and Interior Minister Basuki in the course of which discussion of West Irian has focussed on encouraging measures which GOI belatedly taking to improve economic, political, and social climate in West Irian as well as other measures such as amnesty for Papuan leaders, all looking to implementation of 1962 Treaty and, we would certainly hope, well beyond. Only specific point Schiff thought it might be helpful for me to pursue, since he
Page 02  Djakar 08530  310221Z

Was leaving, was how GOI proposed to relate its "unitary state" concept (see next para) to its obligations to carrying out 1962 Treaty.

3. Schiff then read me excerpts of telegram approved by Luns, reporting Suharto-Luns conversation of July 4. In this conversation Suharto stressed that provision in Indonesian constitution for a unitary state extending from Sumatra to Merauke (East New Britain) west Irian rendered implementation of 1962 treaty difficult, since treaty envisaged possibility of breaking off a part of this "unitary state". Suharto asked for GON understanding of the difficulties which GOI will encounter in its implementation of the 1962 treaty. Luns responded to Suharto by saying that he hoped a solution would be found, consistent with the letter and spirit of the treaty, which was satisfactory to both GOI and GON. Suharto agreed and reiterated his hope that implementation would not create difficulties.

4. When I expressed some surprise over this somewhat stiff exchange between Suharto and Luns, Schiff explained that, elsewhere in his discussions of this issue, Luns took a more relaxed accommodating line. At one point he had told Suharto, "If any problems arise, it won't be due to Luns." Schiff added that we must nevertheless bear in mind that there are some strong views in Holland on west Irian issue, on both right and left sides of Dutch parliament, with old guardists still deeply resentful of what transpired there some years ago and with leftists only too anxious to see Suharto's "New Order" deeply embarrassed over West Irian issue. Although Luns shares bitter memories of 1962 (Hague 6267), Schiff does not believe that Luns would allow his feelings to outweigh his good judgment as foreign minister of a country that has so much to gain from promoting favorable solution in Indo-Dutch relations. As a tactician, Luns may see advantage in staying in with the old guardists in order to bring them along re: formula for carrying out the "act of free choice" in manner acceptable to both Dutch and Indonesians. Schiff and I agreed that Malik seemed to be setting the stage for such a formula and that Suharto, Basukihrachmat, Swrdo Ednie (military commander of West Irian) and other key figures likely to support approach Malik recommended.

GP-3 Green  Confidential
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PAGE 01 DJAKAR 08648 040503Z

ACTION EA 15

INFO ID 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DOD 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, 096 W

R 04045Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECESTATE WASHDC 7153

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 8648

SUBJECT: "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" IN WEST IRIAN

REF: USUN A-2054

FOR DEPUTY ASST. SECRETARY GODLEY FROM AMBASSADOR

1. REF AIRGRAM INDICATES THAT ATTITUDE OF ORTIZ SANZ COULD CREATE
REAL PROBLEM FOR GOI. AS REPORTED PARA 5 DJAKARTA 8503, GOI IS OF
OPINION (PERHAPS MISTAKEN) THAT ORTIZ SANZ NOW HAS GREATER UNDERSTANDING
OF POLITICAL REALITIES CONNECTED WITH "ACT OF FREE CHOICE". IF THIS
IS NOT THE CASE AND IF VIEWS CONTAINED REF AIRGRAM SHOULD BECOME
PUBLICLY KNOWN, IT WOULD BE MOST EMBARRASSING FOR MALIK AND OTHERS
IN GOI WHO ARE WORKING TO CARRY OUT 1962 AGREEMENT IN MANNER WHICH
IS MEANINGFUL BUT WHICH AT THE SAME TIME WILL ENSURE CONTINUED
INDONESIAN CONTROL OF WEST IRIAN.

2. UNLESS SOMEONE IN USUN HAS CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH
ORTIZ SANZ IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR US TO STAY OUT OF
THIS ONE DIRECTLY. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF HIGH STAKES RIDING ON
ORTIZ SANZ'S MISSION AND IMPORTANCE OF HIS GETTING OFF ON RIGHT
FOOT, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD DO ANYTHING WE CAN INDIRECTLY TO MAKE
HIM AWARE OF POLITICAL REALITIES. IT OCCURS TO ME THAT BEST
APPROACH MIGHT BE TO TIP OFF SUDJATMOKO INFORMALLY TO FACT THAT
ORTIZ SANZ MAY HAVE SOME MISCONCEPTIONS REGARDING INDONESIA'S
INTENTIONS REGARDING 1962 AGREEMENT AND SUGGEST THAT SUDJATMOKO
MIGHT WISH TO TALK WITH HIM IN ORDER TO
REDUCE CHANCE THAT ORTIZ SANZ MIGHT MAKE UNFORTUNATE STATEMENT
EITHER PRIOR TO OR AT TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL IN DJAKARTA WHICH WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 02 DJAKAR 8648 040503Z

PUT FAT IN FIRE.

3. I WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS WHICH YOU MAY HAVE REGARDING ORTIZ SANZ' PRESENT STATE OF MIND.

GP-3. GREEN
CONFIDENTIAL

88
ACTION IO 15
INFO EA 10, CIAE: 00, DODE: 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07L, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01,
SP 02, SS: 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, RSR 01, 121 W
R 070032Z AUG 68
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SESTATE WASHDC 2770
INFO AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 6130

REF: DJAKARTA TEL: 8503 AND 86481 USUN A-2054

1. MISOFF TALKED TWICE WITH ORTIZ SANZ TODAY SEEKING
CLARIFICATION POINTS MADE IN REPS. MISOFF DRAWING ON
THREE AND A HALF YEARS CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH ORTIZ
AND STRESSING CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF CONVERSATION AND US
HANDS-OFF ROLE WORKED IN AMB. GREEN's POINTS AS CLARIFYING
QUERIES RAISED BY ORTIZ IN REPS. AIRGRAM.

2. ORTIZ SANZ APPEARED MORE RELAXED ABOUT ASSIGNMENT THAN
IN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED CONVERSATION AND IN LIGHT HIS
CONVERSATION WITH SUDJATMOKO SEEMS FULLY PREPARED ACT ON
ASSUMPTION INDONESIAN PROCEEDING IN GOOD FAITH IN ARRANGING
ELECTIONS ORTIZ STATED HE TOLD SUDJATMOKO THAT "IF NEW
CHILD TO BE BORN TO INDONESIA YOU ARE MOST INTERESTED IN
HAVING CHILD ARRIVE IN STATE OF GOOD HEALTH."

3. MISOFF DETECTED NO INDICATIONS ORTIZ SANZ WOULD
RESIGN IN HIGH DUDGEON OVER WHAT HE IMPLIED IN LAST CONVERSATION
WERE ALREADY EVIDENT INDICATIONS OF INDONESIAN BAD FAITH.

4. ORTIZ NOTED HIS INSTRUCTIONS AS SYS. REP. WERE TO PARTICIPATE
IN PREPARATION AND ELECTIONS AND GIVEN POSSIBILITY OF
PARTICIPATING GENTLY OR STRONG. HE INTENDED PARTICIPATE
"IN BETWEEN THESE TWO EXTREMES" HE INDICATED THAT IF HE
HAD SUGGESTIONS TO MAKE TO INDONESIAN GOVT. HE WOULD MAKE
THEM IN WRITING LEAVING TO GOI DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 USUN N: 06130 0701497

ACT ON THEM*

5. ORTIZ STILL CONCERNED RE: THE ELECTION AS TO HOW TO APPLY TO PRIMITIVE STONE AGE PEOPLE: THE "INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES" CALLED FOR IN THE AGREEMENT.

6. ON BASIS OF CONVERSATION MISOFF IS CONVINCED THAT ORTIZ FULLY AWARE OF DIFFICULT SITUATION IN WHICH GOI FINDS ITSELF AND HAS NO INTENTION MAKE DIFFICULT SITUATION WORSE. ORTIZ STATED AT ONE POINT, "MALIK SEEMS GOOD PERSON. I APPRECIATE HIS POSITION AND WILL BE VERY KIND TO HIM."*

7. ORTIZ SANZ AND WIFE EXPECT ARRIVE DJAKARTA AUGUST 12. HE HAS AUTHORIZED UN'SECT OFFICIAL ISSUE STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT "HE AND WIFE LOOKING FORWARD WITH DELIGHT GOING TO BEAUTIFUL COUNTRY WHICH ALSO HAS HAD TREMENDOUS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND FEELS SURE WILL HAVE FULL COOPERATION GOI."*

8. ORTIZ SANZ LOOKS FORWARD TO MAKING DISCREET PERSONAL CONTACT WITH AMBASSADOR GREEN DURING NATIONAL HOLIDAY CELEBRATIONS AUGUST 17. ORTIZ SANZ WELL AWARE HE MUST AVOID TOO MUCH OVERT CONTACT WITH AMERICAN EMBASSY BUT OBTUSELY LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTACT WITH AND POSSIBLY SUGGESTION FROM AMBASSADOR GREEN.*

GP-3*

BALL
To: The Secretary
Through: S/S
From: INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Indonesia Faces Delicate Problem in Executing West Irian "Act of Free Choice"

As the 1969 deadline approaches, the Indonesian government is beginning to consider how it will carry out the "act of free choice" it is required to hold in West Irian under the 1962 agreement which transferred administration of that former Dutch territory to Indonesia and which provided for a UN role in the "act of free choice". Convinced on the one hand that no Indonesian government could survive the political trauma resulting from the loss of West Irian and faced on the other hand with considerable popular discontent in the territory, the Indonesian government faces the delicate task of designing a form of "self-determination" which will ensure its retention of West Irian and yet not appear as a flagrant violation of its international obligations and of the rights of the Papuan inhabitants.

Semi-Appointed Council Envisaged. Recent reports suggest that Indonesia plans to establish a new regional legislative body, the West Irian Council (modeled largely after the old Dutch New Guinea Council), which will "speak for" the people of West Irian. Members of this council will consist of tribal chiefs, appointed representatives, and members directly elected by "approved restricted lists" of voters. The proportion to be occupied by each category is not yet known, but Indonesia clearly considers the tribal chiefs (at least some of whom...
will doubtless be hand-picked by the government) to be a crucial element; between now and the holding of the "act" the Indonesian government plans to devote considerable effort to wining and dining these chiefs in Djakarta. In an attempt to mollify local Papuan opinion, the council will accompany its expected decision to remain within Indonesia with recommendations for future economic assistance to the territory from the central government and from United Nations agencies—in the belief that the prospect of continued United Nations interest in the territory will make Indonesian rule more palatable to the inhabitants. These plans do indeed presage a rather elaborate Indonesian effort to fulfill the letter of the 1962 agreement, and there will doubtless be wide understanding of the impossibility of holding a Western-style direct election in a region as primitive as West Irian. Nevertheless, observers of the proceedings will be struck by the obvious fact that not even a small portion of the Council members are to be elected, directly or indirectly, by universal adult suffrage. Indonesia evidently hopes to exercise some control over the selection of all the representatives.

Dutch Approach U.S. Cries of "foul play" are sure to be heard in some segments of the Dutch population, where strong feelings on West Irian still exist. The present attitude of the Dutch government, however, appears fairly sympathetic to Indonesia. On a recent visit to Djakarta, Foreign Minister Luns reportedly assured President Suharto that he would not cause trouble for Indonesia on the West Irian issue, and the general impression which the Indonesian government seems to have received is that the Dutch are more interested in maintaining their currently excellent relations with Indonesia than in reviving the once-bitter West Irian
issue. In discussions with U.S. officials, the Dutch (including Luns himself) have on some occasions taken a different line, expressing concern over Djakarta's "one-sided attitude" and recalling the American role in mediating the West Irian dispute, have requested U.S. assistance in ensuring Indonesian compliance with the 1962 agreement. In their most recent conversation with U.S. officials, however, the Dutch have indicated that they are reasonably satisfied with U.S. efforts to encourage Indonesian compliance with the 1962 agreement. To some extent, these ostensibly contradictory reactions may reflect differences of opinion within the Dutch Foreign Ministry on the West Irian question. As far as can be determined, however, the Dutch complaints do not presage a "tough" attitude on West Irian but are principally an effort to have U.S. leverage brought to bear on Indonesia, in the hope of preventing too blatant manipulation of the "act" and thereby heading off a possible public outcry in Holland damaging to Indonesian-Dutch relations.

By involving the U.S., the Dutch government may also be preparing a scapegoat should West Irian become a domestic political issue in the Netherlands. Potential political criticism could come both from left-wing parties unfriendly to the Suharto government and from right-wing elements still bitter over the loss of the territory in 1962. Should Indonesia's fixing of the "act" appear too blatant, substantial public opinion might also be aroused on humanitarian grounds. A combination of strong political pressures and public opinion might force the Dutch government to take a public position critical of Indonesia and perhaps even raise the issue in the United Nations—although it would probably take this latter step quite reluctantly.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- 4 -

U.N. Representative May Have Reservations. A major factor determining whether the West Irian issue is raised in the United Nations will be the attitude of the Secretary General's Representative for West Irian who, according to the 1962 agreement, is to "advise, assist, and participate in arrangements...for the act of free choice." In late July, the Secretary General's Representative, Fernando Ortiz Sanz, voiced the suspicion that Indonesia had little interest in a free election and said that unless he could assure the residents of the area a completely free choice he would resign rather than "preside over a farce." Recent reporting indicates, however, that Ortiz's views have been tempered somewhat and that his approach to the Indonesians will be more sympathetic than his earlier comments suggested. Ortiz remarked on August 7 that his instructions authorized him to participate "gently or strongly" in the self-determination preparations and that he intended to follow a policy "in between these two extremes." Despite his currently more accommodating stance, however, it still remains doubtful that Ortiz would feel he could go along with the arrangements Indonesia is now contemplating.

Serious Afro-Asian Opposition Improbable. Among the U.N. membership, the Afro-Asian nations seem unlikely to challenge Indonesia on its West Irian arrangements, in view of the support which the radical Afro-Asians once gave to Indonesia in its campaign to obtain West Irian and the current sympathy which Indonesia now enjoys among the more moderate Afro-Asian nations. The prevalence of minority problems and the general sacredness of colonial boundaries among most of the new nations should also inhibit Afro-Asian interest in West Irian. Should the issue be raised, either by the Netherlands or by Ortiz himself, however, it is possible that a few Afro-Asian states would join in criticism of Indonesia.
Increased Insurgency Unlikely. Fresh evidence of discontent in West Irian could, however, upset current estimates of a relatively low level of international interest in the problem, arousing opinion in the U.N. and the Netherlands (and perhaps the U.S. as well). The most spectacular evidence of discontent would be a sudden upsurge of Papuan separatist insurgency between now and late 1969. Information on insurgency in West Irian is presently very scanty, but it does appear that insurgent activity continues in the territory. At the same time, however, it appears that Indonesian troop strength in West Irian is sufficient to contain the insurgency at its present level and to prevent any serious increase in dissident activity, given the primitive nature of the insurgents' armaments and organization.

Press Role Crucial. It is clear, however, that there is popular discontent in West Irian and that the economy is so run down that substantial economic progress before late 1969 is out of the question; an Australian correspondent who recently visited West Irian, described the economic situation inherited from the Sukarno administration as an "utter mess." The extent to which these conditions become known and have an impact on public opinion outside Indonesia will depend greatly on press coverage; a spate of muckraking news stories on conditions in West Irian could have almost as much effect as a spectacular rise in insurgent activity. The effect of such reporting would, of course, be greatly exacerbated by public evidence that Indonesia was proceeding to set up an obviously "rigged" act of free choice. Indonesia is probably correct not to close West Irian to journalists--since closed areas usually receive the most inaccurate and unfavorable news coverage--but its treatment of correspondents who do visit the territory will be extremely important.
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMIN

- 6 -

If the Indonesian government does not liberalize its present plans for carrying out the "act of free choice" in West Irian, it will run considerable risk of antagonizing important elements within the United Nations, in Holland, and perhaps in other countries—thereby creating a serious international political problem for Indonesia (with possible economic repercussions as well). If the government adjusts its present plans so as to make at least some gesture toward the 1962 agreement's principle of the "eligibility of all adults.....to participate in the act of self-determination," then it can probably expect a generally sympathetic response from the U.N., the Netherlands, and most Afro-Asian countries.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  DJAKAR 08977  210119Z

88
ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DOD 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, 10 13, AID 28, E 15, RSR 01, 154

R 201110Z AUG 68
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7317
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
/USUN NEW YORK 174
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 8977

CORRECTED COPY

SUBJ: THE STAKES IN WEST IRAN: "CT OF FREE CHOICE"

REF: STATE 216459

1. "CT OF FREE CHOICE" IN WEST IRIAN MAY WELL BE MOST
IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUE IN INDONESIA DURING COMING YEAR.
WE THEREFORE BELIEVE IT USEFUL EVEN AT POSSIBLE RISK OF
REPERITION TO REVIEW EXACTLY WHAT IS INVOLVED IN THIS
ACTION AND WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR SUHARTO GOVERNMENT.

2. AS DEPT AWARE, INDONESIA FACES DILEMMA IN DECIDING
HOW TO EXECUTE 1962 AGREEMENT. GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO
CARRY OUT SOME TYPE OF "CT OF FREE CHOICE." AND FONMIN
MALIK IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN IN FOREFRONT PLEDGING TO WORLD
THAT GOI WILL HONOR ITS OBLIGATIONS. HE HAS CONTINUED TO
TAKE THIS LINE DESPITE CONSTANT OPPOSITION IN DJAKARTA PRESS
FROM TRADITIONALIST MOSLEMS AND FROM RADICAL NATIONALISTS
AND LEFTIST ELEMENTS SUCH AS NAVY' NEWSPAPER EL BAHAR,
WE BELIEVE MALIK' VIEWS WILL CARRY THE DAY AND THAT
GOVERNMENT WILL HONESTLY SEEK TO DEVISE SOME MEANINGFUL WAY TO
CONDUCT ASCERTAINMENT WHICH WILL NOT INVOLVE REAL RISKS OF
LOSS OF WEST IRIAN.

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3. RETENTION OF WEST IRIAN AS FULL-LEDGED INDONESIAN PROVINCE IS A POLITICAL NECESSITY FOR SUHARTO GOVERNMENT AND FOR ADAM MALIK. SUHARTO HIMSELF WAS MILITARY COMMANDER OF "RIKORA"CAMPAIGN WHICH INDONESIANS BELIEVE BROUGHT WEST IRIAN TO INDONESIA, AND MOST INDONESIANS, DESPITE VARYING POLITICAL ATTITUDES, REGARD THAT VICTORY AS FINAL STAGE OF STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE. EVEN THOSE INDONESIANS WHO REGARD WEST IRIAN AS MIXED BLESSING WHICH BRINGS MORE PROBLEMS THAN BENEFITS BELIEVE THAT LOSS OF TERRITORY THROUGH "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" WOULD UNDERMINE MALIK AND DEAL SERIOUS BLOW TO INDONESIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY. POLITICAL MOSLEMS AND JINGOISTS, WHO ARE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PRESENT GOVERNMENT BUT LACK FIRM ISSUES ON WHICH TO ATTACK IT, WOULD USE LOSS OF WEST IRIAN AS BASIS FOR ALL-OUT ATTACK ON SUHARTO ADMINISTRATION AND MODERATES WHO ARE NOW SETTING INDONESIAN POLICY. THEY COULD SET IN MOTION TRENDS WHICH WOULD UNSEAT THIS GOVERNMENT AT VERY LEAST THEY WOULD CREATE SITUATION WHICH WOULD FORCE ARMY TO USE REPRESSION AGAINST THEM AND POSSIBLY SPARK VICIOUS CYCLE LEADING TO OUTRIGHT MILITARY REGIME.

4. FACED WITH THIS PROBLEM, MALIK AND OTHERS ARE SEARCHING FOR WAY TO SATISFY REQUIREMENTS OF 1962 AGREEMENT WITHOUT UNDULY AGITATING DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION. MALIK'S PROPOSAL TO SETTLE WEST IRIAN'S FUTURE THROUGH PARTLY-LECTED, PARTLY-APPOINTED "APUAN COUNCIL" (JAKARTA 8592) IS VIRTUALLY ONLY IDEA YET ADVANCED WHICH SHOWS PROMISE OF ACCOMPLISHING THIS.

5. NEW YORK AGREEMENT'S WORDING ON MEANS OF CONDUCTING "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" APPEARS PROVIDE ONLY INDIRECT ROLE FOR SYG REPRESENTATIVE RATHER THAN "SUPERVISORY ROLE" MENTIONED IN SOME RECENT DOCUMENTS. NY AGREEMENT PROVIDES ONLY THAT SYG "DVISE, ASSIST AND PARTICIPATE" (MB ORTIZ SANZ USED THESE EXACT WORDS ON HIS ARRIVAL IN DJAKARTA AUG 12 - DJAKARTA 8836) AS FOR MODALITIES OF "CT", NY AGREEMENT STIPULATES ONLY THAT ALL ADULT PAPUAN NON-ALIEN RESIDENTS "HAVE RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN ACCORD WITH INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE" AND LEAVES CHOICE OF MEANS ENTIRELY TO GOI.

6. MALIK'S SPECIAL ASSISTANT, SUDJARWO, UPON RETURNING
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 DJAKAR 08977 210119Z

RECENTLY FROM THE HAGUE AND NEW YORK, CLAIMED THAT ISSUE HAS ATTRACTION LITTLE ATTENTION IN UN CORRIDORS AND REPORTED TO HIS GOVERNMENT THAT THANH AND OTHERS WITH WHOM HE HAD DISCUSSED PROBLEM SHOWED "UNDERSTANDING" ATTITUDE. THIS MAY WELL BE OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ASSESSMENT. WE DO KNOW, HOWEVER, THAT IN DJAKARTA AT LEAST, DUTCH FOR THEIR PART ARE THROWING UP NO SERIOUS OBSTACLES. DUTCH AMB. SCHIFF RETURNING IMMINENTLY TO HAGUE AND ASSUMING RESPONSIBILITIES OF SG OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FULLY RECOGNIZES PROBLEMS WHICH INDONESIA FACES AND IS CONCERNED ONLY THAT "CT OF FREE CHOICE", HOWEVER, IT IS CARRIED OUT, NOT JEOPARDIZE GOOD DUTCH-INDONESIAN RELATIONS WHICH HE HAD WORKED SO HARD TO BUILD DURING PAST THREE YEARS. LIKE OTHERS IN DJAKARTA, HE SEES NO FUTURE FOR WEST IRIAN EXCEPT AS PART OF INDONESIAN REPUBLIC. IT WOULD BE UNVIEABLE AS INDEPENDENT NATION AND IT WOULD BE INFEASIBLE FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS TO JOIN AREA TO ONE OF ITS OTHER NEIGHBORS EVEN IF THEY WANTED IT. (UDJARWO HAS MENTIONED TO US PRIVATELY THAT MALIK' PAPUAL COUNCIL IDEA WAS LARGELY INSPIRED BY SCHIFF AND THE DUTCH.)

7. WE FULLY SHARE VIEW THAT USG SHOULD NOT BECOME DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THIS ISSUE EITHER THROUGH ATTEMPTING TO PRESSURE INDONESIA OR HOLDING HANDS OF DUTCH AT SAME TIME WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THROUGH POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING OF REALITIES OF WEST IRIAN SITUATION OR OF 1962 AGREEMENT WE MIGHT BE DRAWN INTO SUPPORTING MORE "IMON PURE" PLEBISCITE THAN SITUATION WARRANTS. WE NOTE, FROM PARA 3 REFTEL, THAT UN HAS NOT IN PAST BEEN RECEPTIVE TOWARD INDIRECT SYSTEM FOR DECIDING SUCH ISSUES. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC FOR ANY UN MEMBER WHO KNOWS SITUATION IN WEST IRIAN TO HOLD OUT FOR FREE AND DIRECT ELECTIONS. NOR SHOULD WE REFER TO UN "SUPERVISION" WHEN THIS NOT STIPULATED IN AGREEMENT.

8. AS DEPARTMENT AWARE, WE ARE DEALING HERE ESSENTIALLY WITH STONE-GE, ILLITERATE TRIBAL GROUPS WHOSE HORIZONS ARE STRICTLY LIMITED AND WHO WOULD BE UNABLE TO GRASP ALTERNATIVES INVOLVED IN FREE PLEBISCITE. FREE ELECTION AMONG GROUPS SUCH AS THIS WOULD BE MUCH MORE OF A FARCE THAN ANY RIGGED MECHANISM INDONESIA COULD DEVISE, AND ORTIZ SANZ HIMSELF SEEMS AWARE OF THIS. (IN LATTER CONNECTION, WE APPRECIATE USEFUL CONVERSATION WHICH JACK CATES OF USUN HAD WITH ORTIZ SANZ.) NOR DO

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WE BELIEVE MALIK' "APUAN COUNCIL" SHOULD BE REJECTED OUT OF HAND. NOT ONLY DOES THIS SEEM TO BE BEST WAY YET SUGGESTED OUT OF DILEMMA FACING INDONESIANS AND DUTCH, BUT IT HAS ADDED ADVANTAGES OF GIVING WEST IRIANS CHANCE TO OFFER CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS ON FUTURE OF AREA. IS MALIK SEES IT, THEY WOULD NOT BE LIMITED MERELY TO VOTING YES OR NO AND ESTABLISHES CONTINUING ORGANIZATION THROUGH WHICH THESE VIEWS CAN BE HEARD. AS WE SEE IT, THESE WOULD BE NO SMALL ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
Ambassador Ortiz Sanz, U.N. Representative for the implementation of the New York Agreement on West Irian, has just returned from an orientation visit of one month in West Irian. A fair amount of publicity has surrounded Ortiz Sanz since his arrival in Indonesia, much of it sponsored by ultra-nationalist groups voicing apprehensions that Ortiz Sanz has come to Indonesia to "interfere" in Indonesia's internal affairs. This reflects the fairly widely held view in military and other circles in Indonesia that West Irian is a sovereign part of Indonesia and that therefore there is no need for any determination of popular wishes. Underlying this sentiment, of course, is the multi-year agitation during the Sukarno period against the New York Agreement and any outside intervention in West Irian affairs.

Ortiz Sanz has handled his role adroitly. He made it clear to the press on his arrival and in subsequent publicly reported statements that he was in Indonesia solely to assist the Indonesian Government in fulfilling the obligations it had undertaken under the New York Agreement. He has been circumspect in his comments and has earned the respect of most of the officials with whom he is dealing. In private, he has sought to impress upon the Indonesians the necessity, from the point of view of Indonesian interests, for a sincere and
honest implementation of the New York Agreement that will withstand the scrutiny of the United Nations and international opinion. He has moreover pointed to the almost certain prospect of continuing insurrection and international agitation against Indonesia if the GOI should flaunt the intent of the New York Agreement and seek arbitrarily to impose its will upon the Irianese people.

Ortiz Sanz has established close rapport and a commendable degree of mutual understanding on the means to be employed in the implementation of the New York Agreement with President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik, and other top officials of the GOI. He recognizes, however, the importance of oppositionist elements, principally concentrated in the Indonesian military, and he is sensitive to the political pressures that will be brought against President Suharto and the Foreign Minister in the critical year to come. He is therefore attempting to devise a formula for an "act of free choice" in West Irian which will result in affirmation of Indonesian sovereignty but which will also represent a fair reflection of the people's desires and will stand the test of international opinion. The achievement of this difficult objective will require inter alia some kind of arrangement for continuing international support of the social and economic development of the Irianese people.

On October 2, U.N. Representative Ortiz Sanz gave me a rundown on his activities and his thinking in connection with his role in West Irian. Ortiz has just returned from his initial visit to West Irian and about October 7 will be going back there accompanied by his wife and staff for a stay of four months, during which he hopes to explore means of carrying out the "act of free choice".

Ortiz is determined to arrange a credible "act of free choice" in West Irian that will meet the obligations of the U.N. and stand the scrutiny of international opinion. He has convinced at least certain important elements in the GOI that only such a procedure could result in the kind of solution of the West Irian problem that the GOI itself expects. Any deviation from a credible implementation of the New York Agreement will almost certainly, in his opinion, present the GOI with a serious problem of internal subversion in Irian itself, not to mention the discredit that the country will earn in the international community.

Ortiz Sanz says there are two principal schools of thought in the GOI regarding the "act of free choice". A small group of top leaders headed by Adam Malik, including Ambassador Soedarwo, and President Suharto agree with Ortiz that a straightforward and sincere implementation of the New York Agreement is required and Ortiz claims they are lending their full support to an effort to assure that this is obtained. The other school of thought, represented by "the military", regards West Irian as
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having already returned to Indonesian sovereignty and that therefore any further determination of the people regarding their future is irrelevant. The latter point of view is also sustained by radical Muslim groups, residual Sukarnoist forces, and some nationalists. The position of the Malik forces supporting a credible act of free choice is made delicate by the uncertain degree of calculated risk in GOI acceptance of an open expression of choice on the part of the Irian people. Malik is prepared to accept this risk but is of course eager to see the margin of uncertainty reduced as much as possible through the formula that will be devised to register the peoples' choice.

Ortiz has had some difficulty in establishing terms of reference for his activities. The New York Agreement calls upon him to identify eligible voters, both male and female, and to see that their expression of "free choice" is implemented "in accordance with international practices". He said this is obviously an absurdity because at the present stage of development of the West Irian people, no procedure of voting can really accord with international precedents or practices. The Agreement, furthermore, calls for him to "participate" in the act, which he has defined as meaning (a) that he is present in the area one year prior to the implementation of the act of choice and (b) that he undertakes to "improve" to the extent possible the procedures designed by the Indonesian Government to fulfill their responsibilities under the New York Agreement.

He intends to exert influence on the Indonesian Government by presenting recommendations in various levels of acceptability. He first intends to recommend that the GOI implement the act through a formula of one man, one vote in the inhabited coastal areas of West Irian, and by testing tribal sentiment through a carefully supervised process of musjawarah (reasoning together toward a consensus) in each tribal area. He does not believe the GOI will accept this and he is prepared next to recommend the formation of a constituent assembly to be composed of the members of the present local councils (there are eight councils with 25 members each), supplemented by (a) a one percent representation of the population at large, namely 700, or (b) a one-half percent representation, or 350. He believes an assembly in the neighborhood of 500 to 600 members would constitute a representative body for the Irian population as a whole. He expects some difficulty in selling this concept to the GOI but he noted that Soedjarwo is in agreement in principle, and has already conceded that perhaps a body of as many as 200 representatives might be required to represent the population. Soedjarwo initially suggested the Provincial Legislative Council which numbered 60.

Ortiz would be prepared to accept election to this Constituent Assembly on the basis of musjawarah in the populated coastal areas with the addition

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to the Assembly of already recognized tribal leaders from the highland areas. He will recommend that the entire process of selection of the members of the assembly be implemented in the full glare of publicity with adequate representation of the U.N. at hand at every step as well as members of the international press. The act of choice, itself, he believes, should take place in greatest solemnity and with full international publicity so that there would be no question that the GOI had sincerely discharged its responsibility to test the wishes of the West Irian people.

Ortiz recognizes that the problem facing both him and the GOI is the risk that the Irian representatives, however they might be constituted, would vote against remaining in Indonesia. He concedes that it would be inconceivable from the point of view of the interests of the U.N. as well as GOI, that a result other than the continuance of West Irian within Indonesian sovereignty should emerge. As he said, "Who else wants to take on the West Irian problem?" To perhaps guide the West Irian representatives towards an acceptance of their destiny within the Indonesian nation, Ortiz believes there must be some formula for a continuing international contribution to the social and economic development of the West Irian people. Ortiz said he was deeply moved by his contacts with the primitive Iriane and he feels that the international community cannot renounce its responsibility for assisting them in years to come.

His present plan is to shoot for the "act of free choice" no later than September 1969. The New York Agreement required his presence in West Irian one year before the act was to take place; he arrived in Irian on August 23, 1968, therefore he believes that September would be an appropriate time for implementation. He would thereafter complete his report for the UNSYG and U.N. General Assembly and would recommend to the SYG that the report be submitted to the GA sometime towards the end of the 1969 session in order to avoid continuing, possibly contentious, debate if the report were delivered earlier in the UNGA session.

Ortiz has achieved good working relations with Ambassador Soedjarwo. When he first arrived in Indonesia there was an effort to restrict him to Djakarta. Indeed the GOI embarrassed him by providing two large buildings for his use: (1) a residence much too large for him and his wife, and (2) an office building which Ortiz said "could accommodate the American Embassy". He immediately made it clear, however, that he intended to spend most of his time in West Irian itself, a position that was accepted by Malik and Soedjarwo.
Ortiz regards his assignment as clearly the most difficult he has ever faced; not only must he try to fulfill his responsibilities to the U.N. but he must maintain his bona fides with the GOI. He is sensitive to the political pressures that are exerted on the GOI on the emotional West Irian issue and recognizes that while President Suharto for the time being is supporting Malik and Ortiz in their general approach to the problem, circumstances could change which would swing the President to the other side. Ortiz would regard this as a calamity. He entered a plea that all friendly missions with interest in West Irian and with access to Indonesian leaders should try to exert constructive influence in underlining to the Indonesians the vital importance from the point of view of their own basic interest of a credible implementation of the New York Agreement.

COMMENT: Ortiz has made an excellent impression in the Indonesian community. He is clearly a man of stature and understanding. While straightforward, he has managed to establish his credentials as being basically a friend of Indonesia, acting on behalf of the GOI to achieve a solution for a knotty problem that will be acceptable not only to the GOI and the West Irian people but will sustain the international reputation of Indonesia. Ortiz' plans, as reported in this airgram, should be carefully protected. They must not, under any circumstances, be revealed to Indonesians.

LYDMAN

[Signature]
Page 01

DJAKARI 00077 040242Z

91

ACTION EA 15

INFO EUR 15 10 13 E 15 AID 28 CU 04 CIAE 00 DODE 00 GPM 04 H 02

INR 07 L03 NSC 10 P 04 RSC 01 SP 02 SS 20 USIA 12 NSA 02 RSR 01

1158 W

RE: 0310452Z JAN 69

FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8600

INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USUN 218

CI: N FM D E N T I A L DJAKARTA 077

SUBJ: WEST IRIAN

1. IN A TWO-HOUR DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL SECURITY AND

POLITICAL PROBLEMS WITH INTERIOR MINISTER BASUKI RACHMAT

TODAY, HE DISCLOSED GOVERNMENT'S LATEST THINKING WITH REGARD

TO CARRYING OUT OF NEW YORK AGREEMENT.

2. HE PREFACED HIS REMARKS BY STRESSING THAT ONE-MAN, ONE-

VOTE APPROACH WHICH SOME OUTSIDERS HAD RECOMMENDED WAS OF

 COURSE IMPOSSIBLE IN PRIMITIVE CONDITIONS OF WEST IRIAN.

WHAT GOVERNMENT NOW PROPOSES TO DO IS TO ASSEMBLE WEST

IRIANESE MEMBERS OF THE 8 LOCAL COUNCILS OF WEST IRIAN (THERE

ARE ABOUT 15 WEST IRIANESE OUT OF 25 TOTAL MEMBERSHIP IN

EACH OF THESE 8 COUNCILS) PLUS THE 30 EAST IRIANESE MEMBERS

OF THE 40-MAN REGIONAL COUNCIL AT SUKARNAPURA, PLUS ABOUT

40 TRIBAL LEADERS AT SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY NEXT SUMMER

THESE 280 OR SO WEST IRIANESE REPRESENTATIVES WOULD CONGREGATE

IN SUKARNAPURA WHERE THEY WOULD DRAW UP A STATEMENT CONCERNING

DESIRE OF WEST IRIANESE PEOPLE AND THEIR POLITICAL FUTURE.

STATEMENT WOULD PROBABLY CALL FOR CONTINUATION OF WEST

IRIANS IN INDONESIAN REPUBLIC BUT MIGHT ALSO CALL UPON

INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO DO MORE IN WAY OF ECONOMIC

ASSISTANCE AND MAKE SIMILAR PLEA FOR ECONOMIC AID FROM UN

AND ELSEWHERE. BASUKI SEEMED CONFIDENT ABOUT RECEIVING
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PAGE 02. DJAKAR 00077 040242Z

STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FROM THESE REPRESENTATIVES, MOST OF WHOM ARE KNOWN TO BE SUPPORTERS OF GOVERNMENT (HE DIDN'T SAY SO, BUT SOME HAVE BEEN RECIPIENTS OF FAVORS, INCLUDING TRIBAL CHIEFS WHO HAVE BEEN WINED AND DINED IN DJAKARTA IN COURSE OF PAST YEAR).

3. WHEN I ASKED WHAT ORTIZ SANZ' REACTION WAS TO THIS APPROACH, HE SAID THAT GOI HAD NOT DISCUSSED IT WITH HIM. HE GAVE ME TO UNDERSTAND THAT ORTIZ SANZ IS LINGERING ON LONGER THAN EXPECTED IN WEST IRIAN AND THAT GOI WISHES HE WOULD SPEND MORE TIME IN DJAKARTA. HOWEVER, AS FAR AS BASUKI WAS AWARE, ORTIZ SANZ IS UNDERSTANDING OF PROBLEM AND OF ISSUES AT STAKE. IN SHORT, HE FELT THAT ORTIZ SANZ WOULD GO ALONG WITH ABOVE FORMULATION WHICH SHOULD APPEAL TO ANYONE FAMILIAR WITH CONDITIONS IN WEST IRIAN.

4. BASUKI WAS PLEASED OVER "NEGOTIATIONS" THAT HAD LED YESTERDAY TO SURRENDER OF LODEWIJK MANDATJAN, PROMINENT LEADER OF A DISSIDENT GROUP IN VOGELKOP AREA. BASUKI SAID THAT GOVERNMENT'S INTENTIONS TO CARRY OUT NEW YORK AGREEMENT AND GIVE GREATER LOCAL AUTHORITY TO WEST IRIANESE HAD BEEN HELPFUL IN CONVINCING MANDATJAN THAT HE SHOULD GIVE UP STRUGGLE. THIS SURRENDER WOULD DEFLECT THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT CONSIDERABLY.

5. SARWO EDHIE'S VISIT TO AUSTRALIAN SIDE OF NEW GUINEA HAD BEEN A SUCCESS, ACCORDING TO BASUKI. SARWO EDHIE HAD JUST REPORTED BACK TO DJAKARTA WHERE HE HAD DEPICTED AUSTRALIAN NEW GUINEA AS BETTER OFF ECONOMICALLY THAN INDONESIA'S WEST IRIAN BUT THAT LATTER IS BETTER OFF POLITICALLY AND SPIRITUALLY (WHATEVER THAT MEANS). BECAUSE OF THIS "BALANCE," SARWO EDHIE FAVORS INCREASING CONTACTS BETWEEN BOTH HALVES OF THE WORLD'S LARGEST ISLAND, STARTING WITH CULTURAL EXCHANGES (E.G. DANCE GROUPS) AND SPORTS (SOCCER). GP 4.

GREEN.
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01  DJAKAR 00396  171115Z

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE: 00/070 W

R 171045Z JAN 69
FM AMBASSAD DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8739
INFO USMISSION USUN
AMBASSAD THE HAGUE

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 396

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN

1. ORTIZ-SANZ TOLD ME JAN 17 IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD INFORMED U THAT THE "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" COULD NOT BE CARRIED OUT IN WEST IRIAN "ACCORDING TO INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE", I.E., ONE MAN ONE VOTE. HE THEREFORE RECOMMENDED SECGEN BRING DUTCH AND INDONESIAN TOGETHER TO WORK OUT A REALISTIC INTERPRETATION. ORTIZ-SANZ THINKS SECGEN ALREADY HAS DISCUSSED PROBLEM WITH DUTCH AND INDOES IN NEW YORK AND AMBASSADOR SUJARWO MAY NOW BE IN HOLLAND FOR BILATERAL TALKS WITH DUTCH.

2. SUJARWO MAY ALSO BE SEEKING DUTCH CONCURRENCE TO HOLD "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" ON OR BEFORE INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE DAY, AUGUST 17. ACCORDING TO NEW YORK AGREEMENT, "ACT" CANNOT BE HELD PRIOR TO AUGUST 24 (ONE YEAR AFTER ARRIVAL OF UN REP ON SCENE) BUT ORTIZ-SANZ SEES NO DIFFICULTY IN SHIFT IF DUTCH AGREE.

3. ORTIZ IS OPTIMISTIC "ACT OF FREE CHOICE" WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCEPTABLE MANNER BUT IS KEEPING PRESSURE ON GOI TO ASSURE PROCEDURES DO NOT DISTORT "PRINCIPLE" OF FREE CHOICE. HE BELIEVES HE HAS COMMITMENT FROM GOI TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS EARLY MARCH WITH THE EIGHT REGIONAL COUNCILS CONCERNING PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED. IN MEANTIME ORTIZ IS URGING GOI TO ACCEPT "ONE MAN ONE VOTE" IN COASTAL CITIES AND FORMULA FOR DETERMINING CHOICE OF TRIBAL PEOPLES THROUGH DESIGNATED LEADERS OR "MUSJAWANAH". ALTERNATIVES WOULD BE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUENT COUNCIL OF PERHAPS THOUSAND MEMBERS, CONSISTING OF EXISTING REGIONAL COUNCILS, LEADERS ON TRIBAL REGIONS AND MEMBERS APPOINTED...
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 DJAKAR 00396 1711152

TO REPRESENT SPECIAL INTERESTS, E.G. UNIVERSITY, FUNCTIONAL GROUPS, BUSINESS, ETC. (COMMENT: ORTIZ LEFT THE IMPRESSION HE WAS FLEXIBLE ON PROCEDURES BUT THAT HE WOULD KEEP PRESSURE ON GOI FOR MOST DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION FEASIBLE).

4. ORTIZ CONCERNED THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW YORK AGREEMENT MAY COME UNDER ATTACK WHEN FINALLY REPORTED TO UNGA. HE THEREFORE THINKING OF SUBMITTING REPORT IN NOVEMBER SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL DECEMBER WHEN GA SHOULD BE PREOCCUPIED WITH OTHER ISSUES AND ANXIOUS TO ADJOURN. TO HELP SOFTEN COMMUNIST BLOC AND LEFT WING GOVERNMENTS, HE HAS ASKED FOR LEGAL ADVISOR FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO JOIN HIS STAFF AND A CZECH HAS BEEN ASSIGNED.

5. IN GENERAL, ORTIZ GAVE CLEAR IMPRESSION HE PLEASED WITH COOPERATION FROM GOI AND IMPRESSED WITH WHAT INDO CIVILIAN AND MILITARY DOING IN WEST IRIAN. HE OBVIOUSLY TOUCHED BY LONG RANGE NEEDS OF PAPUANS AND LIKELY RECOMMEND CONTINUED INTER. NATIONAL SPECIAL ASSISTANCE FOR THESE PEOPLE.

GP-3. LYDMAN
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 01 CANBER 00749 060637Z

ACTION EA 15

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, 10 13, RSR 01 094 W

R 060605Z FEB 69
FM AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
TO SECMST WASHDC 3422
INFO AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
CINCPAC

UNCLAS CANBERRA 749
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: SUHARTO PRONOUNCEMENT ON WEST IRIAN SELF-DETERMINATION: AUSTRALIAN PRESS REACTION

1. AUSTRALIAN PRESS REACTED SHARPLY ON FEB 5 AGAINST PRESIDENT SUHARTO'S STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 3 TO EFFECT THAT ANY DECISION BY WEST IRIAN TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM INDONESIA WOULD BE TREASON.

2. DAILY TELEGRAPH: "INDONESIA HAS NO MORAL, GEOGRAPHIC, ETHNIC OR HISTORICAL RIGHT TO CLAIM WEST NEW GUINEA AS ITS PROPERTY, EXCEPT BY A CLEAR DECISION OF THE INHABITANTS...EVERYTHING PRESIDENT SUHARTO SAYS--AND EVERYTHING THE AFRICAN AND RUSSIAN DELEGATES DON'T SAY--MAKE IT ALL THE MORE IMPERATIVE THAT THIS YEAR'S PLEBISCITE SHOULD BE UNDER THE STRICTEST UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION."

3. CANBERRA TIMES, WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT IT WILL BE MORE IN AUSTRALIA'S INTEREST THAT WEST IRIAN BE RESPONSIBILITY OF A FRIENDLY NEIGHBOR RATHER THAN THAT IT SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OR UN-SUPERVISED NATION WITH IMPOSSIBLE ECONOMY, FELT THAT OBVIOUSLY RIGGED AND MANAGED ACT OF SELF-DETERMINATION PRESENTS AUSTRALIA WITH MORAL DILEMMA: "TO ACCEPT IN WEST IRIAN THAT WHICH WE SAY WE OPPOSE UNDER ARMS IN VIETNAM.

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WOULD BE HYPOCRISY... AUSTRALIA MUST STATE ITS BELIEF THAT PRINCIPLE AT RISK IS OF GREAT AND BASIC IMPORTANCE, AND THAT EVEN AT THIS LATE STAGE INDONESIA SHOULD ABANDON ANY THOUGHT OF INTIMIDATION OR MANIPULATION IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE THE REAL WISHES OF PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN."

"IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN WILL FINALLY VOTE FOR MORE PROMISING FUTURE WITH REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA. BUT ONUS LIES HEAVILY ON PRESENT INDONESIAN GOVERNMENT TO SEE THAT THEY ARE AT LEAST GIVEN THE SHADOW OF A CHOICE." CROOK
CONFIDENTIAL  004

PAGE 01  DJAKAR: 02381  2207212

18.
ACTION: EA. 15

INFO: EUR: 17, 10, 13, CIAE: 00, DOD: 00, JPM. 06, H. 02, INR: 07, L. 03, NSAE: 00,
NSC: 10, P: 04, RSC: 01, SP: 02, SS: 20, USIA: 12, AID: 28, SRR: 01, 139, W

R: 220605Z, APR; 69
FM: AMBASSADY DJAKARTA
TO: SECSTATE: WASHDC: 9668
INFO: AMBASSADY CANBERRA
AMBASSADY THE HAGUE
USUN: NEW YORK: 257
AMCONSUL: MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA


SUBJECT: WEST IRIAN: ONE MAN - ONE VOTE DEMONSTRATION: IN DJAJAPURA.


1. MISSIONARY AVIATION FELLOWSHIP CHIEF PILOT, AN AMERICAN (PROTECT SOURCE), TOLD EMBOFF: APRIL 21 OF ONE MAN - ONE VOTE DEMONSTRATION: IN DJAJAPURA. ON EARLY MORNING; OF APRIL 14, THE DAY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, AMIR MACHMUD, AND PARTY ARRIVED IN THAT CITY. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, OPM (ORGANIZATION FOR FREE PAPUA) CAILRES COLLECTED SUPPORTERS: IN TRUCKS DURING PRE-DAWN HOURS OF APRIL 14 AND GATHERED IN FRONT OF RESIDENCE OF U.S EMBASSY DIRECTOR SANZ AND MARCHED TO GOVERNOR'S RESIDENCE CARRYING PLACARDS CALLING FOR FREE ELECTION ON: ONE MAN - ONE VOTE PRINCIPLES. GROUP REPORTEDLY NUMBERING 1000 PERSONS THEN MARCHED INTO DOWNTOWN DJAJAPURA. SOURCE SAID MILITARY COMMAND WAS COMPLETELY UNPREPARED FOR DEMONSTRATION: ALTHOUGH EXTRA TROOPS HAD BEEN BROUGHT INTO DJAJAPURA FOR MACHMUD'S VISIT, ONE SHOOTING INCIDENT OCCURRED WHEN APPARENTLY NERVOUS TROOPS FIRED ON DEMONSTRATORS: ACCORDING TO REPORT, ONE PERSON WAS INJURED. DEMONSTRATION BROKE UP PEACEFULLY IN LATE MORNING: HOURS PRIOR TO MACHMUD PARTY'S ARRIVAL. ALTHOUGH A SMALL GROUP OF DEMONSTRATORS LESS THAN 100, APPEARED AT AIRPORT AND WAVED PLACARDS.
CONFIDENTIAL:

PAGE 02 DJAKARTA 2381 220721Z

2. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, MILITARY COMMANDER SARWO EDHIE PASSED ORDER AFTER GROUP HAD ASSEMBLED NOT TO RESTRAIN DEMONSTRATORS. SOURCE COMMENTED FURTHER THAT SARWO EDHIE HAS NOT ATTEMPTED TO INTERFERE WITH OPM-BACKED ACTIVITIES IN HOPE THEY WOULD RUN THEIR COURSE AND ALSO TO FORESTALL CHARGES FROM OUTSIDERS THAT GOVERNMENT IS REPRESSING IRISI, COMMENT ON OTHER HAND GOI HAS BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE ANY PUBLICITY TO THIS DEMONSTRATION AND SOURCE'S REPORT PROVIDED FIRST DETAILS OF INCIDENT TO REACH EMBASSY. ACCORDING TO RUMOR, SARWO EDHIE REACTED TO SHOOTING INCIDENT BY CALLING IN THREE SOLDIERS RESPONSIBLE AND PERSONALLY STRIPPING THEM OF THEIR RANK.

3. EXCEPT FOR APRIL 14 INCIDENT, SOURCE STATED MACHMUD'S VISIT PROCEEDED PEACEABLY AND ON SCHEDULE. SECURITY PREPARATIONS AND PRECAUTIONS WERE AS GREAT AS WHEN SUKARNO VISITED WEST IRAN. SPEULATING ON POLITICAL EFFECT OF THIS DEMONSTRATION AND OPM AGITATION IN GENERAL, SOURCE BELIEVED FAVORABLE TO GOI.

OUTCOME OF ACT OF FREE CHOICE WOULD NOT BE AFFECTED IN LONG RUN, HE SAID THAT INTERIOR WAS QUIET, ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF EVENTS IN VOGELSCHILD AREA.

4. SECOND SOURCE, LIM BIAN KIE, MEMBER OF BRIG. GEN. ALI MURTOPO'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS STAFF, TOLD EMBOFF DEMONSTRATION OCCURRED ON APRIL 12 OR 13 AND THAT IN ADDITION TO OPM IT WAS ORGANIZED BY FRITS KIRINHO, PNI FIGURE, WHO REPORTEDLY TRIED RECENTLY TO TAKE OVER P.T. IRAN BAKTI (SEE PAGE 8, REF B) AND KORWA (POSSIBLY AGUS JOHANNIS KORKA, HEAD OF CHRISTIAN WORKERS ASSOCIATION) WHO LIM SAYS HAS DESIGNS ON GOVERNORSHIP. LIM CONFIRMED SIZE OF DEMONSTRATION IN TOWN BUT UNABLE TO CONFIRM REPORT OF AIRPORT DEMONSTRATION. LIM INCLINED TO DOWNPLAY SERIOUSNESS OF DEMONSTRATION AND BELIEVES GOI PLANS WOULD NOT BE DISRUPTED THEREBY.

5. COMMENT: WE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH BOTH SOURCES THAT THIS TYPE OF ACTIVITY IS NOT LIKELY TO HAVE SERIOUS EFFECT ON GOI PLANS FOR CONSUMMATION OF ACT OF FREE CHOICE. HOWEVER, GOI AUTHORITIES LIKELY TO BE MORE ALERT IN FUTURE TO INSURE SUCH DEMONSTRATIONS ARE CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED.

GP 3

LYDMAN CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: Ambassador Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Act of Free Choice in West Irian (UNRWA)
Robert F. Slutz, Jr., First Secretary
Alphonse F. Laporta, Second Secretary and Consul

Date and Place: April 25, 1969, Office of Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz

The Ambassador had returned about ten days ago from West Irian and will return to West Irian again in early May for his third prolonged visit to observe the final stage in carrying out the Act of Free Choice.

During the conversation the Ambassador emphasized several times that his job was only to observe and provide advice to the Indonesian Government on the carrying out of the Act. He refused to comment about political conditions in the area, relationships between the civil and military authorities, or on the exact procedure which will be followed in implementing the Act. Concerning the latter, he stressed that this was entirely in the hands of the Indonesians themselves and that his role was confined strictly to advice which they may or may not adopt. On the other hand, it was obvious from his comments that he was keeping a meticulous record of the advice he was proffering and the number of times and occasions when his advice was given. He seemed a bit pessimistic about the outcome of this operation. There was little doubt in his mind that the verdict when announced would incorporate West Irian into the Republic of Indonesia. He is still concerned that Foreign Minister Malik had not accepted his advice at least to try the one man-one vote formula in several of the coastal towns. The Ambassador said that Malik’s response to his urging was that if the Indonesian Government did adopt that procedure it would also have to adopt the one man-one vote formula for the upcoming national elections in 1971; according to the Ambassador, the GOI did not plan to do that.

He has also urged that Article 22 of the New York Agreement providing for the right of assembly and freedom of speech be observed in West Irian. Again he referred to Foreign Minister Malik who, according to the Ambassador, had replied that the GOI would have to allow the same privileges and rights in other parts of Indonesia if it were to grant them in West Irian. Malik is alleged to have said that if such concessions were made the GOI would be facing rebellion from various parts of the country within fifteen days. (Comment: This sounds more like an editorial comment by the Ambassador than a quote from Malik.)
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On the matter of Article 22 and the one man-one vote issue, the Ambassador indicated that the carrying out of the Act of Free Choice in West Irian is being complicated by journalistic pyrotechnics which seek to embarrass the Indonesian Government. He said that the ideals written into the New York Agreement several years ago were in many instances unrealistic in their application to Indonesia in general, which has not espoused many of the tenets of Western "pure democracy," and West Irian in particular, the majority of whose population cannot possibly understand voting, democracy, the United Nations or the outside world.

The Ambassador appeared convinced that at least 25 African states would not accept the Act of Free Choice under the present arrangements being made by the GOI. He added that probably ten Arab states would take the same position.

When queried about the attitude of the Arab states in contrast to the Indonesians' belief they had a special relationship with the Arabs, he completely dismissed the Indonesian belief as illusory when applied to this matter. In his report to the Secretary-General, the Ambassador said he would only record the carrying out of the Act and the advice he gave to the GOI; he said he would make no conclusions and that each member state of the UN would have to decide for itself whether the Act were acceptable under the terms of the New York Agreement.

The Ambassador claims to have travelled more than 14,000 miles throughout West Irian in carrying out his assignment to observe. Tribal villages which he has visited were so primitive that he would not even consider them to have achieved a stone-age culture. He appeared deeply impressed by the hard work and dedication of the missionaries who were devoting their lives to helping these tribesmen. He is thoroughly convinced of the absolute impossibility of obtaining any judgment whatsoever from these primitive, child-like people.

He dismissed completely the notion that any of the so-called rebels were agitating for independence. He is convinced they were simply expressing a preference for Dutch authority over that of Indonesian. He said that the few Irianese leaders abroad were not true spokesmen of the people, but in fact were in the pay of certain Dutch elements.

He carefully pointed out that the New York Agreement does not specify precisely who is to participate in the Act. He sees no violation of the letter of the Agreement if ethnic Indonesians resident in West Irian were to participate in the Act.

His estimate of the number of Indonesian troops in West Irian is approximately 4,000. They were at present engaged primarily in preventing any outburst of the armed rebels into the populated coastal areas. He believes that if the Indonesian authorities wished to wipe out the rebellion it could be mopped up within three months, notwithstanding the difficult terrain, and provided the Indonesians had the funds to support such a military effort. His estimate of the number of Papuans under arms is 200 or 300, armed with World War I Mauser rifles, spears, and arrows.
CONFIDENTIAL

The Ambassador dismissed the idea that all Papuans are potential rebels and a security threat to the GOI. He noted that, as primitives, the Papuans in the highlands where the armed rebels have their sanctuary are naturally suspicious of any foreigner and normally roam about armed with spears, clubs and poisoned arrows. Again, he criticized the journalists for inflating the size and extent of the insurgency and its political importance.

The Ambassador said he would shortly propose to Malik that the GOI grant a general amnesty to political prisoners sometime prior to the final expression of the Act of Free Choice. He said, however, that he had little hope his suggestion would be adopted by the GOI, considering the non-receptivity to his other advice and the likelihood that there would be demands for amnesty in other areas of Indonesia on other political issues.

When asked if he would object to the Consul calling on his chief observer during his forthcoming trip to West Irian, the Ambassador said it might be better not to visit the UNRWI office in Djayapura but that a social meeting could be arranged. By way of explanation, the Ambassador said it might not be beneficial for the U.S. to take more than a routine interest in UNRWI, lest the USG be drawn into the politics of the Act. He said the Indonesians and their political opposition in West Irian could easily get the wrong impression from a formal call by the Consul on the UNRWI Mission.
TO: Department of State
INFO: CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, USUN, CINCPAC FOR POLAD, MEDAN, SURABAYA

FROM: Amembassy DJAKARTA
DATE: May 2, 1969

SUBJECT: West Irian: Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz on the Act of Free Choice

REF: (A) Djakarta's A-69 of February 19, 1969
(B) Djakarta's A-803 of October 4, 1968

The sole enclosure is a memorandum of conversation with Ambassador Fernando Ortiz-Sanz, Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Act of Free Choice in West Irian (UNWVI).

As compared with his statements in earlier conversations (see refs) the Ambassador appeared to be considerably less bullish concerning his role in encouraging the GOI to hold a meaningful and internationally-acceptable Act of self-determination and noted, with some regret, (1) the refusal of the Indonesians to accept a one-man-one-vote formula for at least the coastal towns of West Irian, (2) the lack of full freedom of speech and assembly, and (3) the unlikelihood that the GOI would accept his proposal for a general amnesty prior to conclusion of the Act. The conversation was also notable for his obvious unwillingness to comment on the economic and political situation in West Irian, questions on which he had been forthcoming in earlier conversations.

On the positive side, the Ambassador concluded that there is little doubt that the Act will be decided in favor of West Irian's continued inclusion in the Indonesian Republic, there being no viable alternative to such a course. The Ambassador estimated that the threat of real insurgency against the GOI was quite slim and that the concept of a

Enclosure: ct
Memorandum of Conversation
large-scale Papuan revolt against the Indonesians has been nurtured by unscrupulous foreign newspaper reporters. Regarding irresponsible press reports that the GOI is suppressing civil liberties in West Irian and is not living up to the spirit of the New York Agreement, the Ambassador believed that the GOI was applying the same general restrictions on political activity, mass meetings, press freedom, direct voting, and other civil liberties in West Irian as are applied in other areas of Indonesia.

The Embassy is unable to assess the Ambassador's view that at least 25 African and ten Arab nations will not accept the results of the Act as it is now being carried out by the GOI. The Embassy would appreciate receiving any information available concerning the likely reaction of other UN members and the activities of the Indonesian UN delegation or the Indonesian Embassy in obtaining support for the Act.

It is obvious from the tenor of the Ambassador's remarks that the active role he envisaged for the UNHMI mission in influencing the GOI has been blunted in recent months and that his grand plans have been circumscribed and his activities limited strictly to an observer/advisory function.

A foreign correspondent in Djakarta claims to have reliable information from New York that the Ambassador in fact tendered his resignation some time ago but it was not accepted.

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POL 19 West Irian

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 058

PAGE 01 Djakari 02827 081147Z

51

ACTION: EA 15

INFO: OCT 01 EUR 17/10 13 CIAE 00 DOD 00 JPM 04 H 02 INR 07 L 03

NSAE 00 NSC 10 P 04 RSC 01 SP 02 SS 20 USIA 12 AID 28 OPR 02

NIC 01 RBR 01/1/43 W

R: 081055Z May 69

FM: AMBASSAD0Y Djakarta

TO: SECESTAE: WASHDC 9855

INFO: AMBASSAD0Y CANBERRA

AMBASSAD0Y THE HAGUE

AMCONSUL MEDAN

AMCONSUL SURABAYA

USMISSION USUN

CINCPAC 177

CONFIDENTIAL FOR POLAD

SUBJ: WEST IRIAN: DISTURBANCES

REF: Djakarta 2805

A CLEARER PICTURE HAS EMERGED OF EVENTS IN WEST IRIAN.

CONFUSION AND SPECULATION IN GOVERNMENT AND PRESS CIRCLES MARKED
SECOND WORKDAY AFTER AUSTRALIAN BROADCASTING (ABC) REPORT
ON ENAROTALI INCIDENT AND BIAK FIGHTING. IN CURIOSITY TWIST,

FOHMING MALIK ADMITTED IN HURRIED QUESTIONING MAY 8 BY PRESS
INCLUDING ABC THAT INDONESIAN MILITARY HAD INDEED ATTACKED
TROUBLEMAKERS AT ENAROTALI AIRSTRIP (NOT TOWN). WITH ROCKETS
FIRED FROM B-52 BOMBER MALIK FOLLOWED THIS TURNABOUT FROM HIS
AND OTHER PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS BY ASSERTING
ROCKETS CONTAINED ONLY FIRECRACKERS AND WERE DESIGNED TO
SCARE THOSE WHO HAD SEIZED AIRFIELD. IN STATEMENT
MAY 7 TO PRESS MALIK DISMISSED IDEA THAT 30,000
TRIBESMEN ROSE IN REBELLION IN ENAROTALI AREA WHERE,
WE SAID, "IT IS DIFFICULT TO GATHER TOGETHER 1000
PERSONS." ALSO COMMENTING ON ENAROTALI INCIDENT, INFO

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02: DJAKAR: 02827 081147Z

MINISTRY SAID ELEMENTS OF ENAROTAI POPULATION HAVE BEEN MANIPULATED FROM ABROAD TO OPPOSE GOI WEST IRIAN GOVERNOR KASIEPO NOW VISITING DJAKARTA TOLD DAILY SINAR HARAPAN THAT ENAROTAI INCIDENT CAUSED BY FRP PAPUA MOVEMENT (OPM) AGITATORS AND LOCAL DISSATISFACTION ENGENDERED BY GOVERNMENT FAILURE TO BUILD ROAD FROM INTERIOR TO TOWN OF NABIRE ON COAST.

2. REGARDING BIAK FIGHTING ABC BUREAU CHIEF TOLD EMBOFFS HIS INDOONESIAN CORRESPONDENT IS FIRM ON CERTAIN POINTS: (A) THAT DEATH OF SIX IRIANESE AND ONE INDOONESIAN MARINE WERE CONFIRMED BY GOVERNMENT; THOUGH ADMITTEDLY LOW-LEVEL SOURCES IN BIAK (B) 167 IRIANESE HAVE BEEN ROUNDED UP BY POLICE SINCE MID-APRIL ON SUSPICION OF OPM AGITATION; AND (C) MANY IRIANESE, INCLUDING NUMBER OF OPM PARTY MEMBERS WHO ARE EMPLOYEES OF REGIONAL AIRLINE MERPATI NUSANTARA, HAVE LEFT COASTAL TOWNS TO SEEK REFUGE AND REGROUP IN HILLS IN NORTHERN PART OF ISLAND IN SUPPORT OF ABC REPORT AUSTRALIAN EMBOFF SAID AMB. SUJARNO ADMITTED IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH FOREIGN CORRESPONDENT MAY 7 THAT FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN BIAK AND CONFIRMED SEVEN SEATHS.

3. INFO MIN BUDIARDJO HELD CLOSED BRIEFING FOR MEMBERS OF INDONESIAN PRESS MAY 8 IN WHICH HE STATED THAT GOI HAS EVIDENCE OPM CELLS ARE OPERATING ALL OVER WEST IRIAN AND EXPRESSED GOI DETERMINATION TO ROUND UP AGITATORS INFO MINISTRY IN LATE AFTERNOON STATEMENT MAY 8 REPORTEDLY IMPOSED BAN ON JOURNALISTS TRAVEL TO WEST IRIAN AND SAID NO FUTURE PERMITS WOULD BE ISSUED TO EVEN OFFICIAL VISITORS ON GROUNDS THAT GOVERNMENT TOO BUSY WITH INTERNAL SITUATION AND CANNOT ACCOMMODATE THEM PROPERLY.

QP:3# LYDMAN

CONFIDENTIAL
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PAGE 01 DJAKAR 03614 01 OF 02 100040Z

84. ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, EUR 17, 10 13, CIAE 00, DOD 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, UPW 01, AIN 28,
RSR 01/1/14 W

R 0910522 JUN 69
FM AMBASSAD DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 212
INFO AMBASSAD CANBERRA
AMBASSAD THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
USMISSION USUN
CINCPAC 1191

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 DJAKARTA 3614

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF WEST IRIAN SITUATION

C* STATE 88198 D* STATE 87881

1. SUMMARY: THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE (AFC) IN WEST IRIAN IS
UNFOLDING LIKE A GREEK TRAGEDY, THE CONCLUSION PREORDAINED.
THE MAIN PROTAGONIST, THE GOI, CANNOT AND WILL NOT PERMIT ANY
RESOLUTION OTHER THAN THE CONTINUED INCLUSION OF WEST IRIAN,
IN INDONESIA. DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AS THE
CLIMAX IS REACHED BUT THE INDOONESIAN ARMED FORCES WILL
BE ABLE TO CONTAIN AND, IF NECESSARY, SUPPRESS IT. THE GOI
WILL BE SENSITIVE TO ITS "IMAGE" ABROAD, HOWEVER, AND WILL
SEEK TO AVOID ACTIONS THAT WILL REFLECT NEGATIVELY ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE AFC IN THE SENSITIVE EYES OF THE
NETHERLANDS, AUSTRALIA AND WITH UTHANT. THE TEST OF THE
GOI'S CREDIBILITY VIS-À-VIS THE IRIANES, AS WELL AS INTER-
ATIONAL OPINION, WILL COME LESS FROM THE AFC THAN FROM
POLICIES AND ACTIONS UNDERTAKEN AFTERWARD. UNLESS THE GOI

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

IS PREPARED TO DEVOTE A MAJOR EFFORT TO DEVELOPMENT OF WEST IRIAN; DISSIDENCE WILL INCREASE AND POSSIBLY SERIOUS PROBLEMS WILL ARISE WITH PAPUA/NEW GUINEA AND GOA. END SUMMARY.

2. IT IS KNOWN THAT OUTCOME OF AFC IS PREDICTABLE. GOI HAS NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING WEST IRIAN TO CHOOSE OTHER THAN INCORPORATION INTO INDONESIA. SEPARATION IS UNTHINKABLE. TO MOST INDONESIANS, WI IS PART OF INDOMANIFEST DESTINY," WHOSE LOSS WOULD GIVE IMPETUS TO FISSIPAROUS TENDENCIES IN OTHER PARTS ARCHIPELAGO, WHERE ANTI-JAVA FEELINGS RUN STRONG. SUWARTO GOVERNMENT WOULD FACE CRUCIAL INTERNATPOLITICAL FCCLASH WITH NATIONALISTS AND MOSLEMS WHO ALREADY CARP AT GOI RITUALISTIC ADHERENCE TO NEW YORK AGREEMENT WITH SUCH HIGH POLITICAL STAKES QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER IRIAN WILL REMAIN PART OF INDONESIA BUT HOW GOI MANAGES AFC TO SATISFY U THANT AND ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION, PREVENT INTERNAL IRIAN SITUATION FROM GETTING OUT OF HAND, AND COPE WITH EXTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURES, LARGELY FROM AUSTRALIA AND NETHERLANDS.

3. EVERY INDICATION IS THAT GOI DETERMINED PUSH ON WITH AFC AS PLANNED (REF B) DESPITE THREAT OF DISRUPTIVE INCIDENTS BY INCREASINGLY DESPERATE FREE PAPUA ACTIVISTS OR INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER CREDIBILITY OF INDOMAN METHOD. LACK OF COHESION AMONG ANTI-GOI ACTIVISTS (REF A) INDICATES, HOWEVER, THERE LITTLE LIKELIHOOD OF IRIAN-WIDE REVOLT WHICH COULD JEOARPIZE AFC; HOWEVER, OPPOSITION IRIANESE DO NOT APPEAR HAVE COHERENT PLAN TO SABOTAGE AFC AND THERE NO EVIDENCE SO FAR OF WIDESPREAD BOYCOTT. FACT THAT OVER HALF AFC COUNCIL SELECTIONS ALREADY COMPLETED POINTS TO AFC WINDUP ON SCHEDULE.

4. AS AFC COMPLETION NEARS, THERE WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE FURTHER SPORADIC INCIDENTS, REFUSAL OF SOME VOTERS TO TURN OUT. POANA SIBLY DEMONSTRATIONS BY ANTI-GOI ELEMENTS. ACCORDING IRIANESE POLITICAL SOURCES, STUDENTS PARTICULARLY ARE BECOMING DESPERATE AND SEEKING DRAMATIC EVENT TO TURN WORLD'S ATTENTION TO THEIR PLIGHT. THESE SAME POLITICIANS, BEING PRAGMATISTS, ARE NOT PUTTING THEIR NECKS ON LINE BY JOINING FOREFRONT OF OPPOSITION.

5. 6000 PLUS INDOMAN TROOPS IN WI APPEAR CAPABLE OF QUICKLY SUPPRESSING ANY INCIDENTS THAT MAY OCCUR UNTIL AFC COMPLETION, MILITARY COMMANDER SARWO EDHIE DETERMINED ACCOM-
PLISH: HIS PRIMARY MISSION TO KEEP LAW AND ORDER. SOME STEAM HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN OUT OF OPPOSITION BY PREVENTIVE ARRESTS SINCE LATE APRIL OF KNOWN FREE PAPUA ACTIVISTS. ROUND-UP IN DJAJAPURA OF ONE MAN-ONE VOTE DEMONSTRATION LEADERS; AND INCREASED BORDER SURVEILLANCE WHICH CAUSING INCIDENTS AND INCURSIONS REPORTED BY EMBASSY CANBERRA AS REPORTED REF: B, REBELS IN NORTH BIAX, BIRD'S HEAD, AND MOONAMANI AREA ARE ISOLATED AND, LACKING MATERIAL RESOURCES, DO NOT POSE SERIOUS INTERNAL SECURITY THREAT.

6: GREATER CAUSE FOR CONCERN IS FUTURE INDONESIAN RELATIONS WITH IRIANESE. AFTER COMPLETION AFC RITUAL, THERE IS MUCH NEED FOR CROSS-CULTURAL TOLERANCE AND UNDERSTANDING AND DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT IN WEST IRIAN ADMINISTRATION (ASSUMING FUNDWI EFFECTIVELY TAKES UP: SLACK IN DEVELOPMENT FIELD IN NEXT TWO YEARS) IF: INDONESIANS ARE TO KEEP FAITH WITH IRIANESE, UNCONCILIATORY ATTITUDE, MALADMINISTRATION, OR MASSIVE NEGLECT BY GOI WILL AGGRAVATE FESTERING ANTAGONISM AND IRIANESE DISTRUST OF INDONESIANS (SUCH AS ALREADY EXISTS IN SUMATRA, MINAHASA, AND AMBON TOWARD JAVANESE). SEEDS OF THIS SHOWN CLEARLY IN EXPULSION OF INDONESIAN TEACHERS, CIVIL SERVANTS, AND PREDATORS FROM ENAROTALI AREA AND LOOTING OF THEIR HOMES AND PROPERTY BY REBELS.

BT
CONFIDENTIAL 742

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 03614 02 OF 02 100941Z

14
ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01, EUR: 17, IO 13, CIAE: 00, DOD: 00, JPF: 04, H: 02, INR: 07, L: 03

NSAE: 00, NSC: 10, P: 04, RSC: 01, SP: 02, SS: 20, USIA: 12, UPW: 01, AID: 28

R 091052Z JUN 69
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 213:
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
IEUMJDN/AMCONSUL MELANIA 1937
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
USMISSION: USUN
CINC PAC: 1192

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 2 DJAKARTA 3614

C O R R E C T E D: C O P Y (PARA: 7)

7. RELATIONS WITH GOI ARE LIKELY TO BE STRAINED: FURTHER IF FREE PAPUA ELEMENTS IN PAPUA/NEW GUINEA (A) PERMITTED CONTINUE EVEN PIECEMEAL SUPPORT OF ANTI-GOI ELEMENTS; (B) SUCCEED IN FORMING COORDINATED SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT IN WEST IRIAN; AND/OR (C) PROVOKE BORDER INCIDENTS THERES IS EVEN GREATER DANGER IF WEST IRIAN BECOMES "POOR RELATION" AS RESULT GOI FAILURE TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC/POLITICAL CLIMATE WHILE P/NG CONTINUES TO PROGRESS NO EVIDENCE YET THAT GOI HAS GIVEN ANY SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA ON WEST IRIAN-P/NG MATTERS, BUT SITUATION PROMISES TO BE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR BOTH GOVERNMENTS.

8. CONSIDERING ALL ASPECTS OF SITUATION, MISSION WHOLEHEARTEDLY ENDORSES DEPARTMENT POSITION AND GUIDANCE CONTAINED. REFS: C AND D. USG HAS NOTHING TO GAIN BY INTERFERING IN ALREADY COMPLEX PROBLEM AND THEREBY DISRUPTING PRESENT FRUITFUL RELATIONS WITH GOI; WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, CONTINUE IN LOW KEY TO BRING TO GOI ATTENTION NEED FOR CREDIBILITY IN AFC FOR IRIANESE SAKE AND TO KEEP RELATIONS WITH GOI AND GOI ON.

CONFIDENTIAL
EVEN KEEL. BELIEVE IT ALSO INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TO GET
GOI THINKING ABOUT LONG RANGE IMPORTANCE OF WI IN TERMS
WORLD OPINION AND PARTICULARLY RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA. GOI
IS THINKING OF PHASING OUT FUNDWI AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IF
LEFT TO OWN DEVICES, HOWEVER, GOI UNLIKELY TO GIVE MUCH
ATTENTION OR MKMRIAL HELP TO WEST IRIAN. SOMEHOW MESSAGE
SHOULD BE GOTTEN ACROSS TO GOI THAT WORLD OPINION REGARDS GOI AS
HAVING SPECIAL COMMITMENT TO STONE-AGE IRIANISE REQUIRING
SPECIAL EFFORT PERHAPS BEST FURTHERED THROUGH MULTILATERAL
APPROACH.

GP-3. LYDMAN
ACTION: USUN NEW YORK

INFO: Amembassy CANBERRA
      Amembassy DJAKARTA
      Amembassy THE HAGUE

STATE

SUBJECT: "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian

REF:  A. STATE 87710  B. STATE 87881

FOR AMB YOST

1. In accordance with Acting Secretary's recent promise to Dutch PriMin Luns (Ref A), Asst Sec Green has again expressed to Indonesians our interest in having West Irian agreement carried out, and you are requested approach SYG.

2. As you aware, discussion this subject with U Thant is for number of reasons very delicate matter. We do not wish to undercut our "non-involved" stance and appear to be interfering in what is essentially a matter between SYG and GOI. We wish especially to avoid leaving impression that USG pressing SYG toward firmer position with GOI on carrying
out "letter and spirit" of 1962 agreement. We also wish to avoid any public reference to our discussion with SYG. We assume SYG has similar interest.

3. We suggest therefore that you seek appropriate occasion to raise this matter with SYG in very low key, during call to discuss other subjects. Believe best approach would be to inform SYG that we have conveyed informally and privately to Indonesians our interest in having West Irian agreement carried out. In this connection, you may wish draw on para 2 Ref B.

4. To avoid any impression of our seeming to be unhappy with quiet manner in which Act of Free Choice being handled, suggest that you make it clear at the outset that we appreciate the problems he and Ortiz-Sanz face in supervising the implementation of the 1962 Agreement and recognize]
that it is in best interest of all concerned, including Indonesian and Dutch Governments, that "Act" be accomplished with minimum of friction and public disagreement. We are aware of steps which GOI has taken in preparation for "Act". With advice and assistance given by SYG and his representative we are confident that "Act" can be accomplished smoothly.

5. If atmosphere of your discussion permits, you might inquire how SYG envisages handling his report to GA. We would find it useful if report were definitive enough clearly to make completion of the "act of free choice" for all concerned.

GP-3

END

[Signature]

Rogers
CONFIDENTIAL

TO: Department of State

INFO: CANBERRA, THE HAGUE, USUN, MEDAN, SURABABA

FROM: Amembassy DJAKARTA

SUBJECT: The Act of Free Choice As Seen From West Irian.

REF: A. Djakarta's telegram 3445 of June 3, 1969
B. Djakarta's A-220 of May 28, 1969

SUMMARY

The GOI is pressing ahead with its plan for the Act of Free Choice (AFC) in West Irian and there is virtually no chance it will be disrupted or altered in any way. The manner of implementation of the AFC is varied. In some areas the early steps in the AFC are being conducted in a reasonably democratic and credible manner. There have been instances, however, in which the selection of AFC council members has been patently undemocratic. Indonesian officials in West Irian, officially at least, are optimistic concerning the successful implementation and aftermath of the AFC. Foreign opinion ranges from outright condemnation of the GOI to the acceptance of political reality and not overly pessimistic views as to the post-AFC period. The Irianese themselves are divided between those who pragmatically accept the inevitability of continued Indonesian rule and the diehard idealists who will attempt to disrupt the AFC prior to its conclusion in early August. The role of the UN observer team in West Irian is fuzzy and there are indications that the team members have not been assiduously performing their duties, possibly due to the conviction held by many that the AFC is not a fully democratic process since its outcome has been foreordained. Moreover, a number of the UN team members are sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Irianese.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.
The Act of Free Choice (AFC) is going ahead as scheduled by the GOI. Ever since the Suharto government focussed on the obligation deriving from the New York Agreement to arrange some sort of act of self-determination in West Irian this year, the atmosphere surrounding the AFC has aroused much emotional furor. Among other things, the AFC has precipitated nationalistic rumblings in certain Indonesian political circles, giving one the feeling that a time machine had cast Indonesia back into the days of Sukarno's "Trikora" campaign. It has also uncovered skeletons in the Dutch Government's closet. Much of the sentiment being expressed now in Dutch political circles seems to stem from an uneasiness over the Dutch role in the 1962 New York Agreement. The AFC and doubts as to its credibility have also become extremely important to the Australian Government which, with the articulate elite of Papua/New Guinea looking over its shoulder, is trying desperately to avoid new political issues with Indonesia. And last but not least, world attention has been drawn to the fate of 800,000 Irianese (not all of whom are ethnically Papuan), some of whom sincerely feel they have a right to be free of outside control.

The plan for carrying out the AFC formulated by the GOI effectively ensures that West Irian will not be separated from Indonesia. At the same time the plan adheres closely to the letter of Article 18 of the New York Agreement. The spirit of its adherence is quite another matter, and it is this elaborate GOI stage-managing that has been the essential cause of internal discontent within West Irian and of consequent protests from Papua/New Guinea. The plan itself has already been reported in reference B and some of the consequences of its implementation have been seen in the events of the past three months. This report comments on the progress and execution of the AFC as it is viewed in West Irian by the Irianese, the United Nations observer team, and the Indonesian authorities.

THE GOI FORGES AHEAD

The first phase of the AFC ended with much publicity on April 11, 1969, as each of the kabupaten DPRD's (sub-provincial district assemblies or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) accepted the central government's plan for carrying out the AFC. Essentially, AFC Consultative Councils are to be set up in each kabupaten, with the membership thereof generally selected by indirect means. The kabupaten AFC council is then supposed to deliberate on the question of continued inclusion of the territory within Indonesia, thus preserving the unity of the Republic "from Sabang to Merauke." The keystone in this process is the method used to arrive at the ultimate decision and in selecting members of the AFC councils. This method, described by the government as uniquely Indonesian and democratic, is known as musjawarah. In this instance, musjawarah involves consultation by the AFC councils with a central government team headed by Ambassador Sudjarwo Tjondonegoro and subsequent formulation of a single position.

As noted below, selection of the AFC council members has not been uniform in all areas of West Irian. This phase is scheduled to be completed by July 10,
after which the AFC will move into the consultation phase. Curiously, the plan for execution of the AFC did not specify exactly how AFC council members were to be chosen, although it was stipulated that (a) they must include tribal or ethnic group leaders, political party and mass organization representatives, and the present members of the kabupaten DPRD's minus the military members thereof; and (b) they must have established residence in West Irian prior to August 1962, when the New York Agreement was signed. This excluded military personnel and Indonesian officials from participation. Importantly, the plan did not specify whether the AFC council members were to be chosen by a one man-one vote system in some or all areas of West Irian or whether musjawarah was to be employed for their selection. The result has been that both methods have been used and in one area the population has even had a choice between the two.

As of mid-June approximately 900 out of 1025 AFC council members were selected (musjawarah does not strictly connote "election"). During the period of the reporting officer's visit to West Irian, May 12 to June 2, selections had been made in most areas outside the major towns, except for the Manokwari and Enarotali regions, and selections were proceeding apace in Merauke, Djajapura, and Biak towns.

POSITIVE ASPECTS

Generally democratic AFC council selections have been conducted in several areas of West Irian. Two instances illustrate that musjawarah does not necessarily imply that the outcome of a "selection" is rigged nor always, in western terms, undemocratic. The reporting officer discussed the council selections in the Tanah Merah area of Merauke kabupaten with Father Peter B. Resubun, a native of the Kai Islands (west of West Irian), a Catholic priest, and a vice chairman of the Merauke DPRD. He described the selections in Tanah Merah as follows: the kabupaten election committee composed of DPRD members and chaired by him visited Tanah Merah for over three weeks in late April and early May; the committee met separately with local government officials, including KPS (sub-kabupaten government head or kepala pemerintah setemphat - intermediary between the kabupaten and district), district heads, village leaders, and tribal chiefs*; a list of nominees was compiled as a result of these meetings and the eligibility of each was checked, primarily to ensure that the nominee actually resided in the village he was to represent; the committee then held meetings of eligible adult voters at which the nominees were presented and selections made by means of open discussions; and lastly, the assembled voters approved the whittled-down list of nominees in a mass voice vote. He remarked that the village meetings were well-attended, quietly

*The distinction should be made that tribal chiefs and village heads (lurahs) are not always the same individual. In fact, many ethnic groups in West Irian do not have chiefs as such but they may have clan (extended family) leaders or possibly no formal leaders at all. Some groups, like the Asmat, may have one or several kepala perang or war chiefs who have only ceremonial functions and are vestiges of bygone warring days. The lack of definite tribal leaders in some areas has perplexed both the Indonesian and Dutch Governments which have been known to arbitrarily name chiefs in some areas, a practice which has occasionally led to difficulties with tribes not having hierarchical systems or when an unpopular man has been chosen.
run, and that he heard little dissension over the choices. Father Resubun, who was often critical of the GOI in conversations with the reporting officer, said he was satisfied that the selections were as democratic as possible in the Tanah Merah region, the population of which is heterogeneous in that it includes some extremely unsophisticated tribes yet has a core of educated Papuans and Javanese who were inmates of old Dutch and Sukarno regime prison camps in the area.

AFC council selections in the Biak area followed much the same pattern as described above, except that the voters were given a choice between a one man-one vote election and the musjawarah system. In what appeared to one observer to be a genuine expression of popular sentiment, the gathering chose the musjawarah system.* Moreover, according to Wisber Locis, a member of Ambassador Sudjarwo's team who is the adviser for the AFC on the Biak bupati's staff, AFC council selections in the Biak area were marked by 75% voter participation and there was no evidence, in that area at least, of any boycotting by the public of the AFC processes.

Election committees varied in their makeup according to location. In Merauke, for instance, the committee chairman was a vice chairman of the DPRD and committee members were drawn from that body as well; thus most of the members were civilians and bona fide residents of the area (but not all ethnic Papuans either, since the chairman himself came from the Kai Islands). The Biak election committee, on the other hand, was headed by a Javanese police commissioner and his committee included several non-Irianese government officials. GOI Department of Foreign Affairs officers assigned to each kabupaten advised on the conduct of the AFC, represented Ambassador Sudjarwo in that area, handled public relations matters, and in many cases acted as an "official greeter" for visiting GOI officials, the Ortiz-Sanz team, and the press. In general, the Foreign Department advisers observed by the reporting officer carried out their duties in a most inconspicuous manner and appeared to work well with the local authorities. Many of them had been in West Irian since October 1968 and understandably looked forward to returning to regular foreign office assignments after the conclusion of the AFC.

NEGATIVE ASPECTS

It is difficult to place unsavory incidents which have occurred recently into a broad perspective. One cannot generalize, for instance, that the Indonesian Army is coercing the population to acquiesce in the AFC, nor can it be said that anti-government activists have been successful in sabotaging the AFC by spreading rumors among the people, boycotting the AFC council selections, or perpetrating acts of terror. The pattern is very uneven.

* A description of the selections in one Biak district may be seen in the reporting officer's Memorandum of Conversation with London Times correspondent Stewart Harris dated June 9, 1969, pouches to all addressees.
First, there is no denying that the AFC council selection system has been abused in areas where there has been no consultation with the people and the council members were appointed by fiat. In one instance, the Merauke DPRD member from Agats, a native Asmat, simply appointed 1/4 of his friends as AFC council members. It is obvious that this selection was patently undemocratic but was it any more undemocratic than entrusting the selections to politically unsophisticated village heads who, according to American missionary observers, would have either sold the seats to the highest bidder or appointed local hangers-on whom they knew would be considered "reliable" by local government officials? It was the consensus of the resident missionaries that no meaningful selection could have taken place in the Asmat territory given the low level of political understanding and the Asmat penchant for placing the acquisition of material goods, particularly tobacco, above everything else, thus making them susceptible to the worst forms of political manipulation.

A somewhat similar incident took place in the central highlands town of Mulia, an area inhabited by the relatively primitive Dani tribe. All of the AFC council members from Mulia were appointed by the district head, an Irianese, without any consultation with the people. To make matters worse, the district head was asked by one of his selectees what would happen if he (the council member) voted against the continuation of Indonesian rule when the full council met in the kabupaten capital of Wamena. The answer was simply, "Why, the army will shoot you." Naturally, concluded a missionary from that area, "the word is out" that only a "yes" vote was acceptable even before the final consultation phase began.

Many Irianese who have participated in the village meetings or who will take part in the AFC councils will do so out of fear, whether real or imagined. During the reporting officer's visit, rumors circulated in many areas that whole villages or even tribes would be wiped out by the Indonesian Army if the inhabitants were not compliant. These fears were in some cases spread by anti-government activists like one Merauke resident, an employee of the government printing plant, who for no specific reason sincerely believed that "the Indonesians want to kill us all." This individual approached the reporting officer after dark one evening and asked that a petition be forwarded to a UN representative. He explained that no Irianese was able to approach the UN team without fear for his life. The petition, signed by several Irianese, claimed that over 100 people had been arrested in Merauke alone for anti-government activity (this figure could not be confirmed by Father Resubun and the Dutch missionaries who estimated that during the past year less than twenty persons had been arrested) and that the inhabitants of 16 kampungs (villages) had been polled secretly with the result that 1175 persons voted against the government and only 93 voted for continued association with Indonesia. Commenting on the results of the poll, Father Resubun admitted that while there was undoubtedly a great deal of anti-government sentiment in the kampungs, only part of the adults in each village could have been polled if the figures given in the petition could be believed. The petition was passed to a UN observer in Biak.
The fear of reprisal for holding anti-Indonesian views has not been eased by the actions and statements of many civilian and military officials. An incident reported in The Australian of June 4, 1969, typifies the headstrong and heavy-handed attitude of many Indonesians who believe that anti-government sentiment in West Irian must be quashed at all cost. This news item quoted a speech by an Indonesian Army Major which had been reprinted in the Djajapura government newspaper. In appealing to village leaders to bring back Irianese who had fled into the bush, the Major allegedly said "I am drawing the line frankly and clearly. I say I will protect and guarantee safety for everyone who is for Indonesia. I will shoot dead anyone who is against us --- and all his followers." Regarding the military campaign against anti-Indonesian elements, there is no doubt that individual excesses, including unwarranted shootings, heighten tensions surrounding the AFC and help to substantiate Irianese fears of reprisal.

AS THE IRIANESE SEE THE AFC

A widespread belief among politically-aware Irianese is that they were cheated by the New York Agreement, the UN, the Indonesian Government, the Netherlands, and even the United States for its role in bringing about the 1962 agreement. To Frits Kirihio, a purged member of the DPRD and widely acknowledged to be one of perhaps a dozen effective Irianese political leaders, the AFC was "no choice at all." He told the reporting officer on May 15 in Djajapura that the present predicament of the Irianese people was due to the AFC which, in a deal worked out by the UN and the US and forced on the Dutch and Indonesians, sealed the fate of West Irian. He stated that the Irianese were fooled into thinking that the New York Agreement guaranteed Papuan independence in 1970, as the Dutch had promised earlier. The Irianese believed the Dutch were sincere in their intention to grant West Irian independence because in 1960-61 they allowed the Papuans to have their own flag and national anthem; furthermore, they took a cadre of 150 Irianese (including Kirihio himself) to the Netherlands to be trained in leadership and government. He commented that many Irianese who did not understand the realities of the present situation (viz. that the Indonesians are in West Irian to stay), still believe that their wish for independence will be granted by the UN this year.

Kirihio said that he and other political leaders had little choice but to keep silent until conclusion of the AFC in the hope they would still be able to lead their people within the framework of the Indonesian Republic. Kirihio clearly recognized the limitations of UN authority in working out the AFC. He remarked that if freedom of expression and freedom from reprisal could be guaranteed by the UN, all Irianese, including himself and "even the governor", would back the independence movement. But, returning to reality, he saw no chance that the UN might intervene and said in any case that Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz was "totally ineffective."
Kirihic's views were representative of those held by other Irianese politicians whom the reporting officer met in West Irian. On one hand, they still looked to the ideal of West Irian independence but realized, on the other hand, that the AFC was not going to provide the chance to fulfill that ideal. At the opposite end of the pragmatist/idealistic spectrum were the diehard advocates of independence who can be divided into two groups: the longtime "freedom fighters" like Awom and the more numerous, largely unorganized, political agitators, particularly students. In their steadfast idealism, these people consider the AFC to be the last chance to effect a release from Indonesian rule. They also believe that the UN and the US would intervene if the Irianese could propel their cause to the forefront of world attention. According to estimates of the situation by Irianese, the students in particular would seek to provoke incidents and possibly mount demonstrations as completion of the AFC nears. In conversation with one of Awom's "lieutenants" in Manokwari, the reporting officer had the impression that the Awom diehards, finding it increasingly difficult to wage a guerrilla campaign against the Indonesians, were desperately seeking (and not finding) outside assistance so that they might be able to strike one more blow before the completion of the AFC.

Despite the tensions, fears, and ideals of the Irianese, the AFC moves steadily on. The degree of popular participation in selecting AFC council members does not indicate any widespread boycott, although there have been incidences of non-participation in the Djajapura area where many dissidents fled to the border area. Another obvious exception was in the Enarotali area where, as of mid-June, only one-eighth of the population had returned to the town; by the July 10 deadline, however, the situation may have sufficiently returned to normal that enough people would be available to make the necessary selections. From the Djakarta standpoint, there appears to be no serious impediment to completion of the AFC on schedule and according to plan; if the official GOI determination to do so were any indication, the AFC will be successfully concluded before August 17 - Indonesian independence day.

**THE UN TEAM IN WEST IRIAN**

In general, the UN observer team in West Irian has been doing a good deal of talking and not much observing. Since the completion of the first consultative phase of the AFC on April 11, team members have seldom taken to the road. They did, however, accompany Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz on a one day trip to the interior in mid-May, during his unscheduled visit to West Irian following the Enarotali affair, and again in June to observe the final stages of AFC council selections in Merauke, Biak, and Sorong. During the initial stage of the AFC, Ortiz-Sanz himself visited all eight kabupaten but his observers have not tried to visit the outlying areas of each kabupaten to witness AFC council selections. The team, however, did expect to witness council selections in the major towns prior to July 10 and observe the AFC consultations and final deliberations in each kabupaten between July 10 and early August.
According to Marshall Williams, Ortiz-Sanz' Principal Secretary and chief of the UN team's Djajapura office, the team members hoped to leave West Irian by August 8 at the latest, assuming that the G0I's own timetable for the AFC is met.

The reasons for the observers' record of non-observation during the council membership selection phase are not clear and several press correspondents have criticized the Ortiz-Sanz mission on this very point. Members of Ambassador Sudjarwo's team do not understand why the UN observers have not moved around more than they have, considering they have been informed of the dates of council selections in each kabupaten, there are no bars to their travelling anywhere in West Irian, and transportation is readily available. The answer probably lies in the views held by the observers themselves: the result of the AFC is a foregone conclusion; the UN is not interested in intervening again in West Irian; and the UN team's mission is narrowly defined to observing and advising (being done by Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz himself in Djakarta) rather than actually assisting in a plebiscite.

The activities of the UN observer team in Djajapura are not particularly well-regarded on either professional or personal grounds. Indonesian government officials are often openly critical of the Ortiz-Sanz mission for what they term "political meddling," translated as inciting the local population to anti-government acts. At best, the Indonesian officials in West Irian consider the UN team a necessary evil and regard its activities with suspicion. Members of the observer team have come in for a good deal of criticism from Indonesians and foreigners alike for their outspoken public comments against the Indonesians and their high-living (for Djajapura), including much time spent at the nearby public beach.

The political views of the UN team are typified by those of Marshall Williams and James Lewis, an observer, both American citizens. Williams, a UN employee for 23 years, has served on UN plebiscite teams in Togo and the Cameroons and on various political missions, including one to Papua and New Guinea. Lewis has been with the UN for about 15 years and at one time also served in Papua and New Guinea. Williams makes no secret of the fact that he identifies and sympathizes with the Irianese because of his own American Negro antecedents. He proudly boasts that twice in West Irian he has almost been declared persona non grata for publicly criticizing the G0I and he recounts with relish his ejection by the police from the UN offices along with a small group of Irianese demonstrators. Although it was a clear case of mistaken identity, he misses no opportunity to embarrass the Indonesians, including military commander Sarwo Edhie, with the tale.

Both Williams and Lewis are totally anti-Indonesian in their attitude and they condemn what they call the Indonesian "colonization" of West Irian. They claim 95 percent of the Irianese support the independence movement and
that the AFC is a mockery. They said they are deeply concerned with the lack of civil liberties allowed the Irianese and fear an unrestrained military crackdown on anti-government elements. They dismissed the view that the GOI could not allow a one-man-one-vote system and unrestricted freedom of speech and assembly in West Irian because it would face repercussions in other parts of Indonesia. They argued that West Irian is a "special situation" created by the UN and the New York Agreement. Moreover, they said, despite declamations to the contrary, the GOI has no right to consider West Irian part of its territory until after the AFC.

Notwithstanding their open sympathy for the Irianese cause, Williams and Lewis conceded that the UN would not consider re-injecting itself into the West Irian situation because (a) the UN has no desire to rekindle the dispute with the Indonesians and (b) the UN is too heavily committed in the Middle East and other areas. The Indonesians, they said, have acted on this assumption in devising and implementing the AFC. They concluded that, although the UN is well rid of the West Irian problem, it is a pity the Irianese have to be left to the Indonesians as the result of the politically expedient and faulty New York Agreement.

The UN observer team then is resigned to "ride out" the AFC with its inevitable conclusion. As seen from West Irian, the report to UN Headquarters, the anticipated expression of official UN satisfaction with the conduct of the AFC, and the remoteness of further UN involvement are matters far removed from the struggle at hand.

**AFTERMATH OF THE AFC**

Just as there are great contrasts in the implementation of the AFC, Irianese political views, and the UN public and private positions, similar differences in opinion are to be found concerning the aftermath of the AFC. Indonesian officials are generally sanguine about the prospects: military commander Sarwo Edhie, for instance, is optimistic about post-AFC period since he considers the process to be a "genuine form of Indonesian democracy" in which all elements of West Irian society will be reconciled.

More realistic, perhaps, is the view of Frits Kirihio who told the reporting officer that the people are likely to lapse into apathy after the AFC once they realize that West Irian is not going to be independent and that Indonesian rule is to continue. He believed that present Irianese dissatisfaction with the Indonesian government would not lead to a full-scale revolt in the post-AFC period and, by the same token, he believed that no extraordinary repressive measures would be applied by the GOI to Irianese nationalists. Although most foreign observers predict, like Kirihio, that the situation will calm down after the AFC, one American missionary in Biak forsees continued political turmoil in that area due primarily to the traditional dislike of the Biak people for "foreign rulers." He noted in this connection that the Biaks have in the past opposed the Dutch, Japanese, and Indonesians and, "if
Jesus Christ Himself came down to earth to rule West Irian," the Biaks would still not be satisfied. He likewise believed that the Biaks could not peacefully participate in an independent Irianese government and would continue to be a source of dissension in West Irian no matter who was running things.

It is clear, however, that the political future of West Irian is almost entirely in GOI hands. A reconciliation of Irianese political elements with the government after the APC depends principally upon the amount of political control the GOI is willing to turn over to the Irianese, the degree to which Irianese are integrated into government agencies, and the rate and lasting effect of economic development efforts. There are no easy answers to the problems to be faced in West Irian, especially considering the checkered record of the GOI there, the diverse interests of the Irianese, and the uncertainties of future economic development.
The Free Papua Movement (OPM) is not the all-pervasive revolutionary organization some believe it to be. Other than a small leadership cadre operating in the Djajapura area having cross-border contacts, anti-government dissidents have virtually no liaison with each other, receive no outside assistance or direction, and are generally incapable of mounting an insurrection in the face of the relatively large Indonesian military establishment in West Irian. Grievances and anti-GOI sentiment are quite real, however, and there is little question that a great majority of the non-Stone Age Irianese favor a termination of Indonesian rule. Opposition to the GOI stems from economic deprivation over the years, military repression and capriciousness, and maladministration. Limited efforts of the GOI to rectify these problems to date have generally been "too little and too late," and it is uncertain whether the Indonesians will actually try to ameliorate the sources of local discontent in coming years. Despite the undercurrent of opposition, anti-government elements have been unable to translate words into deeds and there is little likelihood that the few existing internal security threats will be allowed to get out of hand. It is difficult to predict whether the GOI will take harsh repressive measures or seek to establish good government and further economic progress in the region. The outcome is likely to be mixed and uneven.
CONFIDENTIAL

The Opposition

The Free Papua Movement (OPM) is widely believed to be the core of opposition to the Indonesian Government in West Irian. But it is difficult to track down the OPM as an organization, although not because its security is tight or people unwilling to talk. On the contrary, everyone talks about the OPM; it has few, if any, secrets, and many Irianese proudly proclaim they are "members" of the OPM. A foreigner travelling in West Irian has no difficulty in contacting anti-government activists. They stop you on the street and groups of them gather around when you visit a native village; in short, no one is reluctant to discuss the OPM and their reasons for disliking Indonesians. One American missionary explains this by saying that "the Papuans simply are unable to keep a secret." Of course, information known to foreigners is also available to the Indonesian authorities, the Army, and even to the most casual observer.

The OPM is not an Irian-wide centrally-directed or even loosely-federated organization. Outside of Djajapura and the border area, there is little contact among dissidents, although the elusive "central board" of the OPM in Djajapura claims to have "contacts" in four (and only four) West Irian towns. External contacts are restricted to the Papua/New Guinea border area and there is no evidence that external aid is coming into other parts of West Irian, particularly since the 11-man propaganda publishing ring in Djakarta, which periodically sent anti-government leaflets to Biak, was broken up by the police in early May. More importantly, there is no contact between the centers of armed dissidence in north Biak, the Bird's Head, and Enarotali. J. Rumbobiar, an Awom lieutenant and former Manokwari police official during the UNEFA administration, told the reporting officer that Awom's group was not in contact with any other armed dissident group or any OPM "central leadership"; Awom had never received any assistance from outside sources but had "seen" (not disseminated) a few leaflets smuggled in from Djakarta; and that Awom expected no help from the Dutch, whose aid he would not accept, or from "so-called" OPM leaders Marcus Kasiepo, Nicholas Jouwe, and Herman Womsiiwor, whom Rumbobiar criticized for living comfortably overseas off Dutch money.

The OPM, however, does represent an amorphous mass of anti-Indonesian sentiment. Card-carrying members of the OPM as such must be few, although partisans claim that it has anywhere from 1500 to 5000, or even 500,000 members. Irianese political leader Frits Kirihio, a recently purged member of the provincial assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah or DPRD), estimated the number of hard-core anti-government leaders to be only about 150, not including politicians like himself who privately support West Irian independence but, realizing the unlikelihood of achieving such a goal in the near future, were keeping to the sidelines, preferring to lay the groundwork for political maneuvering in the post-Act of Free Choice (AFC) period. The goal of these pragmatic politicians is to capture more provincial government positions for themselves and Irianese in general. In adopting this view, there is plenty of room for personal ambition and at least six leading Irianese, including Kirihio and former governor Bonay, are rumored to be angling for the governorship.
Regarding the magnitude of the opposition to Indonesian rule, probably a decided
majority of the Irianese people, and possibly 85 to 90 percent, are in sympathy
with the Free Papua cause or at least intensely dislike Indonesians. An
American missionary in Biak described a situation there which reflects, in
microcosm, the attitudes of the West Irianese. The Biak congregation of the
Indonesian Pentecostal Church split a year ago into two approximately equal
factions: those favoring continued union with the Indonesian church head-
quartered in Djakarta and those anti-Indonesians (politically as well as
religiously) who favored the creation of an independent Irianese Pentecostal
Church. While a year ago, only 50 percent of the congregation exhibited pro-
inddependence views, the missionary estimates that over 75 percent now are hostile
to the Indonesians.

Translating words and sentiments into action is quite another thing, however.
Father J. Duivenvoorde, secretary to the Bishop of Merauke, characterized anti-
government movements as "much talk, no action." Despite rumors that there would
be a general uprising on some specific date, the magic day inevitably passes
without a ripple. Bold activists declare their intention to assassinate UN
Ambassador Ortiz-Sanz (or Ambassador Sudjarwo, Interior Minister Amir Machmud,
or military commander Sarwo Edhie) the next time he comes to town; again,
there has been no indication of any serious attempt to fulfill such threats.
Conversely, Father Duivenvoorde pointed out, three times the desired number of
recruits turn out to join the Indonesian Army and no one in Merauke, not even
the most violent activist, passes up an opportunity to attend a party given
by the bupati or some other government official. If there were serious plans to
launch a rebellion, he concluded, the population of the town would have long
ago fled to the bush, there would be boycotts, strikes or other signs of mass
resistance, and some dramatic act of defiance would have occurred by this time.

In short, there is a great deal of talk which has not and probably will not be
translated into action. There is no indication that the OPM, under the leadership
of its "committee of twenty" in Djajapura and encouraged by other Irianese
leaders has the capability of directing a revolt against the Indonesians. The
necessary coordination and lines of communication presently do not exist,
resources are lacking, and the will to act is fragmented.

Sources of Discontent

There is no doubt that the sources of Irianese discontent with Indonesian rule
are real and the scars left from past abuses will continue to fester for many
years to come. In more candid moments, Indonesian officials admit to the
GOI's poor record in administering West Irian and they agree, for instance,
that the GOI has not acted quickly enough to remove incompetent and politically
questionable appointees from the Sukarno and Subandrio heyday. Prior to the
appointment of Brigadier General Sarwo Edhie as military commander in July 1968,
West Irian was administered as a fiefdom of vested, particularly military,
interests. As noted in reference D (pages 9-11), the "New Order" cleanup has
begun, but barely. Efforts are still being made to oust the more corrupt officials, but the GOI is proceeding very slowly and there has been no initiative to remove Djakarta-based officials, such as the Ministry of Interior's Director for West Irian Affairs Marwoto, who are identified with the old regime.

In addition to the failure to remove these inept officials, maladministration is common, especially in areas having large concentrations of military personnel. Local military commanders often run the large towns, like Manokwari, and civilian officials have little authority. The military is generally noted for its rapaciousness stemming from, among other things, low pay and inadequate rations, as well as for a tendency to degrade the Irianese because of their darker skin and lack of civilized attributes. The military community in Manokwari, for instance, numbering approximately 3000, places an almost intolerable burden on the local economy. The Manokwari area produces enough food, excluding rice, for its population, but the large influx of military personnel for mopping up the Arfak rebellion has resulted in shortages of fruits and vegetables, so crucial in this region with its poor soil. Soldiers commonly expropriate agricultural commodities intended for sale in the local marketplace. Local merchants now remove rice from their shops when a troopship enters port to avoid selling their entire supply to disembarking soldiers who purchase the grain (from savings earned while aboard ship) and then resell it in the market at higher prices. Retail shops in Manokwari are, with few exceptions, military owned or operated. The army also has an adverse effect in certain other areas where merchants are not allowed to operate unless "licensed" by the military or where soldiers simply take goods from the shops without payment.

Military repression has stimulated fears and rumors of intended genocide among the Irianese. These fears in large part have been generated by shooting incidents involving trigger-happy, jittery troops. In mid-May, for example, a suspected OPM courier was hunted down and shot by a twelve man army patrol which might just as easily have captured him. A serious military atrocity was narrowly averted in the relatively peaceful area of the south coast near Agats when a boatload of Police Mobile Brigade troops, ready to fire into a wooded shore area lined with natives armed with bows and arrows, was prevented from doing so by a newly-appointed district head whom the troops were escorting. Rather than forcing his way into the area at gunpoint to solve a local dispute the district head (an Irianese) returned the next day without an armed escort and successfully resolved the problem.

Perhaps the most oft-cited grievance of the Irianese is that the Indonesians cleaned out the shops and storehouses in the period immediately following their takeover of West Irian administration in 1963. Missionaries reported that they had witnessed Indonesian military personnel loading up Air Force planes at night with goods taken from local merchants. Within two months of Indonesian takeover on May 1, 1963, there was an acute shortage of food and consumer goods. It is
little wonder that the Irianese look back fondly to the Dutch days when such items were in relatively abundant supply.

The Enarotali affair is a good example of how general and local grievances can combine to spark trouble. The GOI explanation that the revolt of the local police was inspired by purely local causes, not involving opposition to the AFC is in conflict with the testimony of local missionaries. The latter reported that three local district heads, the rebel leader Wamafia among them, insisted on application of the one man-one vote system and forced the departure of Indonesian teachers and officials so that there could be a free and unfettered election. Other causes of the incident were: (1) the police had not been paid for two months prior to the April 30 incident; (2) the people wanted the Paniai kabupaten capital moved from the coastal town of Nabire (population approximately 6000) to Enarotali with a surrounding population of about 40,000; (3) the government failed to replace the bupati who, in addition to feeding continually with his district heads, was accused of large-scale corruption in selling at high prices the food, clothing and tools meant for free distribution among the people; (4) the government's failure to begin construction of a road from Enarotali to Nabire despite repeated promises to do so; and (5) the allocation of more AFC council seats to the less populous town of Elaga which was considered "safe" by the government in contrast to the "political unreliability" of the Enarotali people.

The sources of discontent, then, have diverse roots. Although many of these problems, particularly those involving the military, are similar to those faced by the inhabitants of other parts of Indonesia, the situation in West Irian, if not rectified and drastically improved, will continue to provoke widespread discontent and unrest.

Internal Security

The Indonesian Armed Forces have between 6000 and 8000 troops in West Irian at present, composed of two understaffed battalions of the local Tjenderawasih division and elements of the Hasanudin (Makassar), Brawijaya (Surabaya), Siliwangi (Bandung) and Merdeka (Menado) divisions. Navy and Air Force detachments are small and confined to their respective bases. The Marine detachment previously stationed in Biak was repatriated to Java in May. In addition to locally-raised police forces, there is one battalion of Police Mobile Brigade troops stationed on the south coast. In the Manokwari area most of the troops were introduced in mid-1968 to quell the Arfak rebellion led by Loedwijk Mandatjan. Since the official termination of the rebellion in January 1969, several of these units have been assigned to other areas. Although military commander Sarwo Edhie's stated policy is to rotate troops in and out of West Irian annually, the reporting officer encountered troops of the Hasanudin and Brawijaya divisions which had been stationed there for four and five years. Sarwo Edhie has stated that his primary duty between now and the completion of the AFC is to keep law and order. There is little doubt that he will be able to do so with his impressive array of forces.
The location and strength of the three active insurgent groups have been reported in reference B. It is interesting to note that the GOI has officially branded insurgent leaders as criminals. Moreover, Indonesian officials refuse to acknowledge publicly that these insurgencies are politically inspired. For example, both the leader of the north Biak rebels, Frits Awom's brother, and Warmaisma, leader of the rebellious Emarotali policemen, have been charged with embezzling government funds. Thus, they can be hunted down, imprisoned and dealt with as criminal code violators rather than as political prisoners who might at some point be eligible for amnesty, possibly at the instigation of the UN.

It is questionable whether these insurgent groups can hold out much longer. To date, the military has not begun to root out the north Biak rebels (numbering approximately 150) due to lack of roads into the area and a shortage of small boats needed to effect coastal landings. Awom's forces, presently estimated at only 50 or 60, are being contained in the mountains of the Bird's Head and no military pressure is being applied to them. The only actively prosecuted anti-insurgent operation is that against the Emarotali rebels, whose strength is calculated by GOI sources to be down to 90 as a result of recent defections. The military strategy in this situation is to isolate the rebels and persuade them to abandon their resistance. As Sarwo Edhie told a gathering of native leaders in Emarotali on June 5, all will be forgiven if the rebels come out of the bush and surrender their weapons.

In all areas but Emarotali where the rebel policemen are well-armed, having taken their weapons with them, the insurgents have few modern weapons, very little ammunition and no supplies. Awom's Bird's Head forces were reportedly extremely short of food and his lieutenant, Rumbobiar, said that the men have fewer than a dozen World War I and II vintage rifles. Missionary sources in the Manokwari area believe Awom will be forced to surrender within a few months, despite protestations that he will fight to the end. The north Biak rebels are in even worse straits. Reportedly they have only three or four rifles and are unable to find food in the scraggly forests of that coral island. According to Mansoor Achmad, a government Information Service official, these rebels were told by their leaders that a foreign submarine would appear, bringing food, goods and weapons. This reversion to the "cargo cult" idea was also found in other areas of West Irian. The reporting officer on several occasions was told by anti-government activists that they were waiting for plane and boatloads of supplies from an unspecified foreign source.

Information is very scarce in West Irian concerning recent border incidents and concentrations of criminal or anti-GOI political elements in the Papua/New Guinea border area. Government officials, including Sarwo Edhie, have declined to comment on the situation. It is known that some of the border crossers had arms, and rebels in a border camp east of Tanah Merah are reputed to be in possession of a machine-gun. Also, frequent border crossings by canoe have been reported on the north coast. Indications are that the border will continue to be the scene of incidents, as more Irianese flee from the Army's campaign to repress anti-government sentiment as the AFC is concluded.
In conclusion, it is just a matter of time before the Indonesian military cleans out the pockets of armed dissidence. The only remaining question is to what extent (and expense) the GOI is prepared to go in quashing active dissidence. Overreaction and brutal repression would have an undesirable effect on international opinion but, then, the Indonesians have been known to ignore these consequences in quashing other revolts in the past.

SALBRATTH
INDONESIA

Background - The West Irian Question

Summary

The future of the western half of the primitive island of New Guinea poses problems to which there are no satisfying answers. We believe that the difficult task of ascertaining the desires of the population regarding Indonesian sovereignty, which is now under way, is being appropriately handled by the Indonesians and the United Nations.

U.S. Position

United States involvement in the "Act of Free Choice" can be of no real help to any of the parties concerned. We will withhold comment until the "Act" is completed and the UN Secretary General has made his report to the United Nations.

Discussion

The Dutch-Indonesian Agreement

Negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General and with the mediation of Ellisworth Bunker, resulted in a 1962 Agreement under which sovereignty over West Irian passed to Indonesia subject to verification of the desires of the inhabitants before the end of 1969. Indonesia was charged with the execution of this "Act of Free Choice" with the "assistance and participation of the United Nations Representative and his staff."

The Situation in West Irian

This is one of the most primitive areas of the world. Although there is some sentiment for independence among the coastal townspeople, there is no awareness of the problems this would entail. For most Irianese, whose horizons do not extend beyond their immediate neighbors and kin, such political issues have no meaning. There was active tribal dissidence against Indonesian rule in one part of West Irian last year but this has subsided. Some violence
has occurred more recently in other scattered areas but this has often had no direct connection with the independence issue, and the seriousness of these incidents has been exaggerated in the U.S. press. Exile proponents of Papuan independence have accelerated their efforts to magnify such incidents to attract foreign attention as the "Act of Free Choice" approaches a conclusion.

The "Act of Free Choice"

As organized by the Indonesians, the "Act of Free Choice" is to consist of "consultations" with representative councils established in the eight districts of the territory. These councils, which are each composed of from 75 to 125 delegates or one for approximately every 800 persons in the population, are to be consulted separately during the period of July 10 to August 5 on whether they wish West Irian to remain within the Indonesian Republic. United Nations Representatives have observed the formation of many of these councils and have attended or will attend each of the "consultations."

Indonesia should have no difficulty in winning an endorsement from these councils for continued Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian.

While the "Act of Free Choice" will disappoint those who hoped for greater participation of the population, it appears to be within the terms of the 1962 Agreement and not unsuited to the level of political awareness of the population.

The United States Role

The "Act of Free Choice" poses domestic and external political problems for both Indonesia and the Netherlands, some of which would be diminished were the United States to enter the picture. Our role in 1962, however, does not make us the guarantor of the agreement's implementation and our involvement could in no way contribute to an outcome acceptable to all.

We are encouraged by Indonesia's commitment to fulfill its obligation to hold the "Act of Free Choice" and we note that a competent representative (Mr. Ortiz Sanz) of the UN Secretary
General is on the scene in contact with both the local inhabitants and the Indonesian Government. We will await with interest the UN report on the carrying out of the treaty commitment and will withhold official comment until that time.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

SECRET

July 18, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Djakarta Visit: Your Meetings with President Suharto

1. Schedule: Your schedule is at Tab II. The principal feature unique to this stop is your visit to a fair, which should be a colorful affair and one which will give you exposure to Indonesians aside from Government leaders.

2. Background: NOTE: Attached at Tab A is a memorandum which covers general themes which are applicable to Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. This memorandum covers those themes which are peculiar to Indonesia. Compared with the Philippines, we have few major bilateral problems with Indonesia. Our aid program is working smoothly, part of a model multilateral effort. We have led the international moves to help Indonesia reschedule Sukarnoist debts, and have won President Suharto's gratitude as a result.

The government is under the control of a moderate military man, Suharto, who although indecisive by outside standards is committed to progress and reform. He has achieved impressive results in his own way in cleaning up the mess left by Sukarno. He is assisted by good economic advisers and by a Foreign Minister (Malik) who has been a leader in promoting responsible Asian regionalism. The economy has been stabilized and the rate of inflation reduced to zero; the most pressing domestic economic issue now is to get business activity moving. Another pressing problem is the population question, particularly in Java.

Despite the predictions of many outside observers that Indonesia would break up, the country has hung together and has an increasing sense of national consciousness. There remain resentments on the part of the "Outer Islanders" over the major share of the nation's political and economic benefits which the Javanese enjoy.
SECRET

The Communist party, which almost took over Indonesia four years ago, is no threat at the moment, although pockets of Communist influence remain and Muslim orthodoxy, extreme Malay nationalism, and regional separatism remain potential dangers.

3. What Suharto Will Want:

a. He will seek to assure himself of the consistency of your commitment to Vietnam and of your intention to see that the U.S. plays a role as a counter to Chinese power in Asia after Vietnam.

b. He will seek to assess your personal reaction to Indonesian non-alignment and to get some sense of your possible reaction should Indonesia be approached in a more positive way by the USSR. (We have an intelligence report that he has become convinced that the U.S. and the USSR have already reached a secret rapprochement in order to cope more effectively with Communist China. He may attempt to verify this possibility. Although he may suggest that Indonesia would have no problems with such an arrangement, he remains suspicious of Soviet intentions and will be worried about the long-term Soviet role. He will continue to treat the USSR as a friendly nation, however.)

c. The GOI has already indicated that it will seek your views of ASEAN; Suharto's intention presumably is to get your reactions to Asian regional initiatives which do not include the U.S.

d. Suharto may raise several direct bilateral issues. He may express his appreciation for U.S. economic aid and support for debt re-scheduling, and seek assurances that the U.S. role will continue.

e. Suharto may press for assurance that Indonesia's oil quota to the U.S. will not be reduced. (He fears that discoveries of Alaskan oil may result in reduced U.S. import quotas.)

f. The Indonesians have indicated that they wish to discuss "the problem of acquisition of arms". (Our current MAP agreement limits our aid to civic action support and training, and runs $6 million a year. Indonesia faces real problems of replacing worn-out equipment, mostly Soviet-supplied during the Sukarno era. It is less than clear, however, whether Suharto really expects us to supply more arms, or whether he will make the request to satisfy his generals.)
g. Suharto may possibly express a willingness to participate in an international enforcement mechanism for a Vietnam peace solution. (Interest in playing a regional role may here be reinforced by military expectations that they could obtain U.S. arms -- perhaps from surplus stocks in Vietnam -- as a quid pro quo.)

4. What We Want: Your principal purposes will be

-- to set forth your thoughts concerning the post-Vietnam Asian scene and the importance of national self-help and regional cooperation.

-- to impress upon Suharto and the Indonesians a sense of our shared purposes and goals in Southeast Asia.

-- to seek good personal relations with Suharto, who seems likely to be around for some time.

-- to explain and gain Indonesian support for your policies in Vietnam.

5. Points You Should Stress:

a. Vietnam:

-- We want a settlement in Vietnam, but it has to be one that will really permit the South Vietnamese to arrange their own future. We are serious that whatever arrangements are made not just be a convenient cover for our withdrawal but provide workable machinery to guarantee their freedom of choice.

-- We are negotiating in good faith and are not pursuing a military solution, but if negotiations are to succeed, the time has come for the other side to take them seriously. Your eight points are about as far as you can go, and President Thieu has made a serious step toward devising a realistic political program.

-- We have made serious concessions: the end of bombing, the withdrawal of 25,000 combat troops, the offer of simultaneous troop withdrawal, the proposal of free elections with international supervision.
-- You will keep open the question of further troop withdrawals. Your decision will depend on the GVN's ability to fill the gap, on developments in Paris and on whether there are NVA force withdrawals.

(Although he has not expressed it, Suharto may be somewhat nervous that the withdrawal of 25,000 men represented the beginnings of a U.S. pullout.)

-- It is hard to know what more we can do, but still we have had no response. The other side goes on trying to work on our public opinion. They cannot expect us to hold still for that.

-- Asians have a stake in how the war ends. If the mass of Americans are disillusioned with the costs of the war and what it achieved, they will be unlikely to support extensive cooperation with Asians in the future. If they feel they have achieved something they may be more inclined to go on helping.

-- If Suharto offers to play a role in peacekeeping in Vietnam after a settlement: Welcome the offer and say that you may be back in touch on it as you see how the situation unfolds.

b. Southeast Asia after Vietnam:

-- The U.S. will continue to play a role in the area as an external counterweight to Communist military power and subversion.

-- You recognize that the security of Southeast Asia is even more important to nations there than to the U.S., and you expect them to take the lead in providing for their own defense and for the well-being of the area. You wish to support them, but self-help and mutual cooperation in the area make it easier to sell the idea of a U.S. effort in their behalf to our own people.
-- Praise the efforts by Suharto and Foreign Minister Malik to play a responsible role in the region. (They were active in the formation of ASEAN and have tried to conciliate the Malaysian/Philippine quarrel over Sabah which threatens it. Malik has tried to exert a calming influence on jingoistic anti-Chinese attitudes on the part of the new Malaysian Government.)

-- Given its size, leadership and resources, Indonesia will play a major role in Asia in the future. Solicit Suharto's views as to the future of the region.

-- Impress upon Suharto that you respect and accept his policy of non-alignment and an "active and independent" foreign policy.

-- Set forth your view of the China problem: U.S. resists Chinese Communist expansionism; you are concerned with the international more than domestic conduct of Communist China and willing to deal with China if it shows the inclination; you believe that in the long-term the aim should be to bring China into a peaceable relationship with its neighbors rather than to isolate it; you doubt that there will be opportunities for any significant change in relations with China in the near future, though you expect to continue to make limited moves to encourage Communist China to seek a less hostile relationship.

-- You will wish to disabuse Suharto of the idea that there has been a U.S./USSR rapprochement in a mutual effort to contain Communist China.

. You are not interested in any security scheme organized from Moscow or in supporting an anti-Chinese pact.

. We do not know exactly what the Soviets have in mind with the Brezhnev proposal for an Asian security arrangement. We have asked without receiving a clear response, except an indication that they seem interested in some system for containing Communist China.
Aside from suggesting a greater Soviet role, it is difficult for us to see the point of the proposal unless the Soviets are offering to commit their power to protect Asian nations against Chinese attack. In that case, we assume they will do so for their own reasons.

In the absence of a concrete Soviet proposal, there is not much we can say about the idea except to restate our view that these are issues for Asians to decide.

What is President Suharto's analysis?

c. Indonesian/U.S. Economic Aid Relations:

-- Praise the Indonesian accomplishment in ending inflation. (Down from 635% in 1965 to 0% so far in 1969.) Express hopes for current efforts to spur business activity.

-- Cite the multilateral aid program to Indonesia as a model for other countries. (We were instrumental in organizing an Inter-Governmental Group to channel aid to Indonesia; the U.S. non-food contribution is less than half the total. We also encouraged the Group to appoint Abs, a German banker, to make proposals -- expected shortly -- as to how to handle the vast foreign debt inherited from Sukarno. You should endorse the general procedure without committing yourself to accepting Abs' specific proposals, which may cause us some legal problems.)

-- Express confidence that the U.S. will continue to provide its share of aid under these arrangements. The cooperation of other countries, and the effective Indonesian utilization, will help to counter the very real pressures in the U.S. toward reduction of AID budgets.

d. Military Aid:

-- You hope to be able to maintain the current MAP program for civic action programs.
--- You think we can best help Indonesia by concentrating primarily upon economic aid. However, we are willing to consider special circumstances, and we look on Indonesian security as a U.S. interest.

--- Our worldwide MAP resources are very limited, and you are under strong pressure to use those in situations where there is a direct identifiable external military threat or where the aid contributes directly to our own strategic posture.

e. The Indonesian Oil Quota in the U.S. Market:

--- (If he raises) You may wish to mention the Cabinet Task Force on oil import controls, and suggest that the Task Force would welcome Indonesia's views and give them careful consideration.

f. Relations with Suharto:

--- Mention your last meeting in April 1967. (He frequently speaks of it.)

--- Reiterate your invitation to him to visit the U.S. next year. (CAUTION: There has been some shifting of the proposed dates for the visit. The initial invitation, never accepted, was for this autumn. With the aid of the Indonesian Ambassador in Washington, we are presently trying to encourage him to take the initiative to defer until 1970. It would be well to check with Ambassador Galbraith as to the status of that maneuver before shaping the precise language of your invitation, so as to avoid offending him by making it seem that you have unilaterally delayed the date.)

6. Points to Avoid: The West Irian "act of free choice" will be underway during your visit. It consists of a series of consultations, rather than a direct election, which would be almost meaningless among the store age cultures of New Guinea. There is a UN observer on the scene, and we assume that U Thant will go along with the Indonesian form of the act of free choice. There is, however, a small but active West Papuan independence movement, and a variety of groups in Australia and the Netherlands which take exception to the
Indonesian technique of self-determination. Because the U.S. played a mediating role in resolving the Indonesian/Dutch controversy over the future of West Irian, there may be a tendency to associate you with the form in which the act of free choice is being conducted. We should avoid any U.S. identification with that act.

7. Proposed arrival, toast and departure statements are at Tab III.
INDONESIA

Talking Points

Suharto has frequently mentioned the good talk you and he had in Djakarta in April 1967. He is delighted that you are including Djakarta on your itinerary and, while we have no serious bilateral problems, can be expected to use this opportunity to explore your thinking on the security of Southeast Asia and long-term U.S.-Indonesian economic relations.

Subjects Indonesians May Raise

Viet-Nam

-- Indonesians will be anxious to get your assessment of the possible nature of a Viet-Nam settlement and implications for Southeast Asian security.

-- They will probably question you regarding GVN military capabilities and the political viability of the Thieu administration.
SECRET

- 8 -

If the Indonesians raise this subject (you should not), you should explain the limits on our worldwide MAP resources but say we will continue our present level of MAP support ($6 million annually). We believe we can best help Indonesia by concentrating primarily on economic aid but we will keep this under review in the light of developments in Southeast Asia.

West Irian

The "Act of Free Choice" in West Irian (formerly West New Guinea) to determine whether that area wants to remain with Indonesia will be under way from July 10 to August 5. We believe West Irian will definitely decide to stay with Indonesia. Indonesians are concerned that some UN members, particularly French-speaking African states, may object to the indirect manner in which this ascertainment is being conducted.

SECRET
SECRET

-9-

-- You should not raise this issue. If the Indonesians do, you should tell them that we understand the problems they face in West Irian but do not believe it is in our interest or that of Indonesia for us to become directly involved. The UN Secretary General is responsible under the 1962 Dutch-Indonesian Agreement for "advising and assisting" Indonesia in this exercise. He has his personal representative in West Irian and is carrying out these responsibilities. All seems to be going well, and we will await U Thant's report to the General Assembly.

Debt Rescheduling

-- The Indonesians will probably express their appreciation for our key role in bringing about a basic study of the Indonesian debt regime.

-- NOTE: Last year at our urging Dr. Hermann Abs of the Deutsche Bank was appointed agent of the Western creditor nations to study and recommend a solution to the problem posed by the $2.2 billion Sukarno debt. (The Communist creditors
SECRET 360

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 04947 2503422

ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01 EUR 17,10,13, CIAE 00, DOD 00, JPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, AIO 28,
UPW 01, 141 W

R 250315Z JUL 69
FM AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO SECSTATE WASH 782
INFO AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
USMISSION USUN
CINCPAC 1229

SECRET DJAKARTA 4947
CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: WEST IRIAN: AUSTRALIAN, DUTCH AND THAI AMBASSADORS' VIEWS ON AFC

REF: DJAKARTA 4822

1. SUMMARY: SINCE THEIR RETURN FROM WI WITH FONMINT MALIK JULY 20, AUSTRALIAN, DUTCH AND THAI AMBASSADORS HAVE INDIVIDUALLY GIVEN AMBASSADOR SUMMARY THEIR VIEWS ON AFC AND WI SITUATION IN GENERAL. THEY HAVE BEEN AND ARE CONTINUING TO BE CAREFUL TO AVOID PUBLIC COMMENT. EACH EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN OVER WAY AFC WAS BEING CARRIED OUT BUT GENERALLY THOUGHT EXERCISE WAS PROGRESSING BETTER THAN EXPECTED DURING TRIP MALIK MADE NO ATTEMPT OBSCURE HEAVY-HANDED GOI TACTICS IN IMPLEMENTING AFC.

2. THAI AMBASSADOR (AND DEAN OF DIPLOMATIC CORPS) PHINIT AKSON TOLD AMBASSADOR JULY 27 THAT INDONS SHOULD HAVE USED ONE MAN-VOTE SYSTEM IN COASTAL CITIES TOGETHER WITH SECRET BALOTTING UNDER PRESENT SYSTEM ANY WOULD-BE
SECRET

PAGE 02 DJAKAR 04947 250342Z

DISSENTERs WERE FORCED TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY UNDER EYES OF THE MILITARY. IN MEETINGS HE OBSERVED, AFC COUNCIL MEMBERS WERE HARANDED BEFORE VOTE BY MOST ELOQUENT GOI SUPPORTERS. PHINIT AKSON SAID AMBASSADORS RECEIVED LETTERS LISTING NAMES OF THOSE IMPRISONED FOR ANTI-GOI VIEWS, INCLUDING TJENDERANA SIH UNIVERsITY (DJAJAPURA) STUDENTS. MALIK TOLD AMBASSADORS THAT ARMY HAD DOUBLED NUMBER OF TROOPS ALREADY IN WI FOR AFC (FROM 8 TO 16,000) BUT HE (MALIK) URGED MILITARY TO REMOVE SOME OF THEM WHICH ARMY PROMISED TO DO IN SEPT. PHINIT AKSON NOTED DUTCH AMBASSADOR;S COMMENT THAT DUTCH FOMMINLUNS EXPECTED INDONS TO RUN AFC IN MANNER THEY NOW DOING BUT HOPED IT WOULD BE WITH SOME DIGNITY. THE AMBASSADORS, ACCORDING PHINIT AKSON, FOUND DIGNITY COMPLETELY LACKING.

2. DUTCH AMBASSADOR SCHELTEMAN TOLD AMBASSADOR THAT AFC IN MERAUKE LAID ON TOO THICK, THERE WAS CHORUS LIKE TIDAL WAVE, OF ENTHUSIASTIC APPROVAL FOR CONTINUED UNION WITH INDONESIA. SPEECHES WERE GIVEN IN SAME WORDS READ FROM SAME BOOK IN WAIMEENAA (DJAJAKIDJAJA KABUPATEN IN CENTRAL HIGHLANDS). AFC WASH QUIETER, SPEECHES WERE PERFUNCTORvH AS MOST COUNCIL MEMBERS UTERED ONLY RED AND WHITE (SIGNIFYING INDO FLAG) THEN SAT DOWN. IN NABIRE, SEVERAL AFC COUNCIL MEMBERS QUESTIONED GOVT AND PRAYER WAS GIVEN BY CATHOLIC DELEGATE THAT GOVT WOULD WORK FOR PEOPLE INSTEAD OF PEOPLE FOR GOVT. ANOTHER DELEGATE ASKED THAT CORRUPTERS IN GOVT BE REMOVED. ACCORDING SCHELTEMAN, THESE EVENTS COULD HARDLY HAVE BEEN REHEARSED. SCHELTEMAN SAID HE HAD ASKED HIS INDO FRIENDS TO COMMENT ON POSITIVE ASPECTS OF AFC SO HIS REPORT TO GON (WHICH HE SAID WOULD BE READ IN PARLIAMENT) WOULD HAVE RING OF TRUTH. SCHELTEMAN COMMENTED RUefully HE WAS NOT FINDING THIS EASY.

3. AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR JOCKEL SHOWED AMBASSADOR COPIES HIS WRITTEN REPORTS (PROTECT SOURCE). HE HAD NOTED BAD EFFECTS OF AFC: POLITICAL ACTIVITY INTENSIFIED IN THIS BACKWARD AREA; DIVISIVE EFFECT AMONG IRIMANSE, AFC "IMPELLED INDONS TO GREAT EFFORTS OF INDOCTRINATION" OF POPULACE, INDON REPRESSvON CAUSED BY FEAR OF SEPARATISM, AND AROUNSED IRIMANSE EXPECTATIONS WHICH COULD NOT BE MET. POSITIVE EFFECTS WERE THAT AFC FOCUSED HIGH-LEVEL ATTENTION ON WI AND THERE SEEMED GENUINE GOI INTENTION TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. JOCKEL CONCLUDED, SITUATION "NOT IRRETRIEVABLE" IN THAT
SECRET

PAGE 03 DJAKAR 04947 250342Z.

RACIAL AND NATIONALISTIC IMPULSES OF IRANESE NOT YET.
STRONG AND MATERIAL PROGRESS WOULD PAY OFF POLITICALLY
FOR INDONS. OF AFC DELIBERATIONS OBSERVED. JOCKEL
NOTED MERAUKE WAS ENTHUSIASTICALLY PRO-INDON. WAMEÑA WAS
PRIMITIVE AND "IF VOTE REPRESENTED ANYTHING, IT WAS FOR
CONTACT WITH OUTSIDE WORLD"; NABIRE WITH MIXED HIGHLAND
AND COASTAL POPULATION WAS ONLY ABOUT ONE-FOURTH NOT
ENTHUSIASTIC FOR GOI AND SPEAKERS DEMANDED EDUCATION AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN ADDITION TO END OF CORRUPTION. IN
BIAK AND DJAJAPURA HE FOUND IRANESE "SULLÉN AND DISCONTENTED."
JOCKEL CONSIDERING RETURNING TO WI IN EARLY AUGUST AND
REQUESTED FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM GOA REGARDING
ADVISABILITY ANOTHER TRIP. GP-3

GALBRAITH

BT

NNN
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PAGE 01 DJAKAR 05393 071118Z

19 ACTION EA 15

INFO OCT 01 EUR 17 AF 12 10 13 CIA 00 DODE 00 JPM 04 H 02 INR 07 L 03 NSE 00 NSC 10 P 04 RSC 01 PRS 01 SS 20 USIA 12 AID 28 E

CU 04 UCF 05 GBR 01 175 W

R: 071039Z AUG 69
FM AMBASSASY DJAKARTA
TO AMBASSASY ABIDJAN
AMBASSASY CONAKRY
AMBASSASY COTOndo
AMBASSASY DAKAR
AMBASSASY DAR ES SALAAM
AMBASSASY FREETOWN
AMBASSASY KINSHASA
AMBASSASY MONROVIA
AMBASSASY NAIROBI
AMBASSASY NIAMEY
AMBASSASY TANANARIVE
AMBASSASY YAOUNDE
INFO SEC STATE WASHDC 963
AMBASSASY BRUSSELS
AMBASSASY CANBERRA
RUDKTH/AMBASSASY THE HAAGUE 476
AMBASSASY PARIS
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
US MISSION USUN
CINCPAC 1236

CONFIDENTIAL 920 JAKARTA 05393

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: GOI FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT TO AFRICAN NATIONS

1. ON AUG 15; GOI FONMIN ADAM MALIK WILL DEPART ON BRIEF VISIT TO EUROPE AND TOUR OF AFRICAN CAPITALS; SCHEDULE FOR WHICH STILL BEING WORKED OUT. PURPOSE OF TRIP IS TO ENLIST
SUPPORT FOR GOI IMPLEMENTATION OF ACT KN FREE CHOICE (AFC) IN WEST IRIAN WHICH GOI BELIEVES WILL BE OPPOSED BY SEVERAL (MOSTLY FRANCOPHONE) AFRICAN NATIONS* IN ADDITION ACTION ADDRESSEE CITIES* MALIK PLANS VISIT CONGO-BRAZZAVILLE. MALIK WILL ADDRESS WORLD ASSEMBLY OF YOUTH (WAY) MEETING IN BRUSSELS AUG 18 AND WILL MAKE BRIEF STOPOVER IN PARIS. IT NOT KNOWN WHETHER MALIK PLANS DISCUSS AFC WITH BELGIANS OR FRENCH PRIOR BEGINNING AFRICAN TOUR.  

2. BACKGROUND OF AFC AND US POSITION SUMMARIZED IN CURRENT FOREIGN RELATIONS NO. 29 (PP68-10).  

3. OPPOSITION TO GOI OUTSIDE WEST IRIAN COMES FROM SEVERAL IRIANESE NATIONALIST GROUPS AMONG WHICH FREE PAPUA ORGANIZATION (OPM) LED BY NICHOLAS JOUWE IS MOST INFLUENTIAL AND AFFLUENT. JOUVE AND COHORTS HAVE LOBBED FOR INDEPENDENT PAPUA EXTENSIVELY IN UN AND EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IN NETHERLANDS. HERSZANTI-INDON SENTIMENT STILL RUNS STRONG AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT IS FORTH AMONG OPM CHARGES AFC NOT DEMOCRATIC EXPRESSION OF WILL OF PEOPLE AND HAS PRESSED FOR ONE MAN-ONE VOTE FORMULA. REPORTS INDICATE EXPATRIATE OPPOSITION GROUPS ATTEMPTING MOBILIZE AFRICAN SENTIMENT AGAINST AFC USING RACE (BROWN INDONS OPPRESSING BLACK IRIANESE) AS ONE LEVER TACTIC APPARENTLY IS TO FORCE UNGA OR COMMITTEE DEBATE WHICH WOULD DRAW WORLD ATTENTION TO ALLEGED UNDEMOCRATIC NATURE OF AFC AND INDON OPPRESSION.  

4. MALIK'S AFRICAN TOUR IS CALCULATED TO COUNTER OPM AND OTHER PROPAGANDIZING AGAINST GOI AND FORESTALL OPPOSITION IN UN. AFC HAS ARoused NATIONALIST FEVER AMONG INDONS AND GOI CONSIDERS IT ESSENTIAL WEST IRIAN BE RECOGNIZED AS PART OF INDON REPUBLIC WITHOUT QUALIFICATION. GOI, IN SENDING MALIK TO AFRICA, IS DETERMINED NOT TO LET BALL DROP NOW IN VIEW OF WHAT GOI BELIEVES WAS RESOUNDING SUCCESS IN "WINNING" AFC. MOREOVER, GOI REASONABLY CONFIDENT UNSYG WILL GO ALONG WITH GOI IMPLEMENTATION OF AFC IN VIEW UN DESIRE NOT TO BECOME REINVOLVED IN AREA. ALSO, DUTCH GOV'T DESPITE ITS HISTORIC INTEREST AND AUSTRALIA AS NEIGHBOR APPEAR DISINCLINED TO BECOME INVOLVED AND HAVE INDICATED THEIR ACQUIESCENCE IN GOI METHOD AND RESULT OF AFC.  

5. ACTION REQUESTED: WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS ON MALIK VISIT TO ADDRESSEE COUNTRIES AND ASSESSMENT OF HOST GOV'T ATTITUDE ON
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PAGE 03. DJAKAR 05392 071118Z

WEST IRIAN ISSUE* GP-3*
GALBRAITH
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NNN

CONFIDENTIAL
TO : EA - Ambassador Green
FROM : EA/IND - Paul F. Gardner

SUBJECT: Call by Indonesian Ambassador Soedjatmoko - BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

Ambassador Soedjatmoko will call on you at noon Tuesday, August 26, accompanied by Political Counselor Alex Alatas. I will be present.

The Ambassador would like first to exchange general impressions of the President's visit to Djakarta and then "exchange thoughts" on the three subjects discussed below:

West Irian and the United Nations

The "Act of Free Choice" will undoubtedly be placed on the General Assembly's agenda, and the Secretary General's report on the "Act" will probably be brought directly before the plenary session. The Indonesians hope that debate will be limited (perhaps to statements by Indonesia and the Netherlands) and that the General Assembly will "take note" of the fulfillment of the Indonesia-Netherlands agreement without a roll call vote.

The Ambassador might ask for our support in preparing smooth U. N. handling of the Act. You might point out that lobbying for certain procedures could focus undue attention on the Agenda item, stimulating other nations to take part. If asked by other delegations for our views, however, the U. S. delegation would note that lengthy debate could serve no useful purpose.

If the Ambassador indicates that Indonesia will refer to the West Irian issue as an "internal affair" (as did Foreign Department official Sani during Foreign Minister Malik's African tour), you might note that the use of arguments often heard from the Union of South Africa could draw a negative response from African and other nations.

FUNDWI

Our last report on the GOI attitude towards the U. N.'s Fund for West Irian was provided in June by Major General Sohar, Chairman of the Central Board for utilization of FUNDWI. Sohar said FUNDWI should be dissolved upon exhaustion of its current funds in "four or five years." (About $8 million of the $30 million supplied by the Dutch has been
spent, according to Sohar) Sohar said FUNDWI should not be replenished by other donors. The GOI would prefer bilateral assistance for West Irian.

If the Ambassador indicates that the GOI as a whole now takes such a negative attitude towards FUNDWI's continuation, you might wish cautioning against coupling FUNDWI's future with U. N. consideration of the "Act of Free Choice."

Assistance for the Indonesian Air Force

Alex Alatas said that the Ambassador has a "brief from Djakarta giving more details" on the Air Force's needs. We have just received the attached memorandum from General Larson replying to points raised in Ambassador Galbraith's MAP recommendations. To show the Indonesians that we are playing the game above board, I suggest that you read to the Ambassador paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of this memorandum. (Both Colonel George Benson and I believe that you could show him the memorandum if it were not for the reference to the C-119's, which reveals our mission's recommendations.)
CONFIDENTIAL 078

PAGE 01 DJAKAR 07266 211051Z

21
ACTION: IO 15

INFO: OCT 01, EUR 20, EA 10, VO 02, SCA 01, CPR 02, SY 03, CIAE 00, INR 07,
NSAE 00, RSC 01, FBI 01, RSP 01, 064 W

211020Z OCT 69
FM: AMEMBASSY DJAKARTA
TO: USMISSION USUN
INFO: SECSTATE, WASHDC 1765
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA
AMCONSUL MEDAN
AMCONSUL SURABAYA
CINC PAC 1280

CONFIDENTIAL DJAKARTA 7266
CINC PAC FOR POLAD

SUBJ: WEST IRIAN ISSUE IN UNGA

1. CHIEF OF PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL OPERATIONS STAFF (OPSUS) BRIG GEN ALI MURTOPO IS HEADING SPECIAL MISSION WHICH WILL ARRIVE NEW YORK PRIOR UNGA DEBATE ON WI ISSUE NOV 12th IN ADDITION MURTOPO (WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY WIFE AND TWO SONS), OPSUS MEMBERS OF MISSION INCLUDE ARMY LT COL NGAIRAN WHO HEADS OPSUS TASK FORCE; ON WI MAJOR BOEMARTO PITUT, SUHADI, JAN WELANDOUM (LONGTIME CLANDESTINE OPERATOR AND FINANCIAL WHEELER-DEALER WHO IS CLOSE TO MURTOPO), NOUSSY, PASARIBO, HAMONANGAN; AND PHOTOGRAPHER MOHAMMAD NURDIN (IRIANISE IN DELEGATION ARE: WI GOVERNOR FRANS KASTEPO (BROTHER OF MARCUS KASTEPO, PRESIDENT OF DISIDENT PAPUAN NATIONAL FRONT, NOW IN NEW YORK), PARLIAMENT MEMBERS: LUCAS JOUWE (COUSIN OF MICHAEL OLAS JOUWE, CHAIRMAN OF PAPUAN FREEDOM COMMITTEE), WIM RUMAINUM (CHRISTIAN PARTY LEADER), AND: LOEDWIJK ADAMSIBAS, EK CHAIRMAN OF PAPUAN NATIONAL FRONT NOW CHAIRMAN OF PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY (DPRI).)

2. MISSION SCHEDULED: DEPART IN SMALL GROUPS BETWEEN OCT 24 AND 27 WITH STOPPERS IN HONG KONG TO PURCHASE NEW
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PAGE 02 DJAKAR 07266 211051Z

SUTTS.

3. PURPOSE OF MISSION IS TO ENLIST SUPPORT FOR GOI IN UNGA AND SHOW THAT IRIANISE SUPPORT ACTS OF FREE CHOICE. ACCORDING OPUS SOURCE PAPUAN DISSIDENTS MARCUS KASIPE AND NICHOLAS JOUWE WILL PROBABLY BE CONTACTED. ALTHOUGH LITTLE HOPE IS SEEN FOR RECONCILIATION WITH OVERSEAS PAPUAN NATIONALISTS SOURCE ALSO NOTED FOMIN MALIK ENCOURAGED SENDING LARGE DELEGATION TO PROVIDE BROAD COVERAGE IN CHECKMATING POSSIBLE OPPOSITION.

4. COMMENT: IRIANISE DELEGATION ARE CONSIDERED TO BE "RELIABLE" TO GOI GOVERNOR KASIPE AND LUCAS JOUWE TOOK PART IN PREVIOUS AFC "TRUTH MISSIONS" (SEE EMBTEL 5524 OF AUG 13, 1969 AND A-252 OF JUNE 25, 1969). SENDING OF MURTOPO AND TOP OPERATIVES TO UN ON M ISSUE IS APPARENTLY RE-DUBLED GOI EFFORT TO ASSURE SMOOTH SAILING FOR AFC IN UNGA.

POL 3

GALBRAITH
CONFIDENTIAL 094

GOVERNMENT INFORMATION

POL 19 WEST IRIAN

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 094

PAGE 01 USUN N 04093 090123Z

85

ACTION 10 15

INFO OCT 01 EUR 20 EA 10 CIAE 00 DODE 00 PM 05 H 02 INR 07 L 03

NSAE 00 NSC 10 P 03 RSC 01 PRS 01 SS 20 USIA 12 RSR 01 111 W

6989 US 9689

R 082319Z NOV 69

FM USMISSION USUN NY

To SECSTATE WASHDC 9869

INFO AMBASSADORS DJAKARTA

AMBASSADOR THE HAGUE

AMBASSADOR CANBERRA

CONFIDENTIAL USUN 4093

UNSYG REPORT ON WEST IRIAN

1. UN SYG REPORT ON ACT OF FREE CHOICE IN WEST IRIAN

RELEASED BY SECRETARIAT LATE EVENING NOV 7. 153-PAGE

REPORT CONSISTS OF 3-PAGE COVERING STATEMENT BY SYG WITH

LENGTHY REPORTS ON UNSYG REP ORTIZ-SANZ AND OF GOI

AS ANNEXES.

2. SYG'S CAREFULLY QUALIFIED STATEMENTS REFLECT

CAUTIOUS AND CAREFUL DRAFTING. HE DOES NOT STATE EX-

PLICITLY HIS OWN CONCLUSION THAT ACT WAS SUCCESSFULLY

CARRIED OUT; RATHER, HE QUOTES ORTIZ-SANZ STATEMENT

THAT "IT COULD BE THAT, WITH THE LIMITATION IMPOSED

BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TERRITORY

AND THE GENERAL POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA,

AN ACT OF FREE CHOICE HAS TAKEN PLACE IN WEST

IRIAN" IN ACCORDANCE WITH INDONESIAN PRACTICE, IN WHICH

THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POPULATION HAVE EXPRESSED

THEIR WISH TO REMAIN WITH INDONESIA. SYG ALSO NOTED

IN DON REPORT STATEMENT THAT ACT WAS SUCCESSFUL, STREN-

GTHENING UNITY OF INDONESIA AND ITS PEOPLE. SYG

"ENCOURAGED TO NOTE FROM GOI REPORT ITS DETER-

MINATION TO CONCENTRATE EFFORTS OF GOVT AND PEOPLE OF

INDONESIA ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND PROGRESS OF WEST

NEW GUINEA." SYG ALSO NOTED THAT ENLARGED COUNCILS

ON BEHALF OF PEOPLE OF WEST IRIAN "WITHOUT DISSENT..."
PRONOUNCED THEMSELVES IN FAVOR OF THE TERRITORY REMAINING WITH INDONESIA. THIS WAS RESULT OF THE ACT OF FREE CHOICE."

3. ORTIZ-SANZ LENGTHY REPORT, MOST OF WHICH DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF HIS AND INDONESIAN ACTIVITIES IN CARRYING OUT AGREEMENT, CONTAINS TWO RESERVATIONS. ORTIZ-SANZ SAID DESPIRIT HIS EFFORTS, ART XXII OF AGREEMENT RELATING TO RIGHTS OF INHABITANTS (INCLUDING FREE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ASSEMBLY), "WAS NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND THE ADMINISTRATION EXERCISED AT ALL TIMES A TIGHT POLITICAL CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION". SECONDLY, HE NOTED THAT WHEN HE ARRIVED IN WEST IRIAN IN AUG 1968, "I WAS FACED WITH THE PROBLEM OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ART XVI OF THE AGREEMENT". UN EXPERTS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS OF ADVISING ON AND ASSISTING IN PREPARATIONS FOR CARRYING OUT PROVISIONS FOR SELF-DETERMINATION HAD NOT BEEN PERFORMED DURING THE PERIOD 1 MAY 1963 TO 23 AUG 1968", AND HE THEREFORE HANDICAPPED IN CARRYING OUT HIS ROLE.

4. FULL TEXT SYG'S: STATEMENT USUN 4092 @P-4 @

YOST
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Confidential Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 17, 1969
TIME: 12:30
PLACE: Secretary's Office

SUBJECT: UNGA Consideration of the West Irian
"Act of Free Choice" (Part 1 of 3)

PARTICIPANTS:
Foreign Minister Adam Malik of Indonesia
Ambassador Soedjatmoko
Abu Bakar Lubis, Special Assistant to the Minister
Elkana Tobing, Advisor to the Minister

The Secretary
Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Robert W. Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Edward E. Masters, Country Director for Indonesian Affairs

Copies to: See page 3

Foreign Minister Malik opened the substantive portion of the conversation by observing that he would like to bring the Secretary up-to-date on the UNGA's consideration of the West Irian "Act of Free Choice." When the issue came before the Assembly on November 13, Malik said, the delegate of Dahomey objected to the short time allowed for consideration of the Secretary General's report on this matter. He was supported by Gabon, Togo, Ghana and Ecuador, all of whom felt that three days was too short a time to study an issue of this complexity. As a result of this concern, the President of the General Assembly ruled that consideration of the issue would be postponed until Wednesday, November 19.

The African states, Malik continued, are concerned by the principle of self-determination, particularly as this might at some point apply to areas such as Rhodesia. They have little understanding of the Indo-Dutch Agreement of 1962 and fail to realize that, by raising procedural questions, they are threatening to reopen this whole sensitive issue between Djakarta and the Hague.
Malik said Indonesia hopes that on November 19 the President of the General Assembly will bring about quick approval of the Indo-Dutch resolution on the "Act of Free Choice" and that there will be no debate. Malik reiterated the request he had made to Assistant Secretary Green the previous day for the U.S. to do what it could to help convince the African nations of the need for judicious handling of this matter.

Secretary Rogers said we had already been in touch with the delegations mentioned by Foreign Minister Malik as well as with others. In our general discussions on this matter we have taken the position that the 1962 Agreement has been satisfactorily executed. The Secretary questioned, however, whether it would be advisable for us to become too active. What we want to do, he said, is to be discreet but at the same time persuasive. Secretary Rogers said he was quite well acquainted with the Ambassador of Togo and it was his understanding that the Ambassador also headed his delegation to the General Assembly. If it would be useful, he could call the Ambassador and express our views personally.

Malik said Indonesia is working closely with the Dutch delegation in New York and that Foreign Minister Luns has been helpful. However, one reason for the current problem is the fact that in 1962 Luns pushed Dahomey into taking an anti-Indonesian position. Dahomey resents this and is motivated in part by a desire to get even with Luns, even though this now embarrasses Indonesia.

Assistant Secretary Green asked whether the Indonesians had solicited the help of France, which could exert influence on the Francophone nations involved. Malik said they had indeed been in touch with the French and that he had also discussed this problem with British Foreign Secretary Stewart during his visit to London in early November. In addition, talks had been held with the Asian group at the UN. Members of this group were confident that Indonesia would win if there were a vote in the General Assembly, but Indonesia would prefer that there were no debate since this would open up old wounds between Indonesia and the Dutch.

Concluding this portion of the discussion, Malik said considerable embarrassment had been caused by an article in the November 16 issue of the New York Times which reported that
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200,000 children were to be removed from West Irian and settled in Java. This, Malik said, is a complete distortion of the actual situation. Djakarta's intention is not to deport these children but rather to support them within West Irian under an arrangement similar to the Foster Parents plan in the United States.

Clearances:

EA - Mr. Green
S/S -

COPIES TO:

S, U, J, D, C, S/S, INR/OD, S/PC
AF, EA-3, EUR, IO, L, USUN

Amembassies:

Djakarta
Cotonou
The Hague
US Mission Geneva
Send the following message, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to:

N41D46 5A PD WUX NEW YORK NY NFT NOV 24 1969

PERMANENT MISSION OF USA

799 UNITED NATIONS PLAZA NYK

ON BEHALF OF THE INDONESIAN DELEGATION, PERMANENT MISSION AND STAFF, LET ME EXPRESS TO YOU OUR APPRECIATION FOR YOUR VALUABLE SUPPORT REGARDING WEST IRIAN, WHICH HAS HELPED MAKE POSSIBLE THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE LONG STRUGGLE OF THE INDONESIAN PEOPLE FOR COMPLETE FREEDOM, NATIONAL UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

DR H ROESLAN ABDULGANI SENDS
INDONESIAN MISSION