
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. References</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Sources</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Report</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Introduction</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Front Aufklärung III in the East</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Agents</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Combating Soviet Agents</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Interrogation</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Double agents and W/T Play-backs</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Exploitation and Evaluation of Intelligence Material</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Conclusions</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Comments and Recommendations</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. REFERENCES

4. SOURCES

5. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

6. APPENDIX

7. FK III in the East

---

Source: The end of the war spelled catastrophe for all Germans. The German people, who had fought bravely for their homeland, was now faced with the harsh realities of defeat and the task of rebuilding their nation. The situation was further complicated by the arrival of American and Russian forces, who had suffered heavy losses in the war and now sought to claim Germany as their own. As a result, the German people were forced to make difficult decisions that would shape the course of the country's future.
16. (Continued)

(1) Status of Russia

a. Army

(2) Status of Intelligence

For that purpose, some were

a. Army

(3) Section

Supervision of

RUSSIA

(4) Status of Russian

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA

RUSSIA
(8) The sea could be used by the enemy, but his use was limited to the land only in special cases.

(9) The mines were laid in the sea, and the economy, social, and industrial life of the nation was being affected in many places.

Airfields were occasionally occupied, and the enemy sometimes suffered losses.

4. Combating Operations

(1) Combat Operational Criteria

(a) The operations were dominated by the enemy's actions, which determined the development of the strategic situation.

(b) The enemy's operations were dominated by the economic, social, and industrial life of the nation.

(c) The enemy's operations were dominated by the enemy's losses, which determined the economics of the nation.

(d) The enemy's operations were dominated by the enemy's losses, which determined the economics of the nation.
ultimately directed at the bands had the support of the Lithuanian Government in their efforts to gain freedom from German occupation.

4. German Intelligence

(a) The General Staff

Tanks and armored personnel carriers were used by the General Staff's intelligence units. These units were equipped with modern Central European wireless equipment and were under the command of Major General von der Tann. Sources indicated that the equipment was in a minimum of one tank per unit, and certainly not higher in some cases or cities.

(b) Occupation Troops

Occupation troops were allotted to the General Staff for the search for agents. But, the purpose was not to prevent operations by the German intelligence service. Instead, they were used for internal security and counterespionage operations. The occupation troops were equipped with modern wireless equipment and were under the command of Colonel von der Tann.

(c) SS Intelligence

The SS was responsible for intelligence operations against the persecuted Jewish population. They were equipped with modern wireless equipment and were under the command of Major General von der Tann.
Local committee work pass certificates were not working as frequently as expected under close controls.

The distraction of the guards in every OSS and Eastern front was a constant threat. The guards were dead or captured, diluted with a new element of Time and other critical considerations.

6. Interrogation

(1) Purpose

Interrogation is conducted in the following manner to obtain important information from captured agents. Obviously, the photographs of captured agents are not available. It is necessary to attempt a psychological attack to obtain a general aim of operations to understand the captured agent in order to obtain a general plan of operations.

(2) Methods

We are now revealed that they were greatly and extremely

order from the CASSIS for big and large preparation for the OSS.

They explained that Americans really fear the OSS force. Our

successive method would probably have led to various
divisions. Several severe psychological sentences were administered,

agents under interrogation. Agents admitted this and

questioned the importance of the OSS, especially the

Russian anti-communist operations. We still had a

upset captured agent to give information, but the general

of feigned kindness and peremptory, but desperate and insane.

One method of interrogation is the method of torture until torture would reveal the information. The popular method was the political prisoners, the anti-communist anti-communist, and Communist.

In the experimental factory, interrogation is split into groups. The prisoner-related and other investigation is conducted the same size, the application of torture is applied.

PAK III units the order to prepare interrogation. In our factory is difficult to prepare the next to talk. In a few days, certain the following the face of the factory. A forced change is to replace the guard who has been found guilty to replace it. (1) to guard CASSIS for big and large preparation for the OSS. There was a few people to do the same thing, the guard to replace the guard who has been found guilty. It has improved the check, but
(3) Briefs

Information was gathered from FAX III interrogations, training simulations, and the extent to which the mission had been "tactically"

Briefs for all tasks were issued regularly.

"Freda" scoop into the depth of their intelligence efforts. The IIIs (Ill) were usually encountered by the enemy. Data about the area, climate, civilian population, infrastructure, and enemy strength was also collected from FAX III interrogations. The enemy strength was also collected whenever available but was not greatly trusted by FAX III.

Special questionnaires were employed in the interrogations. Experts from the nearest unit were consulted in these interrogations.

It is evident that the position of III can play a significant role of the FAX III units. The activity involved is often classified and

Sources stated that some information is accurate, whereas conclusions could be drawn from the analysis of reports. The equipment is always provided by the enemy, but the enemy does not know.

(4) Reports

Originally, reports were long, complex, and detailed. FAX III units collected a vast amount of information. The report was prepared by a team of experts and contained all the data. The report was then given to the enemy for the enemy to analyze correctly. The data was always provided by the enemy, but the enemy does not know.

The enemy was involved in a group with the interrogators, co-workers, etc. A presentation of the results is given with measures taken and recommendations for future operations.
(d) Training

Intensive training was needed to fit a double agent for his individual commitment. If at all possible, he was never allowed to have conversations with other agents or his German dispatching organization. Despite giving him any hints regarding the German agency responsible for the mission, the instructor discussed all details with the agent, taking advantage of the agent's knowledge of local conditions in the area in which he was to operate. The cover story was rehearsed and committed to memory. As part of the training, once familiar, the dispatcher often assumed the role of a Russian commissioner to test the agent's steadfastness under interrogation and protect him against later surprises.

(e) Examples of Successful Operations

As a typical example of the use of 07 spies in operations against the Russians, sources cited a deception reported to by the Germans when they were forced to evacuate large numbers of troops encircled in the BULGAR area early in 1943. Fake orders were to make Soviet intelligence believe that the Germans were making reinforcements into BULGAR in preparation for offensive action. Since a narrow supply corridor existed, the orders sounded quite plausible. A number of agents were turned and sent to the Red Army with the story that they had observed considerable troop movements into the encircled area. In addition, agents were placed in the prisons where they spread the same story. Soon afterwards, the prisoners were given a chance to escape. Sources say that this deceptive maneuver succeeded, and that the Russians hesitated in pressing the area, which was evacuated with few losses.

As an example of the use of 07 spies in the rear areas, sources offered the following: In summer 1943 two Soviet agents were caught in Northern Estonia. Interrogation disclosed information that led to the liquidation of the whole group with which they were connected. At the same time it was learned that a second group was to be dropped from the same plane in an area about 200 km away. One of the captured agents was sent successfully to the German side, and after a short time was led to the edge of the other group's area. It was quickly understood that without adequate clothing and money, he sought surrender to this group as the last survivor of his own group, from which he said he escaped after the others had been annihilated in a fire fight. He gained the confidence of the group leader, and reported regularly on the group's activities until the Germans decided to liquidate it too.

(f) Pack 07 Spies

Eastern OK III personnel had much success with their 07/2 play-back methods. It was faster than 07 spies and a better means of enemy deception and of gaining knowledge of enemy operational intentions.

(g) Definition and Purpose

A pack 07 spy is the contacting of the enemy with the aid of turned enemy P/O agents and in accordance with their missions. Its purposes are to open a channel for enemy deception, to gain knowledge of enemy intention by obtaining new missions from the opponent, to gain non-
test with operating resident agencies, in general, to prevent, if so desired, the commitment of other agents in the same area, or to induce the opponent to commit further agent personnel and supplies where they would most easily be captured.

(b) Prerequisites and Procedure

The same personal qualifications of the incarcerated agent were required for a Park GY Spiel as for a GY Spiel. In addition, the following practical rules had to be strictly observed:

1. The Russians usually fixed a very brief time limit in which the agent, after having been dropped, was to transmit his first procedure call. To this end, the agent was informed that he had landed safely and was taking up contact on the basis of his code phrase. If the time limit for the first message was exceeded, the Russians invariably assumed that the agent was operating under restraint.

2. The same rule applied if the Germans intervened while regular contact between the agent and his base station was in progress. The proper timing between the last message and the first German-influenced message had to be observed.

3. The agent, while transmitting his first procedure call, had to be prevented from giving his programmed warning signal. This could consist of a period of a certain point in the message, a certain type of phrasing, or some way of tapping his message which would warn the base station that he was operating under restraint.

4. The agent's personalized manner and speed of transmission was always well-known to his base station. All messages, therefore, had to be tapped out by the agent himself.

5. If it was the agent's mission to take up contact from a forest area, he could not be placed in the vicinity of power or telephone lines which might disturb the connection.

6. A possible direction-finder check by the Russians on the agent was taken into account. The turned agent therefore had to be placed in the vicinity of his original target.

7. Coding and decoding had to be performed by Soviet personnel and all messages had to remain in their possession. The agent could participate in the phrasing of the message to ensure that it corresponded to his mission and his own type of wording.
The agent had to be under constant surveillance during VT contact by a German operator, who would immediately take over incoming messages for decoding.

Consequences of Faulty Security

Intelligence officers noted the following instances of proof of the absolute necessity of strict adherence to secure listening security procedures. VT III, then under the leadership of a British captain, conducted a VT IV Spitz in spring 1943 in the KHARN area. Security had been relaxed and the Russians had been induced to drop an agent to replace another agent who, unknown to the Russians, had been converted to the German side. The new man was immediately captured and allowed to meet the VT IV double agent. The latter, who had so far operated reliably, was now persuaded by the newly-captured man to participate in a plot to kill the Trupp leader and several other persons, capture secret documents, and return to the Red Army. It became the double agent's job to inform the Russian command station of the plan. Contrary to good procedure, he had access to the cipher and the codes of the Spitz. He substituted his own coded message for a tactical deception message the Germans had given him. The plot never materialized. It was accidentally discovered by BAELE (who was later killed), but the VT IV Spitz was also spilled.

Conducting the Spitz

No Special 1st authority was required for VT III units to start a VT IV Spitz. To obtain such authority would have delayed the all-important initial procedure calls. First messages had to be non-tactical, giving the impression that the agent had not or yet had an opportunity to reach his target. Meanwhile, the response of the home station was carefully observed. If it hesitated to send tactical messages, the Germans assumed that the Russians had recognized the deception attempt.

Starting with the first German tactical message, the VT IV Spitz was subject to 1st authority. All Spitz material was released by the Chief of Staff of the Service Group and contained a mixture of truth and deception in order to strengthen the home station's impression that its agent was working successfully. The element of truth was important because the Russians had ways of undoing their agents against each other. It also prevented the Russians from getting intelligence by reversing false information in the messages if they recognized the German code.

The only certain way of knowing that the Russians were not suspicious of the German-conducted traffic with the marked VT agent was to induce them to drop further personnel and supplies. A less certain measure of success were Russian messages containing congratulations and deprecations for the VT agent and his group. However, the Germans always had to be on the alert against surprises. For instance, in July 1944 PT III conducted a VT IV Spitz in the area of the Service Group. In the course of which the Russians were successfully induced to drop supplies. After some time, further supplies were requested by the double agent and provided by the Russians. The load was dropped according to plan, but when it was cleared it exploded, killing or injuring several Trupp members.
It was a mistake to bury the Russians into resupplying their enemy groups, dropping reinforcements, or revealing contact addresses of resident agents. The Russians often became suspicious on the basis of such requests and broke off contact. Special light signals were arranged for the dropping of agents and supplies. Then personal were involved; the Germans had to take strict precautions so that none of the group could escape capture and reveal the plot to the home station. Moreover, the Russians developed the habit of having other agents check an supply and personnel drops and even of assigning the same drops and missions independently to separate agent groups.

Sources claim that an average of ten to twelve Funk Spiel agents, extending over an average period of three to six months each, were captured monthly over the whole Eastern front. They do not credit great significance to this figure, however, since several of the agents were undoubtedly played by the Russians and not the Germans.

(e) Examples of Successful Operations

As examples of their success with H/F deception methods, sources offered the following:

FAT 326 conducted a Funk Spiel in autumn 1943 with the partisan Central Staff in the course of which the Russians dropped eight agent groups in addition to considerable amounts of supplies. Out of 25 agents dropped, all were captured. The Spiel lasted eight months.

In the spring of 1944 the FAT 326 radio liaison officer at German troops based on the border started two Funk Spiel with the Polish and Baltic Sea. It was the Red's intention to obtain information on German traffic in the Baltic Sea, and the Russians conducted two independent agent groups for the mission. Both were secured by the Germans, and the Funk Spiel was conducted in such a manner as to make the Germans believe that they were working independently and effectively. While this Spiel was in progress, the first abortive peace negotiations took place between Finland and the USSR. When they failed, the Russians started a surprise offensive on the Finnish front, making necessary the shipments of German reinforcements there. The German troops were shipped via Estonia, and this information on movements in that area became of increasing importance to the Russians. By means of the Spiel the Germans succeeded, according to sources, in deceiving Russian intelligence for a considerable period of time.

The most successful operation, however, was a Funk Spiel conducted by FAT 326. It began in the USSR in summer 1945 and lasted for more than a year. In the course of the Spiel the Russians were induced to drop approximately 50 two-man (or seven) agent teams, all of which the Germans captured without difficulty. Sources stated that the Spiel enabled Germans to recognize Russian operative intentions in the Polish, Czech and Upper Silesia areas for a whole year.
6. Exploitation and Evaluation of Intelligence Material

(1) Function at Leit Stelle Level.

That German Front Auskunftung III services did not confine their activities to the purely police activity of searching out enemy agents is the main basis for the claim made by sources to distinguish, from the SD, GESTAPO, whose whole energy was connected with arresting and evaluating, said that this actually was the main function of Front Auskunftung III, that closest coordination with the Jo's was therefore imperative, and that the whole SHAEF vs Front Auskunftung task had to be seen in this light.

L/Stelle III got accustomed Auswertung for the Eastern Front. It collected the reports from PAs and Psi's subordinate to it and disseminated its digests of the big picture to higher staffs, especially Frede Major Gen.

(2) Types of Material

L/Stelle III got performed Auswertung on the following types of material:

(a) Card Index of Agents

(See para 24(3)(a) this report).

(b) Enemy Intelligence OB Card Index and Map

The card index contained all known details about enemy intelligence units, sub-agencies, personnel, etc. and the OB bunker, training schools, personnel data on enemy, and OB personnel, excluding agents. The map showed the enemy situation, location and type of intelligence agencies, training schools, and agent's camps. These various points on the map were indicated by a number which referred to the card index.

(c) Special Reports and Hints

Reports of interest to special German agencies were published at the Leit Stelle. As examples, sources mentioned reports concerning the effect of German propaganda, the character of Soviet propaganda, political developments in occupied territories, church developments in the USSR, industrial data, and new assignments of sabotage groups, such as the portable printing press or the SSO set carried in a gas mask emulator. (For Hints, see para 25(3)(b) this report).

(d) Enemy Target Reports and Map

The compiled enemy target reports were submitted every ten days to the L/Jo of the Eastern Theater of War, Poland Steel Market (enemy target map) showing commitments of enemy agents, their dispatchers, targets and channels of communication accompanied the reports. To compile this material, the Leit Stelle received not only the reports from its own subordinate units but also from the rear area Jt's such as Ostland, Nieder, Nieder Ost, Niern (N-240), and Ciege, as well as the SHAEF-controlled C5 agencies.
16. (Continued)

(e) Main Effort Maps

The Schwere Punkt Karte (main effort map) showed on a monthly basis what the Point Ziel Karten demonstrated every ten days. Tactical symbols on these maps illustrated graphically the areas of committed agents during the month, their routes of commitment, targets, and types of missions. The Germans knew from experience that the Russians invariably increased their commitments of agents in areas selected for future operations. In using the Schwere Punkt Karte the In had to take into account that not all agents were caught and that deception by the enemy was possible. However, according to sources, enemy intentions as recognized from these maps were usually proven accurate.

(f) IN Daily Reports

Daily reports on important events were submitted by the IN, implemented by bi-weekly conferences in which enemy intentions and possible deception were given primary attention.

(g) Partisan Situation and Map

The close connection between partisan movements and intelligence gathering made it necessary for the FAX III services to perform duties such as partisan OC and armament—which were normally considered "espionage" work in the German setup. GÖTZER stated that intelligence on partisan developments was of great importance but was consistently ignored by the high strategists. Reports on the partisan situation, illustrated by maps showing partisan-dominated and endangered territory, remained academic as the German leadership never committed adequate security forces to control the partisans effectively.

(h) Training Material

Systematic intelligence training was not conducted for FAX III personnel in the East until 1945. The L/Stell then began to supply training material on the army intelligence services which was used as the basis for courses held periodically by the L/Stell for old and new personnel. A counter-espionage school dealing with all army intelligence services was in the planning stage in February 1945 and was to be operated by Chief Prov. Ausland/RM. Courses prepared for presentation by the L/Stell primarily covered interrogation technique, report writing, OP and FAX bookkeeping, and original reports of incidents and interrogations concerning the Soviet Intelligence Service, its working methods, agents net and controllers. The course, taught by specialists in the fields mentioned, lasted an average of three weeks.

(1) Enemy Documents

All captured documents were routed through the enemy documents section at L/Stell, 121 Ort, which in turn distributed the material to the interested agencies. Only material concerning the Soviet Intelligence Service was retained. This section practically closed down in 1944 for lack of material with which to work.
(J) Statistics and Monthly Reports

Monthly statistics indicated the degree of Soviet intelligence service activity and gave concise information on enemy intelligence targets, types of missions (espionage, sabotage, assassination, deception, mined missions), and the dispatching agencies. Agents were classified by sex, age, occupation, party membership, and manner of recruitment. The statistics aimed at showing proportional successes of the Soviet intelligence service and the British GHQ services. Routes of communication (line-crossing, parachutes, submarines) were distinguished and individual PAs and FAs were represented by success curves on captured and recognized agents.

The monthly reports implemented the statistics and added a tactical evaluation of the intelligence situation on both sides to complete the larger picture. The IA, however, was cautioned not to value these comprehensive reports too highly as the statistics were subject to errors and incompleteness and the reports dealt with the past month's activities only.

4. CONCLUSIONS
None.

5. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
None.

WILDER/AA

For the Commanding Officer

[Signature]

Chief, CI Section

31 May 46
Distribution "G" plus CI for Room and AO of S, G-2
John CI, US Forces, European Theater

- 17 -