DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

DEFENSE POLICY

Statement made on Saturday 5 May by Secretary McNamara at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Athens

Previous reference: C-R(61)69

When I had the honor of addressing you in December I put forward my government's views on the directions that NATO defense policy should take.

At the time, I gave you our estimates of Soviet nuclear strike capabilities and compared them with the current nuclear strength of the Alliance. The results of that comparison were, on balance, encouraging, and nothing has occurred during the past five months to shake our confidence in the design and adequacy of our programs. In the aggregate, Alliance nuclear forces are numerically larger than those of the Soviet Union. They are more diversified, better deployed and protected, and on a higher state of alert. They are combat-ready and able to engage in flexible and decisive action.

You will recall that I also expressed confidence in the ability of the Alliance to maintain its superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc in a general nuclear war even though we must face the prospect of great and growing damage in the event that deterrence should fail. I then indicated my government's reasons for believing that the Alliance should bring its non-nuclear forces to a better balance with its nuclear forces. Today, I would like to discuss in greater depth our views on the problems of general nuclear war and its deterrence, the role and level of non-nuclear forces, and the linkage between these two types of forces in relation to deterrence. At the end of my remarks I will relate these considerations to several of the defense issues which have recently occupied the attention of the Alliance.

1. The need for the exchange of information to help provide a more adequate basis for closer consultation, participation and consensus on important issues, including in particular nuclear issues.

2. The formulation of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons.

3. The role of external nuclear forces in the defense of the Alliance.

4. The level of non-nuclear force appropriate for the Alliance.
I. General Nuclear War and Its Deterrence

Nuclear technology has revolutionized warfare over the past seventeen years. The unprecedented destructiveness of these arms has radically changed ways of thinking about conflict among nations. It has properly focused great attention and efforts by the Alliance on the prevention of conflict. Nevertheless, the US has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible basic military strategy in general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, our principal military objectives, in the event of a nuclear war stemming from a major attack on the Alliance, should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces while attempting to preserve the fabric as well as the integrity of allied society. Specifically, our studies indicate that a strategy which targets nuclear forces only against cities or a mixture of civil and military targets has serious limitations for the purpose of deterrence and for the conduct of general nuclear war.

In our best judgment, destroying enemy forces while preserving our own societies is—within the limits inherent in the great power of nuclear weapons—a not wholly unattainable military objective. Even if very substantial exchanges of nuclear weapons were to occur, the damage suffered by the belligerents would vary over wide ranges, depending upon the targets that are hit. If both sides were to confine their attacks to important military targets, damage, while high, would nevertheless be significantly lower than if urban-industrial areas were also attacked. As an example, our studies of a hypothetical general nuclear war occurring in 1966 show that, with the conflict starting under one particular set of circumstances, and with the Soviets confining their attacks to military targets, the United States under present civil defense plans might suffer 25 million deaths and Europe might suffer somewhat fewer. On the other hand, were the Soviets to attack urban-industrial as well as military targets, the United States might incur 75 million deaths and Europe would have to face the prospect of losing 115 million people. While both sets of figures make grim reading, the first set is preferable to the second. There are others like them.

In the light of these findings the United States has developed its plans in order to permit a variety of strategic choices. We have also instituted a number of programs which will enable the Alliance to engage in a controlled and flexible nuclear response in the event that deterrence should fail. Whether the Soviet Union will do likewise must remain uncertain. All we can say is that the Kremlin has very strong incentives—in large part provided by the nuclear strength of the Alliance—to adopt similar strategies and programs. Thus, we calculate that in 1966, if the Alliance were to limit its retaliatory attack to military targets in the Soviet Union, while holding superior forces in reserve, the Soviets might suffer around 25 million deaths, whereas if we attack urban-industrial targets in the wake of a Soviet strike against European and American cities, the Soviets would suffer at least 100 million deaths.

Other factors besides target strategies of the belligerents would determine the damage in a thermo-nuclear war. The yields of the warheads used in a nuclear exchange would make a significant difference in the amount of
blast, thermal, and fallout damage; and it is possible to match the yields to
the particular targets under attack and so reduce damage to civilians.
Furthermore, as the accuracy of missiles improves, the belligerents could
attack targets with greater assurance of destroying them; they could also
reduce the yields with which they strike. If they so choose, they could
regulate the height at which they burst their weapons and thereby affect
the amount of fallout that is distributed. The existence of civil defenses
also could have a significant impact on the number of deaths, especially if
only military targets are attacked so that the principal danger to most
civilians is from fallout. Depending on these and other factors, the number
of deaths could vary over a wide range - by four times or more. The more
discriminating the attacks, the less the damage.

I have raised these points because we think they are relevant to
allied defense policies now and in the future. In particular, we believe
that they have important implications for the general war posture of the
Alliance and the role that NATO should assign to nuclear forces in its grand
strategy.

II. The General War Posture of the Alliance

Perhaps the most important implication of these observations is
that nuclear superiority has important meanings. I want to stress that for
the most relevant planning period - through the mid 1960's - there can be
little question about the ability of the Alliance to maintain nuclear
superiority over the Sino-Soviet Bloc. During the coming fiscal year the
United States plans to spend close to $15 billion on its nuclear weapons to
assure such superiority.

Strategic Retaliatory Forces

We are confident that our current programs are adequate to ensure
continuing superiority for as far into the future as we can reasonably fore-
see. By 1965, as shown in the table below, these programs will give us
935 long-range bombers, about 800 air-launched missiles, and over 1500 ICBM
and Polaris missiles in addition to nuclear forces stationed in Europe, the
Far East and at sea.
### US Strategic Retaliatory Forces

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<td>-</td>
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<td>800</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>562</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>1507</td>
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(a) Effective 1st August, 1961, the program provides for approximately 50% of the B-52 and B-47 forces, less those units assigned to training, to be on 15 minute ground alert.

We doubt that the Soviet Union will be able to match this capability. Nevertheless, as insurance against the unforeseen, we have already purchased the capability to increase rapidly the production of the Minuteman missile beyond our expected requirements by installing production lines additional to those required by our current program. We can take other remedial measures as well should our estimates of Soviet capabilities undergo significant changes.

### Target Coverage of Threat to Europe

The relevence of our nuclear capability to the nuclear threat facing Europe deserves some emphasis. This threat is not inconsiderable. At the present time SACEUR’s most urgent set of targets, the threat list, consists of approximately 700 targets. (There are in addition other lower priority targets to be dealt with by major subordinate commanders, during and after the first strikes.) The SACEUR threat list includes such high priority targets as MRBM sites, bases for Soviet nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear storage sites, and military command and control centers. A planned strike against one of these targets may consist, for example, of a B-52 launched from a base in the United States, an A4D from an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean, and also a missile
fired from the United States or from SACEUR's area. By means of this cross-targeting we achieve a high probability of destroying the designated target.

More than 1800 weapons are scheduled against SACEUR's nuclear threat list. SACEUR plans to assure the destruction of 90 targets on the list with his forces alone. Approximately 300 targets are scheduled for attack and destruction solely with external forces. SACEUR schedules sorties against another 200 or more targets with his own forces, but the assurance that he will be able to destroy them is not enough to warrant reliance on his attacks alone. Therefore, with respect to these 200 targets, additional sorties are assigned to forces external to his theater. The entire threat list is covered and approximately 90% of it is scheduled for attack by external forces. Of the weapons now assigned to this task, about two-thirds will be delivered by the US Strategic Air Command. The United States has made clear that it places the major Soviet nuclear forces threatening Europe in the same high priority category as those also able to reach North America. In short, we have undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis. This will continue to be our objective. In the execution of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are only one resource among many.

Survivability and Control

A large nuclear force is not enough to assure a politically responsible force, or to carry out a policy of controlled and selective response, or to permit us to fulfill all important general war missions. These vital properties depend on the survivability and endurance of the forces and their vital networks of command and control. The Alliance now possesses the ability to absorb a Soviet attack and go on to destroy a very high proportion of the targets of importance in the Sino-Soviet bloc. This powerful, second-strike force will be maintained together with the ability to control and direct the forces as the military situation may dictate at the time. For this purpose, distance, dispersal, mobility, hardness, and alertness represent the most effective measures at our disposal. All are being exploited in current bomber and missile programs.

In light of these considerations, the bulk of the nuclear resources of the Alliance, to the extent of 90% of the alert nuclear weapons and over 90% of the total yield of alert nuclear weapons, is stationed outside of European territory, designed to function as a single instrument to accomplish a single indivisible task. Geographic, technical and military considerations suggest that most of these forces should continue to be so located. And with a large overall gain in effectiveness, for example, the large missile force that is planned will greatly reduce the elapsed time from decision to launch to destruction of enemy targets — even with remotely based missiles.
Effectiveness in Combat

I think we are entitled to be confident that the Soviet Union will not initiate the use of nuclear weapons in the face of our nuclear superiority. A surprise nuclear attack, coming out of the blue, simply is not a rational course of action for the Soviet Union. However, even if such an attack were to come, looking ahead as far as 1966, we are confident that in the wake of such an attack we could destroy about 90% of the fixed targets in the Soviet Union while retaining large reserve forces with which to counter surviving bloc forces and to force an end to the conflict. We could also inflict civil damage over a wide range depending upon our target strategy. The Soviets could not win such a war in any meaningful military sense and they might lose their country in the course of the conflict.

A Soviet initiative in the use of nuclear weapons as an outgrowth of a limited engagement in Europe or elsewhere appears equally unlikely. In this case also, the Soviets would find themselves unable to gain any fruitful objectives.

Indivisibility of Control

I have already mentioned the importance of command and control. If we are to exercise the necessary direction of our forces, a system of command must survive for that purpose. But there is more to command and control than the underground centers, seaborne controls, and airborne operations centers that we possess or are developing. The efficient use of our resources implies that the Alliance deterrent system have three vital attributes: unity of planning, executive authority, and central direction - for in a major nuclear war there are no theaters, or rather, the theater is world-wide. Specific missions and the most efficient way to perform them should determine the weapons that we acquire, where we deploy them, and who should command them.

It is even more important that the Alliance have unity of planning, decision-making, and direction with respect to responses to enemy actions and especially to retaliatory attacks against him. There must not be competing and conflicting strategies in the conduct of nuclear war. We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible and if nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities. Doing this means carefully choosing targets, pre-planning strikes, co-ordinating attacks, and assessing results, as well as allocating and directing follow-on attacks from the center. These calls, in our view, for a greater degree of Alliance participation in formulating nuclear policies and consulting on the appropriate occasions for using these weapons. Beyond this, it is essential that we centralise the decision to use our nuclear weapons to the greatest extent possible. We would all find it intolerable to contemplate having only a part of the strategic force launched in isolation from our main striking power.

If a portion of the Alliance nuclear force, acting by itself, were to initiate a retaliatory attack by destroying only a small part of the
Soviet nuclear force, our enemy would be left free to reallocate other weapons to cover the targets originally assigned to the destroyed part. Thus, aside from endangering all of us, a strike aimed at destroying the Soviet MRBM's aimed at Country A, which left the others standing, would be of little value to Country A. It would merely oblige the Soviets to shift other missiles to cover the Country A targets. We would all find it equally intolerable to have one segment of the Alliance force attacking urban-industrial areas while, with the bulk of our forces, we were succeeding in destroying most of the enemies' nuclear capabilities. Such a failure in co-ordination might lead to the destruction of our hostages - the Soviet cities - just at a time at which our strategy of coercing the Soviets into stopping their aggression was on the verge of success. Failure to achieve central control of NATO nuclear forces would mean running a risk of bringing down on us the catastrophe which we most urgently wish to avoid.

In this connection, our analyses suggest rather strongly that relatively weak nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be adequate to perform the function of deterrence. In a world of threats, crises, and possibly even accidents, such a posture appears more likely to deter its owner from standing firm under pressure than to inhibit a potential aggressor. If it is small, and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, it enables a major antagonist to take a variety of measures to counter it. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of it being used independently, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. In short, then, weak nuclear capabilities, operating independently, are expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.

It is for these reasons that I have laid such stress on unity of planning, concentration of executive authority, and central direction. Without them general nuclear war means certain ruin; with them we have a chance of survival as nations.

III. The Role of General War Strength in Alliance Strategy

What does the Alliance accomplish by creating this complex machinery to maintain nuclear superiority over the Sino-Soviet bloc? And what is the impact on NATO's policies of both the grave damage that would result from nuclear war and the great variations in that damage under different strategies?

My Government feels that the strategic capabilities I have described have important political consequences. The Alliance continues to possess much of the diplomatic freedom that it has enjoyed in the past. We can confidently reject the missile threats that Mr. Khrushchev so imprudently brandishes. If the Soviets or their satellites impinge on
our interests we can resist with considerable confidence that our antagonists will not wish to escalate the conflict. The question at issue now is the point at which NATO, not the Soviets, would wish to escalate a non-nuclear conflict.

As the President has indicated on a number of occasions, the United States is prepared to respond immediately with nuclear weapons to the use of nuclear weapons against one or more members of the Alliance. The United States is also prepared to counter with nuclear weapons any Soviet conventional attack so strong that it cannot be dealt with by conventional means. But let us be quite clear what we are saying and what we have to face. Owing to our non-nuclear deficiencies, there is, first, a high probability that in an ambiguous situation the West, not the East, would have to make the decision to initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Secondly, there is the almost certain prospect that, despite our nuclear superiority and our ability to destroy the Soviet target system, all of us will suffer deeply in the event of a major nuclear war.

The Berlin crisis exemplifies a type of threat that we should expect to face elsewhere in the NATO area. In such a crisis the provocation, while severe, does not immediately require or justify our most violent reaction. Also, as such a crisis develops, as military force is threatened or becomes engaged— even in limited quantities— the increasingly alert nuclear posture of the belligerents makes the prospective outcome of a nuclear attack for both sides even less attractive.

In short, faced with the more likely contingencies, NATO, not the Soviets, would have to make the momentous decision to use nuclear weapons, and we would do so in the knowledge that the consequences might be catastrophic for all of us.

We in the United States are prepared to accept our share of this responsibility. And we believe that the combination of our nuclear superiority and a strategy of controlled response gives us some hope of minimizing damage in the event that we have to fulfill our pledge. But I would be less than candid if I pretended to you that the United States regards this as a desirable prospect or believes that the Alliance should depend solely on our nuclear power to deter the Soviet Union from actions not involving a massive commitment of Soviet forces. Surely an Alliance with the wealth, talent, and experience that we possess can find a better way than this to meet our common threat.

We shall continue to maintain powerful nuclear forces for the Alliance as a whole. They will continue to provide the Alliance a strong sanction against Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. Under some circumstances they may be the only instrument with which we can counter Soviet non-nuclear aggression, in which case we shall use them. But, in our view, the threat of general nuclear war should constitute only one of several weapons in our arsenal and one to be used with prudence. On this question I can see no valid reason for a fundamental difference of view on the two sides of the Atlantic.
IV. **Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons**

Our great nuclear superiority for general war does not solve all our problems of deterring and dealing with less than all-out direct assault. What, then, is the prospect that NATO can fall back on the local or tactical use of nuclear weapons? Battlefield nuclear weapons were introduced in NATO at a time when our shield forces were weak and the Soviet atomic stockpile was small. In these circumstances it was reasonable to hope that NATO might very quickly halt a Soviet advance into Western Europe by unilateral application of nuclear weapons on or near the battlefield. Using nuclear weapons tactically might still accomplish a desired end in the early 1960's. Consequently, we continue to maintain substantial nuclear forces within the European theater and we now have over nuclear weapons of various yields stockpiled in Europe.

But how much dependence should NATO place on these capabilities? We should succeed in deterring the Soviets from initiating the use of nuclear weapons, and the presence of these weapons in Europe helps to prevent Soviet use locally. But NATO can no longer expect to avoid nuclear retaliation in the event that it initiates their use. Even a local nuclear exchange could have consequences for Europe that are most painful to contemplate. Further, such an exchange would be unlikely to give us any marked military advantage. It could rapidly lead to general nuclear war.

To be sure, a very limited use of nuclear weapons, primarily for purposes of demonstrating our will and intent to employ such weapons, might bring Soviet aggression to a halt without substantial retaliation, and without escalation. This is a next-to-last option we cannot dismiss. But prospects for success are not high, and I hesitate to predict what the political consequences would be of taking such action. It is also conceivable that the limited tactical use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield would not broaden a conventional engagement or radically transform it. But we do not rate these prospects very highly.

Highly dispersed nuclear weapons in the hands of troops would be difficult to control centrally. Accidents and unauthorized acts could well occur on both sides. Furthermore, the pressures on the Soviets to respond in kind, the great flexibility of nuclear systems, the enormous firepower contained in a single weapon, the ease and accuracy with which that firepower can be called in from unattacked and hence undamaged distant bases, the crucial importance of air superiority in nuclear operations—all these considerations suggest to us that local nuclear war would be a transient but highly destructive phenomenon.

I realize there is a school of thought which believes that the United States and the Soviet Union might seek to use Europe as a nuclear battleground and thus avoid attacks on one another's homelands. Not only does my government emphatically reject such a view; we also regard it as unrealistic. It ignores the basic facts of nuclear warfare I have described; it contemplates geographical limits unrelated to the actualities of target locations, and of the varied sources from which
attacks would come. Any substantial nuclear operation in Europe inevitably would involve both forces and targets in the US and USSR. It is possible, as I have mentioned, that a small, demonstrative use of nuclear weapons could be contained locally; and possibly, distant nuclear operations in less vital locations outside the NATO area, or at sea, may be limitable. But there is likely to be no effective operational boundary, or set of mutual restraints, which could restrict large-scale nuclear war to NATO Europe and the satellites. As we understand the dynamics of nuclear warfare, we believe that a local nuclear engagement would do grave damage to Europe, be militarily ineffective, and would probably expand very rapidly into general nuclear war.

V. Non-Nuclear Forces and Deterrence

With the Alliance possessing the strength and the strategy I have described, it is most unlikely that the Soviet Union will launch a nuclear attack on NATO. But there are other forms of aggression, and in December I mentioned our concern that the threat of general war might not be adequate against many lesser Soviet actions, political as well as military. Some such hostile actions we could thwart now; others we might not. To deal with these others, how can we convincingly show that aggression, if continued, would lead to a situation where the danger of nuclear war was very great indeed? Let us assume two situations:

In the first, the NATO front is lightly covered by our forces. In the event of deep penetration by Soviet non-nuclear forces which our forces cannot prevent, the only military options open to Alliance forces are immediate nuclear response or defeat. This might be true even for a minor Soviet challenge.

In the second, we assume the NATO front firmly held under a concept of forward strategy. Ready and able to deal with any Soviet non-nuclear attack less than all-out, NATO forces guard positively from the frontier against any quick strike or ambiguous aggression. The NATO front can be broken only by massive application of Soviet power. In such a major fight, if Western forces were thrown back, Alliance nuclear action would follow.

If you were on the other side, which situation would you consider more laden with a real risk of nuclear war with all its consequences? Which would make you more inclined to refrain from a series of actions designed, step by step, to erode NATO's interests? To us the answer is clear.

In the first situation, it simply is not credible that NATO, or anyone else, would respond to a small step - the first slice of salami - with immediate use of nuclear weapons. Nor is it credible that a chain of small actions, no one of which is catastrophic, would evoke a response of general nuclear war. We regard it as much more evident that NATO would find it politically possible to act in effective defense of its interests from the second posture than from the first.
The development of recent events concerning Berlin may provide relevant evidence of the utility of limited but decisive action. Although it would be premature to announce the end of this crisis, and in any case we cannot be certain of the influences that most affect Kremlin policy, it is not unlikely that the NATO non-nuclear buildup conveyed to the Soviets the right message about Berlin. When the Soviets began menacing Berlin, they may have entertained doubts about Western determination; clearly they were not deterred from their initial steps by our previous nuclear threats. But the creation of greater new non-nuclear strength has reinforced our overall deterrent, and the aggression has not occurred. It was not simply the substantial increase in NATO manpower and the addition of the equivalent of four combat-ready divisions, 88 more ships and 19 more air squadrons, but the meaning which their addition conveyed of our determination that may have given the Soviets second thoughts.

For the kinds of conflicts we think most likely to arise in the NATO area, non-nuclear capabilities appear to be clearly the sort the Alliance would wish to use at the outset. The purpose of our common effort is the defense of the populations and territories of NATO. To achieve this, at least initially, with non-nuclear means requires that our non-nuclear defense begin where the populations and territories begin. A truly forward deployment, along the lines General Norstad has advocated, we consider an urgent need of the Alliance.

Let me make clear however that we do not believe that a forward defense must be able to defeat in non-nuclear action every conceivable element of Soviet strength that might be thrown against it. Our nuclear forces would rapidly come into play if an all-out attack developed. We believe the Soviets can hardly doubt that; hence, we think it quite improbable that a major attack would develop out of a crisis.

In our view, an urgent military task facing NATO is to provide in the Central Region non-nuclear forces of the approximate size called for in MC 26/4, with these forces being fully equipped and manned, and adequately supported. Provision of the organized units is one step, and, from the table below, you can see some of what remains to be done.

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<th>Country</th>
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<td>Combat division equivalent</td>
<td>16  22 2/3</td>
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(a) Strengths include Brigades as 1/3 Division
We are about two-thirds of the way toward our 20-division-equivalent force. During the last year we have seen a 25% increase in fully combat-ready division equivalents. In air forces our present strength of 2,682 aircraft is quite near the goals, and the numbers have been augmented by 10% this year. Our air and ground force goals are not distant, and during the past year we have made real progress toward them. The quality of our forces, however, is another question and one to which all NATO governments should give searching attention. In December, I spoke of this problem citing the surveys by major NATO commanders. Some actions were under way then, and some further ones have been begun. Here too we have seen some improvement. But even after current programs are completed, there will still remain serious deficiencies. Manning levels still promise to be inadequate, and many needed combat support units are missing or weak. Some reflection of how this can drag down our combat capabilities is seen in the table by the contrast, both for a year ago and for today, between nominal division totals and the number of fully combat-ready division equivalents.

There are also alarming weaknesses in our service support systems. Defects which degrade our ability to support sustained non-nuclear combat include exposed positioning of stocks, lack of depth in depot systems, low levels of war reserves of ammunition and repair parts, and much obsolescent or absent material. The improvements which have been made in supply and stockage levels for certain types of ammunition, sonobuoys, and Army personnel carriers suggest that we can correct our other logistical deficiencies.

These deficiencies should be of concern to the Alliance for an additional reason. They suggest that the Alliance is not carrying out its defense tasks efficiently. The resources currently devoted to non-nuclear forces on both sides of the Atlantic are by no means small. But until these forces are strong enough to make possible effective action against those of the Bloc, they contribute little to our defense. Moreover, our efforts are unbalanced. For example, NATO has more men under arms than the Soviet Union and its European satellites but judges itself to be inferior in non-nuclear conflict — that type of conflict in which manpower counts most. To a considerable extent, this inferiority stems from specific, remediable deficiencies. As long as they continue to exist, they will serve to undermine our overall efforts.

May I emphasize the earnestness with which my government regards this non-nuclear buildup by recalling some of our relevant programs. Having put in hand a series of measures, including the addition of $4 billion to the 1962 and 1963 budgets, to assure adequate, protected strategic nuclear strength, last summer we undertook to strengthen our non-nuclear power by adding $10 billion for this purpose to the previously planned level of expenditures for fiscal years 1962 and 1963. To take the immediate steps which Berlin obliged, and to tide us over while new permanent strength was being created, we called up 158,000 reservists. We will be releasing them this summer, but only because in the meantime we have built up on an enduring basis more added strength than the call-up temporarily gave us. The number of US combat-ready divisions has been increased from 11 to 16. Stockpiled here in Europe now are full sets of equipment for two additional divisions; the men of these divisions can be rapidly moved to Europe by air.
The US is prepared to offer its Allies help in overcoming their logistics support difficulties and equipment shortages by providing credit for the purchase of material and supplies and by providing for the delivery of such material, in certain cases, from existing US stocks or from current US production to allied forces.

I want to repeat that meeting these goals, and improving the quality and staying power of these forces may not enable us to defeat an all-out Bloc non-nuclear attack. But it will fill in the major gap in our deterrent strength. With improvements in ground force strength and staying power, improved non-nuclear air capabilities, and better equipped and trained reserve forces, the Soviet Union can be assured that no gap exists in the NATO defense of this vital region, and that no aggression, small or large, can succeed.

VI. Current US Views on Alliance Decisions

Although it is not our purpose at this meeting to reach decisions on the major issues confronting the Alliance, my government believes that we must do so in the very near future. Consequently, I shall summarize our current views on these issues as they have developed out of our current and ongoing review. I trust that the result will be a further exchange of ideas among us.

Exchange of Information

An important item is the amount of information that the Alliance should have about nuclear posture and strategy. Our own view is that the flow of information should be greater than it has been in the past. We welcome the new procedures for handling sensitive information and we plan to provide information about our nuclear forces and consult about basic plans and arrangements for their use on a continuing basis.

At this meeting, as at the December meeting, I have attempted to be forthright in providing information that bears on the crucial issues facing us. Last week, General Power presented to the NAC a statement on certain aspects of US strategic retaliatory power. In the coming months, US military personnel will be prepared to discuss other aspects of our common problems.

Guidelines and Consultation

The formulation and adoption of guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons has also occupied the attention of the Alliance. I believe the discussion has been a useful one. It has cast light on the complexity of the problems of deterrence and war conduct. We feel that the guidelines that have been agreed to by a large majority of the Alliance are appropriate and helpful.

Coverage of Soviet Forces Threatening Europe

I have described the strength of the strategic retaliatory forces devoted to Alliance tasks. This force works in conjunction with NATO—
committed forces and is devoted to a very considerable degree to countering Soviet forces that are able to attack Western Europe. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of our treaty commitments but also because the indivisible character of nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the US targets key elements of Soviet nuclear striking power, including MRBM's, with as high priority to that portion that can reach Western Europe as to that portion that also can reach the United States.

**Commitment of POLARIS**

A major and growing component of those external forces is the POLARIS fleet. The President stated at Ottawa that the US would commit certain of these submarines to NATO. Effective today, we are committing the five fully operational ships, earmarked for assignment to SACLANT. By the end of 1962, two more will be committed for a total of seven. By the end of 1963, we expect to have committed 12, and probably withdraw two for overhaul, leaving a net of 10. Thus our entire POLARIS force ready at that time will be committed to NATO.

As the program develops thereafter, it is our present intention to commit to NATO those POLARIS submarines which are fully operational — that is, those which have been worked up to readiness, less those withdrawn for major shipyard overhaul — which operate normally in NATO waters. Under present plans, this will be the bulk of the POLARIS fleet, since some will go to the Pacific, and perhaps some in due course, to other stations.

This protected, long endurance, controllable force is a vital and unique element of NATO's retaliatory capacity. It must be used so as to make a maximum contribution to the overall NATO nuclear response which we regard as indivisible. Specifically, operations, targeting, and firing timing of the POLARIS submarines must be responsive to the overall requirements of the Alliance as a whole. Their use, therefore, will not be limited to the support of any single theater or major commander.

**An MRBM Force**

We are prepared to enter into a detailed discussion of the need for an MRBM force in the Permanent Council as soon as possible after this meeting. We will then be ready to discuss the full range of technical, military and political problems that would be associated with such a force. We expect our allies will wish to consider very carefully the full implications of undertaking this venture. There are many complicated questions to be dealt with. In the meantime, the US, although it is not committed to the procurement or deployment of an MRBM weapon system, is proceeding with the design of such a weapon. Certain of the technical specifications of the weapon we have under development are listed in the attached Appendix.

**Non-Nuclear forces and the Forward Strategy**

We believe that NATO and its military commanders should undertake as a high priority matter the implementation of the forward strategy in the Central
Region. Specifically, that the ground forces needed to defend at the frontier, on the order of 30 divisions, be provided; that ground and air forces be appropriately deployed and supplied with required combat and service support elements; that adequate equipment and stocks to make these forces effective be made available, and that the air forces, in particular, be protected so as to be able to function effectively in non-nuclear combat.

The United States recognizes the difficulties to be overcome in accomplishing this program. But it is a modest one in relation both to the crises that may arise and to the resources we command. The question is not one of the ability of the Alliance but of its will. The obstacles are real. We all have our special problems of conscription, or budget level, or the balance of payments. However, the brute facts of technology and the realities of military power cannot be denied. They call for us to take common action.
Summary Data on Missile "K"

Range
2,000 n. mi.

CEP
About 1,000 feet (land based) at
1,000 n. mi.

About 1,700 feet (sea based) at
1,000 n. mi.

Warhead yield

Missile gross weight 12,000 lbs

Method of operation: surface ship mobile or road mobile to be
determined in the light of numerous factors

Cost for 250 missiles about $2 billion

FY 1963 amount programmed by the US
for research and development $80 million

Availability: Assuming a production decision by 1st July 1963
operational deployment would begin in 1965.