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Courier

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---TO GERMANY ONLY---

COS, Karlsruhe

4 May 1949

Munich Operations Base

Organizational and Individual Security Problem

[COS Staff]

1. The maintaining of organizational and individual security vis-à-vis our connection with GHQ promises some difficulty. The immediate aims of our security programs are:

   a. To conceal the identity of the US Agency operating GHQ.

   b. To conceal the connection with the GHQ staff in Munich, Karlsruhe, and elsewhere.

   c. Maintenance of the personal security of career intelligence staff personnel assigned to GHQ.

2. Unfortunately, the identity of our organization was the byword in all discussions among the high level US Army and German personnel at the time our investigation began in November 1948. Subsequent indoctrination of both the US and German staffs has shown material results. At our request, both Schneider and Philip have recently assembled their staffs and given additional lectures on this general subject.

3. For security reasons alone, our entrance into GHQ will, except in the top staffs on both US and German sides, be done as inconspicuously as is possible. Only the top German staff will be advised of the change in control. Both German and US Staffs have been instructed to carry on an active campaign to ensure that the change is not passed down to a subordinate level where possibility of compromise is greatest.

4. [COS Staff], whose real identity and basic affiliations are unquestionably known among some of the top German and US staff personnel. [COS Staff]

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assistance in developing a secure communications system will be appreciated. (C.0.) occupies a quarter of a page in the new Munich Telephone Book. All calls go through Munich Military 2921, the compound switchboard. The security of this line is questionable. Within the compound telephone conversations are considered secure; the basis for this assumption is unknown. Constant telephone traffic between Pfullach and Karlsruhe, comparable to that carried on between most operational bases and Karlsruhe, would immediately reveal the connection with the (C.0.) German switchboard operators as well as to any agency tapping the 2321 line. We will request Philip to establish a direct telephone line in one of our restricted offices (off limits to all but our own staff personnel). This phone will be registered under our cover designation and utilized for all outside calls in which our security aims are involved. The feasibility of this solution will be examined more in detail in the future.
8. Any transportation assigned to the Staff must be license plates not previously utilized at an operational base. In this respect, social and business contacts with NGOs must be carefully considered and consistent with the security situation.

9. In general, too frequent appearances at clubs and other public social events with the present US Staff members will be avoided; particularly with those that do local representation work. Munich Military Post, Military Government, as a member of [secret].

10. Our staff will be situated in a substantial one-story, stone building, just inside the only gate through which one can enter the compound. The compound is surrounded by a high wire fence and a careful checking system is employed at the main gate. The German staff member who acts as commandant of the post is responsible for the security of the entire installation and frequently conducts security tests to test the general security of the compound. Our building is being provided with substantial iron bars on its windows. The offices in which our files and funds will be kept will be provided with separate locks on the doors. We will be requesting combination padlocks for this purpose. The entrance to the building will be locked at night by the US military guard who will be on duty in the building and at our telephone exchange from the time we leave in the evening until the offices are opened in the morning. The combinations (or keys) for our offices and files will be known only to our own personnel. Our offices will be arranged to ensure that the code room, the file room and the office of our own staff secretary will be off limits to all but our own staff personnel. Correspondence internal to [secret] and open to both German and US Military Staff personnel will be kept in separate steel filing cabinets located in the less restricted offices of our staff and will be maintained by a German secretary provided by the organization.

11. During one of my recent discussions with Philip on the subject of security, he reported that the impending turnover of [secret] to our organization is a much-discussed matter up at Heidelberg. If this is true, the Deputy Director might be willing to take this up at a staff conference in the near future. It will be impossible to conceal the takeover from them since many of them are now concerned with staff supervision of [secret]. The only other alternative thus appears to lie in recruiting the Deputy Director's assistance.

Distribution:
2 - COS (action and info)
2 - FDM (Info)
1 - Munich [G.0.]

Inclosure - 1: "Individual Cover for Staff Members Assigned to [G.0.]

[Signature]
1. Since the designation of present military cover for [redacted] is probably well compromised within the Munich Post, it appears undesirable from a long range security point of view that our staff members be assigned to that organization. Since connection with [redacted] in Munich is also to be avoided, a cover unit designation for the assignment of all of our staff personnel assigned to [redacted] is being obtained. This cover will be utilized for the following general purposes:

a. Official designation on orders.
b. Mail address.
c. Personal documents.
d. Registration with all local agencies.
e. Cover story for casual contacts outside of business.

2. Our restricted telephone (direct line out of compound) will be listed under this cover designation and our secretary will be briefed to answer all incoming calls accordingly. All calls, local or long distance, to [redacted] units in Germany will be made over this phone and booked under this cover designation.

3. Since it is contemplated that most married staff personnel will be assigned quarters in the Pullach area, social contacts with US and German families living in or near the compound and connected with [redacted] can be expected. Within [redacted] circles this offers only the usual personal security problems. References to previous intelligence experience in the Theater and during wartime should be vague, especially with respect to recent assignment in the Theater. Previous connection with [redacted] cannot be disclosed.
6. Since the entire structure of the German organization is designed to provide a "sanitary security belt" between the Pullach Organization and field units. 

7. 

8. Appearances in company of well known US Military Staff members of [redacted] will be kept to a minimum.

9. At German-American social functions within the organization, 

10. The complete cover story of each individual staff member assigned to [redacted] will be reduced to writing and kept in a separate individual security file. It will be necessary that other members of the staff be conversant with the details of the cover stories of all other staff members.

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