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FROM: USNATO, BRUSSELS

DATE: 7 January 1969

SUBJECT: NPG - Consultation - Remarks by Ambassador
         Cleveland

REF: USNATO 6266, USNATO 6376

NPG Permanent Representatives met on December 17, 1968,
      to discuss the subject of Consultation Procedures. As
      reported in USNATO 6376, the essence of the discussion
      was that a European-Canadian "caucus," led by the
      Netherlands, was making certain proposals to the US for
      mechanical consultation procedures under the Athens Guide-
      lines. The Netherlands had compiled and summarized country
      replies to a questionnaire prepared by delegation staffs
      (NPG/D(68)8). The US had felt it premature to address the
      questions in detail, and had not circulated written replies
      to the questionnaire, nor did USNATO have specific instruc-
      tions for the December 17 discussion. Therefore,
      Ambassador Cleveland assumed a listening role until near
      the end of the meeting, at which time he made remarks on
      a personal basis in order to outline some basic US con-
      cerns about the subject. These remarks, summarized in
      USNATO 6376, follow in detail.

Ambassador Cleveland opened his remarks by noting that a
new and interesting procedure had appeared in the course
of consideration of this topic: a European-Canadian
caucus bargaining with the United States. The US can't
complain about this since it is a product of its present
constitutional position and its reluctance to circulate
written answers. This caucus differs inherently from

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the US, whose power is being shared. A certain amount of prereconciliation of views by the rest is not a bad way to go about the problem, as demonstrated by the excellent material, prepared by the Netherlands, now before the NPG.

Ambassador Cleveland said that his comments on this material were not US policy, were not instructed views. They were his interpretation of considerations that are important to the US.

In the first place, he noted that consultation is Presidential business. Nuclear weapons are a form of military power whose use is reserved to the President by explicit legislation and by repeated policy declarations. This means that even small mechanical issues must be considered at higher levels in the US Government than those at which most issues are considered. Furthermore, during this period of transition, it is difficult to resolve an issue which depends so much on Presidential policy, style, and taste.

Ambassador Cleveland took exception to Ambassador Grewe's statement that nothing had happened in this area since the Athens Guidelines were laid down, or since the NPG Charter was approved. It has always been the US view that it was most important to exercise the collective brains of the Alliance on the nature of the weaponry and the nature of the strategies and contingencies in which its use may be necessary, given that there has been no experience of nuclear war. The main purpose of NPG has been to achieve a deep understanding of the implications of nuclear warfare. Procedures, no matter how good and flexible, are no substitute for having something to say when you get to the table. Procedures should be built out of continuing substantive work. Much has been accomplished by consulting on nuclear planning in fact and the NPG has given a new dimension to Alliance affairs. He thought that the efforts of NATO should not be downgraded to outsiders by giving them the impression that nothing has been accomplished.

The US has never felt it wise or feasible to try to develop single, rigid, uniform, and exclusive procedures for consulting on all possible selective releases and uses of
nuclear weapons. The problems are too complicated, and it is impossible to imagine all the contingencies, and so rigidity should be avoided. The drafters of the Athens Guidelines knew what they were doing, and were very careful to leave flexibility. Ambassador Cleveland felt there was adequate recognition of this in the material presented by the Netherlands.

Ambassador Cleveland went on to say that the US has felt that consultation on nuclear weapons use is part of the broader crisis consultation process. Nuclear procedures should be tied to the growing practice and precedents of NATO consultation in developing situations. He recalled the three working groups under the Special Committee. One became known as the McNamara Committee, and is now the NPG. The others, while not receiving equal publicity, had developed the basis for much of the machinery of the Alliance consultation which has since been established. Most of what these Working Groups did related to non-nuclear problems. The relevance of this machinery to nuclear consultation has been neglected in NPG work to date. For instance, the NATO-Wide Communications System, an all-to-all net, has demonstrated a considerable capacity. The Situation Center is a going concern, whose utility has been shown during the Czech crisis and the HILEX exercises. The Czech crisis and the HILEXes have also shown that the Council/DPC is critically dependent on timely information. Furthermore, there is an entirely different political advisory set-up now. The Committee of Political Advisors has been transformed from a once-a-week advisory body to a day-to-day or even continuous political assessment body. Finally, the NPG itself has developed many knowledgeable people in the course of its work. The planner is the most important product of planning. Each capital now has some of these people. NATO should be able to mobilize them in a time of decision-making. The nuclear consultation procedures anticipated and the way NATO countries have been working together should be harmonized.

Ambassador Cleveland questioned the procedural model implied in the material before the group. That model is essentially a vertical recommending and approving system. It may be necessary to pretend this is the way things work, but it does not correspond to the real world. The real world works
horizontally. He would have no objection to wide distribution of selective release requests/proposals, since he favored maximum information to all. The US does this habitually in a crisis, by informing all its embassies, military headquarters, etc. It is increasingly the practice, and it is not so nearly a vertical practice. The first suggestion that nuclear weapons might have to be used will not come up from the field. It will occur to all at the same time, and there will be many exchanges on contingency expectations and plans to meet them.

Procedures vary from country to country. With regard to MNCS using NMRS to disseminate requests, this depends on governments, who may or may not assign key people to these positions. Procedures for using them should not be collectively prescribed because such procedures would tend to treat indiscriminately those who are trusted by their governments and those who are not. Every country needs a responsible place on watch 24 hours a day. Not all countries have such arrangements, but it is important that they do. Even the US had difficulty during FALLLEEX-68, when messages sent over the NATO-Wide communications system were not getting to the State Department Operations Center which had to take action on them. There is an assumption that NATO can determine everyone's role by laying down procedures. But the role each group assumes depends on its own wakefulness, imagination and initiative. It is always everybody's turn to speak up, and there should be no restraints. Time will be too short for waiting turns. The NPG--both its people and its analytical processes--must be included as one of these groups.

Continuing on a personal basis, Ambassador Cleveland saw a good deal of recognition of the need for flexibility in the replies to the questionnaire. What he saw emerging was a modest proposal consisting of three elements:

That all be informed if the question of the selective use of nuclear weapons arises;

That the views of all, and especially those to which special weight should be given, should get to the nuclear power expeditiously; and

That all should be informed of the decision.
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Assuming this was a correct interpretation of the group's wishes, he thought he could commend these proposals to his authorities and to their successors.

Ambassador Cleveland felt tempted to discuss the Canadian point that after the President's decision there is still something for people other than the military commander to do. He did not believe that a case can be made for another collective process after such a decision. Would the purpose of such a process be to advise SACEUR on tactics? Not much could be said of that idea. With regard to the other Canadian point, on retention of national control of use of forces supposedly assigned to a Major NATO Commander, this is a constitutional issue discussion of which should be avoided. It is presumed that at Reinforced Alert, use of forces will have been internationalized, and only logistics would remain a national responsibility.

On the next steps to take with regard to this subject, Ambassador Cleveland personally agreed that a report for the Ministers in London should be prepared. He thought that whether this report should take the form of a draft outline procedure would require discussion within the US Government. He also thought it would be helpful if he could at an early moment tell Washington whether a new look at the Athens Guidelines or just their implementation was the intention of the "caucus." Was it a new policy or just skin on the bones that was wanted? The Canadian points made this unclear. In any case, he concluded that any serious consideration by the US Government would have to await the advent of the new administration.

CLEVELAND