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3. INASMUCH AS REPORTS ON SITUATION CONTINUED TO BE CONFLICTING WE ALSO CONSIDERED WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT RES IF WE WERE FACED WITH IT. I SAID WE WERE INSTRUCTED, TO VOTE FOR ARGENTINE RES AS IT STOOD, BUT TO ASK FOR CHANGES CONTAINED DEPARTMENT 1580 AND THAT WE WOULD ALSO BE GLAD TO SEE FURTHER CHANGES ALONG LINES UK AND FRENCH WANTED IF AMADEO WOULD ACCEPT THEM.

4. DIXON SAID UK'S POSITION WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE RES TOLERABLE TO BOTH PARTIES AND ON WHICH US, UK AND FRENCH COULD ALL VOTE SAME WAY. THEY, THEREFORE, THOUGHT RES INTRODUCED BY THIRD PARTY WOULD BE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE THIS. UK WOULD LIKE ADDITION OF PARAS COVERING SOME TWO POINTS AS US INSTRUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, HE SAID, LAST PARA OF ARGENTINE DRAFT CAUSED UK GREAT DIFFICULTY ESPECIALLY IN ITS REFERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHARTER AND HE DID NOT KNOW HOW UK WOULD VOTE ON IT.

5. BERARD SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE THAT FRANCE HOPED TO AVOID SITUATION WHERE IT WOULD HAVE TO END UP ON SIDE OF EITHER PARTY. PREFERENCE WAS THERE TO NO SC AND PARTIES RESOLVE ISSUE DIRECTLY. RE-TEXTS, HE AGREED WITH UK. IF LAST PARA OF ARGENTINE RES ADOPTED AS IT WAS, THIS WOULD PRESENT NEW PROBLEMS OF MORE DANGEROUS AND DIFFICULT NATURE BECAUSE IT WOULD MEAN CALL FOR RETURN TO STATUS QUO ANTE TO ARGENTINES WHO MIGHT ULTIMATELY BRING ISSUE BACK TO SC. FRANCE WOULD HAVE GREATEST HESITATION IN VOTING FOR IT AND WOULD WANT TO SEE AMENDMENTS MADE TO THIS PARA. (IN SUBSEQUENT MEETING BERARD READ OUT DRAFT FRENCH TEXT OF RESTORATIVE PARTS OF WHICH TOOK NOTE OF REGRETS EXPRESSED BY ISRAEL IN SC AND CONSIDERED THAT THROUGH THESE REGRETS ISRAEL HAD OFFERED MORAL REPARATION TO ARGENTINA.) HE STRONGLY URGED ORTONA PUSH THESE AMENDMENTS BUT SAID HE HAD NO AUTHORITY PUT THEM FORWARD HIMSELF.

6. I SAID I WOULD BE GLAD TO HOLD UP OUR COMMENTS ON RES TO ARGENTINES AS I HAD ALREADY DONE FOR TWO DAYS UNTIL THERE HAD BEEN OPPORTUNITY FOR ORTONA OR SOMEONE ELSE TO URGEBE FURTHER CHANGES IN RES. I WOULD HOWEVER HAVE TO TALK TO AMADEO BEFORE THE END OF THE DAY, AND AT THAT TIME I WOULD TELL HIM I'D LIKE

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LIKE TO SEE HIM ACCEPT SUCH FURTHER CHANGES AS MIGHT BE PROPOSED BY UK, FRANCE AND ITALY. BUT, OF COURSE, I COULD NOT PRESS HIM TO TAKE THEM. IT THOUGHT WOULD QUESTION OR TONIA (ITALY).

(ORTONA SAID HE HAD NO RESPONSE FROM ROMA ABOUT APPROACH TO FRONZIONE. WE HAD ASKED ITALIAN TO MAKE US (USN 1470). AFTER TELLING ORTONA ABOUT ISRAELI REPORT ABOUT AGREED BEN-GURION-FRONT UNI MEETING, BERARD ASKED HIM WHETHER ITALY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASK FOR ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION. ORTONA SAID HE WOULD NEED AGREEMENT OF ARGENTINA TO DO THIS AND THAT, WHILE HE WAS IN POSITION TO ASK FOR ADJOURNMENT, SOMETIMES, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL AMODEO ABOUT ISRAELI PROPOSAL. BEN-GURION-FRONT UNI MEETING. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM DIXON, ORTONA ALSO SAID HE AGREED IT WAS PREPARED THAT A RESOLUTION BE INTRODUCED BY A THIRD PARTY, AND THAT HE WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT TO RESISTANCE MODIFIED THIS WITH ANMODEO BUT COULD NOT BE SPONSOR WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS. ORTONA SAID HE HAD CALLED AMODEO REGARDING SPONSORSHIP BUT WAS NOT PERSONALLY FAVORABLE TO IT. COLONI THEN SUGGESTED THAT A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

BASICS UNADAMO THEN OUTLINED RESPECTIVE POSITIONS ON RES AS OUTLINED ABOVE. ORTONA SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO STAY CLOSE TO ARGENTINA. HE KNEW FRENCH PROPOSALS WOULD BE UNPREDICTABLE TO AMODEO. BUT HE HOPED AMODEO WAS WILING TO SEE THIRD-PARTY RESOLVED. COULD ACCEPT SOME MODIFICATION TO HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF LEFT-MAN CASE. IF PROPERLY MODIFIED, HE COULD ACCEPT ADDITION OF "REPARATION" AND IF IT WERE TO BE QUALIFIED IN ANY WAY, HE WANTED IT QUALIFIED IN DIRECTION OF "CALLING FOR RETURN OF EL MAN" NOT "WILL NOT BE SATISFACTORY TO SAY "ISRAELI APOLOGY WAS SUFFICIENT"

ORTONA THEN CIRCULATED COPIES OF ISRAELI'S RESPONSE (DECR 1530), DIXON SAID THESE WERE NOT COMpletely IN LINE WITH UK AND FRENCH POSITIONS, BUT THEY AGAIN AGREED TO HOLD THEM UP UNTIL ORTONA HAD
HAD OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH AMADEO ABOUT FURTHER CHANGES.
ORTONA THEN SAID HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TALK AMADEO INTO RES. IN WHICH OPERATIVE PARAS: (A) RECOGNIZED ARGENTINA.
ENTITLED TO ADEQUATE REPARATION; (B) TOOK CONSCIENCE OF ISRAELI POSITION IN SC, AND (C) CALLED FOR MAINTENANCE OF NORMAL RELATIONS.
I HAD TO LEAVE AT THAT POINT FOR ANOTHER APPOINTMENT AND UK, FRANCE, AND ITALY THEN PREPARED DRAFT RES. (OSUN422), WHICH
ORTONA SUBSEQUENTLY PUT TO AMADEO.

10. ORTONA HAD LUNCHE WITH AMADEO AND TALKED TO ME IMMEDIATELY AFTER LUNCH. HE ASKED AMADEO ABOUT BEN-GURION STATEMENT, WHICH
SYRIA WAS INTERESTING, THAT BEN-GURION SEIZED ON. ORTONA HAD BEEN
ARRANGED AND GAVE HIM DETAILS FROM FRENCH. AMADEO REPEATED
INFORMATION HE HAD GIVEN ORTONA EARLIER AND WHICH ORTONA DEDICATED
HAD GIVEN. HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO GO AHEAD WITH SC
SESSION. HE SAID HE HAD NO OFFICIAL WORD ABOUT BEN-GURION.

11. ORTONA ALSO SAID HE HAD NOT RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ROME
RESPONSIBLE FOR ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE. ROMA REPENTED THAT
FRONZIZI HAD ALREADY GONE TO ITALY AND ROMA DID NOT THINK THERE
WAS ANYTHING FURTHER ITALY COULD DO. APPARENTLY ORTONA ALSO
INSTRUCTED TO STAY CLOSE TO ARGENTINE POSITION IN THE

12. I THEN RECEIVED CALL FROM COMAY (ISRAELI), WHO ALSO HAD
TALKED EARLIER TO COMMISSION OFFICER. COMAY ASKED WHETHER US
WOULD SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT MOTION. IF MADE IN SC, HE SAID WE
WOULD SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT MOTION. IF MADE IN COUNCIL, EMBASSY
ARGENTINA WAS ASKING US TO SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT.

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13. COMAY THEN ASKED IF ARGENTINA WENT AHEAD AND SUBMITTED DRAFT RES WHAT US WOULD DO. I SAID WE HAD INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT IT. WE THOUGHT THERE SHOULD BE AMENDMENTS WHICH TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION SOME OF ISRAELI POINTS AND WE INTENDED TO URGED THEM. BUT THAT UNDER OUR INSTRUCTIONS WE WOULD VOTE FOR ARGENTINE TEXT IN PRESENT FORM IF SO SUBMITTED. COMAY SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE OPPOSED TO ANY FORMULA INCORPORATING CONCEPT OF REPARATIONS.

14. COMAY THEN STATED THAT WHAT HAPPENS TOMORROW MORNING WOULD HAVE GREAT INFLUENCE ON SC AND ON BEN-GURION, AND THAT GRAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WERE INVOLVED. HE STRESSED THAT ANY STATEMENTS AMADEO MADE IN SC WOULD INFLUENCE ISRAELI ATTITUDE IN SC AND ALSO MEETING IN BRUSSELS. HE MADE SAME POINT ABOUT RES. I TOLD HIM WE WOULD SUGGEST TO AMADEO THAT RES NOT BE TABLED TOMORROW AND ALREADY HAD IMPRESSION AMADEO WOULD AGREE TO THIS." FROM OUR EARLIER CONVERSATIONS (EARLIER COMAY TOLD MISSION OFFICER THAT "IF RES WAS PUT IN OFFICIALLY IT WOULD PREJUDICE PROSPECTS FOR BEN-GURION - FRONDIZI MEETING SINCE IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR BEN-GURION TO NEGOTIATE WITH RES MADE PUBLIC IF DEBATE BEGAN OR RES TABLED IT WOULD AFFECT AND PROBABLY PRECLUDE SUCH MEETING. IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT SOMEONE TAKE INITIATIVE TO AVOID SC." HE DID NOT THINK ITALY WAS RIGHT PARTY TO TAKE LEAD IN VIEW OF ITS PAST ASSOCIATIONS.)

15. I THEN SAW AMADEO. I TOLD HIM WE HAD HEARD BEN-GURION-FRONDIZI MEETING HAD BEEN ARRANGED. AS HE KNEW WE THOUGHT IF THIS WERE CASE SC SHOULD BE POSTPONED. AMADEO SAID HE HAD NO OFFICIAL WORD OF SUCH MEETING AND REPEATED THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTIONS FROM FDR IN EARLY THIS MORNING TO CONTINUE WITH SC SESSION. AMADEO SAID IF MOTION WERE MADE FOR POSTPONEMENT HE WOULD OPPOSE IT. HE ARGUED THAT SC MEETING WOULD ENHANCE PROSPECTS FOR ANY BEN-GURION-FRONDIZI MEETING. HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE SC MOVE RIGHT AHEAD AND FINISH ITS WORK ON RES BY THURS NOON. HE ALSO SAID HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND NOW PLANNED TO INTRODUCE RES IN HIS SPEECH WED MORNING AS THIS WOULD LEND FOCUS TO DEBATE.
16. It reiterated that we thought SC meeting should be postponed.

17. Concerning text of res., I told him we were aware of draft.

18. Amadeo also said he expected ten votes in SC, with only France abstaining. Ceylonese had criticized his res. because it was not strong enough.

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19. IN LEAVING WE CAUTIONED HIM THERE WOULD BE CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT FOR POSTPONEMENT OF SESSION IN LIGHT APPARENT AGREEMENT ON BEN-GURION-FRONDIZI MEETING AND ASKED HIM TO INFORM US WHEN HE HAD ANY FIRM INFORMATION ON IT.

20. FINAL EVENT OF AFTERNOON WAS CALL FROM ORTONA. HE SAID HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS FROM ROME BASED ON APPROACH BY US AMB; HE WAS AUTHORIZED TO TELL AMADEO ITALY WOULD ASK FOR POSTPONEMENT ON BASIS US AMB'S STATEMENT THAT AMADEO HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SUPPORT POSTPONEMENT IF MADE BY THIRD PARTY. AMB ORTONA SAID HE DID NOT SEE HOW HE COULD SAY THIS TO AMADEO. INASMUCH AS LATTER HAD TOLD BOTH HIMSELF AND US THAT HE WOULD OPPOSE POSTPONEMENT, AFTER CONSULTING DEPT, WE TOLD HIM WE AGREED. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH BEELEY (UK) HE TOLD US HE SAW NO FURTHER OPPORTUNITY TO POSTPONE SC UNTIL AFTER PARTIES HAD SPOKEN AS LONG AS ARGENTINA CONTINUED TO OPPOSE IT. AS THERE SIMPLY WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH VOTES THIS WAS SAME OPINION WE HAD ALREADY COME TO OURSELVES.

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