MEMORANDUM FOR

C2, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335

SUBJECT: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

1. This memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7. Security internees are civilians who are detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949 (hereinafter: Geneva Convention).

2. I approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance approaches A as described in Enclosure 1, relating to security internees, subject to the following:

a. Use of these approaches is limited to interrogations of security internees under the control of CJTF-7.

b. These approaches must be used in combination with the safeguards described in Enclosure 2.

c. Segregation of security internees will be required in many instances to ensure the success of interrogations and to prevent the sharing of interrogation methods among internees. Segregation may also be necessary to protect sources from other detainees or otherwise provide for their security. Additionally, the Geneva Convention provides that security internees under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of Coalition forces shall, where absolute military necessity requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication. Accordingly, these security internees may be segregated. I must approve segregation in all cases where such segregation will exceed 30 days in duration, whether consecutive or nonconsecutive. Submit written requests with supporting rationale tome through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA must accompany each request.

d. In employing each of the authorized approaches, the interrogator must maintain control of the interrogation. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation, to include the lighting, heating and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.
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3. (SFS) Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach and recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CJTF-7 SJA will accompany each request.

4. (SFS) Nothing in this policy limits existing authority for maintenance of good order and discipline among persons under Coalition control.

5. (SFS) This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy signed on 14 September 2003.

6. (SFS) POC: MAJ [REDACTED], DNVT, [REDACTED], DSN [REDACTED]

2 Encls
1. Interrogation Approaches (S1)
2. General Safeguards

CF: Commander, US Central Command

RICARDO S. SANCHEZ
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
INTERROGATION APPROACHES (Security Internees)

Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the general safeguards provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementation guidance with respect to approaches A-Q is provided in U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52. Brigade Commanders may provide additional implementation guidance.

A. Direct Asking straightforward questions. The most effective of all approaches, it is the most simple and efficient approach to utilize.

B. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing a reward or removing a privilege, above and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention. Possible incentives may include favorite food items, changes in environmental quality, or other traditional or regional comforts not required by the Geneva Convention.

C. Emotional Love: Playing on the love a security internee has for an individual or group. May involve an incentive, such as allowing communication with the individual or group.

D. Emotional Hate: Playing on the genuine hatred or desire for revenge a security internee has for an individual or group.

E. Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a security internee.

F. Fear Up Mild: Moderately increasing the fear level in a security internee.

G. Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee or calming him by convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated.

H. Pride and Ego Up: Flattering or boosting the ego of a security internee.

I. Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the pride or ego of a security internee.

J. Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it is useless to resist by playing on the doubts that already exist in his mind.

K. We Know All: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator already knows the answers to questions being asked.

L. Establish Your Identity: Convincing the security internee that the interrogator has mistaken the security internee for someone else. The security internee is encouraged to “clear his name.”

M. Repetition: Continuously repeating the same question to the security internee during an interrogation to encourage full and candid answers to questions.

N. File and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the interrogator has a voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must be corrected by the security internee.

Enclosure 1
O. **Mutt and Jeff**: An interrogation team consisting of a friendly and a harsh interrogator. This approach is designed to cause the security internee to have a feeling of hostility toward one interrogator and a feeling of gratitude toward the other.

P. **Rapid Fire**: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing security internee to answer questions fully.

Q. **Silence**: Stating at the security internee to encourage discomfort.

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Enclosure 1
GENERAL SAFEGUARDS

Application of these interrogation approaches is subject to the following general safeguards:

(i) limited to use by trained interrogation personnel; (ii) there is a reasonable basis to believe that the security internee possesses information of intelligence value; (iii) the security internee is medically evaluated as a suitable candidate for interrogation (considering all approaches to be used in combination); (iv) interrogators are specifically trained for the approaches; (v) a specific interrogation plan, including reasonable safeguards, limits on duration, intervals between applications, termination criteria and the presence or availability of qualified medical personnel, has been developed; and (vi) there is appropriate supervision.

(U) The purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a security internee with the least intrusive method. Applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained investigators or interrogators. Interrogators and supervisory personnel will ensure uniform, careful, and safe conduct of interrogations.

(S/NF) Interrogations must always be planned, deliberate actions that take into account factors such as a security internee’s current and past performance in both detention and interrogation; a security internee’s emotional and physical strengths and weaknesses; assessment of approaches and individual techniques that may be effective; strengths and weaknesses of interrogators; and factors which may necessitate the augmentation of personnel.

(S/NF) Interrogation approaches are designed to manipulate the security internee’s emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing cooperation. Interrogation operations are never conducted in a vacuum; they are conducted in close cooperation with the detaining units. Detention regulations and policies established by detaining units should be harmonized to ensure consistency with the interrogation policies of the intelligence collection unit. Such consistency will help to maximize the credibility of the interrogation team and the effectiveness of the interrogation. Strict adherence to such regulations, policies and standard operating procedures is essential.

(S/NF) Interrogators must appear to completely control the interrogation environment. It is important that interrogators be provided reasonable latitude to vary approaches depending on the security internee’s cultural background, strengths, weaknesses, environment, extent of resistance training, as well as the urgency with which information believed in the possession of the security internee must be obtained.

(S/NF) Interrogators must ensure the safety of security internees, and approaches must in no way endanger them. Interrogators will ensure that security internees are allowed adequate sleep; and that diets provide adequate food and water and cause no adverse medical or cultural effects. Where segregation is necessary, security internees must be monitored for adverse medical or psychological reactions. Should military working dogs be present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all times to ensure safety.

(S/NF) While approaches are considered individually within this analysis, it must be understood that in practice, approaches are usually used in combination. The title of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumulative effect of all approaches to be
employed must be considered before any decision is made regarding approval of a particular interrogation plan.