Dear Robert,

This is another lengthy long hand letter with copies to no one. Unfortunately the only avenue of communication with you in which I have any real confidence are these personal delivered letters. All significant development here which are reportable by telecon have been so reported. Nevertheless it is clear from the messages we have received from Y that these reports are not being forwarded to Y from Washington. In one case we received a number of questions from Y almost all of which were answered in the separate telecons which were transmitted three, four, and five days preceding earlier than your questions. Two of these messages were explicitly addressed to you. If it should become necessary to continue our operations, it is in my opinion essential that communication between here and Y be drastically improved, preferably with direct uncensored transmission of messages being authorized. I apologize for the failure of information from here to reach you, but both Price
Our experience in the delivery of the first man has convinced almost all of us of the importance of one need - improved leadership. It is my opinion essential that any atomic bomb to be used in any fair quantity must be capable of being completely protected against even a slight possibility of a nuclear explosion being initiated by fire in take off of the aircraft. This is particularly true later when atomic bombs are available in sufficient quantity that one can not safely gamble the safety of the base on merely the low probability...
If a fire on a single take-off and when one can afford even a small loss of reliability to insure the protection of the lone face. Only twice since I have been out here have I been even slightly worried or nervous with both of these times the intensity of my worry made up for the relative calm of the other periods. One of the last times was during the two-hour interval between the scheduled report from Ashworth on the magnetic raid and the time of the actual report. However, the worst period was that between the time the B-29 engines were set fire and the time the plane was well clear of the island. The night before the take-off four planes in succession crashed, one the other end of the island, in fact, the situation got so bad an omission of 100 planes was cancelled after only 30 got off the ground. Since I have been here I have noted several fires resulting from crashes. By
actual testing, a very intense gasoline fire continued for over twenty minutes, six or eight fire engines working on such a fire don't even make a dent. After witnessing such fires and after having sweated out one atomic bomb take-off, I cannot urge too strongly the importance of complete nuclear safety in take-off for future models. The only way I have been able to think of is a took show-mod with a cylindrical plug through the HE so the active material can be inserted or the invention of neutal material or neutal material in the form of a non-charged in flight. I realize the difficulties of this and a non-Christy model. However, I feel that this factor is so important that with future great abundance of active materials even a loss in efficiency to achieve it is justified. The one FM Take Off has been my most unpleasant experience since joining the project.

I also think that serious thought should
be given to the means whereby from now on the United States can remain in a state of readiness in which an atomic bomb could be delivered to any place in the world on a moments notice. To establish a base time to our present one at Tinian would take a long time. My own preference would be to have the main base in the United States with all equipment necessary for establishing a forward base being air transportable and kept held in reserve along with the necessary air transport at the U.S. base. This would be especially applicable if the unit could be made completely safe against a possible nuclear explosion resulting from an attack. In this case I would strongly recommend accuracy and loading at the U.S. base with only staging occurring at the advanced base. As more material becomes available we could afford a sacrifice in reliability to achieve this and could even avoid the need for a loading pit at the advanced base by having all
planes including the spare ones every one.

Le Moyne, and White have been preparing some post war Air Force proposals to send to Lake. You'd better make sure that these are fully coordinated with future post development plans before the Air Force plans go to far. At present their proposals (which I believe have not yet been sent in) call for the establishment of an atomic bomb base in the Palm Springs - Victorville area capable of delivering atomic bombs to any place in the world. This location would be all right if I move to Pasadena, but I at least have heard nothing official on such a move. I suggest that you watch out that the trail does not go away the dog and that the location of Project Y is not determined by an Air Force action.

I am sure that by now you have be...
the full story on the Ypresian mission, but
in case you have not been fully informed about
the Ypresian one, I shall summarize it.
Our original schedule called for take off on
the morning of 7 August local time (10 August
Washington time). However, on the evening
of 7 August we concluded that we could safely
advance the date to 10 August. When we presented
this to D'Arbelo, he said it was too bad we
could not advance the date still another day,since
good weather was forecast for 7 August
with at least five days of good weather forecast
to follow. We agreed to try with the understand
we might miss our schedule since we were
unwilling to speed any operation which might
unusually affect either safety or reliability.
Finally at 11 PM on 8 August the unit was
in the plane and completely K thoroughly checked
out. Take off was at about 7:00 AM. We all
aged ten years until the plane cleared the
tower. We were scheduled to receive a
strike report at 10:30 AM 9 August, but all we
Hard until until 12:30 was the very worried\nquery from the frotta ship. "Did the strike\nplane abort?" Finally we received the\nmessage from Ashworth that the secondary target had\nbeen bombed largely by radar and that as\nhad technically the unit functioned even better\nthen Hirohima although this was some doubt\nso to the creator of the bomb. Interceptor\nof all sorts. We learned later\nthat the strike plane had its first trouble in\nmaking its rendezvous with the frotta plane.\nAlthough it was supposed to wait out over fifteen\nminutes at the rendezvous point at the coast\nof Japan it kept seeing approaching B-29's\non another mission each one of which it would\nthink initially was the frotta planes. In the\nway the strike plane actually lost 50 minutes.\nIt then made three attempts to bomb the \ntarget, but on each occasion a cloud intercepted\nthe target. This task was another fifty\nminutes. As it's final move then getting low\nit then went to Nagasaki, making a necessary
The weather was very bad but over the usual water
route it was then clear that there was
enough gas for only one run and not enough
gas to carry the unit on to Okinawa (from
which we would have to land en route). It was therefore
decided to drop either by radar or visually.
A take off was made in the course
of which the bomber got one visual
cloud. The bomb was released and apparently
approximately over the Mitsubishi steel
works. However, it was 1500 later. The
weather cleared enough for good photographic
picture to be taken so that we could learn
what a really lucky shot it was. The bomb
was 2000 feet from the aiming point but
was at correct altitude. Probably an even better
position than the aiming point allowed at the
time of the take off. It was certain of the
aiming point, it was not certain that the center of the
cloud, which looked so good as that actually obtained. The bomb
Apparently, destroyed somewhat north of the Matanikau Steel and Arms Works. All other factories and buildings on the Ushibumi River from the Nakaizumi Base River through the Matanikau-Usibumi Ordnance Plant were destroyed. The distance from the northeastern factory that was destroyed to the southern boundary of complete destruction was about three miles and damage might have occurred north of the Usibumi Ordnance Plant if any buildings had been there. Although only 44% of the city were destroyed by the official record, this is due to the unfavorable shape of the city and not to the location of the bomb detonation. The most continuously fighting sector of the city was the section destroyed. Good precision records were obtained on this mission and copies of the curves are being forwarded to you by Alvarez. No further factories were obtained due to the failure of the plane to make its rendezvous. The factory file from Okinawa is being forwarded by Waldron for fund
study at 7. A complete set of photo scan picture of both Hirohito and Nagasaki ship and after the strike is being forwarded to you by Baker (directly I hope but Kinstack may insist this year set go through Grove first). The Nagasaki picture is of very poor quality since the original negative is now in Washington. The extent of the damage is more obvious on prints made from the original negative.

The last message:

I think that on the whole things have gone remarkably well. Up to 19th this was the most successful and best man field party that I have ever seen on hand. Everyone did a really excellent job and the whole organization worked beautifully as a unit. Unfortunately, the order requiring us to stop on either August made us feel rather chary. However, since then we have tried to make the best of our sad situation. I hope
this you can do something to get us home.
Everyone deserves at least the much of a reward.

I'm sorry that this letter has been so terribly long.

Sincerely,

Norman