Part III
The Vandenberg Report
14. SAINT, AMZON to SAINT, Washington, "Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service," 8 January 1946

SECRET/RELEASE
TO GERMANY ONLY

SECRET CONTROL
UNITED STATES FORCES EUROPEAN THEATER STRATEGIC SERVICES DIVISION WAR DEPARTMENT MISSION TO GERMANY AFO 797

8 January 1946

TO: SAINT, Washington
FROM: SAINT, AMZON
SUBJECT: Russian Experts of German Intelligence Service

1. In October it was learned that the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, USFET, had in protective custody several former staff officers of Franche Heere Ost. This office was naturally interested and through discreet inquiries learned some details of the situation.

2. It appears that the French Heere Ost staff unit (General) von Gehlen retreated successfully from Warsaw through Eastern Germany south to Wismar and thence to the vicinity of Godesburg near the Austrian frontier. Von Gehlen, having control of Franche Heere Ost intelligence echelon responsible for German intelligence on the Eastern Front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, decided to turn himself in to the American forces rather than risk capture by the Russians. This he managed to do, together with seven of his staff officers, most of whom were experts on Russian order of battle, both of the Ground Forces and Air Forces.

3. When his American captors suggested that he leave Germany and come to the United States to work with the experts on the Russian Army of the Far Eastern Front, he promptly agreed to do so, recommending that the chief of his secret intelligence operations, Major Hermann Baun (subject, unnumbered SHARP card, copy attached) who had been separated with a few other officers from the old Staff Wallis, be contacted to join the party. Active efforts were made to locate Baun to no avail and the original group set off with von Gehlen for Washington where it is presumed they still are.

4. Baun had meanwhile escaped to the area of southwestern Germany which ultimately became the French Zone. When he realized this, he arranged through a contact with the American Consular authorities in Switzerland to turn himself in to the CIA in AMZON. This was done and the CIA processed him like a normal automatic, arrests, through the Third Army page at Feldinge, publishing his name on the daily arrest sheets and giving the FBI the normal dissemination.
5. The arrival of the NK at USFIS caused a considerable uproar and immediate efforts were undertaken to get Baum to Oberursel under an assumed name and to cover what was from G-2 USFIS point of view breach of security involved in publication of the news of capture. The damage however had been done and it is understood that the Russian Liaison Officer was immediately instructed by his superior officers to ask for transfer of Baum, von Cohen and several other members of the same command, to Russian custody for interrogation. Needless to say, this request was not granted.

6. Baum had with his a Lt. Colonel Pesel (NKS) and three or four minor non-coms formerly belonging to Stab Walli. These men are now living at Oberursel in a private house under cover names. They have not been interrogated by any UI personnel and every effort has been made to keep their presence a secret not only from outsiders but also from officers of Counter-Intelligence Branch, USFIS. They are in the custody of three junior officers of the G-2 Section, who are using them as advisors on incoming intelligence which concerns the Russian Army or Intelligence structure.

7. Also at Oberursel but strictly apart from Baum and his colleagues are several other former Russian officers, including General Gallikin. Gallikin is likewise giving "expert" advice on the Russian military situation. An example of the type of material being provided by Baum is the attached Appendix A, which was furnished at the request of G-2 as a check on Gallikin by Baum himself.

8. It seems apparent from frequent conversations with the officers responsible for Baum, that G-2 originally contemplated setting him up with funds and personnel to run an intelligence front in Soviet Russia. They soon realized, however, that they had neither the facility nor the experienced officers, competent to run such an enterprise and have therefore asked on a very informal level for the advice of X-2 Branch as to what they should do next. Since the whole situation was a delicate one, we have kept our contact with the responsible officers in G-2 on an informal level and have advised them to interrogate Baum at length and have nothing to do with his schemes for further intelligence activity. G-2 has to far not followed the first of our recommendations but I believe they will follow the second. We have further recommended that Baum draw up a list of his principals and have them held in AMMEN and that efforts be made to contact these men with a view to interrogating them and discovering if they have any documents. This was done in early December but the results so far are not known here.

9. From the point of view of the X-2 Branch, the most important number of Stab Walli was not Baum nor in fact any of his colleagues but rather Oberstleutnant SCHMALSLAGER & Dr. MULLER (subject SHAEF card 4056) who was head of Section 3 at Stab Walli “ret” August 1941. Frequent rumors stated that he had been captured by the Russians through a contact in the Munich area he was discovered living under an assumed name in Munich. He was taken to Munich where he was interrogated at length by E and a good deal of valuable information.
was extracted. (See material.) Schmaalschlaeger has now been
arrested by the GIC owing to an indiscretion of his in visiting his
home in Nurnburg, and he is now in an internment camp in the Nurnburg
section. Efforts are being made, however, to obtain his transfer to
Oberrussel where he will be subjected to a thorough interrogation. The
reason for his not being sent to Oberrussel in the first place was that
we were anxious not to get him mixed up with the Baum-group, and that
the original contact with him was made with the understanding that he
would not be immediately sent to an internment camp; it was felt that
the certain documents belonging to Friedl Heere Ost, which have been re-
covered and are mentioned in the reports, might be jeopardized
if he were not carefully handled.

Ends: 2 cc Appendix 6
2 cc Baum SHARP card
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APPENDIX A

General Malishkin was Chief of Staff of the 6th Soviet Army, in which Vlassov held the position of Commanding General. After the Vlassov Army had been activated, Malishkin became Vlassov's adjutant and G.3. of the army. While he traveled for the purpose of organizing the Vlassov Army, he made preparations for the re-activation of the Communist Party in Paris.

An agent who might be able to give more detailed information on this subject is at present detained in an American prison in Salzburg; this agent could be approached if so desired.

While General Malishkin held important staff positions in the Vlassov Army, he was in constant contact with Moscow. He used the following channels:

1. Through General Tsokhin, Chief of Staff of the Vlassov Army and former head of the recruiting army (Ziaknov). General Tsokhin has been a member of long standing of the N.K.V.D. (usually referred to as Tsokhin, Zhilkab National Labor Association); this organization was formed by General Kuznetsov in 1923 - who was kidnapped in Paris in 1939 and taken to Skrohov - with the purpose of unifying the youth of the Russian emigrants in the Balkans. Headquarters of the N.K.V.D. was in Belgrade. The GPU built its own organization into the N.K.V.D. headquarters of the GPU was in Belgrade. It was the task of this branch of the GPU to control the Russian emigrants and to build up an additional intelligence net in Europe. Through the N.K.V.D. the GPU had its agents in all important German government offices where Russian youth was employed as interpreters (Osterreichisches Reichsamt, RSHA; see Schellenberg). The GPU report to the GPU was in Belgrade.

2. Through Jelinkov, Chief of Propaganda of the Vlassov Army and former 0.2 in the Soviet 6th Army (see above); also through Zumutin, Chief of Civil Administration of the Vlassov Army. Jelinkov's uncle is one of the outstanding personalities in the Defense Council in Moscow. Jelinkov, his uncle and Zumutin were regional commissars in Moscow in 1918, when only persons considered absolutely trustworthy were appointed to such positions. Communication between Jelinkov and his uncle was maintained through the Soviet Consul in Stockholm; however, not the Soviet Embassy but the Soviet Consul in Stockholm was used as agency in this operation. A Soviet agent by the name of Malinov in Prague is Jelinkov's middleman in this connection.

Contacts with Prague are available through a person detained by the American Army in FRANKFURT.

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NAME: BAUM  (Ger)  A GERMANY  C/R

STATUS: Major at ASt Warsaw T'of. (Apr 44)

ADDRESS

DESCRIPTION

MISC.

CAREER: Promoted Hauptmann. (2 Jul 44)
At ASt Warsaw, directing I & II activities on the Eastern Front, un-
der SCHMALSCHLÄGER (q.v.) (from Jul 41)
At Sofia. (Sep 43)
In Berlin. (Jun 43)
Back in Warsaw. (Aug 43)