1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: TALEBAN DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JALIL MET WITH SENIOR US OFFICIALS ALAN EASTHAM AND EDMUND HULL IN FRANKFURT, GERMANY NOV 2-3 TO DISCUSS THE USAMA BIN LADEN (UBL) ISSUE. JALIL OFFERED NO NEW IDEAS TO SETTLE THIS ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THE TALEBAN BELIEVED SOLVING THE UBL ISSUE WOULD NOT IMPROVE TALEBAN RELATIONS WITH THE US. HE ASKED FOR A "GESTURE" WHICH HE COULD TAKE BACK TO THE TALEBAN TO SHOW THAT THE US DESIRED TO SOLVE THE ISSUE. HE OFFERED EXAMPLES OF SEVERAL POSSIBLE GESTURES, INCLUDING HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, A LESSENING OF UN SANCTIONS AND DELAY IN NEW SANCTIONS, PERMISSION FOR ARIANA FLIGHTS, AND
US RESTRAINT IN RETALIATION FOR THE USS COLE BOMBING. HE
WAS UNINTERESTED IN DISCUSISNG UBL'S GUILT OR INNOCENCE,
STATING THAT UBL WAS A PROBLEM WHICH NEEDED TO BE SOLVED.
HE THOUGHT THIS COULD BE DONE BY US APPLICATION TO AN
AFGHAN COURT. EASTHAM TOLD HIM WE COULD NOT DELAY
SANCTIONS OR PREDICT THE OUTCOME OF THE COLE INVESTIGATION
OR WHAT STEPS WE MIGHT TAKE IN RESPONSE. HE SAID WE MIGHT
BE ABLE TO TAKE A HUMANITARIAN STEP. HE EMPHASIZED WE
COULD NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN THE AFGHAN COURTS. EASTHAM
ASKED SEVERAL TIMES WHAT RESPONSE WE COULD EXPECT, BUT
JALIL PROMISED ONLY THAT WE WOULD SEE RESULTS QUICKLY.
JALIL MAY MEET AMBASSADOR MILAM IN ISLAMABAD ON HIS RETURN
TRIP TO AFGHANISTAN. JALIL EMPHASIZED THAT THE FACT AND
SUBSTANCE OF THE MEETING HAD TO BE KEPT SECRET. END
SUMMARY

2. (S/NI) AN INTERAGENCY GROUP LED BY SA PDAS ALAN EASTHAM
AND S/CT DEPUTY COORDINATOR EDMUND HULL MET WITH TALEBAN
SECRET

PAGE 03  STATE  215948  092157Z
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER JALIL IN FRANKFURT ON NOV 2-3.
ALSO PRESENT FOR THE US WERE SA/PAB DIRECTOR LUNSTEAD AND
JALIL WAS
ACCOMPANIED BY
JALIL WAS OSTensibly IN FRANKFURT ON A TRADE
MISSION WITH OTHER TALEBAN MINISTERS; THEY WERE UNAWARE OF
HIS MEETINGS WITH US OFFICIALS. JALIL HAD ASKED (THROUGH
FOR THE MEETING FOLLOWING HIS MEETING IN
SEPTEMBER WITH AMB MILAM IN ISLAMABAD.
JALIL WOULD HAVE NEW IDEAS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THE USAMA
BIN LADEN (UBL) ISSUE AT THIS MEETING.

4. (S/NI) JALIL BEGAN ON NOV 2 BY SAYING THAT THE TALEBAN
"WANT TO FINISH THE ISSUE" OF UBL. HE NOTED THAT AFGHANS
WERE LOOKING BACK TO THE 1998 RETALIATORY CRUISE MISSILE
ATTACKS AGAINST UBL FOLLOWING THE EAST AFRICA EMBASSY
BOMBINGS, AND WERE AFRAID ATTACKS WOULD HAPPEN AGAIN.
"BOMBING WILL CREATE MORE PROBLEMS," JALIL SAID. THE
TALEBAN WERE CONFUSED AFTER JALIL'S OWN MEETING WITH UNDER
SECRET

5. (S/NF) YOU WILL MAKE MY WORK EASY, JALIL SAID, IF YOU MAKE
A GESTURE TO SHOW THAT THE US IS NOT OUT TO DESTROY THE
TALEBAN. SEND SOME KIND OF SIGNAL, PERHAPS MEDICINE TO THE
AFGHAN RED CRESCENT. OR, HE SAID, UNFREEZE OUR MONEY IN
THE US AND ALLOW US TO BUY FOOD WITH IT. OR ALLOW AN
ARIANA FLIGHT TO BRING OUR AFGHAN WAR WOUNDED FOR
TREATMENT. OR, HE SAID, ALLOW ARIANA TO CONDUCT FLIGHTS
FOR THE PURPOSE OF "UMRA" (MINOR PILGRIMAGE) IN THE MONTH
BEFORE HAJ (MAJOR PILGRIMAGE). GIVE US "ANY SMALL THING."
IF WE CANNOT WORK THROUGH THE RED CRESCENT, THEN MAKE A
NEW DONATION TO THE UN. THIS WILL ALLOW ME TO SHOW "MY
CLOSE PEOPLE" THAT THE US IS NOT UNFRIENDLY TOWARDS
AFGHANISTAN. THE IMPORTANT THING, JALIL SAID, WAS TO TELL
HIM IN ADVANCE WHAT GESTURE WAS COMING, SO THAT HE COULD
USE THIS WITH MULLAH OMAR AND OTHERS IN ADVANCE TO
CONVINCE THEM THAT DEALING WITH THE UBL ISSUE WOULD BE
PRODUCTIVE. IF THE US PUT MORE SANCTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN,
THAT WOULD SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL.

6. (S/NF) EASTHAM RESPONDED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THE CONCERNS
ABOUT THE US ATTITUDE TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN. WE DID HAVE A
SECRET

ASIDE, WE COULD NOT MAKE ANY HEADWAY ON THE OTHERS. UNTIL
AUGUST 1998 (EMBASSY BOMBINGS) WE HAD DISCUSSED SINCERELY
WITH THE TALEBAN HOW TO RESOLVE THESE ISSUES. THE AUGUST
1998 BOMBINGS MADE UBL MUCH MORE IMPORTANT. "WE WANT TO
SET UP A ROAD CLEARING TEAM," AND WE CAN TAKE A POSITIVE
ATTITUDE TOWARD RESOLVING THE OTHER ISSUES IF THE UBL
ISSUE IS OUT OF THE WAY. IT WOULD BE PRESUMPTUOUS OF US TO TELL THE TALEBAN HOW TO SOLVE IT, HOWEVER. THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION WAS ALREADY ON THE BOOKS, AND SC SANCTIONS WERE EXCLUSIVE TO UBL. HOWEVER, OUR OPPONENT HERE IS ALSO TIME. IF WE DON'T SOLVE THIS ISSUE SOON, THERE WILL BE INCREASING CONFRONTATION. IT WAS OVER ONE YEAR SINCE THE LAST SCR; HE BELIEVED THERE WAS MOMENTUM IN THE COUNCIL FOR ADDITIONAL MEASURES. THIS WOULD BE HARD TO STOP IN ABSENCE OF SOME ACTION ON UBL. EASTHAM SAID HE UNDERSTOOD WHAT JALIL WAS ASKING, BUT WAS NOT SURE WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING. WHAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND WAS WHAT THE TALEBAN WOULD DO IN RESPONSE TO A US GESTURE.

7. (S/NF) HULL NOTED THAT THE US HAD PROVIDED THE US INDICTMENT OF UBL TO JALIL IN MAY. HE THEN MENTIONED THE RECENT GUILTY PLEA IN NEW YORK BY ONE OF THE ACCUSED IN THE EMBASSY BOMBING CASE. HE ATTEMPTED TO READ A PORTION OF THE PLEA RELATING TO DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE ACCUSED BY UBL ON THE 1998 EMBASSY BOMBINGS. JALIL SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO HEAR THIS. FIRST, HE SAID, ALL AFGHANS DISCOUNTED THIS TESTIMONY BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN GIVEN BY A PRISONER, WHO WOULD BE SEEKING FAVORS. SECOND, JALIL SAID, IT DID SECRET

8. (S/NF) JALIL ADDED THAT THE US SHOULD PRESENT DOCUMENTS IN AN AFGHAN COURT. IT IS HARD FOR A JUDGE TO MAKE DECISIONS, HE SAID, IF BOTH SIDES ARE NOT PRESENT. IF YOU GO TO COURT, HE SAID, WE WILL SUPPORT YOU. UBL IS OUR ENEMY--WE DON'T WANT HIM AND YOU DON'T WANT HIM. HOW ARE WE TO HANDLE HIM?

SAID, THERE WAS NO ANSWER TO OUR QUESTION: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF WE WERE TO MAKE SUCH A GESTURE?

10. (S/NF) JALIL REPLIED THAT HE COULD ANSWER AFTER HIS RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN. BUT, HE SAID, ONE PERSON CANNOT PUSH THE BOULDER OFF THE ROAD. IF WE DELIVERED A MESSAGE OF FRIENDSHIP, HE WOULD BE ABLE TO LET US KNOW AFTER THREE SECRET

OR FOUR MONTHS. (COMMENT: CONTRA EASTHAM REPLIED THAT HE WOULD BE A LIAR IF HE TOLD JALIL THE US WOULD HOLD OFF ON ANY FURTHER ACTION FOR 3-4 MONTHS. FIRST, THE COLE INVESTIGATION WAS PROCEEDING, AND NO ONE KNEW WHERE IT WOULD LEAD. HULL ADDED THAT THERE WERE OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS ACTIVE IN AFGHANISTAN BESIDES UBL AND AL QAIDA. THESE GROUPS WERE ALSO THREATS TO THE US, AND THE TALEBAN NEEDED TO DEAL WITH THEM ALSO. SECOND, ON SCR 1267, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN NOW MEANT THAT THERE WAS VERY LITTLE TIME TO RESOLVE THE UBL ISSUE BEFORE THE COUNCIL BEGAN TO MOVE TOWARDS ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS. THIS WAS EVIDENT IN U/S PICKERING’S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW. WHERE THE RUSSIANS EXPRESSED THEIR STRONG CONCERNS. OTHER FACTORS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ATMOSPHERE. NEW NARCOTICS STATISTICS, FOR INSTANCE, SHOWED THAT THE OPIUM CROP HAD INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY. JALIL REPLIED THAT NEXT YEAR WOULD SEE A BIG DIFFERENCE IN THE OPIUM CROP SINCE MULLAH Omar had ORDERED A BAN ON PRODUCTION. EASTHAM REPLIED HE BELIEVED THAT JALIL SAID; IF IT WERE BORNE OUT, THAT WOULD MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE. EASTHAM ALSO NOTED THAT RECENT EVENTS ON THE BATTLEFIELD HAD CONVINced MANY THE TALEBAN WERE STILL SEEKING A MILITARY VICTORY. THIS ALSO HEIGHTENED THE CHANCES FOR SC ACTION.

11. (S/NF) EASTHAM ALSO NOTED A LEGAL POINT. THE UBL CASE WAS NOW IN OUR LEGAL SYSTEM BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN INDICTED. OUR SYSTEM IS ENGAGED IN BRINGING HIM TO JUSTICE. THEREFORE IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR US TO FILE A CASE IN ANOTHER COURT (AS JALIL HAD SUGGESTED), SINCE UBL FACES CHARGES IN THE US.

SECRET

12. (S/NF) THESE THEMES WERE REPEATED IN THE DISCUSSION ON NOV 3. WHEN EASTHAM MENTIONED THAT THE SC WOULD MOVE AHEAD, AND THAT THE COLE INVESTIGATION WOULD CONTINUE,
EASTHAM REPLIED THAT THE COLE INVESTIGATION WAS NOT FINISHED, BUT HE DID NOT WANT TO LEAVE A WRONG IMPRESSION. WHEN WE LOOKED AT THE OPTIONS FOR RETALIATION, WE WERE NOT TARGETING AN INDIVIDUAL, HE SAID, BUT WERE AIMED AT A GROUP AND AN INFRASTRUCTURE WHICH POSED A CONTINUING THREAT TO US LIVES AND PROPERTY. "WE DO NOT GO OUT TO KILL AN INDIVIDUAL." EASTHAM CONCLUDED THAT THE PREFERRED PATH FORWARD WAS NOT THROUGH VIOLENCE AND THROUGH SANCTIONS, BUT THROUGH LAW. OUR PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE TALEBAN HAVE NOT BEEN ABOUT MISSILES AND SANCTIONS, BUT ABOUT MEANS USING THE LAW AND ORDER PROCESS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. THERE IS A VIEW THAT THE TALEBAN IS ASSOCIATED WITH TERRORIST GROUPS BECAUSE IT PROTECTS THEM. THIS PUTS US IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THE TALEBAN AND UBL MERGE IN POPULAR PERCEPTION. THIS MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO MAKE A GESTURE, AS JALIL SUGGESTED, UNLESS WE CAN TELL PEOPLE IN ADVANCE WHAT WILL RESULT. JALIL DID NOT RESPOND.

SECRET

PAGE 09
STATE 215948 092157Z
ON ISSUES SUCH AS ARIANA MERCY FLIGHTS AND UMRA FLIGHTS,

THE TALEBAN SHOULD APPLY TO THE UN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE AND SEE WHAT HAPPENED. MOMENTUM WAS STRONG FOR NEW SANCTIONS, AND EASTHAM OFFERED HIS PERSONAL ASSESSMENT THAT A NEW RESOLUTION WOULD BE INTRODUCED SHORTLY AND THAT THERE WOULD BE NEW STRONGER SANCTIONS BY YEAR'S END. AND IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO OFFER ANY ASSURANCE WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER THE COLE INVESTIGATION MIGHT POINT TO AFGHANISTAN AND WHETHER THE PRESIDENT MIGHT DECIDE TO TAKE ACTION. HE UNDERTOOK TO REPORT TO WASHINGTON, LOOKING TOWARD ANOTHER MEETING WITH JALIL (BY AMBASSADOR MILAM IN ISLAMABAD) ONCE JALIL HAD RETURNED TO THE REGION.

14. (S/NF) JALIL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE IN ISLAMABAD EN ROUTE TO AFGHANISTAN IN A WEEK TO 10 DAYS. HE AGREED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH AMB. MILAM WHEN HE PASSED THROUGH.
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