Part II
Stunde Null
10. Seventh Army Interrogation Center, "Notes on the Red Army—Intelligence and Security," 24 June 1945

NOES ON THE RED ARMY - INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

This report should be read in conjunction with MAO Report "Notes on the Red Army - Leadership and Methods," dated 24 June 1945.

SOURCE

a. GEHEREN, Reinhard, OBWE (Brig Gen), formerly Chief of Foreign Armies East Dept., OKW. Source talked freely during interrogation.

b. SCHURR, Albert, Maj, Foreign Armies East Dept., OKW. Source, a 29-year-old foreigner, worked under the supervision of Gen GEHEREN. He was very cooperative and talked willingly during interrogation.

RATING (both sources): B-2 Date of Int: Apr 45 Interrogator: N.W.

1. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

Unlike the German Intelligence Service, which was distinctly divided into two main branches, viz., procurement of intelligence (SPIONAGE: espionage and evaluation of intelligence), the Red Army intelligence organizations were very closely related to the various military intelligence organizations. Intelligence was obtained in peace time through the following three agencies:

a. The Fourth Dept. of the Red Army General Staff (IV 4) was mainly concerned with military intelligence. The Dept maintained its own network of agents and supervised the activities of the military attaches who, on their part, also established nets of agents for work in their designated countries.

b. The Foreign Dept. of the People's Commissariat of the Interior (INO-KNK) concerned itself with obtaining political intelligence. This Dept. also supervised, to some extent, the activities of the military attaches and of the Soviet diplomatic posts abroad. The INO maintained a separate net of agents for this purpose.

c. The Communist International (KOMINTERN) collected both military and political intelligence through the Comintern Parties in every country. It was in close contact with both the Fourth Dept. of the Red Army General Staff and with the INO-KNK. Again, a separate net of agents was established by this agency.

With the beginning of the war this procedure was maintained and made more complete through the inclusion of corresponding posts in the G-2 office of the 4th Dept. of the OKW. Agents of these posts were, in addition to obtaining political intelligence, in charge of obtaining information from Communist channels. The basic work for the Foreign Division in INO was done by the RA in the RA for the Foreign Division in INO.

Economic intelligence was collected by all three agencies described above, and an attempt to coordinate their efforts was made.

2. EVALUATION OF INTELLIGENCE

Military intelligence was evaluated by the G-2 sections of army and front groups, or by the G-2 Dept. of the Red Army General Staff, according to its scope as set out. Agent reports were appraised with other intelligence sources, with information obtained through reconnaissance and through frontline contacts. The main task of the G-2 sections was to keep situation maps up to date.
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up to date and to evaluate enemy capabilities. The Germans repeatedly succeed in capturing Russian documents of this type, originating from div or corps. These documents proved conclusively that the Russians were able to construct a generally correct picture of the forces opposing them. The last document of great importance thus captured was a situation map that fell into our hands at the end of the Russian winter offensive in the BARN OW bridgehead area. According to this map, the Russians knew the front-line units opposing them, but overestimated the number of armored divisions kept in the rear of the German lines by confusing their numbering.

As in other areas, G-2 employed various means to obtain intelligence, such as tactical reconnaissance, troop observation, aerial observation, capture documents, and radio and aerial reconnaissance. Higher commands also had at their disposal excerpts of hostile propaganda publications and radio broadcasts, and the press of neutral and enemy countries.

3. FOURTH DEPT, RED ARMY GENERAL STAFF

As sources recall it, the Fourth Dept of the Red Army Gen Staff was subdivided into the following sections:

a. Section for registration, collection, and control of all incoming naval files
b. Military Attachés Section
c. Far Eastern Section, with sub-sections for China, Urga, and Manchuria
d. Near Eastern Section, with sub-sections for Turkey, Syria, and Iraq
e. The Balkans and Poland
f. Italy, Spain, and Portugal
g. Germany
h. France, Belgium, and Holland
i. Scandinavia and the Baltic States
j. Great Britain
k. United States of America
l. Information Office, Press, and Propaganda
m. Personnel Section and Education
n. Technical and Material Office, Finance

The Foreign Dept of the NKVD was divided in a similar manner, but its subdivisions were much more detailed.

It is noteworthy that the Far Eastern Section of the U-1 Dept, the Eq of which are probably in HARRIS, enjoyed almost complete independence from the main office and great authority.

4. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

The G-2 Service of the Red Navy was arranged according to battle areas as follows:

a. Western Battle Area, Baltic Sea
b. Southern Battle Area, Black and Caspian Sea
c. Northern Battle Area, North Atlantic and the Bering Sea
d. Far Eastern Battle Area, including AMUR River area

The Navy maintained net of agents in all countries, with which naval contacts were thought possible. At the same time the Navy exercised control over the Naval Attachés, close coordination with the work of the Fourth Dept, and with the Foreign Dept of the NKVD was attempted concerning all common problems.
II. SECURITY

1. GENERAL

The Russians, more than any other nation, are particularly concerned with preventing any possible opponent from obtaining accurate information on any important measures pertaining to their military or national life. This tendency led to such a development of camouflage and security measures that the Russians have become masters of this art. In Russia, penetration into every field of national activities naturally, in the field of military affairs is particularly felt. There are particular characteristics especially suited for adoption. All important military activities, such as approach-marches for major operations and troop movements, are, as a rule, exceedingly well camouflaged.

The Russian master of camouflage against enemy air reconnaissance, particularly when he has enough time to prepare and execute his camouflage activities. But even in the cases when such time is not available, such as during emergency shifting of larger forces to points of main efforts, the Russian is always careful to cloak their movements as much as possible in accordance with the severe punishmont to violators of camouflage and security regulations.

2. SECURITY OF MOVEMENTS

All approach marches are executed mainly at night. Infantry units move in small groups on secondary roads. Motorized units are moved en masse at night and without lights, showing whenever possible. When it is absolutely necessary to use lights, only every third or fifth vehicle uses them in order to deceive possible reconnaissance as to the volume of traffic. The general rule of concealment movements from the front area in daytime and movements towards the front at night is applied in most cases. Night movements start after dusk and end before dawn. During daytime troops are as a rule dispersed in woods, even in extremely cold weather. This is only possible because of the laborious training of the Russian soldier and because of his ability to make good use of nature. In wooded areas, where trees have to be used for the billeting of troops, absolutely no movements are allowed during daytime.

a. Rail Movements

The bulk of movements by rail is executed under the cover of darkness. Superstructures are built over objects that can easily be recognized by air reconnaissance, especially over tanks. These superstructures are sometimes executed with surprisingly simple means.

Occasionally trains have been observed to stop when reconnaissance planes appeared. Loading and unloading activities were also well camouflaged and were executed at night whenever possible. Emphasis was placed on camouflaging the distribution of material from unloading points.

b. Armored Units

Movements of armored units are camouflaged with special care. Camouflage of individual tanks dispersed in woods and, if possible, in villages was so effective that very careful photo interpretation would be a rule disclose not more than three or four poorly camouflaged tanks, and that would already be by the Germans as signs of an imminent offensive. The use of dummy tanks, sometimes placed in really used tank approach march areas, for enemy reconnaissance, the attachment of special coverings for the purpose of sweeping of tracks left by tanks, and the making of deceptive artificial tanks turtles, are widespread.

In order to prevent the premature disclosure of the tank approach march, armored units are fought into the final jumping off area immediately before the attack—sometimes only 1/4 hour before the start.
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5. Artillery Units

Security of artillery preparations is attempted by the continuous construction of additional arty positions, evenly distributed throughout the front area. Thus each front-line bty. has to construct additional gun placements and numerous dummy installations, even when it is not intended to bring up arty preparations in its particular sector. Dummy arty pieces are widely used. Newly built-up arty concentrations can best be recognized by the presence of large btry. ORDNANCE, sizable groups of group commanders, etc. The 76-26 guns, which are difficult to detect, and also by the direction of fire of the newly built positions.

The "attack arty" is brought into position only a few days before the start of the offensive, and an intensified fighter cover protects it from this time on. In order to prevent enemy interception through sound ranging, the "attack arty" does not register its guns. Firing data are carefully obtained by the front-line arty units over a long period, and are then relayed to the reinforcing "attack arty".

The use of alternate arty positions—end of ranging guns is very common with Russian front-line arty units, especially in secondary sectors.

3. SOME SECURITY MEASURES

a. In order not to give away the number of troops to be used in an attack made from a bridgehead, the Russians construct bridges over the surface of which is immediately below water level. These bridges can only be detected by the observation of the bridge approaches or of actual traffic on the bridge.

b. The Russians carry on the construction of infantry positions in depth at all times. Therefore, especially intensive trenching activities cannot be taken as proof of defensive intentions in a particular sector; on the contrary, it might lead to the conclusion that an attack is being prepared in the area.

c. Measures against enemy tactical reconnaissance are strongly intensified before a Russian offensive. Unit boundaries and sectors of the front are maintained to the very end, in order not to give any hints concerning the coming attack. The necessary regrouping is executed in the last few days, and units completely unknown to the enemy are not brought up to the front until the last night before the attack. In order to prevent the enemy from obtaining information about the attack preparations immediately before the start of the offensive, the start of the offensive is often preceded several days before, and then re-occupied during the night preceding the offensive, when the assault infantry units are brought into line.

4. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MEASURES

In addition to attempts, often very successful, to infiltrate into the enemy's intelligence agencies, the Russians employ an exceedingly strict control over the area behind the front lines. This is made easier by the very complicated system of passes, certificates, etc., used by the Russians. It is practically impossible for individual Russian soldiers as well as for unit detachments to cover the shortest distances without the prescribed rations of documents. The control of the rear areas is exercised by the NKVD (People's Commissariat of the Interior), by means of several "specialized passes". These lines, established one behind another, often make use of natural terrain features. Forging of documents is made difficult by the use of all possible, always changing, tricks. A strengthening of NKVD troops in particular sectors should always be viewed with suspicion.

In times of peace or armistice the Russian borders are hermetically sealed off, even when friendly relations exist. A thorough study of measures are the restrictions and strict control of both the domestic and foreign correspondents, who are suspended under the slightest pretext,
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The most important measure against enemy radio reconnaissance is the
suppression of all enemy traffic before major Russian operations. The areas
of radio silence are chosen in such a way, that they can give no indication,
as to the intended place of attack. Radio silence orders were vigorously
enforced, especially during the last year. In the case of the shifting of
major armored forces, single radio stations of important he were usually left
operating in the old areas these stations, in addition to their deceptive role,
were also used for radio traffic concerning supply matters.

III. DECEPTION AND PROPAGANDA

1. DECEPTION THROUGH THE FOREIGN PRESS

The Russians repeatedly attempted to deceive their enemies by planting
special reports in the international press. During the past two
years ANKARA and STOCKHOLM played an important role in this respect. Despite
numerous warnings of German news monitoring agencies, these attempts met with
partial success. Sometimes the Russians even succeeded in giving their "news" the appearance of coming from different sources and of corroborating
one another. Especially numerous were reports planted by the Russians con-
cerning exhaustion within the ranks of Russian troops, low morale, food
troubles in the interior, and counter-revolutionary tendencies within the Soviet
Union. Sometimes items of a primarily propaganda value were also launched,
such as the intended stopping at the DONETZ line, then at the ODER River,
etc.

Besides these general methods of deception, certain deceptive "news" might also be spread by agents. This was the case in the rumors concerning the
intended employment of the Black Sea Fleet, later the Baltic Fleet, in support of the operations in progress at that time.

2. DECEPTION THROUGH PW

Political indoctrination plays a very important role in the Red Army.
The failure of the time is incessantly humored into the minds of the Rus-
sian soldiers. Since it was found that PW and deserters talk willingly
about these political lectures, the Russians use them for deception pur-
pose. Before major operations the Russians attempt, through the PW men
given their own soldiers, to create false impressions either as to the main
aims of the offensive, or as to the timing, strength, etc. of the intended
operation. Especially stressed are supposed visits by prominent Russian
military leaders in certain sectors of the front, alleged reinforcements
by forces from the Far East, dispatch of new tank models, etc.

3. RADIO DECEPTION

No major radio deception scheme has ever been attempted by the Russian
who realized that such a scheme is easily detected if it is not accompanied
by thoroughly planned deceptive measures in all other fields. Tactical
radio-deception has been employed, but was of only limited importance.

4. FRONT-LINE PROPAGANDA

The Russians cleverly select topics for their front-line propaganda
activities. These include the dropping of leaflets and propaganda disseminated
through loudspeakers. The most unusual procedure is sometimes followed
such as trying to bluff and confuse the enemy by the announcements, over
loudspeakers, of the incorrect time and place of the intended attack.
IV. FIELDWORK

1. Gen DESHON stated that Polish forces on the Eastern Front at the end of 1944 seemed to be held, despite political inducements to surrender, that an "eventual conflict" between the Soviet Union on one side and England and the United States on the other was inevitable. Similar statements were made by Russian and British authorities for a long time, and nothing was heard of these particular inducements after that.

2. Twice, the German intelligence agencies received reports about differences of opinion between the Soviet military leaders and the political forces of the Soviet Union. One, whose representative was supposedly ZHUKOV, maintained that the "quick and complete defeat" of Germany and the occupation of "as much German territory as possible would automatically end all European problems with which Soviet Russia was concerned;" the other, whose ideological leader was MALIN, wanted to solve the Balkan question first, before the British and Americans could intervene. This latter faction seemed to have prevailed, at least to a major extent.

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SEVENTH ARMY INTERROGATION CENTER

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