NAVAL MESSAGE

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FM NAVSTRACMD OMAHA NE
TO CNO

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EXCLUSIVE FOR ADMIRAL BURKE FROM VADM PARKER.

JSTPS briefings to Mr. McC Namara on 4 Feb brought forth the following questions and observations.

1. General observations: The Secretary has a good background on probabilities and was penetrating with his questions on probabilities of damage, assurance and overall effectiveness. He asked questions on ratios of force structure versus damage, pursuing it from a statistical approach. He is weak in his knowledge of weapons effects, including vulnerability numbers, system delivery tactics and basic knowledge on airburst versus surface burst. It is understood that steps have been taken to rectify this situation shortly after his return to Washington. His overall approach was quite objective and oriented toward future planning rather than current plans which he indicated he probably couldn't do anything about if he wanted to.

2. Subject: Aircraft tankers. Asked several questions concerning delays in the SITOP for the last bombers to rendezvous with third cycle tankers. This led to question on requirement for tankers now under order. Many of them will not be delivered until 1964 and 1965 although required now. He suggested that maybe we would be better off to spend the money on missiles rather than for tankers.

ADM BURKE ACT
via 942T6(1-6)

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965/06/JD/3
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3. Subject: Missiles. Indicated favorable approach towards increasing missile role in the future. Stated that we should aim to have more missiles in SIOP-63 with such reliability and capability as to permit us to remove our aircraft backup of missile delivered warheads. Stated that we should probably purchase missiles for "reliability testing". Discussed the effect of giving missiles to NATO countries. General Powers answers dealt with the survivability of the missiles and the dependability of the NATO countries to use the missiles if hostilities commenced.

4. Subject: Polaris. Questions started with the role of the FBM on station and be expressed interest in the ability of the Russians to track the FBM or to destroy with hunter-killer subs. Dr. David Stern somewhat belligerent in his statements that the US NY with SCOR had tracked the George Washington considerable distances and felt the Russians could do the same. This discussion was terminated rather abruptly in that this was not considered the proper atmosphere in which to discuss the entire Polaris program but it is obvious that an early briefing of Mr. Mc Namara and Dr. Stern is in order with answers to questions on communications reliability and detection defense.

5. Subject: Damage and assurance criteria. We went through the exercise of explaining the difference between damage and assurance criteria including the term expected damage. Believe he now understands the difference. He was quick to see the significance of damage and assurance criteria as they relate to force structure. He also understands the problem of a missile in meeting current damage criteria because of the large, GP and relatively small warhead. Believe he will be most receptive to suggestions on the subject of revising future criteria and realizes the responsibility he has in this regard. He asked questions on the possibility of developing two different plans of attack—one for retaliation purposes and another for preemptive attack, these questions stemming from the optimum mix problem. He eventually seemed to be satisfied with the optimum mix approach. He asked questions on bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima, specifically how much would we require under JSPP methods to do the same amount of damage. The answer given was that it would require three 80 KT weapons on DAXS to do the same amount of damage under our criteria but there were many qualifications to this answer. Dr. York pointed out this is equivalent to about one megaton.
6. Subject: Organization of JSTPS. No significant questions although he is probably under the impression that there is general agreement with JSTPS in view of the fact that we produced SIOP-52. This belief should be modified to show that SIOP-52 was produced because some good men compromised in the national interest and not because they agreed with all the guidance, procedures, factors and concepts that were employed.

7. Subject: Damage to Sino-Soviet Bloc. Asked piercing questions concerning the number of weapons that would be exploded in Russia, not just on DDX. Went on in detail on fact that programming four weapons to ensure a high probability of getting one on a DDX would mean also a very good probability of getting more than one in Russia itself: was most concerned on what the size of this number of weapons might be; stated that he thought that the fallout would be "fantastic". Expressed concern over the accuracy of damage that was being obtained by SIOP-52 on the Soviet industrial worth and thought that probably it should be higher than indicated by our damage assessment. He felt that the casualty figures for Russia and China were probably conservative. Also expressed the usual concern about withholding strikes in the satellite countries, particularly against their urban industrial targets and explored the procedures for ensuring that this could be accomplished.

8. Subject: Force structure. Asked one basic question: how force structure was determined. Then went into the need for a balance of forces and was particularly concerned throughout the day with aircraft/tankers versus missiles. Desired to know and expects to receive a presentation as to whether or not, at least within SAC, we are getting weaker or stronger with the weapons systems we are purchasing for the future as opposed to what we have in the present force. Stated that one of the firm conclusions of the day is we must strive to get a larger proportion of the SIOP force into the alert force. Even talked of retiring B-47s to get more money to operate the B-52s in an alert status. This led to lengthy discussion on airborne alert and he will receive, from SAC, an extensive briefing on this subject. He asked questions of why we didn’t go to airborne alert no, what prevented it, and when was the proper time to go.

He brought up the overflight of Canada problems AIW indicated that there was a possibility that overflights were in jeopardy. Was most interested in what effects this would have on the airborne alert flights if they were put into effect. Answers by General

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Power on the subject of airborne alert indicated that we could have an eighth of the SAC force ready by 1 May and that with additional crews he could be ready to go with one quarter of the force by January 62, all of this providing he got enough gasoline money to do the necessary training. Mr. McNamaras was convinced that we have enough force surviving after the attack on the US to at least destroy the urban industrial targets of the SINO-SOVET bloc. He seemed to be receptive to the idea of going after urban industrial rather than military targets under the conditions under which we will probably fight the war.

9. Subject: General Comments. SAC taking this opportunity for big pitch. Briefings on 5 Feb will be SAC specifically and have no members of other services attending. It is obvious that they will be highly centered on intelligence and the SAC capability in this regard; with more emphasis on airborne alert. There was usual concern over base loss, now called the DBL factor (destroyed before launch). Also there was concern expressed over the enemy ICBM and FBM threats to the US with specific questions on how much enemy missiles could affect our bases. The speculation was made that the Soviet FBM's alone could destroy 60% of SAC bases.

10. Subject: Recommendations:
(1) That briefings on Fubaris be given to an early date and
(2) that damage and assurance criteria be stressed in guidance for SIOP-63;
(3) That the survivability of Naval weapons systems be stressed as the answer to much of the Soviet threat to our own US strength.

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