There is no access to the high officers of the Federal Government.
Declassified

Memorandum

From:

To:

Date: 1/13/67

Subject: Attached are the guidance of Commander G. E. Thomas for
from 1/13/67 to 1/14/67.

Deception

Office Memorandum

United States Government

[Signature]

[Stamp: Classified]

[Stamp: Declassified]
Objective - To determine if the methodology, procedures and criteria being employed by the Strategic Target Planning Staff are sound and are optimal in the development of a National Strategic Target List and a Single Integrated Operational Plan that are in conformity with the National Objectives as approved by the President.

To this end, the following queries are suggested:

(a) What are the overall methodology and procedures being employed by the Director Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) in the development of the NSTL and the SIOP? How does the DSTP approach compare with that used to develop Study 2009? If differences exist, what are the relative advantages and disadvantages of each system?

(b) What is the target point value system? How was it derived? How is it employed in computer solutions? At what point is the human judgment factor injected? What system of checks and balances is employed?

(c) The damage criteria which you were instructed to employ are quite stringent. (90% probability of severe damage to military nuclear delivery capability and to primary military and government controls of major importance; and 90% probability of destruction of 50% of industrial floor space in urban-industrial targets) Do you feel that they could be relaxed? Weapon requirements are of course critically dependent upon the damage criteria which is utilized for effects computation. They are also influenced by
the effects manual being employed. Have you comparative values for weapon requirements based upon the DASA Atomic Weapon Employment Handbook and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Employment Handbook (AFM 200-8)?

It is apparent that percentage probability specified for achieving a given damage level will greatly influence the weapons requirements. Have you had an opportunity to examine the effect of a 75% probability as opposed to a 90% probability?

The level of damage desired is also a determinant of weapon requirements. Would it be desirable to run a comparison using moderate rather than severe damage as a criterion for military targets (or destruction of total floor space or dwelling floor space rather than industrial floor space as a criterion for urban-industrial complexes). Along these lines, would it be meaningful to examine the damage which would result to total floor space and dwelling floor space from the application of weapons considered necessary to destroy 50% of industrial floor space?

(d) What are the salient points of difference between the SAC urban-industrial model and the Library of Congress Tract Data Model? What if any, is the difference in weapon requirements resulting from the use of the SAC model as compared to the requirement resulting from the use of the Tract Data Model?

(e) What is your basic plan for destruction of Soviet missile sites? How many of these sites (ICBM, IRBM, SAM) have you targeted?
(f) What data processing procedures are used in the development of the NSTL and SIOP? How many different programs are used? Can you utilize your computer set-up to optimize DGZs for the spectrum of weapons being employed by the Unified Commanders? If not, how are you handling this problem?

(g) Have you progressed far enough to have any feel as to whether this process is resulting in a requirement for fewer forces to do the same job than were needed under the old planning system?

(h) You are backing up missiles and non-all weather aircraft with scheduled all weather aircraft. Is a system being developed wherein these back-up aircraft are used on alternate targets if the missiles or non-all weather aircraft delivers on target? How long do you consider it will be necessary to back up missiles with aircraft?

(i) It would appear that the effects of the bombing effort laid on by the SIOP would be cumulative in nature and thus result in more damage overall than straight line summation of the individual damage effects. Have you considered this in your plans?

Comment - An oversimplified example might be the destruction of the Moscow water supply pumping stations by one bomb and resulting greater destruction from fires in another part of the city initiated by a second bomb, fires that could not be fought due to failure of the water supply.
(j) To what extent have you considered the effects of fall-out in your plans? With respect to enemy territory and population? With respect to friendly territory and population?

Comment - Sino-Soviet territory and population stand to be heavily damaged by fall-out from a level of attack even below "massive." It appears that at some point in the application of massive forces of massive destruction, fall-out will seriously menace friendly countries and populations contiguous to the Sino-Soviet areas.

What analysis is made of these effects? Is there a cut-off point?