TOP SECRET

August 5, 1965

My dear Mr. President,

In your letter of December 8, 1964, in reply to my letter of the same date, you reaffirmed the understandings between our two Governments set out in the memorandum enclosed with your letter of February 28, 1964 to Sir Alec Douglas-Home with regard to consultation on the use of nuclear weapons.

Since that time the deployment of United States nuclear depth bombs to the United Kingdom, for use in an emergency by United States and British maritime aircraft, has become imminent. These aircraft are assigned to SACLANT, and will not therefore be included within the scope of existing understandings, unless these are amended. Paragraph 3 of the memorandum provides for amendment from time to time. I accordingly
propose that the following amendments to the memorandum should be made:

(i) Paragraph 1: line 7
Delete "SACEUR-assigned forces in the United Kingdom" and substitute "forces in the United Kingdom which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO commander".

(ii) Paragraph 3: line 4
Delete "SACEUR-assigned forces (strike squadrons) based in the United Kingdom" and substitute "forces based in the United Kingdom which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO commander".

Since these two amendments will cover all United States forces which may be based in the United Kingdom and assigned to a NATO commander in the future, the footnote to paragraph 3 of the memorandum will no longer be relevant and I suggest that it be deleted. This deletion would not prevent the amendment of the
Murphy-Dean Report from time to time should that be considered necessary.

For convenience I enclose a revised text of the Memorandum incorporating these amendments.

Yours ever,
Harold Wilson

The President of the United States of America.
UNDERSTANDINGS WITH THE BRITISH ON THE USE OF BRITISH BASES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. Our understanding on the use of British bases is that the President and Prime Minister will reach a joint decision by speaking personally with each other before certain forces equipped with U.S. nuclear weapons and operating from bases in the United Kingdom will use nuclear weapons, namely SAC, British Bomber Command*, forces in the U.K. which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO Commander and U.S. Polaris submarines in British territorial waters. The basic understanding is contained in the communique of January 9, 1952, covering the Truman-Churchill talks:

"Under arrangements made for the common defence, the United States has the use of certain bases in the United Kingdom. We reaffirm the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances prevailing at the time."

* Excluding aircraft of such Command equipped with British nuclear weapons.
Procedures for carrying out this basic understanding were agreed upon in the Murphy–Dean Agreement of June 7, 1958, which was approved by the President and the Prime Minister. The covering document, the Report to the President and the Prime Minister, repeats almost literally the language of the Truman–Churchill communique:

"2. The basic understanding between the United Kingdom and United States Governments, regarding the use of bases in the United Kingdom by United States forces, provides that such use in an emergency shall be a matter for joint decision by the two Governments in the light of the circumstances at the time."

2. There is a second, more general understanding with the British that we will consult with them before using nuclear weapons anywhere, if possible. The basic understanding on this point is contained in a memorandum of conversation of a meeting between the President and Eden on March 9, 1953. Eden had asked for an assurance of consultation by the
President with the Prime Minister prior to U.S.
use of any nuclear weapon.

"He (the President) said that the United States
would, of course, in the event of increased tension
or the threat of war, take every possible step to
consult with Britain and our other allies."

The President reaffirmed this understanding
when he wrote to the Prime Minister on October 27,
1960, in connection with the Holy Loch berthing:

"With reference to the launching of missiles
from U.S. Polaris submarines, I give you the follow-
ing assurance, which of course is not intended to be
used publicly. In the event of an emergency, such
as increased tension or the threat of war, the U.S.
will take every possible step to consult with Britain
and other Allies. This reaffirms the assurance I
gave Foreign Secretary Eden on March 9, 1953."

3. It should be noted that the agreement for joint
decision by the President and the Prime Minister
does not extend to all U.S. forces under
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SACEUR and SA CLANT but only covers those forces based in the United Kingdom which are assigned or earmarked for assignment to a NATO Commander. The other U.S. nuclear forces under SACEUR and SA CLANT would only be covered by a more general understanding to consult if time permits.
I. CONTROL

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