MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

SUBJECT: The Eichmann Case 1/

1. The Eichmann trial is scheduled to begin in Israel on 11 April, with every assurance that it will receive the extensive publicity in most of the world press and in radio and television coverage. The legal and moral aspects of the case do not concern us here. What is of intelligence interest, however, are the political and propaganda implications of the trial. There will be considerable latitude for various interested states to exploit the proceedings for their own purposes. 2/

EXEMPTIONS Section 3(b)
(2)(A) Privacy
(2)(B) Methods/Sources
(2)(G) Foreign Relations

1/ This memorandum has been discussed with DD/P.
2/ Annex reproduces part of a report concerning the Eichmann case.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
2000

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By NARA Date 2-7-05
The Arabs

4. The Arabs have so far devoted little attention to the matter -- beyond questioning Israel's right to kidnap Eichmann from Argentina. Such WAR propaganda as has been devoted to the substance of the case has taken the form of allegations that Eichmann's testimony implicates certain Israeli or Zionist leaders in deals with the Nazi leadership during World War II. There is enough substance to these charges to make a certain amount of useful anti-Zionist propaganda, but this is about all the political advantage the Arabs can hope to get out of the matter.

The Bloc:

5. The tactical approach of the Bloc to the Eichmann case is already shaping up: a concerted effort will be made to turn the case against the Federal German Republic by way of charging
that former Nazis are in key positions there; and determine the Bloc propoganda will concentrate its attack on one man, Bonn, "revanchist" character of Bonn's policies. To this end, Globke, high-ranking civil servant and right-hand man to the German Chancellor. This propaganda will attempt to present Globke as the principal architect of the Nuremberg racial laws and of the persecution which flowed from them; as Eichmann's immediate supervisor in the task of achieving a "final solution" of the Jewish "problem"; and as a fanatic who prevented any mercy being shown the Jewish population of Salonika.

6. Simultaneously the West German Government will be accused of doing its best to shield Globke and, by implication, to uphold and continue the policies of rearmament and revanchism which Globke represents. The attack on Globke will carry with it the implication that in the person of Eichmann the Bonn Government is itself on trial.

7. At the present juncture, however, it is not altogether clear whether the campaign against West Germany is to remain primarily in the realm of rumor, innuendo, and anonymous pamphlet, or whether it is to be given a complete orchestration of all the propaganda instruments of the Bloc regimes. On the one hand, Bloc leaders hope to score West Germany as the inheritor of Nazi policies
and thus to disqualify the Bonn Government morally in the competition between the two German regimes. The Bonn leadership also hopes that the Globe affair would become a source of contention in the upcoming West German election, spreading confusion and bitterness.

Nevertheless there are reasons why Bloc leaders may wish to limit exploitation of the Eichmann case. For example, to the extent that the Soviets increase the publicity given to the trial, they will contribute to sympathy for Israel and thus possibly embarrass themselves in dealing with the Arabs, and enhance the status of Israel among Soviet Jews. Moreover, Eichmann's testimony may implicate one or more of the key Nazi refugees — e.g., Drisenhagen or Eisela — who have found asylum or employment in the UAR. It is also possible that evidence given in the trial may suggest that the Soviets are giving aid and direction to surviving hard-core Nazi groups devoted to the overthrow of the West German Government. Finally, the testimony might implicate certain ex-Nazis in East Germany or Poland, though we do not believe that any such are in high enough position to embarrass the regimes.

9. Thus, it appears to us that Bloc authorities will tend to play the case by ear, selectively, and differently for different

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audiences. The chances are at least even that, in the broad camp,
ployed campaigns will stop short of all-out exploitation of the

West Germany

10. The West Germans have followed the Klima trial develop-
ments and the impendng trial with great interest, especially
bordering on sympathy. The attitude of the intelligent West
ern world is that Klima's revelations might imply a
West Germans now prominent in business, cultural, political, and
above all, governmental life. They are certain that the publicity
resulting from the trials will give new impetus to that they regard
as an already existing anti-German trend both popular and official
in the Western world, particularly in the US and UK. The
seller status of the Shirer book on the Third Reich, the ill-
feeling generated by the recent financial negotiations between
the US and the Federal Republic, and other miscellaneous factors
in the wind, are interpreted by West German political leaders as
the press as confirmation of these fears.

FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

[Signature]
Chairman

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