Summary record of a meeting of the Council held in the
Zappeion Building in Athens on
Saturday 5th May, 1962 at 5 p.m.

PRESENT

H.E. Mr. Foridun Cemal Erkin
Chairman and
Secretary General:
H.E. Mr. D.U. Stikker

BELGIUM

H.E. Mr. P-H. Spaak
Vice-President of the Council of
Ministers, Minister for Foreign
Affairs

H.E. Mr. P.W. Segers
Minister of Defence

H.E. Mr. A. de Staercke
Permanent Representative

CANADA

The Hon. Howard Green
Secretary of State for External
Affairs

The Hon. Douglas Harkness
Minister of National Defence

H.E. Mr. Jules Leger
Permanent Representative

DENMARK

H.E. Mr. Poul Hansen
Minister of Defence

H.E. Dr. E. Schram-Nielsen
Permanent Representative

FRANCE

H.E. Mr. M. Couve de Murville
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Mr. Pierre Messmer
Minister of Defence

H.E. Mr. Pierre de Lussye
Permanent Representative

GERMANY

H.E. Dr. Gerhard Schröder
Minister for Foreign Affairs

H.E. Dr. h.c. Franz Joseph Strauss
Minister of Defence

H.E. Dr. Gobhardt von Walther
Permanent Representative
GREECE
H.E. Mr. Evanghelos Averoff-Tossizza
H.E. Mr. Aristide Protopapasakis
H.E. Mr. Michel Melas
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

ICELAND
H.E. Mr. Gudmundur I. Gudmundsson
H.E. Mr. H. G. Andersen
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representative

ITALY
H.E. Mr. Giulio Andreotti
H.E. Mr. Adolfo Alessandrini
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

LUXEMBOURG
H.E. Mr. Eugene Schaus
H.E. Mr. Paul Reuter
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defence
Permanent Representative

NETHERLANDS
H.E. Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns
H.E. Mr. S.H. Visser
H.E. Dr. H.N. Boon
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

NORWAY
H.E. Mr. Halvard Lange
H.E. Mr. Gudmund Harlem
H.E. Mr. Jens Boyesen
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

PORTUGAL
H.E. Mr. A. Franco Nogueira
General M. Gomes Araujo
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, representing the Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

TURKEY
H.E. Mr. Ilhami Sancar
H.E. Mr. Nuri Birgi
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative

UNITED KINGDOM
The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Home
The Rt. Hon. Harold Watkinson
H.E. Sir Paul Mason
Secretary of State
Minister of Defence
Permanent Representative
UNITED STATES

The Hon. Dean Rusk  Secretary of State
The Hon. Robert S. McNamara  Secretary of Defense
The Hon. T.K. Finletter  Permanent Representative

INTERNATIONAL STAFF

Mr. A. Casardi  Deputy Secretary General
Mr. F.D. Gregh  Deputy Secretary General, Assistant Secretary General for Economics and Finance
The Lord Coleridge  Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT

General L.L. Lemnitzer  Chairman, Military Committee
General A. Heusinger  Chairman, Military Committee in Permanent Session
Admiral Max Douguet  Chairman, Standing Group
Lt. Gen. J.M. Guerin  Standing Group Representative
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paragraph Nos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NATO DEFENCE POLICY

1. Mr. Rusk (United States) said that in seeking to develop the best deterrent and defensive forces for the 1960's, NATO faced two related questions:

(a) firstly, how the Alliance's role in the nuclear deterrent should be increased;

(b) secondly, what should be the balance of nuclear and non-nuclear forces in NATO's deterrent system.

2. Dealing with the first question, he thought the Alliance would probably have to be satisfied with less than ideal arrangements, but they must be workable for the Alliance as a whole. The Council in Permanent Session had made good progress towards such arrangements, but much remained to be done. He thought the arrangements fell into several categories.

First: Guidelines. The Soviet Union should be certain that the Alliance would not use nuclear weapons for trivial reasons, but would use them to defend vital interests. The guidelines set forth in paragraph 25 of C-M(62)48, which were acceptable to the United States, were an improvement over the past tacit understandings. His country hoped that the cohesion of the Alliance would be further enhanced by President Kennedy's commitment to consult in the Council prior to the use of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world; if time permitted.

Second: Nuclear Assurances. President Kennedy had authorised the United States Permanent Representative to state in the Council that the United States would continue to make available to the Alliance the nuclear weapons necessary for NATO defence and would consult with its allies about any significant changes which might occur in present United States programmes for supplying nuclear weapons in support of NATO forces.

Third: Target Priority. The United States had made it clear in the Council that it accorded the same, repeat same, priority for targets of specific interest to Western Europe as for those more directly endangering the United States.

Fourth: Defence Data Programmes. The United States would keep its allies fully informed, as a continuing process, of both nuclear and non-nuclear force developments, in order that evolving strategic thinking within the Alliance would share a common basis. Information-sharing would continue in the Council, and through military and bilateral political channels. He welcomed the establishment of Alliance machinery to handle certain elements of this information on a regular and secure basis.
Fifth: Commitment of Polaris Submarines. Mr. McNamara would set forth a specific schedule for the progressive commitment of Polaris submarines to NATO (see C-M(62)55).

Sixth: Multilateral MRBM force. If the allies wished to add MRBMs to programmed Alliance forces and to participate in their deployment, the United States would be prepared to join in exploring the possibility of the creation of a sea-based MRBM force under fully multilateral ownership, control, finance and manning. The United States would be prepared to facilitate procurement of MRBMs for an allied force only if it was fully multilateral. He was not urging MRBMs in view of the great strength of programmed Alliance forces; further, any steps in this field must be accompanied by a strengthening of NATO's conventional forces, in order to achieve a better-balanced and hence more effective deterrent. If the allies attached urgency to the MRBM question, the United States would be prepared to participate in a detailed study in the Council as soon as possible after the present meeting, outlining its latest thinking on political, military and technical aspects. However, in order to avoid giving any impression that the United States was imposing a plan on its allies, he urged all members to co-operate fully as colleagues in the discussion.

3. The second question facing the Alliance was the need for increased non-nuclear forces, in order to achieve a better balance of nuclear and non-nuclear power. Provided that the vital interests of the Alliance were safeguarded, every reasonable effort should be made to reduce reliance on the immediate resort to nuclear weapons in dealing with lesser Communist uses of force, notwithstanding the economic and political burdens of programmes to strengthen non-nuclear forces. A central issue was whether the overall deterrent would thus be improved. He considered that an appropriate strengthening of non-nuclear forces would plainly signal to the Soviets NATO's will to meet aggression and to ensure that any resort to force against NATO would be countered effectively. A deterrent to war must have not only a demonstrable physical capability, but also a clear human determination to meet force with force. If the Soviet Union saw an even more economically strong NATO building up its non-nuclear fighting forces in North America and Europe, it was most unlikely to interpret this as a sign of weakness or as a licence for Soviet aggression. Also important was the possible effect on the psychological health of the Alliance of over-reliance on nuclear force.

4. He emphasised that United States views on the need for better-balanced forces were not based on any concept of disengaging nuclear force from any area. On the contrary, the United States sought to strengthen the Alliance's military power to engage the enemy as far forward as possible. However, a meaningful forward strategy must be based on greater conventional capability.
5. In conclusion, he thought that NATO's successful record so far should inspire confidence in working out the problems of the future. One should not allow the basic sources of the strength of the Alliance to be obscured. In the last analysis, the Alliance's integrity and freedom from Communism rested as much on confidence in the rightness of its course as in military and economic strength. The positive purpose of the Alliance was the organization of the North Atlantic area into a real partnership between Europe and North America in the building of a viable free community to embrace both the advanced and the developing countries. In the military field, it should be recognised that the defence of Europe and North America was indivisible. The positive political programmes of the Alliance could not go forward confidently except behind the protection of effective defence. He therefore ended by calling attention to the key rôle of NATO military power in the political future of the Alliance, and by reaffirming the dedication of his country to the programmes needed to fulfil this rôle.

6. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) then made a statement on NATO Defence Policy (for text see C-W(62)55 - distribution limited to six copies per delegation).

7. Mr. WATKINSON (United Kingdom) paid tribute to the clarity and frankness of the statements made by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara. In the light of its own experience of nuclear planning his government generally supported the views which they had expressed. The United Kingdom particularly welcomed the commitment to NATO of Polaris submarines, which would provide a degree of second strike capability representing an immense gain to the Alliance. A great deal of serious and detailed discussion would be necessary before a satisfactory solution could be found to a number of the problems which had been raised, and the United Kingdom noted with gratification the United States' offer to participate fully in these talks.

8. Mr. Watkinson went on to point out that over-reliance on conventional weapons might be interpreted by the Soviet Union as a sign of unwillingness on the part of the West to use nuclear weapons; he thought, however, that the balance between conventional and nuclear weapons which had been proposed by the United States was substantially correct. His Government supported the plan for conventional forces put forward by Mr. McNamara. The United Kingdom faced the Russians not only on the European front, but also around the perimeter of the Communist world. Britain accepted its responsibilities in the Middle and Far East as well as in Europe where it would try to play its full part.

9. The question of MRBMs, including the new missile, should be given careful consideration within NATO. The United Kingdom Government's views on priorities were as follows:

- as a first priority, the strategic deterrent must be maintained at all costs;
- as a second priority, conventional forces should be re-equipped and strengthened on the lines suggested by Mr. McNamara;

- as a third priority, existing methods of delivering nuclear weapons should be modernised; a good many MRBMs might have to be provided for this purpose.

Only after these three priorities had been met should resources be provided for an MRBM force as such.

In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the United States proposals would be seriously and favourably considered by all members of the Alliance.

10. Mr. MESSMER (France), acknowledging the quality and importance of Mr. McNamara's presentation, said that it gave rise to a number of reflections and even objections on the part of the French authorities. In the first place, the United States' condemnation of small nuclear strike forces appeared somewhat hasty, since weak nuclear forces might, in certain circumstances, possess a deterrent value superior to that of far more powerful forces, whose utilisation might appear much more unlikely in enemy eyes.

11. Secondly, the proposal, as he understood it, that tactical nuclear weapons be withdrawn - a proposal which, incidentally, would imply a complete reversal of the present United States practice - was based on the no doubt valid thesis that the inclusion of these weapons in the Western arsenal enhanced the danger of escalation; in considering this proposal, governments should, however, bear in mind that:

- withdrawal of these weapons would have a disastrous effect on the morale of forces faced with Soviet tactical nuclear weapons;

- nations could not reasonably be expected to increase their conventional forces in the knowledge that these were subsequently to be stripped of their tactical nuclear capability, and hence destined to destruction;

- the danger of escalation was in itself a major incentive to caution on the part of the enemy.

12. In conclusion, Mr. Messmer commented that despite lengthy discussion, no concrete results had yet been achieved with respect to the proposed NATO MRBM force; in view of the extreme technical and political complexity of the problems involved he thought that a solution to this question was remote, if not entirely unattainable.
13. Mr. McNAMARA (United States) said that there would appear to be some misunderstanding regarding his presentation. He was, in fact, entirely in agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Messmer regarding tactical nuclear weapons. Subject to the desires of the Alliance, the United States intended to retain in their present location the tactical nuclear weapons presently stored in Europe; furthermore, large-scale production of these weapons was continuing, and the building of stockpiles at various points in the world was fully expected to go on. He emphasised, however, that despite this continued production and stockpiling, tactical nuclear weapons should be considered only as one of a series of other weapons which might be used, and as a weapon which had great dangers and risks associated with it.

14. Mr. AVEROFF-TOSSIZZA (Greece) joined other speakers in expressing his appreciation of the statements made by Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara, which had enhanced his country's confidence in European security and bore witness to the impressive extent of the United States military effort. Whatever disquiet his country might experience as a result of the stress laid by Mr. McNamara on the central European front was fully allayed by the categorical assurances of the United States that all fronts within the Alliance were equally covered. This was particularly important for his country since the South East frontier of the Alliance was particularly vulnerable to a conventional attack.

15. Greece was prepared to maintain the maximum level of conventional forces which its economy would allow, and believed, with Turkey, in a forward strategy and the need to launch a retaliatory attack if this should prove necessary. With regard to the question of guidelines, Greece considered that a timely decision to use nuclear weapons could not be taken by fifteen governments in a crisis. It was therefore willing to designate, in common with its NATO allies, a government or even an individual who would be responsible for this ultimate decision.

16. Mr. SPAAK (Belgium) welcomed the unprecedented thoroughness and frankness with which the United States position had been presented. He strongly recommended that at the earliest possible date these significant statements should be given close and systematic study within the Council in Permanent Session, in the light of that morning's discussion on guidelines. He further suggested that a special joint meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers might be held with a view to establishing what further action should be taken on the basis of this preliminary study.

17. Mr. Rusk's statement confirmed his belief that the United Kingdom and United States assurances, and the establishment of the NATO Nuclear Committee, represented a new approach to the problem. The greatest importance should be attached to the goodwill evidenced by the United States and United Kingdom proposals for joint consultation. He expressed regret at the scepticism voiced
by Mr. Messmer regarding the possible creation of a NATO nuclear 
force; this position, he argued, was surely premature, since, 
despite its crucial importance for Western defence, the proposal 
had never been thoroughly debated within NATO. The Council could 
not reject the idea without having fully discussed it.

18. In principle, Belgium favoured the concept of such a 
force, believing that it would be mutually advantageous to itself 
and to the Alliance. The Council should study this concept and 
report thereon at an early date to governments.

19. The CHAIRMAN, noting the general feeling of gratitude 
for the statements of Mr. Rusk and Mr. McNamara, said that these 
appeared to constitute the first stage of implementation of the 
decisions taken that morning (see C-M(62)54). In accordance with 
these decisions, it was now confirmed that the Council in 
Permanent Session should press forward with the examination of the 
outstanding problems in this field. He would, moreover, draw the 
attention of the Council to:

- the immediate commitment of Polaris submarines to 
  NATO - a decision which he was sure would be welcomed 
  by all members of the Alliance;

- the noteworthy statement that the United States was 
  prepared to offer its allies help in overcoming their 
  logistic support difficulties and equipment shortages 
  by providing credits. He would like to draw 
  particular attention to this offer.

- the suggestion advanced by Mr. Spaak that a joint 
  meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers might be 
  held to discuss the various problems raised by the 
  United States presentations.

20. These points should be examined by the Council in 
Permanent Session.

21. In conclusion, the COUNCIL:

    took note of the statements by Mr. Rusk and 
    Mr. McNamara and of the points made in the 
    course of discussion.

OTAN/NATO,
Paris, XVIe.