DEPARTMENT OF STATE INSTRUCTION

592
SECRET

USRE Lansing, Paris, USPO Paris, Rome, Rome FOR: Liaison Officer
USRO FOR: Thurston

Reference: NIE 100-2-58

Within the framework of normal reporting requirements in the
field of nuclear energy, the Department wishes to receive as much
information as possible concerning the timing and extent of (a)
French efforts to develop an independent nuclear capability and
(b) cooperation among various possible combinations of Western
European nations—FIG, the Six, WMA—on the same end.

Appraisal of the material contained in NIE 100-2-58 (copies of
which were sent to addressses under cover of Department's
CA-951, July 29, 1958) indicated a deficiency of intelligence
information on the above questions, and in view of the importance
of potential fourth power nuclear capabilities for current US
military and political assessments, the Embassy is urged to be
particularly alert in the reporting of such material.

Reporting responsibility in this field is, of course, shared
with other Government agencies, and the Department is keenly aware
of the limitations on the ability of posts abroad to develop
detailed information on military applications of nuclear energy in
the countries to which they are accredited. Although the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, does not permit us to exchange
information concerning atomic weapons design or manufacture with
France or other potential "fourth" countries, the Embassy may
nevertheless be able to take advantage of opportunities which may
arise to acquire useful information in this field from foreign
governmental sources without embarrassment or obligation to the
United States. For example, while it does not appear advisable
to approach the French directly with regard to their nuclear plans,
there is a possibility that Germany or Italy, particularly the UK,
because of their bilateral or multilateral relations with France,

SECRET
in the field of nuclear energy, might have pertinent information on this score. While we do not believe direct inquiries to officials of WEU countries advisable, it is still possible that information may be obtainable by indirection. WEU countries might likewise provide sources of information regarding cooperation among various Western European nations on nuclear weapons development.

In the meantime, it would be appreciated if the addressees would appraise the information and conclusions in NIE 100-2-58 regarding French plans and capabilities in nuclear weapons development and the outlook for cooperative programs among the WEU countries and would let us have their comments on the basis of what information may be currently available.

DULLES