The enclosed memorandum by the Chief of Naval Operations, CNO Serial 000359P60, dated 23 December 1960, subject as above, is referred hereby to the J-3 for consideration in connection with the review of the NSTL and SIOP-62 which will be directed toward possible changes in developing the next NSTL/SIOP, as indicated in paragraph 5 of the Enclosure to J.C.S. 2056/194.

F. J. BLOUIN,
M. J. INGELIDO,
Joint Secretariat.
MEMORANDUM BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

for the

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

REVIEW OF THE NSTL/SIOP-62 AND RELATED POLICY GUIDANCE (U)

Reference: JCS 2056/194

23 December 1960

Ser 000359P60

1. J.C.S. 2056/194 contains approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the NSTL and SIOP-62 and provides for a continuing review of these documents, directed toward identifying areas to be investigated for possible change in developing the next NSTL/SIOP. Recommendations from the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders concerned, and the DSTP have been requested.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations notes the following specific areas which require further investigation and possible action:

   a. Damage Criteria.

      (1) Preliminary damage assessment indicates that use of the criteria contained in the Targeting and Attack Policy results in damage levels and population casualties beyond those which appear to be required. The damage assessment is based on blast damage only, and does not take into account thermal and radiation effects. It is also based on only one weapon per DOZ. Most DOZs have multiple weapons programmed, and the most likely occurrence is that more than one weapon will arrive, further raising damage levels.

      (2) Simplification and
economy could be realized if the damage criteria finally
determined for were also applied to Investigation on a
case-by-case basis of the military acceptability of this
procedure is probably required.

(3) All targets of a given category are subject to the
same damage criteria. Consideration should be given to
provision of a sliding scale of damage, based upon relative
target worth.

b. Assurance at BRL. Existing guidance has been subject
to diverse interpretation. The alert Force was applied to
achieve an overall average assurance approximating but not
less than 75% for arrival at those BRLs associated with the
Alert Force. When the Follow-on Force was applied, the
assurance level raised to approximately 97% assurance on

Attainment of this extremely high level of assurance requires the programming
of many weapons on most DGZs.

c. Constraints. The expected dose rates at selected
monitoring points do not exceed existing constraints levels.
These dose rates were computed utilizing yearly average mean
winds; were based on one weapon per DGZ; and only. A complete constraints analysis, to include
seasonal wind data and the effect of multiple weapons on a
single DGZ, should be made to determine total expected dose
rates. World-wide contamination, to include effect of
Soviet weapons employment, should also be considered.

d. Base Survivability and Employment of Follow-on Forces.
These two are very closely related. Base survivability was
not taken into account in JCS SIOP-62. Survivability factors
should be developed, and any adjustments resulting therefrom
applied to the use of the follow-on forces. JCS war gaming
will develop useful data concerning base survivability.
e. Point Value System. In developing the initial NSTL and SIOP, SAC's existing point value system, adjusted to accommodate an optimum-mix target system, was used. ALPHA and BRAVO points were developed independently and manually integrated into a single list. Time precluded consideration of alternate procedures. The point system should now be examined closely to insure that we are in fact using the best method for the determination of target priorities and location of DGZs.

f. Factors Used in Determining Probability of Success.
The factors used in computing the probability of success of weapons system should be reviewed carefully, for these factors have a strong bearing on total force requirements. The factors applied to missile systems and to non-all-weather delivery systems appear to warrant special consideration.

3. Three additional related areas are not addressed herein. These are: organization of the JSTPS; joint operational intelligence; and the determination of the essential national task together with the development of a target list based thereon. These, and others which may arise later, will be the subject of separate memoranda.

4. It is recommended that the Director, Joint Staff include the subjects discussed in paragraph 2 above in the review of the NSTL/SIOP and associated policy guidance directed by J.C.S. 2056/194.

5. It is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified or specified commands.

6. In consonance with the provisions of J.C.S. Memorandum of Policy No. 83, it is recommended that copies of this paper NOT be forwarded to U.S. officers in NATO activities.