On 21 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Ghraib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghairib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence.

The following persons were present:

COL [Redacted], CFLCC - PMO, Interviewer
LTC [Redacted], CFLCC - SJA, Interviewer
LTC [Redacted], 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
CPT [Redacted], 372nd MP Company, Interviewee
SSG [Redacted], 27D30, CFLCC - SJA, Recorder

This is the second interview for CPT [Redacted].

I was in the LSA when we received a call over the singcars saying that there was a possible riot at Camp Ganci. Everyone had to go up to a upgraded posture, Kevlar and Flak Jacket at that point. My company was put on stand-by. When this situation occurs normally we take all commands from the TOC, MAJ [Redacted], the Battalion S-3, put on us standby. We rounded up 20 of my people who were not working at that time and stood by in the LSA. About 10 minutes later we were called forward, we walked up to the edge of the wall just shy of Camp Ganci. When we called forward again, we stood only in the main runway and we acted as a deterrent.

When the riot was going on we set up a base defense. We were in full battle rattle at that point. The basic ROE was that if they got out of the wire we could engage. If the detainees were inside their compound and no threat to escape we would use minimum force and it would escalate depending on if the detainees got out of the wire. The ammunition changed from non-lethal to lethal.

We carry walk-about radios to communicate commands. The RTO would receive command from the singcars and then transfer the information through the walk about.

The base defense was never rehearsed. The riot was the first time the base defense was deployed. I developed a base defense plan, but I don't remember to whom it was turned in to.

My operations sergeant came in my room and notified me about the shooting. When I arrived on the scene LTC [Redacted], LTC [Redacted], SGT [Redacted], SSG [Redacted] and the
doctor were all present. I also carry a man-pack the situation. I wasn’t aware that an
informant warned about a detainee having a weapon. Military Intelligence has overall
control over Tier 1. I have MP’s there, but MI runs it. It was common knowledge that
COL [redacted] was the OIC over Tier 1. There wasn’t anything in writing but, everyone
was aware that COL [redacted] was in charge of Wing 1. Gen Karpinski, LTC Phillabaum,
MAJ [redacted] and anyone who worked at the hard site. I had never worked in
confinement facility before, so when I was told COL [redacted] was in charge of that Wing 1
didn’t ask any questions. I still made sure that my soldiers working that wing were taken
care of, but I didn’t know anything about the interrogations.

I take full responsibility for my soldiers and their actions. I don’t place any blame
against LTC [redacted]. I didn’t seem to think anything was wrong with my soldiers working
under LTC [redacted] in the MI Wing because the entire chain of command was aware of it.

We first arrived in October and entered the MI wing my first reaction was “Wow there
is a lot of nude people here”. I was told that it was a MI tactic that was used to make the
detainees uncomfortable. There were many people way above my pay grade that walk
through that wing and nothing was ever said about it. I was told it was okay; nothing was
illegal or wrong about it.

I saw LTC [redacted] daily, he spent a lot of time at the hard site. In the beginning he
attended every staff meeting, and then it started to taper towards the end. LTC Jordan
was the OIC of the MI unit, he was in charge of all the MI personnel who were doing the
interrogations.

My soldiers had to conduct detainees accountability counting. I had made a mistake in
my last statement. The soldiers conducted accountability three times a day then a
headcount sometimes around midnight, in my prior statement I said twice, but I meant
twice a shift.

I have never seen a DA 2674-R. My people took the counts, we forwarded it to S-1 from
there I don’t know how it was formatted. 

The ROE changed once. JAG briefed us around the December 2003 time frame. In the
new ROE we went away from warning shots. We had 20 personnel attend the ROE
Training. I don’t recall us receiving the pocket-sized ROE card.

My soldier felt he had to go over me to report the allegations of detainee abuse. He felt
that since the soldiers were about to reframe back to the states, the proper way would be
too short. He apologized to me after. I didn’t have a problem with that, and I understood
what he was trying to do.

LTC [redacted]’s description is that he is about 5’10, balding, a little overweight, and
sometimes he wore glasses. He wore DCU’s with a black “bear suit” type jacket. He
was well known by all the guards. He is a straightforward type of guy. He would stand
up for the soldiers regarding morale issues. He mostly stayed in Tier 1A and 1B.
The MI had a partition set-up so they can conduct their exercises in privacy. The exercises conducted of making the detainees do PT stuff. I’ve seen the detainees holding buckets arms out, and other drills. I didn’t know it was wrong at the time, but I know now. It was the nudity factor that I would question. There were females there on the left side of the hallway; we hung a sheet up because a lot of Iraqis would catcall to the females, we put the sheet up to try to deter that.

I understand this a 15-6 investigation, and the seriousness of this situation. I have concerns for my First Sergeant and my Platoon Sergeant, if you want to hold me accountable that is fine with me, I just would like to ask, could they be released?

The panel briefed CPT [REDACTED]

I feel like there is a discrimination issue with us being reservist. I talked to CID and I know other people were involved but their chain of command wasn’t pulled. We have been treated like criminals, we are confined to this tent, and we aren’t able to go back to our living areas to get items that we need.

The panel briefed CPT [REDACTED] again and dismissed him.
Captain [REDACTED], U.S. Army Reserve, was interviewed on 10 February 2004, as follows:

Q. Have you received word as to why we're interviewing you today?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Before I start, I want to provide you with the purpose of our interviewing you today. I'm Major General Taguba. I'm the Deputy Commanding General for the Coalition Land Forces Component Command, headquartered at Camp Doha, Kuwait. Our Commanding General, Lieutenant General McKiernan has appointed me as the Investigating Officer under the provisions of AR 15-6 under the direction of General John Abazaid, who is Commander of CENTCOM Command. This investigation will gather all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of maltreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, as well as detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7. Now, we'll also further investigate training, standards, employment, the climate, command policies and internal policies concerning the detainees held at Abu Ghraib. And finally, we will be assessing the command climate and the supervisory presence of the 800th MP Brigade chain of command, from General Karpinski all the way down to your level.
So before I start, I want to advise you that we're
going to be recording our interview. And before I start asking
you any questions, do you have any questions as to the scope of
the inquiry?

A. No, sir.

Q. For the record, could you state your full name, social
security number and unit of assignment?

A. [Social security number redacted]

I am the Company Commander for the 372d Military Police
Company.

Q. Let me begin by asking you, how long have you been the
Company Commander?

A. I took over in December 2003--2002, excuse me.

Q. So, you were the Company Commander when the company
was mobilized and deployed to Iraq?

A. Yes, sir, I took over 2 months prior to the
mobilization.

Q. What was your previous position to that?

A. I was the Battalion S1 at the 336th out of Pittsburgh.

Q. Was your unit, both the 336th and 372d, organically
assigned to the 800th MP Brigade? Could you describe what your
chain of command was?
A. We were assigned to the 220th, and we fell under the
99th RSC. That's how our chain of command went.

Q. That was your original assignment.

A. Right, I had no dealings or anything prior to this
deployment with the 800th, so the first time I've ever been
under their command.

Q. So the 372d was part of the 336?

A. Correct, and the 336th fell under the 320th.

Q. Okay.

A. And the 220th fell under the 99th.

Q. RSC out of the Pittsburgh area.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where were you mobilized at?

A. We were mobilized at Fort Lee, Virginia, sir.

Q. How long were you there for your mobilization
training?

A. Seventy-some days, sir, I'm not exactly sure. 72, I
believe. We were originally with the 4th ID contingent, and we
got held up there a little longer than what we thought. So we
sat there from February through May.

Q. Of '03?

A. Correct.
Q. Could you describe briefly what types of training you received there?

A. A lot of stuff was just check-the-block, sir, type thing. I hate to use that terminology, but that's what it was. We focused on—we are a combat support company. We focused on a lot of extra NBC, we anticipated also that threat. And we also focused on a lot of breaching, which I'm very glad we did that because we utilized that a lot in the first part of this deployment.

Q. Breaching operations?

A. Buildings, right, correct, sir. And then we just did all the other ranges and all the other stuff that they had laid or for us. We did a lot of extra unique-type of ranges. We did a lot of live fire and that kind of stuff, which was really good stuff for the company. So that's basically what we focused on. Everything else that they had laid on their agenda was mandatory training.

Q. So predominantly, common task. Any law enforcement or I and R type of tasks?

A. No I and R, sir, I wasn't—we're not an I and R—I did not anticipate that mission. I honestly did not focus that way. I knew we were going with the 1-4 Marines, and I knew we were
going to do a law and order mission. That's what we did for the
first 6 months. So we did very little I and R.

Q. So your initial mission was you were going to the
Marines.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And how did you know about that particular
arrangement?

A. One of my platoon leaders is a congressional aid, and
he had some connections, and he knew who that we were going that
way.

Q. Did you know from the start at Fort Lee which
Battalion you were going to, other than the Marines?

A. No, sir.

Q. No order----

A. It took a lot for us to have some contact or email as
to where we were going. There was some confusion. Like I said,
we were supposed to go through--the original contingent was
scraped and they came up with another plan. So, no, it took a
little while.

Q. Was your parent Battalion there mobilizing with you?

A. No, sir, they're currently here for OIF II; they just
got here.

Q. So you were selected out of that Battalion for----
A. Yes, sir, all the companies were MOB'd except for the
Battalion Headquarters, they stayed at home.

Q. So you were there from February to May, and you
deployed first to Kuwait, and when did you arrive in Kuwait? Do
you remember?

A. Sir, I believe it's May 15th. I'm not exactly sure. I
think that's correct.

Q. Did you receive orders then, follow-on orders to your
deployment northward?

A. Yes, sir, that's where we linked up, we were TACON to
the 1-4. And we proceeded north to the city of Al Halah, which
is in the Babylon Province. And there, we conducted law and
order operations. We also ran a police academy to train the
local police. And we assumed the local police stations there
and we actually ran the stations and gave guidance to the local
Iraqi police officers there and did that kind of operation.

Q. Which Marine outfit were you assigned to?

A. The 1-4, sir.

Q. And how long did you conduct that operation?

A. We were there until October, from May through October.

Q. Going back to your mobilization and deployment, could
you describe for me the status of the readiness of your company
at that time?
A. I just took over the company in December, so I did not have an opportunity to do any training with the company prior to the mobilization. I went off of the previous commander's, you know, where she kind of evaluated the company. When we got there, I pretty much agreed with what she wrote as far as the training, so it's basically TRF, every area there, from witnessing and from seeing the training we did.

Q. How about personnel, what was the personnel status?
A. Our stats at the time, we MOB'd--full strength, we were 180, sir, and we MOB'd with 173 at Fort Lee.

Q. What about your DMOSQ? Were you up there?
A. I know what you're talking about, sir, I honestly can't remember what my numbers were. We were good enough too--we had a lot of people cross level into the company, also, and that brought us up in our strength as far as DMOSQ numbers. I do not recall the exact, I'm sorry.

Q. From December to your mobilization, you didn't really have time to know about your company, is what you're saying?
A. Well, no, sir, December is basically, typically your Christmas part, and then I had January. And we MOB'd February 24th. So no, I knew very little about my company at that point.

Q. So you didn't get a chance to---
Q. When were you alerted for mobilization?
A. There was rumors way back in December. We were actually MOB'd on February 24th.

Q. Now, before I continue our interview questions here, I want to make sure that you know Captain [redacted] who is also a legal advisor here to the interview.

Okay, so short amount of time, didn’t get a chance to know about your company. You knew about the readiness proficiencies of your outfit. And you said upon arrival here, you were assigned to 1-4 Marines and conducting law and order missions off and on.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Let me kind of fast forward a little bit here. So that gave you a little bit of time to know your people, basically. who your First Sergeant was, who your platoon sergeants, your platoon leaders, your company XO, that sort of thing. Could you kind of describe then how the company was melding together under your command?

A. Yes, sir. We were under very adverse conditions there, on the heat, and a lot of those things played into that fact. Overall, I was very pleased with the way the company was
headed. We received nothing but praise from the 1-4. We did an
excellent job down there. I mean, my soldiers, with the
conditions they were in, I think, could not have done a better
job, and I truly mean that. I'm pleased with the First
Sergeant, for the most part. We had a few small issues, and he
and I talked them out and that kind of stuff, but that was
handled internally. There was no discipline problems. We had
some minor things, but everything was handled internally, like
any other company.

Q. When did you change mission and went down to Bucca?
A. We arrived, I believe, October 1st, sir. We assumed
the mission October 15th from the 72d.

Q. MP Company?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you given proper notice ahead of time, or an
alert notice stipulating that you were going to go from a law
and order mission to an internment and resettlement mission?

A. Well, I guess the notice would have been when the
Marines were leaving and we had no home at that point, so we
knew we were moving. And then, we were told we fell under the
310th at that point, a different Battalion, and we were told at
different points that no, we're heading to Bucca, and then from
Bucca, no, you're not, you're heading to Abu. So we did have
probably a week or so in there that we knew we were moving.
Q. So initially, you were being attached or assigned
somewhere to the 310th MP Battalion, which, where were they
located then?
A. They were in DO&E, which is about 2 hours south of
here.
Q. And when you arrived to Bucca, was the 310th then the
parent Battalion, or were you assigned to somebody else?
A. No, they were our Battalion at that point.
Q. At Camp Bucca.
A. Well, we never arrived at Camp Bucca. We sent the
advanced party anticipating our movement down there, and then it
got switched around, and I don't know how we ended up here, but
we ended up here to stay.
Q. So you never served at Bucca?
A. Negative, sir. I just did an advanced recon, and it
got squashed, and we never ended up going there.
Q. So you were never at Bucca, you were assigned to the
310th....
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And the 310th was at Al Haniah.
A. Yes.
Q. And when did you get assigned to Abu Ghraib?
A. October 1st. And like I said, we assumed the mission October----

Q. You hadn't moved out of Al Hallah at that time?
A. No, we came straight from Al Hallah to straight here, sir.

Q. So Al Hallah to Abu?
A. Uhm hum.

Q. And who were you assigned to at that point when you arrived at Abu?
A. Then we fell under the 320th, and then obviously the 800th.

Q. And that was around October 1st, and you assumed the mission around the 15th.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you given any kind of specific instructions as to what your mission requirements were going to be?
A. Well, sir, when we got on ground, we basically did a "right seat ROC" within 72d Military Police Company. I, myself, have never been in a prison, so I had no experience at all as far as a warden or that type of thing. They just showed us what the duties were and how they did it, and we just basically fell in on that.
Q. How long was the TOA?
A. Two weeks, sir.

Q. Two weeks; so you had 2 weeks to gain some understanding of what your mission requirements were going to be.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you get any specific guidance from the 320th MP Battalion command?
A. Uhm....

Q. Did they talk to you like we’re talking right now, saying, “This is what I want you to do, Captain [redacted].”
A. I don’t recall that, sir.

Q. Did the 72d MP Company turn over any records, any SOPs, as they holding the mission then and since you were a combat support company, and how you were going to do an I and R mission, any kind of specialized training, their lessons learned, that sort of thing?
A. I knew the previous commander from the 72d from the previous OA classes and OB classes, so we had a great rapport. He shared what he knew, what he could help me out... As far as SOPs, there were no SOPs, I don’t think so.

Q. Did the Battalion provide you with any SOPs?
A. Negative, sir.
Q. Was the Battalion here already?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. And did you understand that they had any doing with the I and R mission at Abu Ghraib at the time?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you ever ask for SOPs or policy guidance, or what does an I and R company do?
A. Right, we asked, initially, a lot in the beginning.

And I know that the 320th also requested through the 800th, sir, I know they did, for SOPs, and we never received anything. My company started to write our own, and what we did was we took different areas and we started to create our own SOPs from that, and I think we developed about two or three, one for the visitation, which I set up, one for another wing that we wanted specific IP duties and responsibilities in that wing, so we wrote that for that. And I know Sergeant [redacted] who's my NCOIC during the daytime, was working on some other ones, too. There was a generic one that was passed down from the 72d, that was a blanket, cover all. It was not specific to Abu Ghraib or to that particular mission, and we were tweaking that and working on that as we went along. As far as anything from higher down, no.
Q. Did you ever ask any questions, any references like, for example, AR 190-8, or even a copy of the Geneva Convention?

A. No, sir, I never seen a copy of that.

Q. Are you aware of the tenants of the Geneva Convention in the performance of your duty with handling detainees and prisoners and things of that nature?

A. I may not be the smartest guy, sir, but I understand there's certain things you can and can't do when you're dealing with civilian internees.

Q. Is that part of the training and part of the TOA process over the 2-week period?

A. No, sir.

Q. So you had no knowledge that that was part of your mission or part of the tasks associated with your mission in the performance of your duties regarding Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant and the hard site?

A. Nothing formal, sir, but I think as an MP or as a person, you understand that there's certain rights that people have.

Q. Who was your Battalion Commander of the 320th at the time when you assumed your mission?

A. I hesitate only for one reason, sir, because Colonel wasn't there for a little while in the beginning.
Q. I'm talking about in October.

A. Yes, he was gone. It was Colonel [redacted] or Colonel [redacted] was there for a brief time in October, then he left for a while and Colonel [redacted] came in as an interim for a short period for a few weeks and then Colonel [redacted] came back. And I don't have the dates.

Q. So who did you interact with in that——

A. Colonel [redacted] for the most part.

Q. Did you interact with the Battalion XO or the Battalion S3 during the——

A. The Battalion S3 and I have daily conversations, sir, mostly over strength and troop to tasks, and that kind of thing, because we were under strength, as everybody here is. And we had to, you know, do the best we could to accomplish the mission, and that meant shuffling people around sometimes and that kind of thing.

Q. So during the course of your assumption of the mission requirements from October to date, you were developing your own SOPs absent any guidance from higher headquarters?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were those SOPs ever written or posted somewhere?

A. We haven't, sir. The ones we developed were more for the Iraqi corrections so that they understand their job. Our
whole goal here was to turn this over to them and for us to step
back and let them run the prison. So we were developing SOPs
more for them so they understand what their job, what their
responsibilities are and what we expect of them.

Q. And did you understand, of course, in your mission set
that there were interrogators that were going to be involved in
the detainee operations?

A. Yes, sir, they were there and I knew Colonel He was the OIC of the MI. I never had any interaction with them
prior to that, and I wasn’t exactly sure a lot of times as to
what they did and how they did things. But we talked to Colonel
and he helped me. Initially, I saw some stuff that was a
little surprising.

Q. So, were you at least curious as to why interrogators
were involved with detainees?

A. Yes, sir, and Colonel and they told me that Wing One specifically was for HVDs and people
that we had an interest in. And there was also--there were
civilians, we had juveniles, we had females, we had the crazy--I
don’t want to call them crazy, but the psych ward was also
dumped on Wing One. So we had quite a hodgepodge of people in
there.

Q. But what about the Camps Ganci and----
A. I was responsible only for Vigilant, sir. I got Vigilant, the hard site, an escort mission and a PSD mission with one platoon in Doha. That's what I was responsible for.

Q. Describe for us now, Captain [redacted], how you organized your unit to accomplish the mission that was given to you, hard site, Camp Vigilant, how did you organize that?

A. What I did, sir, was I basically broke it down by platoon for the best we could. And from that point, I took my people who were stronger. Being in the Reserves, you have--one of the advantages, hopefully, is that you have some civilian experience. I pulled my people out who were correctional officers in the civilian side and I put them in, for the most part, into the leadership spots and I tried----

Q. Leadership spots where?

A. Within the hard site or at Camp Vigilant.

Q. Were they assigned to a platoon or where you just pulled them out from each of the companies?

A. Sometimes I pulled them out of the platoon, sir, if I felt that we needed, you know, if the one platoon didn't quite have the experience, maybe this one is a little heavier, and I had some correctional people there. We pulled them out and put them in the other platoon so that we could balance it out the best we could. One of the interesting things is, you know, I've
seen the pictures from the CID. I've seen probably 90 percent
of them. I'm appalled by what I saw from my soldiers. I'm not
going to kid you. The interesting thing is that two out of the
seven of my soldiers who are going to be probably prosecuted
here are correctional officers. And they were specifically put
there for that reason, because I trusted them and I was relying
on their knowledge and their experience to do the job.
Q. Let's stop there before we go on that portion. So you
pulled your correctional officers and put them on the hard site.
How did you do the camps and how did you do the PSD and how did
you do the other
A. The PSD, sir, was basically a platoon. They just
wanted a platoon, flat out, and that's what we did with that.
Q. And left them where?
A. They were left at Al Hallah where we originally came
from.
Q. How many platoons did you have?
A. I had four--well, five if you count headquarters, but
I had four platoons of MPs. So I had one platoon there. I had
one platoon basically in the hard site. I had one platoon in
Vigilant. And then the other two, we kind of split between
Vigilant and the hard site.
Q. Who was your platoon leader at the hard site?
A. I actually had a Captain, a Captain [redacted]...
Q. Was he always assigned to you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Or was he one of these kind of guys that was a "hey you"?
A. No, sir, he came in from a lateral transfer, I believe, from the 352d MP Company, a very good guy, very--you know, integrity, correctional lead on the civilian side.
Q. Did he have any experience in I and R?
A. No, sir.
Q. Did he have any experience as a law enforcement officer?
A. No, sir.
Q. What was his branch?
A. He's an MP, sir.
Q. He's an MP. Has he been a company commander before?
A. No, sir.
Q. And so, he was assigned to you as an extra person.
A. No, sir, he was assigned--yes, sir, as a platoon leader.
Q. Based on his rank, not questioning his proficiency, not questioning his competency, not questioning his experience,
you placed him in the command of a platoon that was responsible
for the hardstand.

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. Did you give him any specific guidance?

A. The guidance that I gave him was to make sure we
didn't anything wrong, just to make sure we did everything--took
care of the inmates, and he understood--we had a very good
understanding as to what I wanted and what he--there was no grey
area as to what we were--what our job was from the 72d as to
what we should be doing.

Q. Who had Camp Vigilant? Which platoon was that?

A. That was First Platoon, sir, and the NCOIC of that was
Sergeant First Class [REDACTED] and I had a Lieutenant [REDACTED] as
the OIC.

Q. Who were at Vigilant.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you had a platoon that was doing the transporting,
you said.

A. Yes, sir, we also had the escort responsibilities,
that was the Third Platoon, Sergeant [REDACTED] and they were
responsible for many of the escorts, the daily prisoner runs or
whatever it may be.

Q. And who had the [inaudible]?
A. That was Second Platoon. I had another Captain down there, a Captain [REDACTED], and Sergeant First Class [REDACTED].

Q. What was the role of your First Sergeant at this time?

A. The First Sergeant, basically, he would just roam around, and he did a lot of force protection things. There was a lot of towers and stuff that needed reinforcing, and he kind of focused on Plexiglas gates and taking care of the troops, just when he was walking around and doing First Sergeant kind of stuff.

Q. Now, according to your statement, you said that you spent 70 percent of your time focused on the construction or improvements surrounding the camp.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Your area of responsibility.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So you didn’t spend too much time checking on the detention operations of your company.

A. When I took over the mission, sir, the previous commander told me the majority of your time will be spent on these other issues, and it was. I placed competent people in them areas so that I would not have to, because I knew I would not have the time to be everywhere at once. That’s my reasoning why I put those people where I did. I spent the majority of my
time, as you said, working with the contractors, working with
the CPA. Looking at their construction. There was many, many
issues there, to include the generation power, water, all that
stuff is what I dealt with, the logging. Anything I did, they
basically came through me and I was like the liaison through the
CPA for whatever reason, and that's the job I got.

Q. At the onset of your taking over that particular
complex, did you write down or articulate your mission to your
company?

A. My specific mission, sir?

Q. [Affirmative.]

A. No, they knew, though, the role that I was in. But
no, I didn't.

Q. You did not articulate to them what your role----

A. Oh, yeah, sure, I articulated, but there was nothing
in writing. They understood what I was doing, as they seen me
every day running around doing whatever I was doing.

Q. What did you think your mission was?

A. My mission, sir, was to oversee the hard site, to
oversee Vigilant, to do all that stuff, and to also prepare to
get the jail ready to open up so we could move the people out of
Wing One that were not supposed to be down there and put them in
Wing Five where they belonged so that we could, you know, we
could get in compliance with the... I guess the Geneva
Convention, we were violating the -- I know we were in violation,
and it was no secret that we shouldn't have juveniles and
females and all them people in the same wing or the same tier
with HVDs and I knew that.

Q. But did you articulate that to your higher
headquarters?

A. Oh, yes, sir, and they had also articulated that, too.

There was a lot of pressure from people to open up that other
part of that prison. "When can we open it? When can we do
this?" "It's not ready, the beds...," whatever, it wasn't
ready. So I worked closely with the contractor on a daily
basis, and also, I spent a lot of time with the warden.

Q. So basically, what did you think was your number one
priority based on your mission?

A. In my heart, sir, my number one priority is my
soldiers. and it always will be. If you're going to that, I
mean. I spent the majority of my time, like I said in my
statement, on them other areas, sir.

Q. So your soldiers were your number one priority.

A. My soldiers will always be my number one priority.

Q. But in terms of your mission.
A. My mission, itself, I spent the majority of my time on the other stuff, and I'm not going to tell you differently.

Q. Was there any time when you were conducting the mission that your soldiers were even advised of the tenants of the Geneva Convention in the performance of their duties?

A. No, sir, not that I'm aware of.

Q. Was there a reason why?

A. I don't know, sir.

Q. Because you stipulated, at least you commented that you knew something was not right.

A. Well, sir, we have to backtrack a little, there was an IC/RC investigation, and their initial findings were, [redacted]

That's how I was made aware of it, initially. And because of that, the pressure was put on to [redacted] and that was a big snowball effect from that whole thing.

Q. Okay, now during the course of your command and your mission set down there, how many incidents of riots or attempted escapes or shootings of anything unusual that you were either aware of or were reported to you?
A. When I was there, there were three escapes. There was one attempted shooting in the hard site. There was obviously other ones in Ganci, I don't recall the number there. Riots, there were no riots in my area.

Q. How did you deal with reporting? Did you report those incidents to your higher headquarters?

A. Oh, yes, sir, of course. There was some 15-6s done, usually on everything, on all of it.

Q. Let's cover the escapes here for a moment here. You said there were two escapes.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. They were not attempted, they were successful escapes.

A. They were successful.

Q. How many prisoners escaped from each incident?

A. The first one, there was two, and they used the beds to pry the window open, and they escaped out of a very small area. And we believe there was some inside help from the first one, as far as opening locks and doors and that kind of thing. And they knew exactly where to go, what wall to go to. They knew the tower that wasn't manned, and they climbed right over it and they were gone.

Q. And these escapes were out of the hard site?

A. That particular one was, sir.
Q. When was that?
A. Uh....
Q. A window.
A. December, sir. There was a second one that wasn't too long ago. That would probably have been January. And what happened there was, one of the correctional officers who normally supervises the work details came in and took a particular prisoner out, took him to an isolated area of the prison, the new part. And he was on a cleaning detail, supposedly. The IP just happened to walk away, and left him unsupervised. There was a bathroom nearby, and the particular IP happened to also have access to the supply room. And we believe that he gained access to the uniform and dropped the uniform in the bathroom and conveniently walked away. The inmate changed his clothes, walked right out of the prison, walked under a manned tower that was manned by IPs, walked right through it and walked right out.
Q. Pertaining to the first incident, did you take corrective actions at the time, that something was----
A. Yes, sir, what we did, as we started to--we welded the beds together at that point. We started welding beds and making sure all the slats were welded down. The beds were welded together so they could not use them as a leverage. We also, at
that point, we tried to reinforce, and I emphasize “try.”

because it was a daily struggle to keep the clothing off of the
windows so we could see the windows, that they were being
tampered with. That’s what happened when they first--they broke
off the concrete and they pried away the rebar by using the bed,
and they hung some clothing over it so it wasn’t detected.
That’s how that happened, so that’s what we did as far as that.
We also took corrective measures. I personally went to General
who was the Iraqi warden at that point and explained to
him how this happened and how they did it. And he took
corrective actions as far as addressing his people at that
point.

Q. Did you give the same report, the same brief to your
own chain of command?

A. Yes, sir. General Karpinski came up a day or two
later, and I actually gave her the tour, the nickel tour, as to
exactly how they did it, where they went and the path they took.

Q. Was there any change to your standard as you know it,
your self-imposed standard for accounting for all those
prisoners at any given time? How did your accountability----

A. Right, sir, there was a checks--we had a checks and--
we actually accounted for the prisoners ourselves, and we made
the IPs also account for and we balanced our numbers together

and made sure....

Q. How often was that done?
A. That was done daily, twice a day.

Q. Between the hours of when?
A. It was done in the morning, sir, and in the...and I
don't know that, that was handled by the NCOs. And I know they
did it. I don't know what times they did it, though.

Q. Was there any written report provided or filed that
you know of?
A. No, sir, there was just a daily board we kept our

numbers on. And I reported the numbers every day at my 09 staff

meeting as to the number of people in the hard site.

Q. Who did you report that to?
A. To Colonel [REDACTED] and his whole staff, sir, the

number of people present, the number of beds available, and then

if there's any other issues.

Q. Was that done verbally?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any written reports on a daily basis from

you, twice a day, as you say, up to Battalion that you can

recall?
A. Sir, that wasn't my responsibility. I do believe that
Major [redacted] the 3, reported that stuff up through the---
Q. Chain of command?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What company, since you're operating the hard site,
you were operating Vigilant and obviously, those folks are doing
their accounting of the prisoners twice a day, as you stated.
A. Yes, sir. The S1 also briefed the numbers in the
morning, too. So she had accountability of the numbers that we
had. So there was a communication between us and the 1. She
knew exactly who was there by name and how many---
Q. We understand how you were doing that. You relegated
that responsibility to the NCOs and because, for whatever
reason, and they were reporting those numbers to you verbally.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. There's no written report. There's no listing of all
prisoners by ISN, and all prisoners are accounted for twice a
day, and then somebody signs off on that report and then it gets
to your company TOC who will then provide that report to the
Battalion
A. That is correct, yes.
Q. So it's all done by visual.
A. Yes, sir, it was 100 percent. They’d go through the cells and they would check the number, the bracelet that they wore, by ISN. And then each person on a wing was responsible for that responsibility, and then together, they would collectively take that to the NCOIC, he would add up the numbers and make sure they were right.

Q. That’s how they would do it, okay.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were there any other corrective actions that were taken after the second escape?

A. Yes. We immediately posted—where the escape was a wing that was brand new, and what it was a bunch of administrative offices. It was stuff that was used for inprocessing in the past. And because of that, it was just basically a big hallway with a lot of offices on both sides. So what we did was we immediately posted IPs at the door and at the--where you came in at, and also at the hallway, there was another IP posted there. They were instructed that no one, nobody left that prison without an ID card, nobody. And then also, I talked to [redacted] and he put that in place almost immediately. And we also--there was a door there that, which we’d call the common lower door, the little heavy steel door
that slid across, and he also enclosed that door at that point, too. So it saved

Q. Are you saying that you also had Iraqi correctional
officers that were involved in detainee operations?

A. Absolutely, sir. That was the one thing that--you
know, if I could change or--or I guess I had no control over
that. We were--it's a civilian-run prison run by the Iraqi
correctional officers. They went through a 2-week training
course, and they were basically given to us, and we were to
train them, OJT, train them and kind of teach them their
responsibilities. And we had to rely on them a lot because we
could not--we did not have the manpower--to put the appropriate
number of people we wanted to on the wings. So we had to rely
on the Iraqi correctional police or whatever you want to call
them, to do their job. And because of that, you know, we got
put in a lot of situations where----

Q. But that site was under your control.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Your direct----

A. Well, mine and the General from the Iraqi----

Q. But I'm looking at the hard site was your direct
control.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. But then you had Iraqi----

A. It was a partnership, sir. That's the way I like to look at it. Like I said, all along, our goal was to turn this over to the Iraqi police. We're not going to be here all the time, and our goal was to eventually, as they learned what we expected, we tried to step back and let them take over the responsibility.

Q. Let's concentrate now on the shooting that happened where...which part of your complex did that shooting occur?

A. That was in One B, sir, top floor.

Q. One B, top floor. So if I'm looking down the hallway....

A. It would be to your left, sir, on the top.

Q. What occurred there?

A. We had got a tip from one of the inmates that possibly one of the other inmates at the other end of the wing had gained access to a weapon. Immediately, my NCOICs--the procedure was, a lot of times, they would put on their flak jacket and their Kevlar, and immediately, what we did was, and we tried not to alert the guy that we were on to him, that we possibly had something. So what we do in a case like that is we would take--we would take the inmates--ask them to come forward to their door, and just handcuff them through their door. And as they
worked down the line, when they got down to the person who we
suspected had the weapon, he became very agitated. And he had
the weapon underneath his pillow, I guess, on the bed, pulled
out the weapon and he started to shoot, fire off many rounds.
One of the rounds struck one of my soldiers in the vest and
glanced off of his vest, and there were many other shots that
got into the walls. The NCOIC at that time grabbed the
shotgun....

Q. Who was the NCOIC?
A. Sergeant [redacted] and he fired
two non-lethal rounds at the suspect. The suspect basically got
up and just continued with what he was doing.

Q. Was he inside the cell?
A. He was inside the cell, sir, correct. It was locked,
but he was laying the weapon through the bars and just shooting.
At that point, Sergeant [redacted] fired a third round, which was a
buckshot, and it hit the suspect in the legs. At that point, he
stopped, dropped the weapon and stopped. They extracted him,
extracted him from the cell. We called medical support and then
we evac'd him out of there at that point.

Q. What did you do afterwards? Did you report it?
A. Yes, sir. As you can imagine, sir, that was a rather
large event, so yes, sir, everybody knew about that. That very
night. Colonel [REDACTED] the entire staff was on-site. Colonel [REDACTED] the OIC of the MI was also present during the shooting. He was there, myself, of course, we were all present right immediately after.

Q. Were there any corrective actions taken by you or authorized or directed by your chain of command at that time, if anything?

A. The only thing I can recall, sir, is at that point, we went to a heightened state and everybody wore their flak and their Kevlar inside the hard site at that point.

Q. How was that done?

A. That was ordered down: through, I believe General Karpinski through the Battalion.

Q. Just wear your flak vest, anything to be done—

A. You know, I forgot something. We did, also, we searched everything. We went through the entire wing. We went through everything and did a complete search of that entire area. We also searched some of the other wings, too, very extensively, looking for anything, weapons or that type of thing.

Q. Any other corrective actions like unscheduled searches, unscheduled checks, that sort of thing?
A. We've always did that thing, sir. We use the dogs, also. We used them many times. That was done almost on a daily basis. I can't say it was done every day, but we did that quite often, unscheduled routine searches of the cells.

Q. What about around the camps?

A. That was also done randomly, but that was scheduled through Master Sergeant He would basically just come to me and say, "Sir, we're gonna check--we're gonna search Vigilant Three or whatever, or Charlie, Delta at 09," and I'd say, "Roger that," and we would do that. We'd just set it up.

Q. Who was Master Sergeant

A. Master Sergeant I'm not sure exactly what company he was with, sir. He was with one of the other companies, and he was just basically put in charge of all the searches, through either Camp Ganci, Vigilant or the hard site.

Q. So he wasn't assigned to your company.

A. No, sir.

Q. And you understood him to be, as an authorized person, did you ask him, "What do you do for a living?" or "What's your role?"

A. He's a--I believe a State Trooper, I talked to him, personally.

Q. So he's a State Trooper.
A. Yes, sir, for Pennsylvania.

Q. Where did you think he was assigned to? What unit was he assigned to, that you know of?

A. Sir, I'm sorry, I don't know. I know it was one of the other units that are there on the ground, and I'm not sure what unit he came from, to be honest.

Q. Is he still around?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. So he's still assigned to the compound?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay, concentration now on another focus area, and that would be any reported abuses of maltreatment of the detainees. Were any of those reports provided to you, or have you heard of rumors or....

A. There was one, and it was reported--Sergeant [redacted], it was reported to me by Captain [redacted] my OIC, and Sergeant [redacted] my NCOIC. The report was only of verbal abuse, and that was it. The actions I took were I immediately removed him from the hard site, sir, and I gave him some additional duties that--we were working on force protection issues and I assigned him to that for his safety and for the inmate's safety at that point.

Q. So there were no other reported physical abuses or maltreatment that you have knowledge of?
A. No, sir.

Q. Did you suspect any?

A. No, sir.

Q. Did you make any visual checks around the area?

A. Yes, sir. I work primarily the daily--I mean, I work, with the meetings and things, and I work mainly the daylight shift. However, I would stop in periodically at nighttime. My OIC, Captain [redacted], was there all day. I had Sergeant First Class [redacted] come in. He stayed many times until 1, 2 o'clock in the evening. There was a time in the evening that they took advantage of, usually between 22 and like 6, and I think that's when some of this stuff happened. But for the most part, we had people there.

Q. That you relied on.

A. Yes, sir, that I relied on, that I counted on. And they were put there, like I said before, because of their civilian skills.

Q. Did you ever check on their military skills?

A. I'm not sure at all if I'm tracking, sir.

Q. You based your selection of people for the specific duties based on their civilian skills.

A. Yes, sir.
Q. But you never checked on their military skills, whether they have the proper leadership skills or experience in that regard.

A. The one, sir, was a staff sergeant, I thought as an NCOIC that was sufficient. The other one was a corporal. And like I said, I was new to the company. He was transferred into me. I had no recollection—I had no idea of his past or anything of that nature. And he never gave me any indication prior to that during their recent mission to think anything else. They both performed well.

Q. Did you understand why those detainees were put in that particular wing?

A. Yes, sir, because they were of some type of intelligence value, or they were either female, juvenile, or psych.

Q. Did you follow up on that, as to why they were important, how long they were going to be there——

A. No, sir, I didn’t care, to be honest, that wasn’t my area. That was the MI’s focus. I didn’t do the interrogations, and I really wasn’t focused on that.

Q. So that really didn’t interest you at all.

A. I mean, they would tell me why they were there. “This guy blew his thumb off with a grenade. This guy shot at
somebody." I knew basically why they were there. I didn't care
for how long they were there or when they were leaving.
Q. Did you understand that was related to your overall
mission requirement?
A. I guess.
[The session paused at 0937, 10 February 2004, and reconvened at
1000, 10 February 2004.]
Q. Captain[redacted] before we continue, let me focus again
on your selection of personnel that were based on their civilian
skills of being correctional officers or in that particular
sense. Could you describe one more time how you selected these
colleagues?
A. Yes, sir. Being in the Reserves, we have the luxury
of having people with very diverse backgrounds. And what I did
was, I took my--we looked at each platoon and we evaluated those
who had, in particular, police or correctional backgrounds, and
we selected those individuals to work, specifically, in the hard
site because we knew we really didn't have the training. I
didn't have the experience, and I needed their help and their
expertise to get us through, you know, to make sure we were
doing the right things.
Q. Did you, upon selection, did you personally interview
these people, or how did you run that?
A. Not personally, sir, but I knew them from—we had been
MOB'd at that point for 6 months at that time, and I knew of
their civilian occupations and what they did. Many of them came
forward to me at that point and said, "Hey, you know, I'd like
to work at the hard site because I work in corrections," or "I'd
rather not work in the hard site because I work in corrections,
I'd rather get away from it," so vice versa.

Q. Who, specifically, were those that you selected?

A. The two that I selected, actually, the three were
Corporal who is a civilian correctional officer,
Sergeant who also works in corrections. He was the
NCOIC of the nightshift. And Sergeant who is a D.C.
police officer, and there was some other ones there, police
officers, but those were the three that jump out at me as far as
senior people, sir.

Q. Now, originally, or initially, who was the NCOIC for
this group? Do you know? Do you remember? Did you pick a
leader?

A. Yes, sir. That would have been Sergeant E7, and he does not have a—he was the platoon sergeant for the
platoon who handled the majority of the hard site.
Q. So Sergeant First Class then became the NCOIC for the hard site, but specifically, which portion of the hard site?

A. Wings one through four, sir.

Q. One through four.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. But who was the NCOIC for the tier? Did you have NCOICs for each tier?

A. Yes, sir, we had like a--well, yes, sir, those were--I can't give you the specific ones because they rotated on a daily basis. There was a dayshift NCOIC, Sergeant Staff Sergeant, he worked mostly days. And then there was the nighttime supervisor, was Sergeant

Q. Sergeant

A. Right.

Q. Can you go back to why these detainees were, the security detainees were being placed in that particular tier, which was overseen by both Staff Sergeant and Corporal. Did you ever inquire as to why they were being placed or segregated from the other detainees on the hard site?

A. I knew that anybody who was in Wing One, sir, we had--they had some type of intel or perceived intelligence to the military, and that's why they were there.
Q. But didn’t you say that they were being placed there for a reason, did they provide that particular guidance to you?

A. Well, that came from, I guess, Colonel [redacted] or Colonel [redacted]. I just knew that whenever they were processed in, that if they came to Wing One, that they had intel value. And that was given to us by whoever brought them in, whoever detained them or arrested them. That could’ve been 4th ID. It could’ve been anyone who brought them.

Q. Somebody.

A. Somebody who brought them in to us, sir, said, “These people have intel value,” when they were inprocessed and they were brought over to the prison, we were told to put them in Wing One.

Q. Were there any kind of special instructions that you knew on the handling and the treatment of these particular security detainees that were placed in Wing One?

A. No, sir, everybody was inprocessed the same way for the most part. We brought them in. We put them into a holding cell. Sergeant [redacted] would then--it was usually during the daylight hours, so Sergeant [redacted] would then assign them to a cell number. They would write on, with a marker, on their hand cell number, their ISN. And then from that point, they were
transported from the holding area, holding cage down into their respective area.

Q. Okay, but let me focus now, you mentioned that these people who were in Wing One, that particular tier is what I’m talking about, were placed there because of their informational value.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you were given instructions as to why they were being placed there in the first place.

A. No, sir, not necessarily. We just, you know, we would just hear over time as to why they were there or why they were suspected of being there. Like I said——

Q. Maybe I’m not phrasing this question properly.

Somebody, after their being placed or interrogated or whatever have you, are of security value, intelligence value, and that particular tier is specially designed to hold those security detainees for a specific purpose, because not everybody is mixed in and mixed up.

A. That’s right.

Q. So did you ever inquire as to why they’re being placed there? Did you ever inquire as to any specific instructions to their handling and treatment?
A. Once again, sir, I honestly didn't care why they were there. I mean, I knew they were there for a reason, but that wasn't my—from my understanding, that was not my responsibility. My responsibility was just to house them, make sure they were taken care of. MI did the interrogation and all that stuff. We did not do that stuff with them.

Q. So the MI, of course, does the interrogation, and the MI, of course, provides some sort of a set of instructions for the treatment and handling—-

A. Okay, I see where you're going, sir. Yes, sometimes they would put them on special sleep deprivation programs. In the beginning, they often stripped their clothing, their bedding, that kind of thing from them. And we were told by Colonel [redacted] when I questioned this that this was an interrogation method and it was something they used. They often brought the dogs in and they would walk the dogs through and stuff like that. But as far as—sometimes they'd also be put on like a sleep deprivation, or they'd want my soldiers to turn on a radio or turn off a radio. They'd be given special favors if they were cooperating, like radios and that kind of stuff.

Q. So those instructions were provided to you through Lieutenant Colonel [redacted] and his—-

A. That is correct, sir, yes, sir.
Q. Were they in a written form or were they---

A. They weren't originally, sir, and then about a month into this, a month and a half into this, I demanded that it was written or we did nothing. We would take no action until we had something in writing. And the reason why I did that, I was concerned that—well, there was an incident that popped up that put a flag up in my head. And what it was, there was a particular inmate, and I don't know who, I don't know which one, but he was on a sleep deprivation program. Well, that particular inmate had a panic attack, and my soldier stopped the music and called for a medic at that point to give this individual some help. The MI guys, his name was [redacted] a big tall guy, I don't know his name or rank, because he was in civilian clothes most of the time, became upset with my soldier for doing that. I approached him and I said, "No, he did the right thing." And I said, "If something would have happened to him, he would have blamed my soldier." And we're not trained for this kind of—and I don't want the responsibility. I've seen how he turned on us and said, "No, it's the MP's fault. You can't do that. I have to start all over again with this guy." I said, "I don't care. I don't care if you have to start all over with him because we did the right thing." From that point on, I made sure that it was in writing, specific
instructions as to what we were to do, how we were to do it, and what we were to do. At one point, I asked that we be removed completely from Wing One, my MPs. I didn’t want to be responsible for anything in there, and I was told, of course, “No, we can’t do that. You have to be down——”

Q. Who said that?

A. That was the XO, Major He said, “No, no, that’s the wrong answer. You have to be there to transport and all that stuff.” So, “Okay, I got you, sir, I understand that.” But at the same time, I wanted something in writing, and from that point on, we demanded it in writing.

Q. When was that confrontation?

A. December, roughly, sir.

Q. Early, mid, late?

A. Probably mid to late. It took me a little while for that incident to happen.

Q. Who brought this situation to your attention? The guards?

A. Yes, my soldier, Sergeant was the one who was working. And one of my soldiers approached me with it, one of the NONs said, “Hey, sir, this happened and he did the right thing.” I said, “Yeah, I fully agree with you. He did the
right thing." And from that point on, I approached that Steve
MI guy and said, "No more."

Q. Did you report these events to your chain of command
besides Major Sheridan?

A. No, sir. Major he was the XO.

Q. This guy, did you ever question who he worked
for?

A. It was just common knowledge, sir, that he worked for
MI. Like I say, he wore no uniform. He was in civilian
clothes. I didn't know his rank.

Q. He didn't wear any kind of uniform?

A. No, sir.

Q. No DCUs?

A. No, sir.

Q. He was strictly civilian.

A. Yes, sir, I assumed so, sir. He had facial hair, so
I'm assuming he was a civilian.

Q. So from then on in, you demanded a written plan on the
handling and treatment of these security detainees. Was it just
for that wing or for everything else around the-

A. It was primarily for that wing, sir, because nothing
else happened in the other wings. There was no interrogation in
Wings Two through Four. Those were criminal only. Only Wing One was specific to that type of individuals.

Q. Were there any unusual circumstances of any other suspected types of, different types of treatment and handling that was occurring in that particular wing that was either reported to you or you suspected to happen?

A. I suspected nothing to the nature of what I saw. Like I said, sir, there were a lot of people without clothing on. I seen some people doing some exercises, but I seen nothing that was--other than that that I suspected to be wrong.

Q. Well, in your statement, you said that people walking around without their clothes on was a normal thing, it was just a nudity thing, and it didn't particularly bother anybody. But how often was that always occurring, every day or....

A. Yes, sir, very frequent in the beginning. I mean, I never worked in corrections before, and my initial thought was, that's a little odd, and I did think that. When I approached Colonel Jordan, I said, "Why doesn't anybody have any clothes on, or why does everybody have their clothes off?" And he just said, "It's an interrogation method that we use," and from that point on, I said, "Okay."

Q. It's an interrogation method that they use, but not during the performance of the interrogation.
A. No, sir. Many times, they were in the cells and they
would just be standing there without clothes on. So as you walk
down the wing and look in, you'd see somebody nude standing
there, correct.

Q. And the answer to you was, "That's an interrogation---

A. That's an accepted method of interrogation. That was
known by everybody. Colonel [REDACTED] everybody knew that.

Q. So it wasn't construed to contract the--as part of any
punishment.

A. No, sir, it was an interrogation method from what I
understood.

Q. I was just trying to make it clear that the prisoners
inside of their cell not being interrogated.

A. Right, sir, he was in his cell with the locked door
and many times nude.

Q. Are you familiar with the interrogation rules of
engagement?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you ever been aware of one?

A. No, sir.

Q. Have you ever seen one?
A. I've never witnessed an interrogation. I’ve seen a part of one for 5 minutes, but they mostly just--I just never went in to watch.

Q. And throughout this whole period, since you were not aware, or at least instructed your troops on the tenants of the Geneva Convention, did that ever occur to you that, perhaps, that could have been a violation of the Geneva Convention?

A. It didn’t at first, sir, but once the IC/RC, when they came through on their initial visit, a lot of that stuff stopped and you seen a lot less of it. It was a corrective measure.

Q. When did the IC/RC come to visit you?

A. I believe the first one was in November, sir.

Q. November....

A. Mid November, sometime, and it took a little while for the report to get generated. And then over time, I saw less and less of that behavior.

Q. With the changes that were made with regards to the treatment, was it done collectively? In other words, did you
put the word out to your company that this type of conduct or this type of treatment will stop or cease because the IC/RC was coming through, or did you just make a determination on your own that the treatment was very important?

A. We constantly, myself, the First Sergeant, the NCOICs, I mean, I would go to them daily and ask, you know, "How are things going? Is there any problems?" "No, sir, everything's fine." I saw them go down to the inmates, you know, walk around in the wing, "How are you doing?" "Okay, good, sir, good."

Nothing was ever reported to me. My soldiers know what's right and what's wrong, sir. They know there's a line you don't cross. And you don't have to even be an MP or a soldier, just a simple person knows when you cross the line.

Q. Well, you entrusted a lot of this stuff to Captain at the time.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And you mentioned earlier that the only instructions you gave were to make sure that everything's right, correct?

A. Well, sir, I had no SOP. I had nothing else to go off of. What we did was, I said, "Make sure they're treated humanely and we're doing the right thing." I don't--I mean, I don't know what else--you know, he understood, he knew what was
expected, and I truly, truly believe in my heart that he did the
right thing and he would never, never let anything go on.

Q. How often did Colonel [redacted] or any of his chain
of command come to visit you?

A. Colonel [redacted] I would see him periodically,
twice a week. I often ran into him in Wing One. I ran into him
a lot at Vigilant. Major [redacted] the 3, I seen him a few
times, 9, 10 o’clock, 11 o’clock at night walking around. So
you know, he made some visits around. Sergeant Major was there.
The 800th, I really didn’t see them a whole lot. I did see
General Karpinski probably five times. It was usually when a
VIP came through, something like that, she would show up. I
couldn’t point out our Sergeant Major if you put him in a
lineup. I have no idea who he is; I’ve never seen him. And I
knew her 3, because I met him previous at Al Hilla.

Q. Who was her S3?

A. Major [redacted] sir. But other than that....

Q. In the absence of SOP, which you mentioned earlier you
developed your own in the absence of guidance, did you ask legal
advice or presented it to the Battalion to see if it was an
acceptable----

A. Sir, that was the plan. We’re still developing—we
have two that are done, I would say, and the actual goal was,
when it's completed, was to pass it through the Battalion for
their approval, of course. And if they wanted to make any
changes at that time, they would do that.
Q. Do you have copies of those SOPs?
A. I don't have them on me, sir, and I'm restricted to go
back there, but I can get them for you.
Q. Okay. How would you characterize the command climate
in the Battalion? You seldom saw the leadership, or you often
saw the leadership?
A. I often did, sir, because we worked right next door to
them. I made several visits a day over there to check in with
the J. We talked about transfers and how many spaces I had and
all the issues that came up in the prison, that kind of stuff.
Colonel [redacted] was available quite a bit, actually. He was
around a lot. He worked pretty late at night.
Q. Were you able to approach him at any time?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Did he give you any kind of guidance or....
A. If I had issues and I was unsure, I would always
approach him. I can honestly say that, you know--and I don't
want this to be misconstrued in any way, you know, he's not the
strongest of leaders, I mean, as far as personality, that kind
of stuff. But he never gave me any incorrect guidance, and I
think everything he did was with the best intent.

Q. So you feel you were adequately supervised by him?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Let's talk about the S3, you said you talked to him a
lot. Major [redacted]
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you consider him as your go-to guy?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Since he provided the type of requirements for you,
did you convey to him what your priorities were? Or did he give
you any inkling or direction of what your priorities ought to
be?
A. No, sir. I mean, I was never sat down and counseled,
if that's what you're saying.

Q. No, in other words....
A. Everyone knew that the previous commander and myself
focused on the building, the issues inside the building, and
that's what we did. That was common knowledge. When I briefed
in the morning, I often briefed that kind of stuff, along with
the numbers, that was one thing. But I often briefed the issues
in the building and how we were coming along, where we were at
and that kind of thing. That's what I did.
Q. Did you understand that to be the guidance from the Battalions?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they amplify that? Did they verbalize that and then write it down?
A. Nothing was in writing, sir. But once again, Colonel many times, almost probably two, three times a week, I'd give him a walkthrough of the prison as to the progress we were making and where we were at with certain projects and how soon we could open up Wing--you know, the push was to open up Wing Five. They wanted to move the inmates.
Q. So did you feel pressure to accomplish that as soon as possible?
A. Well, yes, sir, that was a big issue. CPA was pushing, everybody was pushing for that to be complete.
Q. That was what you believed----
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That was conveyed to your company. Was that to be understood by the company?
A. It was--yes, sir, it was public--it was knowledge common to anybody that worked in the hard site. There was frequent visits from CPA, and that's where they focused on. "Do this, this, this and this." "Yes, sir, we'll take care of it."
Q. So that really, the completion of the renovation around the hard site or around the camp was principally focused on the turnover of those facilities to the Iraqi authorities?

A. That is correct, sir.

Q. So that was then principally your mission requirements then: the daily operation of the detention site was your secondary priority?

A. I guess so, yes, sir.

Q. And you believe that that was commonly understood by your company, and you believe that was the priority given to you by the Battalion commander?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And he did not, at any time, ask you to deviate from those priorities.

A. No, sir. He knew everything I did on a daily basis. He could have, at any time, said, "Hey, Captain [redacted] forget about that. Focus on this." But I was never given guidance to that effect, sir.

Q. Despite the fact that you've had two escapes, despite the fact that you had a shooting incident, you still followed the same priority throughout.

A. Well, sir, we made the adjustments we talked about earlier. We just continued on with our mission at that point.
Q. And there was no inclination whatsoever of your

guards' performance with following established rules,

understanding their responsibility of the Geneva Convention, and

that the only demand you made was anything that came out of the

interrogators was to be put in writing, in the either pre or

post-handling of the prisoners, especially, specifically in Tier

One.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you periodically check your NCOs or your leaders

that were in the hard site to see whether those requirements

placed on them by the MI interrogators were, indeed, in writing?

A. Sir, everything--yes, it is in writing, and they will

not do anything unless it is in writing.

Q. Did you inquire whether those things that were in that

piece of paper, I would imagine that would be the interrogation

plan, were approved by competent legal authorities or by the

Brigade Commander or the Battalion Commander? Were they signed?

A. Yes, sir, everything was approved by Colonel [redacted]

He had the overall plan for each individual person in Wing One.

He's an O5, I'm an O3, and if he approved a plan, I went with

the plan, sir.

Q. So there was a signature that was on the plan.
A. I don't want to commit to that, sir. I think there
is, but I'm not going to commit to that because I'd have to look
at one.

Q. Did your company maintain file copies of those plans?
A. We have those, sir, yes.

Q. So you're assuming that if the Battalion Commander
said so, that he was competent authority to give you a set of
instructions?
A. Yes, sir. Once again, it came from Colonel [Redacted], it
was the MI commander. And I figured the MI commander knew what
he was doing as far as his people.

Q. Did you make any mention of that to Colonel

A. I don't think--no, sir. I don't see a reason to do
that.

Q. The only reason I ask that is because you demanded, in
absence of your demand, that perhaps the Battalion did not know
of such a requirement.
A. I demanded it because I was concerned for my soldiers.
I did not want anyone to get into any kind of trouble for doing
something that----

Q. I understand. You didn't want your soldiers to get in
trouble.
A. Yes, sir.

Q. For anything that happened to the prisoners.

A. That's right.

Q. But I guess my question would be is, because of that demand, because of the absence of guidance from the Battalion, that the Battalion did not make an equal demand or least [inaudible] with subsequently demanded all interrogation plans should be in writing with regards to the treatment of those prisoners in that particular wing.

A. The initial request came from us, sir. I don't know if they jumped on board after that and said, "Go forward with that," I'm not sure. But all I know is now, we get everything in writing.

Q. So you did make mention of that. It was a common understanding, according to you, that says the Battalion Commander or at least the Battalion chain of command----

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Let's now talk about the allegations that your soldiers were participating in or actually committed those detainee abuses. Let me go back to your selection of these two individuals which you mentioned, Corporal [redacted] and Staff Sergeant [redacted]. If you'll describe for me how you came about being notified that these abuses were being done.
A. Approximately--today's the--30 days, a month ago, I
was awoken at midnight, and I was told that Colonel
wishes to speak to me. I went up to the Battalion TOC area. I
was greeted by CID, in particular, and he
basically--there was some other people in the room. He
basically said that this is a serious allegation and we're going
to start, you know, we have to do an investigation on your
soldiers. We believe they're involved in some alleged abuse.
At that point, he asked me to assist him. We went down and we
took them back to the CID area. They also searched their rooms.
They confiscated computers and things like that. Then they
started the interrogation process, and from that point on, they
worked their way through many other people in my company.

Q. What's your reaction to all of that?

A. I'm still in shock. As I've said earlier, I saw the
pictures, and I don't know, I'm totally--I feel betrayed. I'm
just saddened for the MP Corps, in general. I'm saddened for my
company that they would do things like that. And like I said,
sir, you don't need an SOP. You don't even have to be a
military policeman or a soldier. What I saw in those pictures
was just flat out wrong.
Q. Okay, that's fair. I keep going back, Captain to the absence of SOPs. Perhaps, with the absence of SOPs, that pretty much made a determination that the soldiers didn't know what was right and what was wrong. Because of your reliance on these people, you pretty much made a determination that you trusted their judgment and you made a comment that since you didn't know the tenants of the Geneva Convention, could it be that your over reliance on them led to these type of allegations?

A. Sir, I'm going to disagree with that, because like I said, I saw the pictures. They're sexual in nature. You don't need a Geneva Convention or an SOP to know that that's wrong what they did. I don't think knowing the Geneva Convention or having gold-trimmed SOPs in the hallway there would have stopped this action.

Q. Do you think there were implements and that sort of thing?

A. I think that--my initial thought--you know, I've obviously had a lot of time to think about this, and I replay it in my head what I could do differently to stop this or if I would have known anything. I think initially, when they saw the nudity, the exercising, the things like that, that they just took it a step further. But what they did is criminal and
Think our MPs were conducting this. You were aware that a lot of

Well, let's go back and a little bit now where you

Yes, sir.

Is that true?

That's correct, sir.

Authorities.

In order to turn over the faculty to the

To continue to remove the faculty, continue to improve the

You mentioned, your priority was provided to you on that matter,

Of determination operating tasks that you were to do, because as

Shifting of priorities to ensure that you're performing the type

Discarded conduct of that nature, that again, you did not do a

Operations, and given the fact that your escapes, shortcomings and

Duty, which was to conduct I and R, to conduct determination

Though was a set of judgments in the performance of their

Agents in your company were just basically following what they

Trained to conduct I and R, a particular mission, the trusted

The matter is you were operating as a combat support and not

Posed somewhere in the performance of their duty, the fact of

Fact that, if you said there were stops per se, if they were

Giving those circumstances of, again, I harp on the

There's no excuse for that. I mean, I'll honestly say, it's

Wrong.
night's on an average, randomly. Like I said, he was a patron

A. You know, a 7-day week, he probably was there four

Q. How many is many? Many times? Every day?

A. Yes, sir.

These problems?

I believe the proper supervision would have alleviated some of

Q. But there were many, many times, again, perhaps do you

A. Very, very often.

Q. Many, many times.

until 02 in the morning.

He would leave. Sergeant would stay many, many times.

worked 06: to 22:00, roughly, to 22:00, 2000 at night, sometime in there.

A. Captain.

Q. What about Captain.

That he was not there all the time.

other responsibilities. So there were days and there were times

for the evening. Now, he's also a patron, sergeant, so he has

random checks. I did assign sergeant first class there

A. No, sir. There was no stop. Once again, we just did

done during this period of time?

Surprised that perhaps there should be more supervisory checks

and 04. Was there another set of stops or instructions to

do these activities were being done between the hours of 2200
Whose integrity was it?

I'd like to know the

leadership knowing that.

down there a few nights without anyone knowing, without the

and he was not to be down in mining one. However, he wandered

specifically assigned him there as a standby, in an emergency.

1800 and have a brawler where there's people everywhere. So I

you can't have the power down in the middle of the feeding at

have very untreatable power generation sources. And we needed--

on duty was, the electricity was off at the hard site and we

mechanic that I put on duty for 24 hours. The reason why he was

The first one was one of my mechanics, who was a generator.

A. Yes, sir. I know exactly what you're talking about.

were encountering the hard site?

determine operations or even involved on the hard site but yet

you approved? were the people that were not even involved in

access to the hard site, particularly, people like those that

that's. That's very, very possible.

wouldn't be there that night or he was taking off a little

they knew when he had other things going on, you know, he

know. It's very possible. I'm sure it's very, you know, that

sergeant. He had other responsibilities to his platoon.
she violated the direct order given to her by her platoon. And because she bought her in over in room one night, she violated that, and we worked. We gave her a special order to, if she's not at Cgt in processing, so we were not really sure of the hours she worked. She had a very unique work schedule, working over at that location for her on a few occasions at nighttime. We could not locate her. The platoon sergeant was Cgt in processing back and explained how it led to.

Cpt just continued back and explained how it led to.

I gave her an article 15 and reduced her in rank. She back in her room at night. She violated that, and for that, she was back in her room, and we were not working, she's to schedule. It wasn't a set schedule for her. When we approached her, we saw her in the processing area in Cgt, and she worked in the processing area in Cgt, and she worked in the processing area in Cgt, and she worked in the processing area in Cgt.

Where she was, the other thing to that, the other part of that, we didn't know. We didn't know where she was. We had attempted to contact her a few nights, couldn't find her. We didn't know prior to all this breaking relationship with corporal. She was had a relationship or a perceived relationship. The second individual is my clerk, who is now a pc.

I seen him. The second individual is my clerk, who is now a pc. That was special.
there. I didn't know where she was. I thought she was at work.

A. No, sir, at that point, I didn't know she was going

changes to the procedures of access in the hard drives.

her whereabouts, which led to the article 15, did you make any

Q. So, you reduced her. Of course, since you didn't know

but it was on a roll there for a while, unfortunately.

it's because we're getting a little shorter on our tour here.

Timeframe. I had a couple bad weeks there. I don't know if

2 weeks there. It was prior to all this breaking loose, January

Q. You know, sir, I had about seven in the span of about

reduced her, but then when did you give her the Article 15?

so you gave her an Article 15, and of course, you

sergeant, the was the headquarters placoon

A. who was her platoon sergeant?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. She was your clerk.

Q. Yes, sir.

A. Her immediate supervisor.

Q. That's correct, sir.

A. So her supervisor was her platoon sergeant.

Q. Reduced her in rank prior to all this breaking our.

1 sergeant, I issued her an Article 15, company grade. I also
have been any?

was no established procedure to do any of that. Should there

So no checks--nor that there were no checks, but there

walk through at any point.

soldiers just walking through there, it's wide open. You could

so they went to see and what time. As far as regular

through our headquarters in our office. They were logged in as

A. Well, no, sir. I mean, visitors were logged in

authorized in there, visitors or--

so there's no procedure or stop that says who is

There's many, many doors to get in and out of there.

A. There was no--it was pretty much wide open, sir.

who was in charge of the access to the hard drive?

down into wing one. That's how he ended up down there.

Well, on one of his rounds late at night, he would just go

would walk out and check the generators throughout the night.

they stayed in the headquarters section. But they periodically

pointed. I knew that he was assigned--what they normally did was

A. I was not aware that he was up there either at that

What about Specialist

and when we told her to be in her room, we found her in
A: It was, yes.

22. So, a metal hasp is permanent?

21. Nothing I was aware of, no.

20. Anything else went, sir, there was no other--there was

19. But besides weapons, what are authorized---

18. to give up your weapon to the MP that was standing by.

17. weapon was okay. If you went into the individual wings, you had

16. If you walked down the wing, the main wing of the prison, your

15. weapons were--this was put down through the barrack,

14. stance, hasps, things of that nature?

13. contradicted or weapons of anything of that sort, the weapons

12. process by which there’s no checks of the types of any kind of

11. established procedures for access, does this lead us to a

10. go to a question, a follow-on for that. Because there was no

9. In that particular sense then, get me go back, let me

8. pretty much open.

7. people allowed in that wing, other than that, no, sir, it was

6. In that wing, there was no civilians, there was no insight

5. particularly, we try--there was only military people there were

4. doors that were wide open and like I said, in wing one

3. have one or two doors in and out, and there’s a lot of side

2. not a prison kind of guy here, but I would think that you would

1. A: I would think so. I mean, especially you know, I’m
The food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went seen the food trays and the trash bag around, I often went

U.S. soldiers, it's coming from him.

Your people, that it's not coming from an American or from a front of your people and you give the guidance and direction to

But I feel that as a leader, it's important that you speak in assigned to us, and everything was done through an interpreter.

We had interpreters there, worked with us, they were.

How did you deal with that?

Barrier there, I really can't--

First of all, I can't speak the language, so there's a language addressed it in that manner, so I mean, I like to let him--

that came up, concerns I had, concerns that he had, and we set down just about every day and we talked about any issues

I mean, I had a daily meeting with him at 10 o'clock where we think that's the right thing to do, if we ever had any issues,

However, I prefer that he handle his own people, because I just

A. It was a shared responsibility to some extent, sir.

Well, or was there a shared responsibility?

Of you that those Iraqi guards were under your supervision, as was there an understanding or an agreement between the two.

Did you understand, you keep talking about

cleaned up. It's a mess. It strikes, or whatever, and he would

2

1
Great job. Your soldiers are doing a great job.

That stuff. And as I would do that kind of stuff, I often
would say afterward, you know, "Great job, you guys are doing a
certain thing." I often gave the tours, was kind of like the
but somehow, you know, when people would come out, visitors and
many times, said, "Hey, you're doing a

Yes, sir? I did, maybe not specifically him so much.

is whether you're doing okay or you were not doing okay?

to your relationship with the battalion E3. Did you ever ask

5. So that's part of the understanding, let me go back

and the uttermost say so in the end.

Whenever you want me to do it, I will do it."

many, many times, "Whenever you want,

A. No, sir, not directly. But I know that if you know,

chain of command?

That direction provided to you by Colonel

So you understood that. Was that understanding or

Yes, sir.

Immediate control?

was it your understanding that that facility was under your

preparing the facility to be turned over to the Iraq contact,

But let me repeat this one more time. Since you were
Q. So that was part of the conveyance. What about the instructions with the 4 mission requirements of that nature when you talked to the S3?

A. I mean, there was a few things. I know one time he was walking around, you know, in the evening hours and he seen 6 some of the Iraqi guards disciplining one of the inmates and it was a method we didn't approve of. And he approached me with it and said, "Hey, I saw this. I went to your people and I told 9 him what I saw. I don't want to see it again," and that kind of 10 stuff. So he did get around some, and when he saw something he didn't like or approve of, he approached me with it, without a 12 doubt.

Q. And what did you do?

A. We corrected it and I'd go to the next day. "Sir, we witnessed your guards doing this last night," you 15 know. "You can't roll the inmates around in the mud. It's not 16 approved. Please put that out that it's not an accepted method of discipline. We will not take that."

Q. Did you ever take, you personally, take corrective actions? Did you ever delegate any of these actions to your 20 subordinates, to your First Sergeant?

A. Not really, sir. I did most of it, the corrective 22
the sense from October from when you were given a new mission.

Your unit. If you could kind of describe or characterize it in th

ought the chain.

stuff was all passed down and then it was dismantled out.

watch our for this. We heard a rumor about this, that kind of

pass on any pertinent information to the night time super

I guess, in the NOCIC room. Sergeant the day shift would

and they did their little handoff. We had a shift change brief.

It was de-centralized on the wings, as far as the lower enlisted.

It's all de-centralized. I guess, a combination of both.

A. was it done centrally or was it done de-centralized?

A. Yes, sir.

A. Well, were there any kind of procedures or

on force protection stuff and the troop issues, like he should.

mean, he was there and he was helpful, but he focused a lot more

to disseminate the information that way. The first sergeant, I

shift work to touch everybody one on one. But we did our best

changes that needed to be made, it was very difficult with the

leaders would pass the information on. If there were any

and we'd put all that out. The plantation sergeants, the plantation
missions are. So how did you prepare your company for that
and I believe you understood what
No, sir, we had no choice, so we accepted it.
Well, you didn't have much of a choice in the matter.
that, that wasn't our first choice, I'm sure.
know, tedious work. And coming from what we came from to go to
you picture an I and a mission, you picture a lot of long, you
again, but that's not really our expertise. And you know, when
wanted that mission. You know, we accepted. Whatever we were
honestly, sir, I mean, I don't think anybody really
from that and order to departure and resettlement.

what about October on when your mission set shifted.

you think, I'm sure.
the results of that. If you talk to my soldiers, they'll tell
Fort Lee, and it was very, very favorable, and I can show you
major issues. I did do a command survey where we were MOD'd at
times and I appreciate that. I don't really feel there was any
senior NCOs. I know that for a fact, because they told me many
Pretty good, I know my soldiers respect me and they respect my
very little issue, I don't think--the command climate was
A. From October on, I mean, overall, like I said, we had
over it.

A. up until this incident, yeah, that's why I was so hurt.

O. Not up until this incident.

changed at all.

accessible, easily approachable, and I don't think that's

was there. was—not just me, but my senator. NCOs were easily

change that came out in the previous command climate that I did.

A. If I do believe that strongly, that was one of the

change that are proper?

Your leaders that they're doing things that are improper or

wrongdoing in the company or can contribute to you or to any of

command can come up to you and tell you if there are any

enough or postive enough that any soldier in your chain of

0. Do you feel that your leadership style was adequate.

8. MPs do that, we adjust.

they throw at us, we'll do, we'll adjust to anything. I mean,

we've accomplished our mission, and that's our goal. Whatever

goal from day one is get everybody home safely. And so far,

point, just continue on and we'll get our of here. My main

gruntlings. I said, "Look, we've done a great job up to this

reassigned. We've got to have another mission," and there was

A. We just told them, I said, "We're going to be
However, I do take the responsibility for what they did.
Includin' me and other people. It's not just my soldiers,
or are in a picture. There's also other people involved, to
people that kind of thing 'who were standing around, watching
people. The other ones are people who just-mostly naked,
serious ones that contain sexual matters was mostly the
you're right, there was other people in pictures. However, the
involved. It stopped at that point. Nothing went beyond that,
which was going on. If he was involved and
also involved. He stood there in many of the pictures watching
involved. Sergeant, my NCOIC who I trusted, was
every picture. You'll see him performing these acts or right
in the picture. If you look at the pictures, sir, you'll see him in
my soldiers did, but Corporal, in my opinion, is the
the pictures, there's also another part of this that I found out
A. The problem was, this is my opinion, seeing the
Even through proper supervision?
A. Still, we had absolutely no knowledge of that.
4 happening in their one A.
3 had no knowledge of that, or those activities that were
2 captain, one can only speculate that the chain of command
1 there are many people involved in that whole incident.
one. I would love to be able to do that. Actually, my Internet

that. We transitioned from one mission straight into another.

A. No, sir. Honestly, sir, we don't have the time for

more and your readiness status, that sort of thing?

mentioning to you chart of where you are in terms of your troop

did you make any kind of an assessment following your re-

indicated that you conducted a survey at your pre-deployment,

c. Going back to your command structure. Since you

a. Nothing ever got to my level, sir.

c. None whatsoever.

c. No, sir, nothing at all.

mp down to your battalion or down to your?

chose types of incidents that were dissemi-nated from the 800th

knowledge whatsoever of any guidance or letters or preven-

And based on those events at Camp Bucca, have you any

and stuff.

knew about it. We read theheadlines and we seen it on the TV

deployed the last time with my unit. So I knew of him. So we

individually, the one sergeant who was involved. Apparently, he

A. Yes, sir. A lot of my soldiers knew the one

person involved, even that happened at Camp Bucca?

c. Were any of your soldiers or yourself aware about the
I'm saddened for my company that we have to go through this. I help what a few people, you know, with criminal internet do. And know I did my best and I know we all did our best and I can't my company back home. But if that doesn't happen, you know, I outcome of this whole thing, you know, my goal, I want to take sergeant can. I know my senior NCOs can, and regardless of the like I said, I can look myself in the mirror. I know my first have been covered on that aspect, I guess. I'm just, you know, would have stopped these criminal acts, but at least we would demanded them. Although, I'm still not convinced that that instead of just asking for them, maybe I should have nothing is, you know, I probably should have demanded stops from a little more than I do, and absolutely trusting. The second, this is I need to change my style somewhat and maybe micromanage thing, and they failed me. I guess the lesson I learned out of I thought they should be. I trusted my NCOs to do the right change nothing for the decisions I made. I put the people where month now. And as far as what we did personnel-wise, I would a. You know, sir. Like I said, I kicked this around for a recommendation would you make?

Based on all of this, Captain what the end.

I'm still allowed to lead my company back, to do it at all.
has an extensive file, rather thick. The union hired a lawyer.

For doing similar actions, maybe not as severe, sexually, but he

of this. He had been fired from his previous job in corrections

there's a long history with the boss, and the told me

seems also. And he happens to be the

Apprentice Sergeant. I said, "Tell me what?"

known that, I would have told you. I said, "Tell me what?"

involved in this. He said, "Holy shit, sir. If I would have

Greener, right?" I said, "Yeah, he's one of the main people

talking about why I'm here, he happened to say, "Hey, you get

scarf. I'm not sure what he does for them, exactly. As we were

into one of my old files, who is on the bench

decision, while I was whisked away here in custody, I can

know this prior, this would have definitely affected my

the number of MPs, which now can see this type of information. This may explain

A. Just come more, sit, and this may or may-and I don't

want to make:

Now before we conclude, are there any other comments

matter, and I get very upset about this.

saddened for the 80th. I'm saddened for the damn Army for this

saddened for the MP Corps. I'm saddened for the 230th. I'm

we've accomplished way too much to have to deal with this. I'm
was duly warned and the hearing recessed at 10:30.

"They were they're home now."

They deployed here?

Griffing, West Virginia, 6th.

It's a sister company of ours, and they're out of

and the 363d was where?

The 363d.

which company?

There's another, but he came from another company.

were not originally assigned.

Let me just follow up on that. You mentioned that

retary to me, and I wished I would have known that prior.

don't know if that has any effect on anything or not, but it's

wouldn't have put him on a detachment in charge of a wing. So I

number one, he wouldn't even be in my company. Number two, I

guy has a history, and I would have known he had a history,

and I'm not making excuses, but what I'm saying is this

him, they can't catch him in the act, but they know he does

understand, whatever you want to call it, they can't pinpoint

said that he continues to do things, but because he's

an attorney, they got his job back and all that stuff. He also
A. Do you wish to add anything else to your statement?

A. All soldiers were informed no interrogations were to be conducted by them.

A. The Command is making more announcements visits to the back side, reassured everyone understood the SOP and TCP SANCHO S2, everyone understood the SOP and TCP SANCHO S2, everyone understood the SOP and TCP SANCHO S2, everyone understood the SOP and TCP SANCHO S2.

A. We immediately moved all suspects out of the hard site and transferred them. We believe two of the soldiers are identified.

A. Have you viewed the pictures did you recognize any other soldiers previously not identified?

A. Can an issue of disposing a direct order to stay away from Cpl. Draper?

A. As far as the other soldiers involved were there any disciplinary issues concerning SSG Freeck?

A. Was there any disciplinary issue concerning SSG Freeck?

A. We believe the last order is the unit after the mobilization. I was just combining the battalion assigned to your unit.

A. Have you had any problems with this work performance?

A. I have seen board when we mobilize. The was authorized.

A. Yes, he consistently challenged orders and requests from the leadership. He would...

A. How long has Cpl. Draper been assigned to your unit?

A. No

A. Is any of this accurate?

A. Have you heard of your soldiers being told to give definition of the specialwegian?

A. They said things were much better. There nothing was stopped and they seemed happy with what

A. The soldiers were upset with what they saw. They were concerned with the

A. The soldiers were upset with what they saw. They were concerned with the

A. When happened when the IGRC walked through the yard site?

A. No

A. Was the Chain of Command aware of these types of actions conducted in the

A. No

A. Pictures previously shown to you?
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<tr>
<th>Authority to Administer Oath</th>
<th>Type of Person Administering Oath</th>
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Administrator sworn this 12 day of [Month], 2000, that the person described and sworn to above is a person authorized by law to make this statement.

I, [Name], have read or had read to me this statement which begins on page 1 and ends on page 1.

Affiant

[Signature]

Witnesses

[Signature]

[Signature]