FROM: NEW YORK
TO: Secretary of State
NO: 1414, JUNE 20, 7 PM

PRIORITY

SENT DEPARTMENT 1414, REPEATED INFORMATION, ROME PRIORITY 7,
LONDON PRIORITY 55, PARIS PRIORITY 802, BONN PRIORITY 17,
TEL AVIV PRIORITY 47, BERN PRIORITY 47, BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 26

RE: EICHMANN CASE

RMR

1. I MET WITH DIXON (UK) AND BERARD (FRANCE) THIS MORNING AT
11:00 FOR REVIEW OF EICHMANN CASE. DIXON (UK) OPENED MEETING BY
READING REPORT FROM UK EMBASSY, TEL AVIV. REPORT QUOTED ISRAELIS
AS SAYING FRONDIZI HAD ACCEPTED IDEA OF MEETING WITH BIRNBAUM
AND POSTPONING SC SESSION BUT THAT ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETING AND
REQUEST FOR SC POSTPONEMENT SHOULD BE MADE BY THIRD PARTIES.
I SAID WE HAD INFORMATION THAT ISRAELIS HAD ASKED FOR MEETING
WITH FRONDIZI BUT THAT WE HAD NOTHING YET ABOUT ARGENTINE
ACCEPTANCE. BERARD SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT ONLY POINT ACHIEVED
THIRD PARTY ACTION WAS NECESSARY WAS IN SUGGESTING SC POSTPONEMENT;
HE THOUGHT WE WOULD HEAR ANNOUNCEMENT FROM EUROPE AT COURSE OF DAY
THAT ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN COMPLETED FOR BIRNBAUM-
FRONDIZI MEETING.

2. WE THEN CONSIDERED WHO BEST THIRD PARTY WOULD BE TO SUGGEST
SC POSTPONEMENT AND AGREED IT WOULD BE ITALY. IF ITALY DID NOT
WANT TO DO IT CHINA, AS SC PRES, MIGHT TAKE LEAD.

3. DIXON THEN SUGGESTED WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER WHAT ACTION
MIGHT BE TAKEN IN SC IF SESSION NEVERTHELESS HELD. HE HAD
PREFERABLE THAT RES NOT BE INTRODUCED BY ARGENTINA. HE SAID
HE HAD REASON TO BELIEVE RES WOULD PASS UNLESS DECLASSIFIED.

RECEIVED IN THIS CASKET
RESPONSE TO 542, 1:55
REPLY OFFICE 3:40
DISPOSITION:

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NMD 36822
NARA Date 2/1996
HE HAD TALKED TO AMADEO ABOUT SC SESSION INTERMITTENTLY AT DINNER PARTY GIVEN BY AMADEO FRIDAY EVENING. AMADEO TOLD HIM ARGENTINA WOULD REGARD PROBLEM IN SC AS "DISPUTE," NOT "SITUATION," AND WOULD THEREFORE ELIMINATE ITSELF FROM VOTING. DIXON REPORTED HE HAD ALSO URGED AMADEO TO WORK OUT FINAL TEXT OF RES IN PRIVATE AND HAD SUGGESTED HE NOT SUBMIT IT DURING HIS SPEECH ON WEDNESDAY. DIXON THOUGHT AMADEO WAS TAKEN WITH THIS IDEA. HE ALSO THOUGHT AMADEO'S REACTIONS OPENED POSSIBILITY OF PERSUADING ARGENTINA TO ALLOW SOMEONE LIKE ITALY, OR ITALY AND ECUADOR JOINTLY, TO SUBMIT RES. THIS WOULD MAKE PRESENT TEXT MORE FLEXIBLE AND ALLOW IT TO BE IMPROVED MORE EASILY, AND ALSO MAKE FINAL RESULT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO ISRAEL.

4. DIXON THEN SAID HE AND BEELEY (UK) HAD PUT THEIR HEADS TOGETHER OVER WEEK END AND COME UP WITH REVISION OF ARGENTINE DRAFT (SEE USUN 1415). THIS REVISION HAD NO APPROVAL FROM FONOFF AND WAS NOTHING MORE THAN BOUT-DÉ-PAPIER. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING ALONG THESE LINES MIGHT BE LAUNCHED THROUGH THIRD POWER WITHOUT ANY IDENTIFICATION AS TO ORIGINAL SOURCE.

5. BERARD ARGUED THAT PRESENT TEXT OF ARGENTINE RES WAS QUITE UNSATISFACTORY. REFERENCE TO VIOLATION OF ARGENTINE SOVEREIGNTY WAS NOT ACCURATE AND DID NOT EVEN CONFORM TO TEXT OF ARGENTINE NOTE; AT MOST IT SHOULD REFER TO ARGENTINE LAW OR "SOVEREIGN RIGHTS." CALL FOR REPARATION IN OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH WAS AMBIGUOUS AND THEREFORE RAISED ALL KINDS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR FURTHER DIFFICULTIES. HE SUGGESTED ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY APOLOGIZE IN SC, IN WHICH CASE OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH OF RES SHOULD TAKE NOTE THAT ISRAEL HAD ALREADY APOLOGIZED, AND THAT MATTER SHOULD END ON THIS NOTE.

6. I SAID I AGREED IT WAS NOT DESIRABLE FOR ARGENTINA TO SUBMIT RES AT OPENING MEETING AND IF IT COULD BE DISCREETLY ARRANGED FOR RES TO BE SUBMITTED BY THIRD PARTY THIS WOULD BE BEST COURSE FOR ALL CONCERNED. US WAS PREPARED TO SUPPORT ARGENTINE RES WITH ADDITIONAL REFERENCE TO BACKGROUND OF EICHMANN CASE AND ADDITIONAL OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH CALLING FOR PARTIES TO RESUME NORMAL RELATIONS. OTHERWISE WE COULD ACCEPT ARGENTINE DRAFT AS IT STOOD.

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7. Dixon said his overriding instructions were to assure us, UK and French voted together, subject to this, it was important we not let Argentina feel let down, even if we agreed they should not have brought case to SC. He therefore thought Berard's suggestions went too far in direction of Israeli position. He said he did not have concrete instructions as to how to vote on Argentine draft. (Implication nevertheless was that UK wished to be in position to vote for Argentine res., perhaps with some what more changes than we consider necessary.) Berard, on other hand, clearly showed close affinity to Israeli position throughout.

BARCO