J P R182250Z

FM CINCPAC CAMP H M SMITH HAWAII

TO REPW/JCS

INFO RJWXER/DSTPS OFFUTT AFB WEB
    REPBA/CINCLANT
    RJXDG/CINCAL
    RNFZC/CINCEUR
    REDLNR/CINCNEWM
    RJWXBR/CINCSAC
    RJWXBR/CINCPACREP JSTPS OFFUTT AFB

/// TOP SECRET ///

REPORT OF PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SIOP-62
A. JCS 907018 DTG 092127Z-DEC
B. JCS 539220 DTG 070009Z-

REFERENCE B

REQUESTED INITIAL SUBMISSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS
REQUIRED BY REF A BY 20 JAN.

2. MY PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF SIOP -62 CONFIRMS DOUBTS IN MY MIND
AS TO THE VALIDITY OF SEVERAL PLANNING FACTORS WHICH WERE USED IN
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLAN. I THINK WE CAN PRODUCE A BETTER ONE BASED ON
MORE REASONABLE PLANNING INPUT FACTORS.

3. DAMAGE CRITERIA.
   A. THE CRITERIA FURNISHED IN JCS GUIDANCE FOR SIOP-62 WERE
   RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCING SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF DGZS. IN THINKING
   ABOUT THIS, I REEXAMINED THE PHOTOGRAPHS OF DAMAGE WHICH WAS INFILCTED
   ON HIROSHIMA BY A 17FT AIR BURST. THIS EXERCISE REVEALED THE EXTREMES
   TO WHICH WE HAVE GONE IN OUR PLANS DURING THE PAST 15 YEARS. WHILE I
   CAN CONCEIVE THAT SEVERE DAMAGE AS CURRENTLY DEFINED MAY NOT BE
   NECESSARY IN RESPECT TO SOVIET ATOMIC DELIVERY CAPABILITIES, I CANNOT
   DO SO WHEN I THINK OF STRIKING MAJOR GOVERNMENT CONTROLS. HERE IS AN
   EXAMPLE WHERE, IN MY OPINION, DAMAGE CRITERIA APPLIED TO ONE TYPE OF

JCS...ACT(1-27)CSA(29-43)CSAF(44-45)CMC(46-51)CNO

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TARGET SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED AGAINST ANOTHER TYPE. ADOPTING A GRADUATED DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR DIFFERENT TYPES OF TARGETS WOULD PERMIT CHANGING DGZS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF CO-LOCATION OF TARGET ELEMENTS IN AN AREA WHICH CAN BE DAMAGED BY A SINGLE DETONATION. I BELIEVE WE CAN ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES BY DOING LESS DAMAGE AND USING FEWER FORCES AND WEAPONS.

B. IN THE CASE OF INDUSTRIAL FLOOR SPACE, THE CRITERIA USED FOR SIOP-62 DID NOT PERMIT SELECTIVITY AS TO CRITICAL INDUSTRIES AND DID NOT ENCOURAGE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT COLLATERAL DAMAGE CAUSED BY OTHER WEAPONS EFFECTS. ONLY BLAST EFFECTS WERE CONSIDERED BY THE JSTPS. OTHER EFFECTS SUCH AS HEAT, FIRE AND RADIATION SHOULD BE USED WHEN DRAWING UP DAMAGE CRITERIA FOR THE SIOP.

4. CONSTRAINTS.

A. UPON REACHING AN INCAPACITATION THRESHOLD OF AN INDIVIDUAL, SMALL ADDITIONAL EXPOSURE TO RADIATION MAY CAUSE DEATH AND AS A MINIMUM, WILL INCREASE RECOVERY TIME. WHILE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE RADIATION EFFECTS RESULTING FROM THE ENEMY'S USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS UNKNOWN, WE DO KNOW THAT THE CENTER OF THE AREA COVERED BY RESIDUAL RADIATION IS DOWN-WIND FROM THE DETONATION POINT. THIS MEANS TO US IN PACOM THAT OFF-CONTINENT WINDS ALOFT MAY CAUSE US TO BE MORE CONCERNED ABOUT RESIDUAL RADIATION DAMAGE RESULTING FROM OUR OWN WEAPONS THAN THOSE OF THE ENEMY. NEVERTHELESS, WHEN WE CONSIDER THAT WORLDWIDE ABOUT 1450 WEAPONS ARE PROGRAMMED BY ALERT FORCES AND ABOUT 3400 WEAPONS BY ALL OF THE COMMITTED FORCES, WE REALIZE THAT OUR WEAPONS CAN BE A HAZARD TO OURSELVES AS WELL AS TO OUR ENEMY.

B. THE PROCEDURE USED BY JSTPS OF USING THE SINGLE LARGEST WEAPON YIELD ON A GIVEN DGZ FOR CONSTRAINT COMPUTATION IS NOT SATISFACTORY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE HIGH DAMAGE CRITERIA WHICH WERE USED. THESE CRITERIA CAUSED THE HEIGHT OF BURST TO BE LOWERED AND SEVERAL WEAPONS TO BE PROGRAMMED AGAINST EACH DGZ TO MEET THE DESIRED ASSURANCE. IN THE CASE OF PROGRAMMING MULTIPLE ATTACKS FOR HIGH ASSURANCE, WE EXPECT ON A RANDOM PROBABILITY BASIS THAT MORE THAN ONE WEAPON WILL BE DELIVERED MOST OF THE TIME. THIS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT WHEN COMPUTING PROBABLE Fallout ON OUR OWN FORCES AND OUR FRIENDS.

5. ASSURANCE.

AS POINTED OUT DURING THE CONFERENCE AT OMAHA, AN ASSURANCE OF 97 PERCENT WAS PLANNED ON HIGH PRIORITY TARGETS BECAUSE NO BASE SURVIVABILITY FACTOR HAS BEEN DEVELOPED. IN OTHER WORDS, THE HIGH ASSURANCE WAS CRANKED IN AS AN ARBITRARY PIECE OF INSURANCE. THE METHODOLOGY OF APPLYING AN ASSURANCE FACTOR SHOULD BE REFINED. MORE IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, IS THE NECESSITY FOR DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT A BASE SURVIVABILITY FACTOR CAN ACTUALLY BE DEVELOPED.
6. WEATHER FACTOR.

I do not quarrel with the factor itself nor the manner in which it was derived. My position while SIOP-62 was being developed was that the weather factor should not be applied as an across-the-board weapons system degradation factor. I took the position during the planning cycle that the factor should be applied to non all-weather aircraft which are in the alert force because they are required to launch upon receipt of a random go signal. However, I did not agree that the same factor should be applied to the follow-on forces whose launch time is flexible within a range of 4 - 5 hours. My view on this subject has not changed, and I hope it will be reconsidered when developing guidance for the next SIOP. The problem is one of determining the probability of non all-weather aircraft survival until such time as they can launch under conditions where they can identify visually their target. A point which we wish to reiterate is that our forces out on the westpax line can operate for some five (5) hours before SAC arrives on the scene and thus before there is an interference and coordination problem. We have a leeway of 5 hours and will adjust our launches within this leeway to achieve much higher probability of visually sighting the target than that derived from using the overall night/bad weather factor. We think a factor approximating 65 percent instead of 49 percent is proper for application to our follow-on forces.

7. TARGET WEIGHTING SYSTEM.

Targets must be ranked to insure conformance with JCS guidance. This means that a target weighting system must be used. The JSTPS has just distributed a target weighting system manual which is described as being an internal JSTPS procedural manual. It is noted that point values contained in the manual differ from those contained in the National Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) published 12 Oct 1960 which was used in the development of SIOP-62. We are reviewing this manual and intend to comment on it because of the effect procedures will have on developing SIOP. I would have appreciated the opportunity to have reviewed the manual concurrently as it was being developed.

8. WAR GAMING.

A. I am proceeding with the development of a two-sided war game of the friendly forces operating in the pacom primary area of interest. By this means, I propose to identify the significance of the variables under my control in providing maximum target damage with minimim attrition. Of necessity, much effort will be expended in

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FURTHER EXPLORING THOSE FACTORS DISCUSSED ABOVE, SUBSEQUENT STUDY OF
THE GAMING RESULTS SHOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ELEVATE THE CONTRIBUTION OF
EACH VARIABLE OF PRIMARY CONCERN.

B. IN THE NEAR FUTURE I PLAN TO SEND A TEAM TO THE WASHINGTON
AREA AND JSTPS TO DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF COMPARABLE ACTIVITIES IN
THOSE AREAS, WITH A VIEW TOWARD EXCHANGING IDEAS AND PROCEDURES WHICH
MIGHT BE OF MUTUAL BENEFIT.

C. NOTWITHSTANDING MY PLANS TO GAME SIOP-62, FOR THE LONG HAUL
I BELIEVE WE SHOULD GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
CENTRAL GAMING FACILITY FOR USE BY JCS, JSTPS AS WELL AS THE
UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDERS IN GAMING THEIR PLANS. IT IS POSSIBLE
THAT SUCH FACILITY COULD BE AN EXTENSION OF PRESENT EQUIPMENTS
CURRENTLY USED BY JESC, AND COULD BE CLOSE TO WASHINGTON WHERE USE CAN
BE MADE OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT COMPUTERS. FURTHER, THE FACILITY SHOULD
CONTAIN SUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION TO USERS
SPECIFIED ABOVE. THIS SUGGESTION IS MADE IN RECOGNITION OF THE MILLIONS
OF DOLLARS REQUIRED TO ENSURE Duplicative WAR GAMING STAFFS. IF A
CENTRAL FACILITY WERE ESTABLISHED, MACHINES, PROGRAMMERS, TECHNICIANS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL WOULD SERVE ALL USERS. OPERATIONS ANALYSTS
IN STAFFS OF COMMANDERS CONCERNED COULD DETERMINE TYPES OF PROGRAMS
AND INPUTS AND UTILIZE CENTRAL FACILITY TO PRODUCE WAR GAME CONCLUSIONS.

S. ORGANIZATION OF JSTPS.
I REALIZE THAT THE JSTPS WAS HASTILY ASSEMBLED AND ORGANIZED LAST
AUGUST UNDER THE PRESSURE OF HAVING TO PRODUCE THE NSTR AND SIOP BY
DEC 62. AS A CONSEQUENCE, SOME REORGANIZATION AND REALIGNMENT
OF BILLET WITHIN THE JSTPS IS PROBABLY WARRANTED AND DESIRABLE IN LIGHT
OF EXPERIENCE GAINED THUS FAR. ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO SPECIFIC
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF THE JSTPS TO MAKE AT
THIS TIME, THE FOLLOWING ARE THE PRINCIPLES WHICH I THINK SHOULD APPLY:
A. SINCE JSTPS IS AN AGENCY OF THE JCS, ITS ORGANIZATION AND
MANNING SHOULD APPROXIMATE THAT OF A JCS STAFF DIRECTORATE, WITH DUE
REGARD TO THE PROBLEM WITH WHICH IT IS CONCERNED AND THE DUTIES FOR
WHICH IT IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE JCS AND THE SECRET.
B. JSTPS PERSONNEL SHOULD NOT BE ASSIGNED RESPONSIBILITY OUTSIDE
JSTPS.
C. SERVICE REPRESENTATION IN THE JSTPS SHOULD BE EQUITABLE,
PARTICULARLY IN KEY BILLET ASSIGNMENT.

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