1. Northern bases. Use of northern staging bases by the Soviet bomber fleet increases greatly the Soviet attack capability against Conus. In order to secure the maximum surprise, it is unlikely that these bases will have been occupied prior to the launch of an initial Soviet missile attack. Rapid U.S. missile attack against these bases could degrade significantly the weight of the initial or follow-on Soviet bomber attack against Conus; the bomber attacks now programmed probably would not.

2. Constraints. Alert force weapons alone create an excessive and intolerable radiological hazard in many peripheral areas but most notably in South Korea. This hazard will increase when follow-on forces are considered and does not consider the effects arising from Soviet weapons. In order to reduce this hazard to acceptable levels means must be found to divert unneeded weapons, to employ a greater proportion of air burst weapons, to employ smaller weapons, or to forego attack of targets whose destruction is not truly essential.

3. Armed reconnaissance. There is a wide range of Soviet air bases and suspected missile sites constituting potential or possible threats to Conus. Sheer numbers preclude the targeting of all these. Under the system of assurances used there will be residual weapons which will be burst in the craters of previous ones. Diversion of these weapons to armed reconnaissance at pilot option, could be used to attack additional military targets of opportunity. No such program or capability is provided.

4. Interdiction. Neither interdiction of internal sino-soviet communications nor of lines of communications supporting forces is embraced in the NSTAP. An effective interdiction program could markedly reduce the weight of Soviet attack against peripheral areas as well as retard economic and industrial recovery. Accomplishment of an effective interdiction program, both within the USSR and in support of theater forces is a desirable alternative to the unnecessary inflation of assurance levels and attack of less important targets.

5. Guidance. The relation of the NSTAP to the total general war task is not clear within the NSTAP itself; guidance is sometimes vague and contradictory. Clarification of the NSTAP is required along with close correlation of the NSTAP with parallel guidance in JSCP and elsewhere.

6. Point system. The SAC target point worth system has widespread effects both in the selection of the NSTL and in the application of SIOP forces. Careful re-evaluation is needed to equate the arbitrary point values to the NSTAP objectives.

7. Flexibility. The SIOP contains no provision for diversion of later programmed attacks against targets struck successfully in the earlier phases. This lack of flexibility in the SIOP causes it to fall short of the most economical employment of available forces, and compounds constraint problems. With flexibility the same level of assurance against the attack base could be attained at less cost in delivery forces.
8. TIMING. THE PROVISIONS OF THE NSTAP LIMITING THE SIOP TO THE INITIAL ATTACK AND YET ACCOMPLISHING UNDER THE SIOP THE STRATEGIC ATTACK NECESSARY TO PUT THE UNITED STATES IN A POSITION FROM WHICH ULTIMATELY TO PREVAIL. TEND TO CREATE INFLATED FORCE REQUIREMENTS. AN EXTENSION OF THE SIOP IN TIME WOULD PERMIT USE OF AN ORDERLY TIME-PRIORITY OF ATTACK WITH LESSENED FORCE REQUIREMENTS. IMPORTANT BUT IMMOBILE TARGETS CONSTITUTING ONLY A LONG-TERM OR INDIRECT THREAT (E.G., URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES) MIGHT THEN BE ATTACKED ON A DEFERRED BASIS.

9. CRITICAL INDUSTRY. THE NSTAP OBJECTIVE OF DESTRUCTION OF 50 PERCENT OF INDUSTRIAL FLOOR SPACE IN MAJOR URBAN-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES IS INDISCRIMINATE AND PROBABLY WASTEFUL OF RETALIATORY EFFORT. THE "HORIZONTAL" INDUSTRIAL TARGETING IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLE OF ATTACK IN DEPTH (VERTICALLY) AGAINST CRITICAL INDUSTRIAL SEGMENTS, A POLICY FOUND TO BE MOST PROFITABLE IN THE POST WORLD WAR II STRATEGIC BOMBARDMENT SURVEY.

10. INITIATIVE VS RETALIATORY. THE SIOP IS NEITHER CLEARLY A RETALIATORY PLAN NOR CLEARLY AN INITIATIVE PLAN. COUNTERFORCE RECEIVES HIGHER PRECEDENCE THAN IS WARRANTED FOR A RETALIATORY PLAN AND LESS PRECEDENCE THAN IS WARRANTED FOR AN INITIATIVE PLAN. OPTIONS ARE NEEDED FOR THESE TWO BASIC CONDITIONS.

11. NSTL INCONSISTENT. THE NSTL SUBMITTED IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH THE NSTAP OBJECTIVES. IT DOES NOT IDENTIFY URBAN-INDUSTRIAL TARGET COMPLEXES; IT OVEREMPHASIZES NON-PRODUCTIVE MILITARY TARGETS, SUCH AS AIRFIELDS WITH NO CURRENT CAPABILITY; AND AIR LOGISTIC FACILITIES.

12. INCOMPLETE ANALYSIS. SUFFICIENT DATA HAS NOT BEEN AVAILABLE FOR SEARCHING ANALYSIS OF THE NSTL AND SIOP. INSUFFICIENT TIME REMAINS PRIOR TO PRESENTATION OF THE NSTL AND SIOP TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO PERMIT THOROUGH ANALYSIS EVEN IF THE REQUISITE DATA SHOULD BECOME AVAILABLE. THIS ACTION ON THE NSTL AND SIOP MUST BE CONDITIONAL TO SUBSEQUENT, MORE ADEQUATE REVIEW.

13. NEED TO GAME SIOP. AN OBJECTIVE WAR GAME OF THE SIOP IS REQUIRED TO VALIDATE PENETRATION FACTORS AND TO ESTABLISH AND EVALUATE THE EFFECT OF BASE SURVIVAL CONSIDERATIONS.

14. ASSURANCE NOT GREATER THAN 90 PERCENT. APPLICATION OF FORCES TO ATTAIN ASSURANCES OF 90 PERCENT AND HIGHER IS UN-PROMISED AND WASTEFUL OF DELIVERY FORCE CAPABILITIES. BETTER USE COULD BE MADE OF FORCES NOW SO COMMITTED BY PROGRAMMING THEM TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER THE PRIMARY TARGET HAS BEEN STRUCK AND PERMITTING THEM TO STRIKE ALTERNATE TARGETS.

15. WEATHER FACTOR. THE APPLICATION OF THE WEATHER FACTOR USED BY THE JSFTPS IS WASTEFUL OF DELIVERY CAPABILITIES. RIGID APPLICATION OF this FACTOR TO NON-ALL-WEATHER FORCES DURING THE FOLLOW-ON PHASE APPEARS UNNECESSARY, ESPECIALLY FOR HIGHLY SURVIVABLE MOBILE FORCES.