On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence.

The following persons were present:

COL ___ X___, MP, CFCC – PMO, Interviewer
LTC ___ X___, JIA, CFCLLC – SJA, Interviewer
LTC ___ X___, 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
MAJ ___ X___, 320th MP Battalion, Respondent
SSG ___ X___, 27D30, CFCLLC – SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:

[Redacted] Sr., O4, AGR, 320th Military Police Battalion. As an S3, I’m responsible for operations and training within the 320th, to include subordinate companies. I’m essentially responsible for accomplishing the mission according to the commander’s intent. We’ve had a variety of missions, since March, to include running the facility at Camp Freddy at Umm Qasr, to running half of the facility at Camp Bucca, as well as the Buca TOC for the Base Ops, and moving up north to Abu Gharib prison, to run 3 facilities, there, my role is to ensure that each facility operates according to standards, the Geneva Convention. To ensure, despite extremely limited resources, we are able to complete the mission, which ranges from providing escorts, to guarding, feeding, housing, giving water, providing basic human supplies for prisoners, and I do that through taskings to subordinate units.

I know that the Geneva Convention, 1949, differs with EPW’s versus Security Detainees and Civilian Criminals. It gives the guidelines to how facilities should be established, and what should be provided to the prisoner. We know the basics of what is to be provided, such as food, water, housing, medical care. Well, I/R Battalions are not designed, nor were they trained to handle foreign civilian criminals. Part of an I/R mission is U.S. Confinement. It’s been a little confusing, as to whether Geneva 4 applies to Security Detainees versus EPW’s. Sir, I can tell you that I don’t fully understand, because I’ve had several discussions, with several different JAG officers, and brigade personnel, S1’s, and I really think there is a big problem. We originally had civilian criminals at Gancy. We also had, in other compounds, at Gancy, security detainees. So, civilian criminal, at first, we understood Geneva 4 didn’t apply to them. Then, someone said it does, because they’re under U.S. control, but they’re civilian criminals. These were JAG officers at brigade. I remember, one time, [name redacted] was having a
conversation with someone maybe at the Magistrate Cell, explaining that Geneva does apply to security detainees, because they're CT's. So, there's nothing that has ever been put out in black and white, from JAG channels, as to the differences that Geneva may apply, or may not apply, to EPW's, security detainees, displaced civilians, civilian criminals, which is a whole different area, etc...

Nothing at our MOB Station was taught, in regards to I/R Operations. The training plan we submitted, which we had to work between the extremely changing MOB Station training plan, was one of compound operations, and processing, how to go through the processing line. They were the 2 focuses. And of course, daily, were the Rules of Engagement, Rules of Interaction, which are both contained in the Battalion SOP. Scenarios? The total lack of support we know we're not going to have, when we get there, which has been the case for the 12 months. And then of course, weapons qualifications. React to indirect fire, briefings on smallpox, medical briefings, that sort of thing. That's all from Fort Dix I can recall right now.

When we closed Camp Freddy, and the prisoners went into the Bucca facility, we were escorts for 2 weeks, so we did refresher re-training on escorts, which was simply following the bus up, following the bus back, to simplify their role. Upon completion of the escorts, we were given 7 days to move a battalion and a company from Umm Qasr to Baghdad. Upon arrival at Abu Ghariib, in between setting up the facility in conjunction with the engineers, which we set up the facility in a week, which is unheard of, then, making the place livable for soldiers, there was refresher training on compound operations, processing, and basic I/R Operations tasks.

As I see it, Sir, it's ultimately the commander's responsibility, to provide that training, and then it's my responsibility, and, as it goes down, it's the sergeant major's responsibility and the platoon sergeant's responsibility. In conjunction, though, it's also the HHC Commander's, and the First Sergeant's responsibility. So, the 3 and the HHC work very close together, to accomplish his needs, requirements, training, and the battalion's overall mission. Actually, it's E5 to O5 responsibility.

When a training plan is set up, there is an Observer/Evaluator, someone who assesses the training. All training is AAR'd. We base the training on Battalion SOP, 3-3.19-40, which is Internment/Resettlement Operations, and parts of AR 190-8. So, basically, Sir, we use the FM's, AR's, and SOP's, to accomplish the mission, then you pull the training tasks that are required to do that mission. The entire chain of command has eyes on the training.

All of my cooks are in the compounds. Mechanics, we have 3, which only leave to for HHC. Admin, each... If I could back up, nothing has been doctrine, since the day we hit the ground. We have 4 I/R control teams, however, at Camp Freddy, we were running 16 compounds. The math doesn't work. There are not enough I/R control teams, which have the specialized training, to run a compound. You then have to take your guard companies, or they may be combat support companies, train them OJT, because there's no time to have a day of training. That hasn't existed, since we took the facilities. Then,
you have to fill in the holes. We have assumed a tremendous, outrageous, criminal amount of soldier safety risks in running these facilities. I have never seen anything... It is absurd, if I may be so blunt.

To run a compound, a 500-man compound, there're 14 MP's in an I/R control team. There are 2 E7's, 2 E6's, and 2 E5's, per 12 hour shifts. You should have almost 7 MP's on a compound, not counting the MP's in the 3 towers. We are tremendously low, due to of REFRAD's. Our battalion HHC is authorized 56 I/R Control Team MP's. They run the compounds. I have, now, 33. That's it. I run 8 compounds. So, on one compound, you should have, at least, 4 MP's per shift, on the gate, on the ground. I'm lucky, if I have 3, so I usually have 2 MP's. Each compound is authorized a 71L, who does all the paperwork, files, etc, and they're also authorized a supply person, who gets all the supplies for that individual compound. Due to the fact, that we've also been running Base Ops. at the BCF, all of our supply people have to go take care of that. So, that leaves your MP's and your 71L on shift in the compound. So, during the day, you may have 2 - 3 MP's and a 71L, or 2 MP's and a cook, or supply, or an electrician. Most of the soldiers, doing that now at the BCCF, also had to do it at Camp Freddy. They've been, for lack of a better term, "running" prisoners, since April.

It's a resource issue, Sir. Currently we are at a C3 rating. Here's the problem with USR – we could have people in medical, in Landstuhl, and they are still on our books. We still count them. I have 112 soldiers on the ground, and I'm authorized 148. The reason we are down to 112, is REFRAD's. Some are medical, some emergency leaves turned hardship discharges. And, in the reserves, you don't get those back. Your TDA gets locked upon mobilization. Even when the 10 from the Camp Bucca incident were pulled out of the unit, they still counted against our unit as available soldiers.

The service support personnel will never work the compound, without the presence of a military police person, there. They go through the Rules of Engagement, Rules of Interaction, handcuffing, less than lethal training, how the compound operates, which is more of an SOP thing, than a formal training, searches, and the basic MP functions at a compound.

When the second version of the ROE came out, it identified the steps, to prevent an escape, and treating all with dignity and respect, and the steps for the levels of force that are utilized. It defines hostile intent, one's inherent right to defend himself, halt in the native language, show your weapon. At first, warming shots were authorized, now they're authorized. Which changes, and it is briefed daily. The regulation does not authorize warming shots.

The ROI are the Rules of Interaction, i.e. fraternization, how you talk to them, cultural sensitivity, not giving, or accepting gifts, you day to day contact with them. New soldiers are briefed. They read it, and walk through scenarios. It's posted in every tower, every compound tent, and every control area. It's posted on the wall. The Geneva Convention is not posted. Soldiers should know it only to a degree. I don't know every article that applies to prisoners or detainees. We've had the training.
After support personnel have had training, they will observe an MP, before being allowed to perform a task. None of them work in Tier 1A and 1B. The hard site should be MP pure.

After the incident came out, one soldier was identified as being a mechanic, and one soldier was a 71L. I don’t know if they had been through the training.

I know for a fact, that if I were to tell my soldiers, to hit someone in the head with a baseball bat, they wouldn’t do it. I believe one of the soldiers involved had a past criminal history, which, if it had been indicated, would have prevented him from working with prisoners. They saw interrogations, and how newly brought in prisoners were broken by MI. I think, they were criminal individuals, who took the opportunity to do something they knew was wrong, after they’re senior leaders departed the area.

It’s common for NCOs to work all day, get a couple hours of sleep, and then go back and do their rounds at night. It’s very common, due to the fact that there’s a lack of personnel. The way I/R battalions are MTOE’d they are not designed to run 3 different facilities. In my S3 section there’s an O4, an E9, and a couple of E6’s.

The panel stopped, to discuss MAJ____ statements.

Finished with their discussion, the panel gave MAJ____ a list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.
On 10 February 2004, MAJ [redacted] returned, to provide a sworn statement, and documents, outlining the program of training for support personnel transferred into military police functions. He also presented documents outlining his unit’s request for logistical support.

MAJ [redacted] then made the following statements:

Sir, on the CD are all the Situation Reports (SITREPs) from August to present, which went up from the 320th to the 800th, which I know were then wrote up, and sent to CJTF-7. Also contained on the CD are Troops to Tasks, I couldn’t find all of them. Also, I printed out several SITREPs, in case you wanted to view them right away. There also emails on logistical support.

COL [redacted] reads a sworn statement made by SGT [redacted] and MAJ [redacted] responds as follows:

We were attacked, and there were suspects, I believe a woman and her son. They brought to them to the site, directly inside the ECP inside the walls. We responded. I went down, and the IRF was called to secure them. The MI folks later pulled up. They approached the 2 individuals that were on the ground, and there was yelling. Then, when they took the individuals, and moved them back, I recall LT [redacted] coming up to me, while I was on the radio with the TOC. I heard him say something to me. I didn’t understand him. He said something like, “I’m not going to let them continue.” I told him to stand by. I went with him to the other side of the vehicle. I saw one of the MI soldiers push the male Iraqi from the back of the truck. LT [redacted] was already there. I came up, told them to stop, got all of their names, instructed the IRF to do statements. We went to SFC [redacted], who is the 1SG of the 519th MI Company, advised him of the situation, and told him IRF was making statements. He informed me that 2 of the soldiers that went out there, he shouldn’t have sent them, because their friend was killed. He asked me if I saw any physical abuse whatsoever, and I said, “No, but I could see that their emotions were above being able to handle the situation in a calm manner.” After LT [redacted] intervened, I told the one soldier that he was to have no contact, called over his NCOIC. as a matter of fact, and told him, to put that soldier in the front of the truck, and he was to have no contact with the 2 people in the back. The NCOIC was then required to ride with the Iraqi female and male up to the holding area, where they could then screen them, to see if they had anything to do with the attacks. Come to find out, they supposedly were doing their water irrigation, at night, as many of the farmers do.

I never witnessed any physical abuse. I wouldn’t tolerate it. I’m very sensitive to how prisoners are handcuffed. Our soldiers are more very sensitive, because of what our soldiers went through. I won’t even allow profanity, though they don’t understand what you’re saying, and it’s culturally insensitive. I heard the yelling and screaming, and profanity, which I addressed, when I went to the back of the truck. It’s uncalled for, because they don’t even know what you’re saying. No, Sir. At no time, did I witness any prisoner abuse. This incident was immediately handled by the MI chain of command, Sir.
The interview complete, MAJ [REDACTED] was dismissed.
On 12 February 2004, MAJ [redacted] returned for a follow up interview, and to provide
the 320th MP Battalion’s SOP, regarding the use of dogs. The interview is summarized
as follows:

The SOP was prepared 10 December. CPT [redacted] prepared it, I proofread it, and LTC
signed it. MAJ [redacted] produced the work schedule. He was the NCOIC
of the dogs, because he was the senior handler. CPT [redacted] would review and sign it,
and then I would sign it. This was briefed to the Commander. We originally received
two Army dogs, then, three Navy dogs. The two Army dogs are patrol/narcotics. The
three Navy dogs are patrol/bomb. We originally set it up, where all the dogs would rotate
through the ECP, Entry Control Point. I think that’s the one LTC [redacted] originally
signed off on. When I came back from leave, I thought it was best to strictly use the
Navy dogs at the ECP, and keep the Army dogs in the compounds. As far as I know, the
dogs are all certified, and we also allow time for their training. I believe it’s a mandatory
4 – 6 hours a week.

Initially, there was a little bit of “we – they,” when we put the two services together. The
Navy dogs fell right into place, but there was some concerns about the Army dogs.
Understandably, they didn’t want to work the ECP, because they’re not bomb dogs.
There was a strong personality problem with the Army folks, whereas the Navy folks
were here to help. They came from Sicily, I think, and they’re here to work for you. So,
I had gathered together the 5 dog handlers, my Operations Sergeant Major, CPT
Hampton, and, I think, one of my Operations NCOs. I had a meeting right outside the
TOC, and said, “By virtue of military rank you’re on this installation, therefore you work
for the battalion. So, this is how the schedule will be set up. This is what the objective of
the schedule is, what dogs will work where, who will focus on what. Whoever has a
problem with it, we’ll be more than happy to call your chain of command, and you can
pack your bags and leave.” I didn’t have any problems after that conversation.

I don’t know the politics of it, but 1A was given to MI for higher value detainees. Then,
CPA came to me, and said we had to clear out 1B. That was a problem, because I had all
these juveniles, some criminal, some security detainees, and females in 1B, because I had
no place to put them. So, we moved them out within two days.

It wasn’t an easy transition. First, I had to gather the resources to do it. Then, transfer
the paperwork and disks with all their information down to that facility. Then hopefully,
they have the capability to open up the disk. But, getting the resources to do everything
was a strain, every time we moved somewhere.

We moved them out. It sat vacant for at least a week. I was getting females and
juveniles, and I had to put them somewhere, because I wasn’t allowed to turn away
prisoners. So, I put them in 1B. Then, the MI and CPA came to me, and asked, “How
come there’s people in 1B?” I said, “Because you all have me handcuffed. You’ve tied
my hands. You told me to empty this facility. There’s no place to put females and
juveniles. I can’t mix them with the adult male population, obviously. This is the only
place I have to put them.” So, they finally agreed that they had me handcuffed, and I had
no choice. I had to accept them, put them in 1B, and get beat on by CPA and MI. Then, turn around and get the resources together, to move them down to Clark or Mustafa. So, it was always double work. That was the biggest issue I had.

I'm the S3, and I have my hands in everything. As I tell my section, we are the heartbeat of the mission. I'm also AGR, so I'm full time. I don't know, Sir. I like to make things happen. If there's a problem, I'll fix it. If there's an issue with a soldier, I'll help them. Sometimes, I go too far into people's sections, but it's always for good reasons.

LTC [redacted] articulates the priorities for the Battalion, at times, in front of the Battalion and in staff meetings. We have a staff meeting, and a force protection meeting everyday. There, he puts out guidance, taskings, and goals.

The entire release program is broke. I'll start by that. The Conditional Release Program is gaining more visibility, than the regular Security Detainee Review Board. We get a list. If it's for Security Detainees, the list comes from Brigade or the Magistrate. They would be the results of the Security Detainee Review Board, which determined who should be released. Once we received that list, we would find out who was where. Then, our S1 folks would go to MI, to ensure that this individual is not MI Hold, or not on CID Hold, as well. They would check it with the Magistrate, CID, and MI. Then, we'd set up a release date, which was usually two days later, sometimes later. We'd take the list to the compound, and they would verify if those people are on their compound. Once that's done, we'd set up a plan, to have them pulled out of the compounds, taken up to the holding area for outprocessing, put them on vehicles, and take them to eight different locations in Baghdad, to release them.

At home station, we have I/R Companies that are War Traced to us. They are not the same as our Peace Traced. The 305th MP Company is in our War Trace, as well as our Peace Trace, so we approved their METL. We did identify Battle Tasks – Establish an I/R Facility, Provide Logistics in Support of an I/R Facility, Accountability of all EPWs, and Force Protection. When we went to Abu, we identified I/R and Guard Companies. Some were Combat Support Companies that were dwindled down to a Guard Company and given Guard Company equipment, and some Guard Company training. The training that we gave them consisted of right seat rides for 4–7 days, depending on their Company Commander's assessment of their ability to do the mission. All the tasks were very similar – searches, handcuffing... The only real difference is the towers. My battalion doesn't have individual tasks for towers. Geneva Hague Convention training is done twice a year. It's mandatory twice a year. I can't think of anything related to Geneva Hague in our METL. Before we left home station, we had all Ts in our METL Assessment, except Force Protection, which was a P.

The interview complete, MAJ [redacted] was released.
SWORN STATEMENT

LOCATION
Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq

DATE
9 FEB 2004

TIME
2015hrs

FILE NUMBER

LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

GRADE/STATUS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
320TH Military Police Battalion (1/R)

I, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. IM/LISD at the site of the allegations. To the best of my knowledge the female soldier, IM/L, and the 52D male soldier were never scheduled to work in the hard site facility, to include Wing 1A and 1B, performing the roles of Military Police. From what I have been told and heard was that the female soldier was having a relationship with CPL Gruber which could be the reason she was present during the incident. The mechanic was on duty to ensure that the CPA prison generators kept functioning and remained fueled. This was necessary due to the fact that CPA did not provide a 24hr generator mechanic and the generators would constantly go down. The generators operate the water and lights of the prison. That would be the only explanation as to why the mechanic would.

2. Training (Home Station, MOB Station, Theater): The 320th Military Police Battalion has conducted exhaustive training in Interment/Resettlement Operations, Military Police Tasks, crowd control. Less then lethal. ROE. ROI. Law of war. MP Combat support missions. Home Station: Training at home station include all of the above which were scheduled intermittently throughout Drill Weekends and Annual Training. In reference to Annual Training the 320th MP BN was selected 4 years in a row for 8th Army to train the 8th MP BDE. Korea, during Operation Foal Eagle. During drill weekends the unit conducted to Teesside Army Depot (TYAD) where a mock EPW facility was constructed, through the efforts of the 320th and TYAD. This training was conducted quarterly. While at the center for training, the unit focused on Compound operations, the handling of EPWS. ROE. ROI. Use of Force and in-processing, in addition to the required training, mandatory briefings (SAEDA, Geneva Convention, etc.) and COP. During the 4 months prior to mobilization the unit was still slated for Annual Training in Korea, a rotation in Kosovo, while simultaneously preparing for mobilization and deployment to Iraq. The final decision of which the unit would be conducted was made by FORSCOM in January 2003. The unit was mobilized 20 February 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom. While at Home Station, the unit was utilizing its training plan for the MOB station. However, the challenge was the constant changes in the unit. Also, I had reduced the BN TACSON for FR Operations. This SOP was requested by the NDRG in the Pentagon and distributed to all 17 BRs in the system as well as the 78th Training Division to validate IR units mobilizing through Ft. Dix, NJ. 1/8 training dictated by the MOB station consisted NDRS (Processing). The unit was not required to complete a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) for validation as our SOP was used for the validation. In addition to the mandatory training from the MOB Station, the unit had training schedules each day consisting of Compound Operations, SOP review to all members of the BN, ROE, ROI, Use of Force, training on COMBAT AND OTHER MP Tasks. After the unit arrived in theater the only IR training given was that conducted by the unit. This consisted of refresher training in compound operations, ROE, ROI. SOP review and in-processing. The unit was only at Camp Arifjan for 10 days.

3. Relationship between MP and MI (Wing 1A & 1B): The MP were asked by MI to perform several tasks, which included sleep deprivation, music, limit certain prisoners to certain foods (MRE and/or Iraqi food) At first the relationship was awkward. It was confusing as to who was the C2 for the wing. CPA owned the wings yet, they had given the wings to the MI to utilize. Another issue was agencies within OGA would frequently bring prisoners to the facility and not want them processed. When this first occurred, I awaited their arrival (0300hrs) and informed them that either the prisoners was to be processed or they would need to leave an agent with the prisoner. I received this guidance from the 800th MP BDE and COL Charles LaCue, Chief, National Detainee Reporting Center, DAMO, Pentagon. At the beginning of October, the requests were originally verbal. However, the MP on duty, specifically SGT questioned this and requested them in writing. The instructions were always placed on the wall next to the cell of the prisoner. As I understood it from the previous, CPT , the tasks were supervised by himself, or an NCOIC with a member of MI present. I believe that LTC , had also supervised this as well. CPT has since REFRAD. The tasks were carried out by the MP on duty. Only MP were scheduled and participating to work in 1A and 1B.

4. Training Non-MP personnel: Any Non-MP personnel required to work around detainees or prisoners receive the following training: ROE, ROI, some MP tasks (hand cuffs; searching), some received less than lethal training. These soldiers are utilized for additional security versus MP duties. First, Pocket training, ROE, and Use of Force are brisk at shift changes and warrant and MP. Most of the Non-MP soldiers in the units received MP training at either their home station or MOB station. I have discussed this with the Company Commanders that have non MP soldiers performing these tasks.

EXHIBIT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 5


DA FORM 2823, JUL 72
SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 88, WHICH WILL BE USED.
5 Incident - Pictures (what I think is happening). Originally I was assigned as the 15-6 Officer by LTC [redacted] for the alleged incident. CID had already been notified and had briefed me on the incident in question and had shown me the pictures. Upon viewing the pictures I had to "take a break" as I was in shock as to what I was viewing. It was obvious that these soldiers had acted independently to commit these inhumane, criminal acts. These were obviously the acts of criminals and these individuals should receive the maximum punishment allowable. It is obvious that the leadership did not have the indication or knowledge that this could happen or was happening. The Commander, myself, staff and NCOs of the 320th MP BN would not allow such activity. This Command has "preached" against any type of violations of the ROE. ROA and has constantly reviewed the humane treatment of prisoners. If the command had an indication that these individuals could have done such acts, these individuals would not have been permitted to be in the presence of prisoners. If the Command had known of these activities, these individuals would have been apprehended immediately. It would be my opinion that possibly these soldiers had seen similar, yet, possibly not to this extreme, activity by the MI personnel during interrogations of these prisoners. Then took it upon themselves to conduct such criminal acts. I have been a Military Police Officer for 12 years, involved in all types of investigations, to include undercover work with the German Police. I was a RA Officer. Reserve Officer and now AGR Officer. A criminal will perform a criminal act if committed to do so, regardless of the amount of "training to do the right thing," lectures and classes on conduct, etc. They will seize the opportunity of chance to commit such acts.

6 Spot Checks: Command presence has been a vital role of NCOs and Officers in the Battalion, subordinates and companies (not included) especially with this particular mission. Three confinement facilities, over 6,000 prisoners and extremely limited resources (as seen in the Troop to Tasks). Leaders at all levels randomly go through the facilities at all hours of the day and night, from the BN CDR to Squad leaders. I personally know this to be a fact. However, due to the extremely limited assets, constant addition of missions, FRFRAK, work to be done during the daylight hours (0600-2100), Officers and certain Senior NCOs cannot be at each facility every night. The issue of lack of personnel has gone to the extreme that CO CDRs, Senior NCOs, BN Staff pull duty at a guard post, escort, or the compounds to give their soldiers a day off, to reduce the chances of complacency, stress and mistreatment. Would it be possible to commit such acts if leaders are checking on their soldiers? Of course. Again, someone with the obvious frame of mind and intent of these individuals will accomplish their cowardly tasks at their own time and pace. Based on a theory that this should have been prevented, there would have to be an Officer or Senior NCO for each soldier in each unit. This BN ensures that there is an NCOIC for each compound, shift, escort, mission. There exists three facilities, 2 Entry Control points, Force protection points, Holding Area, Processing Line and CPs. Based on the strength of the units, they must be split into several locations to accomplish all missions which results in the utilization of Senior NCOs and Officers to have to pull shifts at times to meet mission.

7 Actions: In addition to what the units have been doing to check on their soldiers at all hours, a DA Form 6-6 has been instituted at the Battalion to have every E7 and above to make nightly sporadic checks at each facility. Despite its effect on daily missions, it has been implemented. ROE, ROA, more detailed guard mounts are ongoing.

8 Since the 320th MP BN assumed the mission of the British Corps Holding Area in March 2003, which had 16 compounds (versus the 4 compounds that an I/R BN doctrinally can operate), to the mission now at BCF, required number of personnel has been a significant issue. Despite this, this unit has accomplished every mission assigned, performing non-doctrinal missions under resourced. Forced to create new doctrine. This unit has processed, safeguarded, fed, housed over 25,000 detainees.

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**AFFIDAVIT**

I, [redacted], have read or have had read to me this statement. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIATED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCTION.

[Illustration of Signature]

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10th day of February 2004 at [Location].

[Signature of Person Administering Oath]

[Typewritten Address of Person Administering Oath]

[Authority To Administer Oath]

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The 320th has housed more EPWs, Security Detainees, and prisoners than any other unit in Theater. A statement that can be supported by the Theater accountability roll up and reports. We have had 13 escapes in 13 months, with 2 different facilities. These escapes in relation to the number of prisoners equals .052%.

I was asked by the panel what we could have done differently. Here is what was done to attempt to mitigate the shortage of personnel and resources. After many requests for Forces cut down the R&R leave from 10% to 5% throughout the Battalion. Senior NCOs and Officers would perform their daily missions, rest for a few hours and then work a night shift. Officers and Sr NCOs would pull shifts for their soldiers. Fought the opening of new compounds until proper resources were received. In addition, I instructed an NCO in the S3 section to compile all SOPs/MOs for all different missions, ensuring that the Companies created and maintained SOPs for their missions, reviewed and approved by the BN. Perhaps a standard training team could have been established to move through out the units.

I feel obligated to mention that during mid to end of September, the CJTF-7 IG visited BCF for approximately 2 days. During the briefing to the BN CDR, BN Staff, Company CDRs and leadership of other tenant units located at BCF, the COL ended the briefing with “There are the poor, weak and the forgotten, you all are definitely the forgotten.” The COL referenced the challenge of being resourceed properly, the constant mortar attacks, and the increasing prisoner population. Following that visit, LTG Sanchez visited BCF. Upon completion of his visit, many from the CJTF-7 staff visited BCF and the Base support began as BCF was declared an Enduring Base. However, no additional resources in the area of manpower was received.

In summation the 320th MP BN accomplished their mission, and continues to do so. Despite tremendous hurdles, dedication to duty, loyalty and training persevered. Mistakes were made, yet, corrective action was always immediately implemented by the Command. The Battalion Chain of Command was in constant communication within itself and to the soldiers. I had absolutely no information that any type of prisoner abuse in any degree had occurred. If I had known, immediate steps would have been taken to ensure that such actions ceased and actions against those individuals would have been initiated.

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**AFFIDAVIT**

I HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 10. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THIS STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCTION.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Witnesses

Organization or Address

Signature of Person Administering Oath

Twice Name of Person Administering Oath

Authority To Administer Oath

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Non-MP Personnel

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NOTE: Non-MP personnel were placed in the compounds to provide additional and required security for the MP on duty. Also, Non-MP personnel work with a MP at all times. If they are placed in the towers, following the above training they right seat ride with a MP for a minimum of 3 days. Also, the Admin personnel are assigned to the compound Control Teams per the MTOE. In addition to providing additional security, they maintain the files and logs. The Non-MP personnel are given this training in the event they need to be utilized, yet again their hands on with prisoners is limited unless required.
ALCON,

Have you ever experienced about 80 prisoners standing in line at 2130hrs at night, cold, and being told that the vendors do not have any more food? Well this is becoming a nightly routine, and because I was there I can tell you it is a very unpleasant experience. Why is it so difficult to bring enough food? That is what the MPs (soldiers) are asking every day. So I guess my question is who in the hell can meal, due to the fact that they, not you, or me, have to deal with it every day. So I guess my question is who in the hell can meal, due to the fact that they, not you, or me, have to deal with it every day. So I guess my question is who in the hell can meal, due to the fact that they, not you, or me, have to deal with it every day.

fix this so that we can at least give the soldier the basic necessary tools to guard prisoners without them having to worry about a riot, fight or other related problems in the compounds during meal times. On the way, you may know why we have to have MRE's on hand every day. So please do not question the ordering of MRE's, we need them to feed prisoners, even though there exists a contract for food. In the mean time I would simply suggest that someone call contracting the vendor, or perhaps (though that conversation will be filled with promises and not results) and fix this continuing problem. Unfortunately the basics required to "house" prisoners: food, lights, prisoner supplies is still a serious issue.

V/R

320th MP BN
S3
DSN: 559-1763
ALCON.
At the 1600 meal for the prisoners, the caterers were short well over 100 meals. SFC S-4, gave the caterers the morning count of 3960 meals even though there were roughly 3700 prisoners on ground. Still the caterers came up short over 100 meals. This is happening almost on a daily basis.

MAJ [ redacted ], Sr.
320th MP BN
S3
DSN: 559-1763

DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 96
DECL ON X1

Classification [ redacted ]
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

From: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:06 AM
To: MAJ (205 M I CA OPS OIC)
CC: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3, LTC CJTF7-320TH MP BN, CDR, (E-mail): Karpinski, Janis BG CJTF7-CDR 800 MP BDE

Subject: (S) FW SIR Prisoner riot

Classification: MAJ CPT

As you know we had a very serious riot last night in Vigilant. Currently there are 689 prisoners in Vigilant. The compounds, based on the segregation requirements are busting at the seams. I cannot emphasize enough the need to reduce the population in Compounds A, B, & C. This is an unstable situation which is putting the lives of the MP and soldiers at risk. I have been to many prisoner riots since March and I can tell you that last night was one that could have turned real bad. The design of Vigilant places the MP in a dangerous situation in the event of a riot with so many prisoners. We must reduce the population in Vigilant ASAP. The situation last night is simply tolerated for the time being and could erupt at any time. Please forward this to whomever can expedite the process.

As you can see from the below SIR, the issues are that there are many Security Detainees that have been held for long periods of time and 1) Not interrogated yet or 2) have been questioned months ago and are still being held. I understand the process, yet we MUST increase the speed of the interviews, release boards, etc. In order to maintain some peace last night, I asked the Prisoner compound representatives to provide me a list of prisoners that have not been seen. Yes, I do know that there will be many on the list that have been seen, but will put their numbers down hoping it will get them out. I also know that your BDE gives you priorities, however that does not maintain peace in the compounds.

FYI the prisoner compound reps request that someone of some type of authority meet with them (about 5) to explain the process. From last night's events, I can tell you that this issue will not go away.

Once again, I cannot emphasize enough the lack of stability in Vigilant and the need to reduce the population.

MAJ CPT

MAJ 320th MP BN
S2
DSN

-----Original Message-----
From: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent: Thursday, November 06, 2003 4:44 PM
To: MP BDE NBC 800 (E-mail)
Subject: SIR Prisoner riot

Classification: NA

1. NA
2. Type of incident: Prisoner Riot
3. 062140LNOV03
4. Baghdad Correctional Facility, Vigilant A, B, C
5. None
6. Personnel involved

Prisoners detained in Vigilant A, B, C
A prisoner Riot began when an MP broke up a fight between two prisoners. The prisoners were throwing food, water, cans, and rocks at the MPs. The prisoners indicated that the riot began because the MPs broke up the fight and subdued the offenders and because they wanted to go home. The 320th TOC dispatched the IRF and QRF. Shortly thereafter, the offenders were requested and issued. The riot was quelled due to diplomacy by the S3 and no injuries occurred. Alarm clocks were requested and issued. Additionally, the prisoners indicated that they have been in the compounds upwards of five months without being asked any questions by MI. This is why they wanted to go home. The prisoners will provide a list of any prisoner who is similar in any way. MAJ [redacted] will make an inquiry as to why these prisoners have not been questioned with MI. He will then inform the compound reps of any information obtained. The riot was quelled and there were no reports of any injuries.

Remarks

Publicity: None

Command Reporting: 320th MP BN

POC MSG: [redacted]

Downgrading Instructions: None

MSG: 320th MP BN

S3, NCOIC

DRV FM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

Classification: [redacted]

MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr.
320th MP BN
S3

DSN: 559-1763

[DiNenna David MAJ CJTF7-320th MP BN - S3]

DRV FM 123-2

Dated: 24 Feb 98

DECL ON: X1

Classification: [redacted]
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

From: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent: Friday, November 07, 2003 10:47 AM
To: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3, 724 MP ALOC
Cc: MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PMO
Subject: (S) RE: MWDs

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

The situation here at BCF is now critical. Last night we had a significant riot in Camp Vigilant. MWDs are a must and we need them asap. We currently have 4500 prisoners in three different locations. We need the dogs. We have the housing, for the dogs and handlers (the engineers are building kennels). We can support the personnel. For some reason this would seem easy simply based on the population at Bucca versus here. In addition we are receiving the prisoners from Bucca that have been there for months and they are causing a great deal of problems here. Is it possible to fix this asap? Please advise. I cannot emphasize enough how critical this is now.

---Original Message---
From: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3
Sent: Wednesday, November 05, 2003 1:22 AM
To: 724MPALOC (E-mail) (E-mail)
Cc: MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PMO
Subject: MWDs

Caveats: NONE

Dale

What is the status of the MWDs there at Camp Bucca? Can we transfer those dogs up to Camp Ganci in the next two weeks? I am cc'ing CFLCC to see what we need to do to get the dogs up there. We need them due to the population up there.

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: NONE

DECL ON: X1
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

From: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent: Sunday, November 09, 2003 1:33 AM
To: OPS (E-mail)
Cc: Karpinski, Janis BG CJTF7-CDR 800 MP BDE
LTC CJTF7-320TH MP BN
Subject: RE: (S) BCF Weapons

Classification [Redacted]

Ma'am,

I would ask that this be reconsidered. I have removed all M16s from the compounds as we do not have adequate weapons racks to secure them. If all 9mms are to be removed I would request that all be replaced by shotguns. That would require the BDE to task other units to provide shotguns as we (BN & COs) would not have non-lethal. Again, non-lethal would be great if the BDE can provide the weapons. I can relay many incidents where the carrying of a weapon has prevented a more serious incident. The compounds are maxed and extremely unstable. Removing weapons from the compounds would place the lives of the MPs in danger.

I believe that this assessment is not one of accuracy, and is made with a lack of experience operating this type of internment/prison facility. I am extremely concerned that this is not based on experience of operating a facility with up to 500 prisoners that are simply held in by wire and not a hard site facility. We are on the ground and have been operating facilities since March with over 15,000 prisoners.

As we all know, this is not a doctrinal mission and not that of Desert Storm where many of the prisoners gladly surrendered and "enjoyed" their stay with food, medical care and clothing. This is not a by the book mission and METT-TC has required that traditional doctrine be changed. This is not a defensive response, yet one of great concern. Based on the fact that my soldiers lives would be in jeopardy if I am at the compounds daily and nightly, I see the personality of the compound and its lack of stability. Please do not change, but that cannot be seen from anywhere else. Many of the MPs approached me when I removed the M16s as they were not comfortable with the lack of firepower. I believe that removing their 9mms will make them even more uncomfortable and extremely concerned. The MP who questioned the carrying of weapons is from the 372nd, and has not operated such a facility since mobilization and has only been in his position for a couple of weeks. Experience is not there. We have had 3 riots - 3 non-lethal shootings in the past 4 days. I cannot emphasize enough the lack of stability within the compounds.

Each compound only has at the most 3 MP on the gate. In the event that the prisoners (100 or so) storm the gate, which has occurred, then what would an unarmed MP defend themselves? Keep in mind these facilities are built over landfill and the prisoners daily make homemade shanks and weapons. They would not need to take a weapon from an MP to kill an MP. They would be one with them. We remove these types of weapons daily from the compounds.

SOP. Unfortunately this is completely not correct. If you question every (17) IR BN in the system as to where the information in their SOP was obtained, the reply is that it was given to them. The 320th SOP was requested by the Validation team at Ft Dix and the NDRS folks at the Pentagon to be distributed to all other IR BNs. The same standard of operation has been used, again, since March.

We are required to transport prisoners to the Medical facility. We are not provided with the proper transportation to transport prisoners. Additionally, there are 2 MP that transport the prisoner to the medical clinic.

I am at the compounds at least 3 hours a day and 5 hours at night. On the spot corrections are made as needed. It is an issue of manpower. Overwork, lack of days off, as we all know, leads to routine, boredom and complacency with any task. This is addressed and reiterated daily.

I would again reiterate that this be reconsidered based on the above. One, allow for additional training, if that is what is believed to be needed and re-evaluated. I strongly request that either the 9mms remain or every MP is armed with a non-lethal shotgun. MPs escort the prisoners many times a day outside of the compounds to do trash and other details around the compounds. They need, require a weapon. Keep in mind again, the prisoners do have weapons in the compounds. We cannot take the non-lethal shotgun from the front of the compound. If we do the MPs at the gate would not have any type of weapon at all. Totally defensive. I would submit another COA to be, securing the 9mm in a lock box in the tent and the ammunition separate. Yet, shotguns would be required. We have experienced that weapons are required in the run way. The towers cannot safely engage all areas of the compounds.
The facility is not designed for the MP to have an escape route if the prisoners rush the gate or come over the wire. Yes, riots of this magnitude happen, as experienced at Camp Freddie in BUCCA. Last night we had to call an additional 70 MPs from the living areas to quell a riot, where three prisoners were stabbed and several were beaten with tent poles. The MPs had weapons which I wholeheartedly believe kept the prisoners in the wire.

I have spoken to several of the MP CO CDRs and they have relayed their concerns of placing soldiers in the facility without weapons. They also believe that weapons are required in the run way based on the prisoners the MPs are securing.

I would not continue to emphasize the request to reconsider if I did not believe that weapons are a necessity to operate the compounds.

VJR

MAJ

The CG has directed that all 9mm's be removed from the compound areas and walkways around Gans and Vigilant.

<< File BCF Weapons asses 6 nov doc >>

SGM

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED/FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRY FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1

Classification: SCORED
Ganci Compound Status
14AUG03

**Compound 1**
- Water Tanks: (Tanks leak aggressively at seams)
- Porta Johns:
- Guard Towers:
- Light Sets:

**Compound 2**
- Water Tanks:
- Porta Johns:
- Guard Towers:
- Light Sets:

**Compound 3**
- Water Tanks:
- Porta Johns: Red (Contains 3 of the required 16)
- Guard Towers:
- Light Sets: Red (Missing 3, 2 that are present need a battery)

**Compound 4**
- Water Tanks:
- Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, requires 16)
- Guard Towers:
- Light Sets: Red (Needs 4)

**Compound 5**
- Water Tanks: (Contains 1, needs 1 more)
- Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
- Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
- Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

**Compound 6**
- Water Tanks:
- Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
- Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
- Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

**Compound 7**
- Water Tanks: Red (Needs 2 Tanks)
- Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
- Guard Towers: Red (Needs 3 Towers)
Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

**Compound B**
Water Tanks: Red (Needs 2 Tanks)
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

**Roll Up**
Water Tanks: Need 5 units and 2 need repairs
Porta Johns: Need 93
Guard Towers: Need 4 (2 are shared towers)
Light Sets: Need 28, 2 need batteries

SSG
320th MP BN
S3, NCOIC
DSN: 559-1763
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

From: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent: Sunday, August 24, 2003 11:20 AM
To: Anthony MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3 (E-mail) CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE (E-mail)
Cc: Jerry LTC CJTF7-320TH MP BN CDR (E-mail)

Subject: (U) Requested Assets

Classification: [REDACTED]

Sir,

The following list contains assets requested for Abu Ghraib:

1. There is a surgeon en route, however we are still missing a PA.
2. Civil Affairs.
5. MI.
6. Interpreters.
7. JAG.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this matter.

SSG [REDACTED]
320th MP BN
S3, NCOIC
DSN: 559-1763

DRV FM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 96
DECL ON X1

Classification: [REDACTED]
ALCON

Last night the prime power folks lit up compound 5. GANCI, strictly with the pole lights and left off the Generator light sets. CPT and myself did a walk around the compound and talked with the tower guards. The current pole lights do not provide adequate lighting for the compound. Therefore, generator light sets approximately 4-6 per compound are required. They are going to power up compound 6 with the pole lights but again we cannot open 6 until we receive more generator light sets (as well as port a johns) not enough to open cmpd 6 to full capacity.

Porta Johns

Need 6 more for cmpd 6
Need 14ea for 7 & 6
Need enough for 2 more MP COs (strength 140 ea) and for other tenant units, MI, CID, Magistrate, Medical
Approximately 330 additional soldiers Need assistance asap if there is an intention to transfer from Bucca to here and place more US forces here

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN
SS
DSN 559-1763

Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1
I need 50 Amada light sets, and the 15 or so light sets fixed (the brown light sets). I need a new contractor to provide food, due to the fact that they are always 100-200 meals short, and at least 2-4 times a week the food cannot be served because it has bugs. Today an entire compound 500 prisoners could not be fed due to bugs and dirt in the food.

FYI

Sir,
Please find attached the itinerary for BG West's visit to the 800th MP Bde, Thu 23 Oct 03. Please address any queries to the undersigned.

CPT [redacted]
C4 XO
822-1432

CPT [redacted]
C4 Plans (LOGCAP Coordinator)
318 822 1436

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
<<< File: 800th MP Bde - Abu Ghareb - 231003.doc >>>

Classification: SECRET
Caveats: NONE

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN S4

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN S4

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN S4

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN BN S3

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN S4

MAJ CJTF7-320TH MP BN S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

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MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4

MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4
The following is a list of deficiencies in Ganci:

CMPD 1:
- Grey water drainage problem
- Broken water pump
- Issues with the shower

CMPD 2:
- Grey water drainage problem
- Issues with the shower

CMPD 3:
- Water valve for tank
- 240 outlets
- Shower heads and valves
- Two light sets have seized motors
- Grey water drainage problem

CMPD 4:
- Water pump
- Water tank leaks
- Shower door latches
- Shower heads
- Porta john door broken
- Water pump switch
- Interior gate bent

CMPD 5/6:
- Light sets

CMPD 7:
- Light sets
The other day when you were here and for the past how many months I addressed the light set issue, the repair of the light sets in the compounds. As we were told was supposed to fix the light sets. Now I am being informed by Mr. BN PBO, that there has not been a contract awarded so the light sets cannot be fixed unless funded some other way. Is this the case? And if so, why wasn't I informed after the hundreds of emails, SITREP, requests, etc. I hope the above info is not correct. Bottom line: the compounds lack the proper lighting to protect soldiers, prisoners, and escapes, all of which is MISSION CRITICAL. I am not sure why a greater emphasis for the past couple of months has not been put on this above our level. We are talking about soldiers safety and prisoner safety and the prevention/deterrence of escapes on this above our level. Please advise on the status of the repair of light sets. I know that issues are being worked to bring Amida from other locations to here, yet the number that I have seen will not fix the problem.

While I am addressing basic necessities, Contract Meals. Disaster. That is the best way to describe this issue. Short hundreds of meals every feeding, bugs and dirt are found in the meals several times a week, and for the past two days prisoners have been vomiting after they eat. That coupled with the fact that their arrival time varies tremendously, this is of great concern as Ramadan has begun. We are now out of MREs for the prisoners and are attempting to get some today from the 541st. We are just about at 4000 prisoners between three locations, and as each day goes by the tension within the prison population increases, obviously. Yet, simple fixes, food, would help tremendously.

I appreciate your immediate assistance with these issues.

VIR
FYI: what do we do about the connexes with the light sets in?

CPT

MSG USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
DSVT 302-559-1743

-----Original Message-----
From: 724MPS4 [mailto:724MPS4@hq.c5.us.army.mil]
Sent: Saturday, September 27, 2003 4:35 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: 724MPALOC, 724MPS3, 724MPS2
Subject: RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Prediction: Classification: NONE
Caveats: NONE

Martin,

I spoke w/ MSG [redacted] in ref to Baghdad Central needing light sets. Tuesday I'm going to send out 8 by railhead it will take 17 hrs to reach your location. Martin as the light sets become available I will send them forward. I will e-mail you the container (connex) numbers as well as any other info that makes it easier for you to identify this equip.

I hope this helps for the time being.

CPT

P.S. 8 light set will come in two to three 20ft containers

-----Original Message-----
From: 800MP S3FWD [mailto:800MPSS3FWD@hq.c5.army.mil]
Sent: Saturday, September 27, 2003 4:40 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: 724MPS3, 724MPS4
Subject: RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Classification: NONE
Caveats: NONE

Then I will need 16 radios from the 724th. Everybody on track?

MSG USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
DSVT 302-559-1743

-----Original Message-----
From: 724MPS4 [mailto:724MPS4@hq.c5.army.mil]
Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2003 3:51 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: 724MPALOC, 724MPS3
Subject: RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Classification: NONE
Caveats: NONE

Martin,

I spoke w/ MSG [redacted] in ref to Baghdad Central needing light sets. Tuesday I'm going to send out 8 by railhead it will take 17 hrs to reach your location. Martin as the light sets become available I will send them forward. I will e-mail you the container (connex) numbers as well as any other info that makes it easier for you to identify this equip.

I hope this helps for the time being.

CPT

P.S. 8 light set will come in two to three 20ft containers
Got it! The 530th MP BN signed over all but four radios to the 724th.
We will give up our four. We plan to send up 120 detainees on either
Tuesday or Wednesday.

Major

----Original Message----
From: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
      [mailto: (E-mail)]
Sent: Saturday, September 27, 2003 8:29 AM
To: 800MP S3/CWO, 724 MP CDR, 724MPALOC
Cc: (E-mail)
Subject: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT !!!!!!!

Classification: [redacted]
Caveats: NONE

<<Tasker #22 Motorola Hand Held Radio Support.doc>>

Aicon Tasker #22 need these ASAP!

Classification: [redacted]
Caveats: NONE

Classification: [redacted]
Caveats: NONE

Classification: [redacted]
Caveats: NONE

Classification: [redacted]
Caveats: NONE

DRV FM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON: X1

Classification: [redacted]
Food is not just late, there isn't enough. Our MPs, Medics and field surgeons can easily identify bugs, knots and dirt now. We talk to the people who bring the food and all they say is that they just deliver. They submit head every day, but they don't deliver. We strongly suggest a 10% overage as BUCCA does and they agree to that. Instead they are 30% short. As for lights, this long existed before I was even the DEP CDR. As for taking the prisoners word I think we have been doing this a little bit longer than most. This is full of shit and not the least bit trustworthy. Why doesn't anyone see that, or from Victory?

MAJ D

The Brigade Deputy sent an e-mail to you on 22 OCT 03 that has to be paid for the services his company performs. The SOW for Baghdad Central is to be awarded on the 28 Oct. This will give one contractor all of the services at the site and that includes maintaining the light sets. For food, yes he has been late but he can not control it. For head count, your unit must submit a timely head count to them. If you get prisoners in after the delivery problem, the new kitchen head count is given to the contractor then they can not deliver food. The new kitchen facility on site should also help solve this problem. The contractor has people with the food from the kitchen to your facility on site should also help solve this problem. They eat the meals and I would like to know who from your staff is inspecting the food before it goes to the site. If it is the prisoners I would take that with a grain of salt.

As for your light sets. There are light sets coming from BUCCA by rail and from the 744 by air. Moving assets in theater takes time. I talked to Mr. Parks about working on the fixed lights and the light sets. Your people told him to do a survey and give them the information before starting work. Also, Mr. Parks needs a bulb that goes into the fixed lighting system so he knows what to get.

MAJ

<< File RE (S) Meeting with MG Wajskowski rff >>
The other day when you were here and for the past how many months I addressed the light set issue. I
was informed by Mr. BN PBO, that there has not been a contract awarded so the light sets cannot be
fixed unless funded some other way. Is this the case? And if so, why wasn't I informed after the hundreds of
emails, SITREP, requests, etc. I hope the above info is not correct! Bottom line: the compounds lack the proper
lighting to protect soldiers, prisoners and escapes, all of which is MISSION. I am not sure why a greater emphasis
for the past couple of months has not been put on this above our level! We are talking about soldiers safety and
prisoner safety and the prevention/deterrence of escapes. Please advise on the status of the repair of light sets. I
know that issues are being worked to bring Amidas from other locations to here, yet the number that I have seen
will not fix the problem.

While I am addressing basic necessities, Contract Meals. Disaster. That is the best way to describe this
issue. Short hundreds of meals every feeding, bugs and dirt are found in the meals several times a week and for
the past two days prisoners have been vomiting after they eat. That coupled with the fact that their arrival time
varies tremendously. This is of great concern as Ramadan has begun. We are now out of MREs for the prisoners
and are attempting to get some to arrive from the 541st. We are just about at 4000 prisoners between three
locations, and as each day goes by the tension within the prisoner population increases. Obviously, yet simple
fixes, food, would help tremendously.

I appreciate your immediate assistance with these issues.

VIR

MAJ

-----Original Message-----
From: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4
Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2003 9:23 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Subject: RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

I will talk to LTC who will inform me when the train arrives at the Baghdad raidyard. What I need from you is
all the container numbers and the train number. Give me the departure time as well. Once the train arrives I will
get PLS Trucks. I just need you to provide the escorts once LTC gives me the arrival time.

CPT Felix

-----Original Message-----
From: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Sent: Sunday, October 26, 2003 4:02 PM
To: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4,
Cc: (E-mail)
Subject: FW: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

FYI Cpt [redacted], what do we do about the connexes with the light sets in?

MSG, USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
---Original Message----
From 724MPS4 [mailto:724MPS4@93sgbde2 army smil mil]
Sent Sunday, October 26, 2003 3:51 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: 724MPALOC, 724MPXO, 724MPS3
Subject: RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT !!!!!!!

Classification
Caveats: NONE

I spoke w MSG Moffett in ref to Baghdad Central needing light sets.
Tuesday I'm going to send out 5 by railhead it will take 17 hrs to reach
your location, as the light sets become available I will send
them forward. I will e-mail you the container (connex) numbers as well
as any other info that makes it easier for you to identify this equip.

I hope this helps for the time being.

CPT

P.S. 8 lightest will come in two to three 20ft containers

---Original Message----
From CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
[mailto: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS@army.smil.mil]
Sent Saturday, September 27, 2003 4:40 PM
To: 800MPS3FWD [mailto: 800MPS3FWD@army.smil.mil]
Cc: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Subject: RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT !!!!!!!!

Classification
Caveats: NONE

Then I will need 16 radios from the 724th Everybody on track?

MSG USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NGO
DSVT 302-559-1743

---Original Message----
From 800MPS3FWD [mailto:800MPS3FWD@93sgbde2 army.smil.mil]
Sent Saturday, September 27, 2003 4:35 PM
To: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc: 724MPS3, 724MPS4
Subject: RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT URGENT !!!!!!!!

Got it! The 530th MP BN signed over all but four radios to the 724th.
We will give up our four. We plan to send up 120 detainees on either
Tuesday or Wednesday.

---Original Message----
From: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS [mailto:c5main.hq.c5.army.mil]
Sent: Saturday, September 27, 2003 8:29 AM
To: 800MP S3 FWD, 724 MP CDR, 724MPALOC
Cc: (E-mail)
Subject: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Classification: 
Caveats: NONE

<<Tasker #22 Motorola Hand Held Radio Support.doc>>

Aicon Tasker #22 need these ASAP

Classification:
Caveats: NONE

Classification:
Caveats: NONE

Classification:
Caveats: NONE

Classification:
Caveats: NONE

DRV FM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1

Classification: 
Caveats: NONE

Classification: SECRET
Caveats: NONE

DRV FM 123-2
Dated: 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1