Chapter Six

The New York Agreement, Negotiating a Cease-fire, and Approaching a Settlement

While Washington was preparing for a settlement and the Principals debated over military traffic lights, the most immediate step was putting the finishing touches on the "further agreed principles" the shuttle team had begun negotiating in the region. Bosnian Foreign Minister Sacirbey would be in Washington on September 22, and Owen, Hill and Pardew would visit the Bosnian Serbs in Belgrade the weekend of September 23-24. The negotiators hoped that between these two visits, they would be able to finalize the principles in time for another foreign ministers event scheduled on the margins of the September 26 Contact Group meeting in New York.

The Bumpy Road to New York

During the two days since the team had returned from the last shuttle on September 20, Owen and his legal advisors had made some slight changes to the principles. Only hours after they had returned from the airport, Owen and Hill met with the legal group to discuss what needed to be improved. Owen explained that each delegation had approved this draft, and that there was a deal unless a major flaw was uncovered. For the most part, the group was encouraged by the progress the shuttle team had been able to make, but advised that they seek some revisions -- specifically, better defined powers of the joint presidency, clearer separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, and, upon Lloyd Cutler's recommendation, creation of a constitutional court.¹

At the State Department on September 22, Sacirbey met with Secretary Christopher but spent most of the day with Owen, Hill and the legal team. The Bosnian Foreign Minister agreed to most of the American revisions, including the constitutional court. His own revisions, such as clarifying that the parliament be elected by "direct, popular vote" and empowering the government to raise revenues, provided more specificity to the principles, but little substantive change. As the U.S. negotiators were

¹ During the last shuttle, Owen had faxed the draft principles back to John Kornblum on September 18, and the legal team reviewed them. See fax from Owen to Kornblum, "Constitutional Principles," September 18, 1995. Details of September 20 meeting from hand-written notes, (L files), September 20, 1995. Owen and Hill were joined by Cutler, James O'Brien of U.S.UN, and Serbian desk officer John Barley. See also Miriam Sapiro/James O'Brien interview; Cutler interview.
learning, Saccirbey didn’t favor their tactic of brushing over potentially contentious points with ambiguity. Rather, he always wanted the points to spell things out to every detail.²

Also that day, Saccirbey met for a half-hour in Strobe Talbott’s office with the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister, Georgi Mamedov.

Although Talbott described the two men as “tense,” they relaxed enough to agree that their countries would cooperate further—pressing soon for a cessation of hostilities, moving toward a full political settlement, and, somewhat ironically, working together to promote Bosnian Serb political forces friendly to Milosevic.³

After incorporating Saccirbey’s changes to the “further agreed principles,” Owen, Hill and Pardew left for Belgrade, where they met with the Bosnian Serbs on September 23. Although these have often been referred to as “secret talks,” they’re more accurately described as “quiet”—there were press reports about the trip, but few described that they would be meeting with Bosnian Serb leaders. Joined by Charge Rudy Perina and the State Department’s Serbian Desk Officer John Burley, they began the day with Milosevic. The Serb leader previewed what the Pale Serbs would likely complain about and what their opening positions would be. He revealed that Karadzic would join the talks, which Chris Hill responded was fine as long as he was not the head of delegation. Explaining that he was sending a message from Holbrooke, Hill described for Milosevic that after these principles were approved in New York, the full team would return to the region for a short shuttle, and soon after they hoped to announce an international peace conference.

After a brief discussion of Eastern Slavonia and a possible framework agreement for a peace settlement, Milosevic reviewed the latest text of the further agreed principles. He told them he had no problem with the joint presidency, but predicted that the Bosnian Serbs would have difficulty accepting the entire concept of a presidency. He was also

² See Hill/Holbrooke Interview. Saccirbey’s changes reflected in draft of agreed principles presented in Belgrade on September 23. See “Further Agreed Principles,” Pardew notebook, Shuttle III.

³ In an attempt to loosen things up, Talbott told them that they had something in common: they both had Muslim heritage and had the same name (Mamedov = slavicized version of Mahmed, which = Mohammed, which apparently triggered the following exchange: Saccirbey: “So, you’re one of us?” Mamedov: “Well, by way of Baku.” Saccirbey: “Baku! That means you’re more communist than Muslim.” Mamedov: “Well, we’ve got a lot of Muslims and a lot of Communists in Russia.” Saccirbey: “Yeah, I know, 20 million Muslims. So you don’t need to be so afraid of us.” Mamedov: “Maybe that’s why we are afraid of you.”) For detail of meeting, see “Saccirbey-Mamedov one-on-one, with Strobe Talbott sitting in”; D office; Friday, September 22, 1995, 2:45-3:15pm,” D files.
concerned about the call for direct elections for parliament, language Sacirbey had added in Washington. "This will go too far," he said. "It's too much for the beginning." 4

The trip to Belgrade was supposed to have been simply "technology," but from the moment the American negotiators sat down with the Bosnian Serbs, they realized they had reverted back to sticks and stones. Their Pale interlocutors -- Karadzic, Krajinik, Koljevic, and Aleksa Buha -- wanted to renegotiate the Geneva principles. Clearly, they had not yet accepted the main provision of Geneva: that Bosnia would remain a single, sovereign state. The Bosnian Serbs had little interest in the principles Milosevic had negotiated, and they had no interest in working with the Federation. They asked when the Bosnian Serbs could vote to decide whether they even wanted to be in a union. When rebuffed, they tried to shape the principles so that their entity would be as independent from the Federation as possible.

On elections, for example, the Bosnian Serbs rejected the idea that both entities would go to the ballot simultaneously. Karadzic claimed that simultaneous elections would remind his people of the "old days," the time when Bosnia was a Federal Republic of Communist Yugoslavia. By holding elections concurrently with the Federation, the Bosnian Serbs would be admitting a political union they wished to ignore. Owen responded that in this peace agreement, Bosnia would continue as a single state. They must recognize that the two entities would work together under a governmental superstructure.

The Bosnian Serbs didn't seem to hear. Their antipathy extended toward the proposal for direct elections. As Milosevic had said, Pale was not ready to empower its people to elect a central "Bosnian" government. Rather, they expected that the Srpska government would send its delegates to the central government, much as a state sends an ambassador to an international organization. They did not wish to see even the weak national government of the American plan, nor did they wish to have an elected national parliament. In fact, the Bosnian Serbs rejected all of the central political functions that Milosevic had accepted. To them, the joint presidency's control over "foreign affairs" referred not to external relations, but internal ones among the two entities. Karadzic even complained that the joint presidency, or, as he called it, the "one-half of hell," was unacceptable. Any common ties, save the UN seat, were unacceptable -- quite simply, the Serbs wanted their own state.

The U.S. team had to enlist Milosevic's help, explaining to him that his colleagues' attitudes were entirely counterproductive and damaging to the peace process. Once again, the burden was on Milosevic to deliver the Bosnian Serbs. By Sunday morning, August 24, he orchestrated an endgame in which he joined the talks shortly after the U.S. had tabled a new draft and bullied the Bosnian Serbs into agreement. This worked flawlessly. All the Bosnian Serb bluster had gone for naught -- the final text was only moderately altered from the one presented by the U.S. The word "simultaneous" was removed from the elections, as was the call for holding them "directly." The Bosnian Serbs accepted the joint presidency and parliament, although the number within the presidency reduced to three (it had been six). The functions of the central government were trimmed, leaving only foreign affairs and international financial matters as enumerated powers. Finally, they rejected Sacirbey's proposal to empower the state to

raise revenues, ensuring that they would not be held liable for any debts of the Sarajevo government.  

While Hill, Owen, and Pardew were on their way back from Belgrade on September 24, Sacirbey sat down at the White House with Tony Lake and Peter Tarroff. This Sunday afternoon meeting was to be the final “systems-check” before the Bosnian Foreign Minister went to New York for the coming week’s events at the UN. Sacirbey explained that the “further agreed principles” draft — the one he had seen before the Belgrade talks — was a good one. However, he said that he had just talked with Izetbegovic, who was very concerned that Owen, Hill and Pardew had gone to Belgrade to meet with the Bosnian Serbs. The Bosnians were worried that the U.S. team had been contaminated with “Belgrade air,” and insisted that the three visit Sarajevo immediately to review the changes. “President Izetbegovic is not going to tolerate your people going and [only- dealing with Milosevic],” Sacirbey said. “This is not a deal between Milosevic and you, but between all of us. The optics look bad; you need to spend more time in Sarajevo to show balance.” Lake tried to reassure Sacirbey, promising that Holbrooke would visit Sarajevo first during the next shuttle round.  

After the meeting, U.S. officials wondered whether this would be enough to satisfy the Bosnians. They did not want to scuttle an agreement in New York because they had overlooked Sarajevo for Belgrade. Izetbegovic then made the decision for them. In a public announcement, he said that due to the “lack of progress” in the constitutional talks, the Bosnians would boycott the New York meeting. Clearly, the Bosnians were prepared to scuttle the entire agreement to get Owen, Hill and Pardew back to Sarajevo. Late Sunday afternoon, Holbrooke reached the three envoys by phone while they were refueling in Shannon, Ireland, and asked them to return to the Balkans.  

Arriving in Sarajevo the morning of September 25, the three tired and unhappy U.S. negotiators met with Izetbegovic and Silajdzic to review the latest draft principles.

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5 Details of these meetings from “Meeting with Bosnian Serbs, September 23-24, 1995,” tape-recorded notes by John Burley; Holbrooke, Hill, Pardew, Owen comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke/Hill interview; and Pardew report to Perry, “Secret talks in Belgrade,” September 24, 1995. Pardew also reported that he had held preliminary talks with the Bosnian Serbs on the map, in which he observed that they seemed more interested in trading Gorazde than Milosevic. On 51-49, Pardew said that “my guess is that they will take it easier than the Federation right now. Over the weekend, both Milosevic and Karadzic also engaged Pardew several times on a NATO implementation force. They both seemed fearful of it, with Milosevic urging that it be small. “No on [sic] will challenge even a small NATO force… we want peace, not war with NATO,” Milosevic told Pardew. Pardew responded that a large force was necessary, but that if there are no problems, [NATO] forces can go home quickly.” For details of territorial talks, see, respectively, “Draft Republika Spska Territorial Proposal”, “Territorial Principles”; and “Republika Srpska Territorial Points”, all dated September 24, 1995, Pardew notebooks, Shuttle III.  
6 Lake and Tarroff were joined by Don Kerrick, the NSC’s Alexander Vershbow, and Leon Fueth of the Vice President’s office. For details of this meeting, see Kerrick comment, Dayton History Seminar; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; and Kerrick notes, September 24, 1995.  
7 Kerrick interview; Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996.  
8 Immediately after the White House meeting with Sacirbey, the State Department had prepared a cable for Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic explaining that the talks in Belgrade had gone well but that due to logistical reasons, Owen, Hill and Pardew would not be able to visit Sarajevo, but it would be the first stop of the next shuttle. Before the cable went out, the decision was made to turn the delegation around. See “Official-Informal,” Cable (Draft), September 24, 1995; EUR files. For details of decision to turn the team around, see Holbrooke, Hill, Kerrick comments, Dayton History Seminar; and Holbrooke/Hill interview. For announcement of Bosnian pullout, see Kit Roane, “Bosnian Says it Will Shun Peace Talks in U.S.,” New York Times, September 25, 1995.
The Bosnians challenged some of the changes, particularly the removal of direct elections for parliament. Silajdžić was highly critical. But as he described his problems, the U.S. team saw that the Prime Minister was not upset over the changes made in Belgrade, but with Sacirbey's changes made the Friday before in Washington (September 22). Silajdžić objected to the presidential bias of the principles, where the joint presidency would have exclusive responsibility over such areas as foreign relations and international financial matters, as well as the ability to appoint a cabinet. The prime minister favored an arrangement closer to a parliamentary system, where the legislature would appoint a cabinet and the joint presidency would act as the head of state with little real governing power.9

To break this impasse, the Americans suggested some slight compromises, such as complete separation between the joint presidency and parliament, and made some minor concessions, such as returning the provision for direct elections. In other areas, they fell back on old negotiating staples—deferral and ambiguity. Rather than making the joint presidency responsible to appoint a cabinet, the principles simply stated that a cabinet would exist. Foreign policy remained as the only specific policy area the government was empowered to run, though it was made unclear whether control would be executive or legislative. The provision for raising funds was dropped entirely. Finally, the principles outlined that all other aspects of the management and operation of the government would be negotiated in "the immediate future."10 After some prodding, Izetbegovic agreed to these principles. In the end, the three Sarajevo leaders had done more to change the principles (that were predominantly theirs in the first place) than the Bosnian Serbs.

Shortly after 10am (EST) on September 25, Owen called Secretary Christopher in New York to report on the changes and announce that Izetbegovic and Silajdžić had agreed to the new text. Hill immediately faxed the draft to Holbrooke, and Christopher called Izetbegovic to thank him for his cooperation. The Bosnian President assured the Secretary that Sacirbey would attend the next day's meeting.11 But, as what was becoming a Balkan pattern to the U.S. negotiators, the "final" agreement was hardly the last word. When Holbrooke received the draft principles that morning, his aide Philip Goldberg grimly said that the Serbs would never accept the Bosnian revisions. He was right.12

Holbrooke and his aides began to work the phones, contacting Milosevic in Belgrade to try to work out another compromise. Christopher and Holbrooke briefed the President and the rest of the Principals via video teleconference on the troubled negotiations.13 In separate afternoon meetings with the three Balkan Foreign Ministers to discuss the overall progress of the peace process, Christopher, Albright and Holbrooke urged that the remaining differences on these principles be cleared away. Turning to other issues, the Americans expressed concern about the continuing offensive in western Bosnia. The Muslim-Croat division remained apparent. Croat Foreign Minister Granic

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9 Hill/Holbrooke interview.
11 Hill/Holbrooke interview; for telcon of phone call, see "The Secretary and President A. Izetbegovic, September 25, 1995," Cable, State 229436, September 27, 1995.
12 Holbrooke/Hill interview.
said that Zagreb's support for the offensive was over, while Sacirbey raged that a cease-fire would freeze an unjust status quo. (Although the Bosnian Foreign Minister had told the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov only three days before that the Bosniaks would work for a cease-fire soon, they clearly weren't ready yet.) Finally, when the Eastern Slavonian issue was raised, all agreed that its resolution was essential to the peace process. However, no one seemed eager when Holbrooke suggested concrete ways to move these negotiations forward.  

Throughout the remainder of that day and into the night, U.S. officials in New York worked to hammer out the “further agreed principles.” Whether by phone or in person, these were difficult negotiations. The concept of direct elections remained a non-starter for Milosevic. He asked that the provision for elections “by popular vote”—which had been readd in Sarajevo—be removed. The Serb leader also argued against “exclusive” foreign policy powers of the new government. The Geneva agreement had stated that each entity could make certain international arrangements, particularly economic ones, with outside countries, and the word “exclusive” seemed to limit that right. In several phone calls that night, Holbrooke tried to cajole the Serbian leader, dangling ambiguously the carrot of “good things” to follow if they solved the problem, particularly the “exclusive” issue.  

Milosevic’s objections ran aground with the Bosniaks. In a meeting that night in his suite at the Plaza Hotel in New York, Holbrooke pressed Sacirbey to concede Milosevic’s point on direct elections. The Bosnian Foreign Minister argued that the only way democracy could work in Bosnia was if leaders were popularly decided. He claimed that otherwise, the Bosnian Serbs would be able to stage sham elections to legitimize their illegal control. Nonsense, Holbrooke rejoined, the Bosniaks already had guarantees (in the Geneva agreement) that an international body would supervise these elections to assure their legitimacy. Even the United States did not insist on purely direct elections for its president, Holbrooke explained. Sacirbey stood his ground, explaining as well that his government would not accept dropping exclusive foreign policy powers. The meeting got very tense, with both Holbrooke and Sacirbey losing their tempers. In the heat of the shouting match, Sacirbey threatened to leave. As the evening wore on, Christopher and Holbrooke saw that nothing was going to get solved that night. It was getting late (past 2am in the Balkans), and they decided to call it a day. They informed Milosevic and Izetbegovic that the next morning, their telephonic diplomacy would begin again at 6am EST.  

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15 Holbrooke interview; Holbrooke detailed these disagreements to Perina in Belgrade and Ambassador Menzies in Sarajevo. See Fax to SWO Operations Center (to be passed to Embassy Belgrade and Sarajevo) from Holbrooke, September 25, 1995, 9:40pm EST.

16 Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke interview; Holbrooke fax to Perina/Menzies, September 25, 1995. The drama of this evening was also reported in the press. See, for example, Michael Dobbs, “Bosnian Foes Near Pact on Constitution; Nature of Elections Still a Sticking Point,” Washington Post, September 25, 1995.
Before seven the next morning, Christopher and Holbrooke were on the phone with Izetbegovic. Christopher demanded that the Bosnian President give in, and Izetbegovic finally conceded. The word “exclusively” was dropped concerning foreign policy powers, as well as the reference to “direct” elections. But the game was not over yet. Two hours later, as Christopher, Holbrooke, and other U.S. officials prepared for the talks on the 12th floor of the U.S. UN mission, Sacirbey called to say that the Bosnians had changed their minds. Apparently, he had called his president and talked him out of his pledge to the Secretary of State. Outraged, Christopher and Holbrooke immediately summoned the Bosnian Foreign Minister to meet with them in Madeleine Albright’s office.

The Secretary of State was getting his first real taste of Balkan negotiations, and he was not happy. Indeed, Holbrooke later reflected that he had never seen him so mad. When Sacirbey arrived, Christopher ignored his outstretched hand, and sternly asked: “what the hell is going on here?” The Bosnian President had made a deal, and now, with time running short, Sacirbey was backing him out of it. Christopher proceeded to have “a firm exchange” with the Bosnian Foreign Minister “about the fact that this had been agreed to by his president and we would proceed on that basis.” Without resolution, they had to attend a previously scheduled Contact Group meeting where the Balkan foreign ministers were supposed to signal their assent. Christopher, Holbrooke and Sacirbey went into the meeting as planned, but with none of their differences solved. None of the other representatives were aware of the new problems, and convened thinking a deal was ready. Christopher opened the meeting, allowed the press to take some pictures, and then adjourned it quickly. With the other Contact Group members utterly confused, the Americans and Sacirbey returned to Albright’s suite to continue their talks.

Christopher proceeded to press the Foreign Minister, but to no avail. The morning’s talks were interrupted several times as both the Secretary and Sacirbey had to attend other meetings. At one point, Sacirbey left to deliver a speech before the UN General Assembly, returning later to argue with Holbrooke. When the Secretary returned, he and Holbrooke told Sacirbey that the time for hedging was over. In several hours, they said, President Clinton would make an announcement from the White House. He would either praise the New York agreement or criticize the Bosnians for their obstinacy -- it was up to Sacirbey and his president to decide which message Clinton would deliver. Sacirbey called Izetbegovic, relating the American ultimatum. Shortly thereafter he told Christopher that the Bosnians would return to the pledge Izetbegovic had made that morning. In exchange, the Americans promised to pursue “direct” elections later in the negotiations, and allowed Sacirbey to speak of an undivided Sarajevo in his acceptance announcement. The Contact Group and Balkan Foreign Ministers were quickly reconvened, and the “further agreed principles” were blessed.

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20 For details of these talks, see Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke comments, Dayton History Seminar; Holbrooke/Hill interview.
21 For final copy of Further Agreed Principles and accompanying joint statement, see U.S. Department of State Dispatch, The Dayton Peace Accords, March 1996.
Shortly before 4pm, President Clinton made the formal announcement from the White House Briefing Room. Substantive, the agreement to the "further agreed principles" -- or "New York principles" -- was a significant accomplishment. For the first time, the parties had agreed to shared institutions of power -- a joint presidency, a national parliament, and a constitutional court. These New York principles provided the state institutions vital to establishing and maintaining the broader concepts -- such as a single Bosnian state -- outlined over two weeks before in Geneva. Yet, both agreements were only initial steps. Alone, they could not assure a lasting peace. But they did bring the parties closer together, and the U.S. hoped that each side would view them as a reason to engage in further negotiations, possibly at an international peace conference. Holbrooke planned to return to the region in two days, hoping to begin to lay the groundwork for the final stage of negotiations.

But the road to New York also provided a glimpse of the challenges ahead. Perhaps the most troublesome was the festering division of the Bosnian camp. The gyrations of the past 48 hours had not been about problems with the Serbs, but over Izetbegovic and Sacirbey's rivalry with Silajdzic. Although Sacirbey had complained about Milosevic's changes, the American negotiators had the impression he was more angry with Silajdzic's alterations. It seemed that with the New York principles, the three Muslim leaders began to see how their decisions would affect their own personal positions in a future Bosnian state. Accordingly, they each tried to mold the principles in ways that would best reflect their future status. The U.S. found itself not only serving as mediator among the three Balkan parties, but among the competing personalities and interests within the Sarajevo government itself.

Return to the Region

Two days after the agreement to the New York principles, the Holbrooke delegation returned to the region for the fourth time. In Geneva and New York, the U.S. had successfully gotten the parties to agree to critical steps toward a final, comprehensive settlement. Now, they believed, was the time to push the parties to convene at a peace conference overseen by the U.S. President Clinton had expressed as much in a September 23 call to German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. "Many serious issues remain, but I think a settlement can be reached in the coming weeks," the President said. "I believe now we can bring negotiations to a conclusion."

Shuttle diplomacy had produced the building blocks of a future Balkan state, but as was obvious, major differences remained. Many difficult issues that had been left out of the Geneva and New York agreements would need to be settled, as well any

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23 Holbrooke/Hill interview.

discussions concerning territory, which promised to be the most contentious. The shuttle team believed that the best way to bridge these final gaps was to convene a peace conference. The model in mind was for "proximity talks," in which the three Balkan presidents would meet and be housed in the same area for the duration of the talks. With the parties lodged in separate buildings in close proximity to each other, the U.S. could continue its shuttle diplomacy, but by foot rather than by plane. In this way, the conference would allow for several weeks of intensive negotiations in which maximum pressure could be brought to bear on the parties.

Holbrooke believed that in order to maximize U.S. leverage, proximity talks should be held on American soil. However, he realized that such a decision would likely further agitate the Europeans. He first discussed this with French Foreign Minister de Charette during a September 27 meeting in New York, who made a "big pitch" to have the conference in Evian, France. Before leaving for the Balkans that week, Holbrooke also raised the issue with Milutinovic and Sacirbey. In what Holbrooke described as a joint meeting "with much agreement and little rancor," the two foreign ministers expressed a strong preference for an American site. They said that U.S. prestige was needed for a settlement to be reached, and that a European venue would be too easy to leave if the talks broke down. Milutinovic "heaped scorn" on holding the conference in France, stating that Evian was the "last place" the Serbs wanted to go. "Who do they think we are, the Algerians?" he quipped to Holbrooke. Moments before he left on this fourth shuttle, Holbrooke also called Vice President Gore from New York's La Guardia Airport to discuss the issue. The Vice President concurred that the logic for a U.S. site was strong, and that he would discuss the issue with the President.

The timing and venue issues were formally described for the Principals in an interagency document that represented the "unanimous views" of the negotiating team. In it, they outlined that the talks should be held in the U.S., recommending a place close to a major metropolitan area such as New York City. By holding the talks in relative isolation outside New York, the memorandum argued, the parties could be sealed off from the press, but close enough to Washington that the talks could benefit from high-level intervention (such as Secretary Christopher or NSC Advisor Lake). While the three parties would be represented by their presidents, the conference would be co-chaired by Holbrooke, Bildt, and Russian Contact Group envoy Ivanov. If an agreement was reached at the talks, a signing summit could be held in Washington, with President Clinton presiding.

27 Philip Goldberg interview, October 31, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996.
28 Although presented as an "unanimous view," this proposal was based primarily on Holbrooke's views. Jim Pardew, for example, had advised Holbrooke that proximity talks be held below the presidential level, and then the three Balkan presidents could convene to finalize the agreement at a peace conference. Pardew suggested that the talks could be held at a European locale such as Italy. See memorandum to Holbrooke from Pardew, "Next Steps," September 28, 1995.
29 State Department Chief of Staff Tom Donilon had called Holbrooke on September 30 to say that Washington officials needed a decision memorandum on the proposed site for peace talks. Holbrooke then had Don Kerrick call Vershbow at the NSC to brief him on the team's views, and asked that Vershbow and
The shuttle team departed for Sarajevo the evening of September 28. In addition to seeking agreement to begin proximity talks, the shuttle team aimed to broker a country-wide cease-fire. A cease-fire supposedly had been one of the central components of the U.S. peace initiative — indeed, it was outlined clearly in Lake’s August talking points. Led by Holbrooke, the shuttle team had thus far resisted this pledge to end the fighting, and Washington had deferred to them despite many views to do otherwise. In Holbrooke’s view, as long as the Muslims and Croats were successful and remained within certain bounds (such as not taking Banja Luka), the negotiation was being decided on the battlefield, improving the chances for a settlement. Although Holbrooke had written to Christopher on September 19 that the Muslim-Croat gains were helping the peace process, by the end of the month he began to consider the timing of a possible cease-fire.

Several factors fed into this consideration. First, as was evident from the comments expressed during the September 21 PC meeting, most officials in Washington were uneasy with encouraging more violence in Bosnia, even if it was in favor of the Muslims and Croats. Aware that their superiority were worried about the fighting, the shuttle team sought to link a conference announcement to a cease-fire. They recommended that if a cease-fire agreement was reached during this negotiating round, the President announce the achievement and outline the U.S. plan for peace talks.

Secondly, as evidenced by Tadić’s performance with Izetbegovic on September 19, it appeared that Croatia’s tolerance for sacrifices was waning. Apparently accomplishing most of their strategic objectives, the Croatians weren’t enthusiastic about risking their own troops to help the Bosnians. “Frankly, we have one basic problem,” a U.S. official was quoted saying in the press, “Tadić just does not particularly like Muslims.” Foreign Minister Granic had told Christopher and Holbrooke at their September 25 meeting in New York that Croatia was no longer providing artillery.

the NSC’s John Schmidt draft the decision memo for the Principals. See “Issue for Decision: Venue for Balkans Proximity Peace Talks,” no date, no author. However, the opening sentence of the memorandum reads: “This memorandum contains the unanimous views and recommendations of all Interagency Principals on the Bosnia Delegation.” See also Visher interview, December 17, 1996.

Holbrooke outlined these twin goals — proximity talks and cease-fire — in a September 29 letter to Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Ivanov. “With the ‘agreed basic principles’ guiding our discussions, I plan to initiate a cease-fire discussion among the parties,” Holbrooke wrote. “I feel this is the next logical step in the process. All parties have an interest in establishing a cease-fire soon and the coming onset of winter gives them an additional reason to agree... If all goes well on these discussions, our next focus will be an agreement on proximity talks. Though the substantial remaining differences among the parties makes a peace conference premature, proximity talks provide an opportunity to keep momentum going and provide a psychological incentive to make progress.” See “Briefing Contact Group on Ongoing Negotiations,” Cable, State 232176, September 29, 1995.

Holbrooke had resisted this since the beginning of his shuttles. As he later reflected, he told the President had his senior advisors as early as August 23 that “unless we were given specific instructions to the contrary... our negotiating team was not going to seek a cease-fire just when the trend on the battlefield was finally helpful to the Bosnians.” See Holbrooke memoirs, draft Chapter 2, September 21, 1996, pp25-26.

Indeed, on September 19 INR drafted for Holbrooke a memorandum outlining the differences between “cease-fires” and agreements on “cessation of hostilities.” The ten-page paper outlined the historical evolution of these terms of art, and also delineated legal issues that may arise in connection with brokering a cease-fire or cessation of hostilities agreement. See memorandum to Holbrooke from Toby Gati (INR), “Bosnia -- Cease-fire Consideration,” September 19, 1995.

support for the Muslims, and had explained to the press that since the successful military offensive had “established a new reality,” it should end. “We believe that this is the right time for the end of war and for a final just peace,” Granic told the Washington Post.\textsuperscript{34} On the other hand, the Muslims were happy to be finally scoring victories, and wanted to press forward. The team was concerned that these diverging objectives almost guaranteed bad news for continued fighting. Without Croat support, they feared that the Muslims would begin to suffer defeats against the Bosnian Serbs. Every time the Muslims fought without Croat support, they “got their ass handed to them,” Chris Hill recalled.\textsuperscript{35} And, as Tudjman’s outrageous display on September 19 showed, if Sarajevo continued to act against Zagreb’s wishes, the Federation’s problems would certainly get worse. Clashes had already occurred between Muslim and Croat troops, resulting in several deaths.\textsuperscript{36} In New York, Sacirbey had told Holbrooke how much he distrusted Tudjman, stressing that “the peace process could be held up by differences in the Federation.”\textsuperscript{37} President Clinton himself understood this problem, explaining in his September 23 phone call with Kohl that a “strong Bosnian-Croat alliance is critical to the success of the peace process,” and that “it [the Federation] must not blow up. We don’t want to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.”\textsuperscript{38}

Fueling these concerns was the third factor, the apparent revival of the Bosnian Serb Army. By September 24, the battle lines had stabilized, and the UN reported that the BSA was mounting successful counterattacks against Croat and Bosnian forces.\textsuperscript{39} There was evidence that Belgrade’s cooperation with the BSA, which was apparently minimal earlier that month, had resumed significantly. U.S. intelligence reported that the cooperation between the Yugoslav and Bosnian Serb armies was “very good and stronger than ever.”\textsuperscript{40} To Holbrooke, the situation metaphorically resembled the moment of a perfect tennis serve, in which the ball is momentarily stationary over a player’s head; it’s no longer rising, it’s not beginning to fall yet.\textsuperscript{41} In other words, the Federation appeared to be reaching what the classic Prussian military strategist Karl von Clausewitz called the “culminating point of victory,” after which an attacker might take on more than can be managed and, therefore, suffer a reverse in gains. Thinking that the Bosnians may not see that they were near their culminating point, the U.S. believed that it would be better for the Federation to stop before the “ball” began to drop.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{34} For quote, see John Pomfret, “Bosnian Serb Losses Could Aid Peace Efforts; Officials Begin to See ‘The Right Time’ for End to War, but Settlement Horizons Remain,” Washington Post, September 25, 1995.

\textsuperscript{35} Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996.

\textsuperscript{36} Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; New York Times, September 28, 1995. U.S. intelligence reported that the strains within the Federation were very evident, and that “the only apparent antidote to polarization is international pressure.” See “Bosnian Federation: International Pressure is Still the Only Counterweight to Increasing Polarization,” Cable, Madrid 10242, October 2, 1995.

\textsuperscript{37} Holbrooke to Christopher, September 29, 1995.

\textsuperscript{38} Clinton-Kohl telegram.


\textsuperscript{40} Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; See also Clark interview, July 15, 1996.

\textsuperscript{41} To Clausewitz, recognizing that an attack had reached its culminating point was difficult. He explained that “it is even possible that the attacker, reinforced by the psychological forces peculiar to attack, will in spite of his exhaustion find it less difficult to go on than to stop — like a horse pulling a load uphill… this demonstrates how an attacker can overshoot the point at which, if he stopped and assumed the defensive,
Sarajevo-Belgrade-Zagreb

As pledged earlier that week after the fracas surrounding the Hill/Owen/Pardew trip to Belgrade, the Holbrooke team's first stop was Sarajevo. It would be important to show the Bosnians that the U.S. had not been "contaminated" by the Serbs. Holbrooke believed that the Bosnians were "pathologically unnerved" by the amount of time his team had spent in Belgrade, and this image had begun to erode their sense of trust in the Americans. Pardew expressed a similar view, recommending to Holbrooke that the team spend more time with the Bosnians rather than Milosevic, because "compared to Sarajevo, Belgrade will be easy the rest of the way."43

When the delegation sat down with Izetbegovic and Silajdziec the morning of September 29, they discussed the cease-fire and next steps for the negotiations. Without committing himself to a cease-fire, Izetbegovic outlined three terms as preconditions for his agreement: restoring utilities to Sarajevo; assuring the full demilitarization of Banja Luka; and opening a road to Gorazde for humanitarian relief.44 All three seemed fair to Holbrooke and his team. Holbrooke then outlined three ground rules for a future peace conference: that each delegation would be empowered to decide for their government (in other words, no ratification process); that delegations could not threaten to leave the talks; and that no press would be allowed. Also, Holbrooke said that there could not be a separate Bosnian Serb delegation - Milosevic would have to negotiate on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs.

Finally, the Holbrooke team and Bosnians discussed the role of a NATO-led military force in implementing a settlement. At that time, NATO planners in Brussels were already in the process of planning for an implementation force, or IFOR.45 Again, the Bosnian president presented his opening position, listing that a NATO force must perform such duties as: enforcing the withdrawal of BSA forces from Federation territory; providing protection for elections; guaranteeing freedom of movement, humanitarian relief, and the return of refugees; and defining and enforcing the Bosnia's border with Croatia and Serbia. This last request had not yet been considered by military planners as an IFOR role, and Pardew warned Holbrooke that this would be a hugely expensive and dangerous undertaking. Holbrooke's first impulse was to support this proposal, but agreed to consider it more carefully.46

Izetbegovic's vision of NATO's implementation tasks meant that the Bosnians expected IFOR to deploy in Serb-held areas, not just Federation territory. Up to that point, NATO military planners had pushed to limit IFOR's responsibilities only to Federation lands, in order to avoid the threat from conducting activities in "hostile" Serb-controlled territories. It now seemed likely, however, that in order for Bosnia to remain

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44 Although the siege of Sarajevo had been lifted by the September 13 agreement, the city still had no gas supplies.
45 See, for example, "September 8 Trilateral Meeting at NATO on Bosnia Peace Plan Implementation,"
46 Details from this meeting from Pardew phone call to KC Brown, OSD (Dale Waters [EUR/RFM notes]), September 29, 1995; and Kerrick notes, September 29, 1995. See also Bruce Clark and Harriet Martin, "Bosnians Take Tough Ceasefire Stance," Financial Times, October 1, 1995.
undivided, NATO troops would have to be deployed in both the Federation and Srpska. As General Clark reported that day to Shalikashvili, "there is a real risk that IFOR would inadvertently solidify the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina" if its deployment was limited to the Federation.  

Clark also described the implications of NATO support for elections security, refugee return, and freedom of movement. Obviously, such tasks entailed a far more intrusive mandate for IFOR than mere separation of forces or securing cease-fire lines, and the military was understandably concerned that such duties put troops at greater risk. "Providing security to the elections process in the Serb entity would entail additional risks for our forces," Clark explained. "It will require a degree of international election and police support which will be difficult to muster. Although the total population is only about 60% of Haiti's or Cambodia's, the terrain, returning refugees, and ingrained hatred will add immeasurably to the difficulties in preventing incidents."

Although a peace agreement was still far from guaranteed, the negotiations had entered a phase in which the military would have to make some hard choices about the risks they would be willing to run to implement a viable settlement. The diplomatic initiative was premised upon a military commitment to Bosnia -- whether in support of a UNPROFOR pullout under 40104 or to implement a peace settlement -- but the specific decisions about the shape and scope of the commitment were critical to the dangers troops would face. Determining IFOR's tasks and area of deployment were not just questions of military logistics. Such choices cut to the core of the Administration's commitment to this effort: how much was the U.S. prepared to pay in blood and treasure for lasting peace in Bosnia? For the time being, such critical answers could be deferred. Clark suggested that the Holbrooke delegation would continue to explore needs in the region. Nevertheless, he said, "[W]e would appreciate any rudder" Washington could provide.

Beyond the significant substantive ground covered, this Sarajevo meeting also helped to reduce some of the tension in the U.S.-Bosnian relationship. Silajdzic, who had been the most recent winner of the Bosnian intramurals, was much more cheerful and cooperative than before. As Ambassador Menzies has relayed to Holbrooke the day before, Silajdzic was pleased with the results of New York and was attempting "to salve bilateral bruises" recently inflicted on the relationship. On the other hand, Mo Sacirbey's performance earlier that week had cast great doubts about his reliability. After New York, Pardew noted that Sacirbey was "inconsistent...seized with the public limelight for its own sake, and an outsider in Sarajevo." Although the team had once been wary of Sacirbey's rival, Silajdzic, some now believed that he could be the least troublesome Bosnian negotiator. "If we convince Silajdzic and stay with him in dealing with Izetbegovic," Pardew had advised Holbrooke, "our troubles with the fractious Sarajevo government will be reduced." Holbrooke apparently was willing to explore this avenue, joining Silajdzic that night for a private dinner.

The next day, September 30, the Holbrooke team left Sarajevo for Belgrade. En route, they stopped in Zagreb, where they met with Assistant Secretary John Shattuck.

47 Memorandum to CJCS/VCJSC from Clark, "Daily Negotiations Update, 29 Sept," October 2, 1995. Unless otherwise noted, all references below are from this document.  
49 Pardew observations from his memorandum to Holbrooke, September 28, 1995.
For the past two days, Shattuck had been in the region to investigate human rights, particularly those in the wake of the July massacre at Srebrenica. He and Holbrooke had discussed this trip in New York on September 27, where they decided that any information uncovered by Shattuck would be passed on to Holbrooke for use in his negotiations. As Shattuck later reflected, these investigative missions to the region provided the “opportunity to help U.S. negotiators raise the price of criminal conduct” by “spotlighting atrocities against civilians the moment they occurred, securing commitments from leaders to end atrocities or face additional NATO bombing or sanctions, moving the War Crimes Tribunal to center stage as a way of raising the personal costs of criminal leadership, and refusing to negotiate with indicted war criminals.” Holbrooke could use Shattuck’s discoveries to prod the Balkan leaders — particularly Tudjman and Milosevic — to end the ethnic atrocities that had come to characterize Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Both Shattuck and Holbrooke, therefore, felt it was essential to be “even-handed” in these investigations, pointing up Croatian and Bosnian abuses as well as Serb. As a result, the two Assistant Secretaries decided that it was imperative for Shattuck to go to the Krajina and get proof that the Croats too were culpable.

With his public fact-finding trips, Shattuck’s mere presence in the region was a useful reminder to the parties that the U.S. was watching and prepared to punish them for human rights abuses. There were, however, lingering concerns from some in the State Department that focusing on human rights would complicate the negotiations and draw attention away from the more important strategic components of a settlement, such as creating a government and territorial borders. Many also argued that these high-level missions were dangerous and better handled by the embassies in the region, as Galbraith had already been doing in the Krajina. But Christopher and Holbrooke wanted to show that this was not ‘business as usual.’ They believed that Shattuck’s investigations would bolster the negotiating effort by providing both symbolic power and strategic leverage. In his memoirs, Holbrooke reflects that while Shattuck’s role was “sometimes controversial,” he proved indispensable to the negotiations: “His trips were a constant public statement that even as we sought peace, we were not abandoning the quest for justice. In the end, even the skeptics, who at first argued that the human rights mission could be handled by the embassies in the region, saw the value that came from a special emissary with a single focus.”

During the hour-long meeting at the Zagreb airport, Shattuck and Ambassador Galbraith explained to the delegation the evidence of Croat human rights abuses against Serbs in the Krajina. Galbraith, reiterating a point he had often made publicly, said that there could be no peaceful reintegration of the Krajina into Croatia unless the Serbs felt

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50 Ambassador Galbraith and Shattuck had also discussed an exploratory trip to Croatia earlier that month, specifically to investigate alleged Croat abuses against Krajina Serbs. Shattuck had begun pressing the Croats on human rights abuses during a September 27 meeting with Foreign Minister Granic at the UN. See message from Galbraith to Shattuck, “Official-Informal,” Cable, Zagreb 3508, September 11, 1995; Shattuck to Galbraith, “Official-Informal,” Cable, State 217607, September 13, 1995; and “Assistant Secretary Shattuck Raises Human Rights Concerns with Croatian Foreign Minister Granic,” Cable, U.S.UN 3742, September 28, 1995. For details of the U.S. human rights strategy in Bosnia and how it related to the negotiations, see Shattuck’s unpublished report, “From Nuremberg to Dayton: The Struggle For Peace With Justice in Bosnia,” and Shattuck interview, July 30, 1996.

51 For background, see Holbrooke draft memoirs, Chapter 13 (April 8, 1997), pp12-15.
that they would be treated as equal citizens of Croatia. Unfortunately, he explained, this prospect appeared far off. Also, they discussed the recent new round of ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serbs against Muslim civilians around Banja Luka. The primary culprit was suspected to be Zeliko Raznatovic, commonly known as Arkan. This Serb paramilitary leader was considered one of the most murderous Serbs in Bosnia. It was widely suspected that Arkan had connections to the Serbian Interior Ministry in Belgrade, and Holbrooke promised to raise his activities with Milosevic.32

That evening in Belgrade, Milosevic brushed aside the Arkan problem, telling the delegation that the Serb thug was a “peanut issue” and would be handled. Turning to Izetbegovic’s proposed terms for a cease-fire, Milosevic was generally cooperative, agreeing to explore possibilities for providing gas to Sarajevo. As expected, he was similarly agreeable on the issue of proximity talks, saying it was now time to convene a conference.33

The Serbs were generally satisfied with the outcome of the New York meeting, although they felt they had compromised more than others. Overall, indications were that Belgrade was ready to conclude a deal. Milosevic reportedly was “pleased” by the way talks had gone thus far, and had judged that “there are no significant problems with the U.S.” Perhaps such complacency was the reason why Holbrooke decided to tweak Milosevic on war crimes. In any event, the Serb leader seemed ready to sign a peace agreement and, importantly, “benefit from the suspension of sanctions,” which he wanted lifted before the onset of winter.34

The next morning, October 1, the U.S. team returned to Zagreb to meet with the Croatian leadership. Holbrooke and Galbraith met alone with Tudjman, while the rest of the delegation met with Defense Minister Susak. Tudjman was clearly irritated by Shattuck’s public assertions about Croatian human rights abuses, exclaiming that he “was surprised” by the criticism. While Croatia sought “partnership and friendship” with the U.S., Tudjman explained, he could not accept such bad publicity. On Eastern Slavonia, he agreed once more to cooperate with the U.S., and with almost no discussion, he agreed to attend proximity talks.

Despite all the talk in Washington, Belgrade and Sarajevo about a cease-fire, Holbrooke still believed that they should still try to squeeze a few more advantageous drops from the drying military fruit. In his view, the Federation’s culminating point was near, but had not yet arrived. In a private meeting with Tudjman that day, Holbrooke discussed the prospects for a cease-fire, which he said he expected in ten days. Yet, stressing that some valuable territorial gains were left, Holbrooke urged the Croat President to “do whatever you can militarily in the next week.” As he had done before, Holbrooke recommended key towns to the Croat leader: “I would hope that you can take Prejidor, Sanski Most, and Bosanski Novi. If you take this, you will have land to give away.” Tudjman listened carefully to Holbrooke’s recommendations, explaining that he

32 Account of Shattuck and Galbraith’s September 27-28 search for human rights abuses from Galbraith
Diplomatic Diary, pp63-64; and Shattuck interview, July 25, 1996.
33 For details of this meeting, see Kerrick notes, September 30, 1995.
34
would consider undertaking joint operations with the Muslims, since "they can't take territory on their own." Later that day, Susak promised to raise this issue with his Bosnian counterparts.\(^{55}\)

**A Decision on Venue**

Following a luncheon meeting with UN Civilian Representative Akashi, the team departed for Sofia, Bulgaria, where they met with Bulgarian officials including President Zhelyu Zhelev, who was thought of as a genuine democratic reformer. The trip to Bulgaria was not directly related to the Bosnian peace process; Holbrooke felt that since he was in the region, a quick visit to Bulgaria, one he had previously promised to make, was feasible. Such a trip would go far in shoring up relations with the former communist state. In these talks, the delegation discussed primarily other European security issues, particularly NATO expansion.\(^{56}\)

As the team settled into Sofia Sheraton Hotel the night of October 1, Holbrooke called Strobe Talbott for an update on Washington's decision-making concerning the location of proximity talks. Talbott explained to Holbrooke that while senior Administration officials supported his call to convene proximity talks, almost no one favored the idea to hold them in the U.S. Apparently Gore's support had waned. "The vote is nine to one against an American venue," Talbott explained, "and I'm one of the nine." He said that only Lake supported Holbrooke, with others preferring that talks be held in Europe. Informed that the issue would be taken up at a PC meeting during the next two days, Holbrooke requested that he be allowed to state his case via secure phone. Talbott demurred, suggesting that Holbrooke instead outline his argument in a cable. After he hung up, Holbrooke spent most of the rest of the night drafting the cable, which he discussed and cleared with his team on the flight to Sarajevo the next day. Returning to Bosnia on October 2, Holbrooke sent the message to Washington from the Sarajevo embassy.\(^{57}\)

Presenting the "unanimous views" of the negotiating team, Holbrooke's cable elaborated on the rationale to hold talks on American soil. "Given the difficulties we will face," Holbrooke explained, "Washington readers of this message may well wonder why they should agree to allow any tripartite negotiations anywhere near the U.S. In fact, our recommendation is derived from the difficulties we face." Holbrooke stated that having the talks at an American site outside of Washington would significantly enhance the chances for success -- "In the U.S., we will have full control of the process; elsewhere, we will probably lose much of our control, reducing our leverage dramatically." Holbrooke described how all the parties wanted to have talks in the U.S., as they felt that it would enhance the prospects for success and, ultimately, help guarantee that an agreement would be respected once signed.

One way an American site would enhance U.S. leverage was by enabling senior officials -- such as Christopher, Lake, Perry and Shalikashvili -- to "drop-by" the talks to

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\(^{55}\) For details of this meeting, see Galbraith Diplomatic Diary, p65, and addendum p2.


\(^{57}\) Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar. According to State Department Operations Center Phone Logs (Shift III), Talbott and Holbrooke talked at 1748 EST. Later that evening (2218 EST; 4:18am in Sofia), Holbrooke called Christopher's Chief of Staff Tom Donilon.
provide extra boosts when needed. For example, Holbrooke explained, “Christopher was indispensable in the difficult morning hours in New York last Tuesday; his availability on short notice was critical, and will be again during the talks in ways that are not easily compatible high-profile and hard-to-schedule transatlantic travel... this U.S. drop-in advantage, we strongly believe, would immeasurably improve our chances of success.” Also, Holbrooke wrote, the rules of the planned conference (no press, and no leaving the conference site) would be very difficult to enforce outside the U.S.

To preempt the anticipated concern that an American venue increases the costs of failure to the U.S., Holbrooke argued that “such a risk-adverse calculus misses the main point: this Administration’s prestige and standing is already fully engaged in the eyes of both the American public and the world. Failure will be approximately the same whether we meet in New Jersey or New Caledonia. We must maximize the chances of success, not reduce them in anticipation of possible failure.” Even if talks were to fail, Holbrooke believed that given nature of the problem, “the world will still give the U.S. credit for its efforts,” and the Sarajevo cease-fire, Geneva and New York agreements would still stand.

Finally, Holbrooke concluded, the parties willingness to take further chances for peace “will hinge to a great extent on their perception that we -- and not the Europeans -- are driving the process.” If the U.S. gave away the process to the Europeans, Holbrooke believed, it would “stop us in our tracks.” The Europeans would undoubtedly complain (particularly the French, who were “making an all-out bid to take over the process by hosting the talks”), but Holbrooke advised that “they will respect us and come along.” Since the American peace effort first began back in August, “it has been viewed by the parties as a powerful signal that, as de Charette said last week, ‘America is back.’ Similarly, the choice of venue will be seen as a critical indicator of whether we are committed to see this process to its conclusion.”

Holbrooke’s proposal was considered by senior Administration officials at a PC meeting the afternoon of October 2. Secretary Christopher urged his colleagues to take the shuttle team’s views seriously. In addition to Holbrooke’s cable, Holbrooke and Roberts Owen had spoken with Christopher by phone, and the Secretary had agreed to lobby in support of their position. Christopher felt that the decision should really be the lead negotiator’s call: “he had been with the parties; he had a firm recommendation as to where we could be most effective, and that was in the U.S.” The Secretary did, however, address the downsides to hosting a conference in the U.S. “Although the team denies this,” he told his colleagues, “the consequences of failure would be greater because it would be viewed as ‘our conference.’ We would be rolling the dice.” Second, Christopher pointed out that the President could “be drawn into this,” that he could not be isolated from such an important event on American soil. Finally, the Secretary explained that such a decision would likely cause a “rift” in the Contact Group. “The allies and Russians will go bananas if we’re seen as hijacking the process,” he warned.

Although Christopher supported Holbrooke’s recommendation, his concerns resonated with Deputy National Security Advisor Berger, who emerged as the leading skeptic about a U.S. site. Berger was concerned that an American venue would become a

58 See “October 3 Principal’s Committee Meeting,” Cable, Sarajevo 637, October 2, 1995.
59 In addition to Holbrooke’s cable, the PC had the interagency document, “Issue for Decision: Venue for Balkans Proximity Talks.” See memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum (EURO). “Principal’s Committee Meeting: October 2, 1995,” October 2, 1995.
media-circus and increase tensions with Congress. Moreover, he too believed that the Europeans would be very angry, possibly creating problems with critical implementation issues -- such as support for IFOR. Albright concurred with Berger on his latter point, explaining that "the level of European hostility against us is incredible." In her view, a U.S. site "would only magnify our differences over implementation." She also expressed concern that the U.S. would have difficulties allowing suspected war criminals -- such as most of the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic himself -- on American soil.

Lake spoke up in support of the U.S. site, arguing that no matter how angry the Europeans might become, they would still participate in implementation. As a way to assuage their dismay, Lake suggested that the U.S. structure a "two-tiered" peace conference, possibly having some portion of the talks (such as a signing ceremony) in Europe. Although Perry, Shalikashvili and Deutsch supported Lake and Christopher, the group decided to delay sending a decision to the President for a few days. Instead, Lake suggested, they should think harder about "a plan to ameliorate European concerns," and brainstorm about possible venues other than New York or Washington.60

On October 4, the Principals reconvened at the White House to make the final decision on proximity talks.61 After a relatively brief discussion, they agreed to hold the talks at a secluded location in the U.S., removed from Washington or New York but close enough to permit "drop-ins" by senior U.S. officials. In a nod to the Europeans, they decided to leave open the possibility that an agreement would only be initiated at U.S. talks, with an official signing ceremony held at a European venue. Lake lobbyed for a final signing at a U.S. summit hosted by the President, but others felt that "the downsides (presumably from Europe) would be too great." Nevertheless, a final decision was deferred for later. 62 Also, the Principals decided that the Holbrooke team should work with Contact Group partners to develop options for possible follow-on events -- such as "implementation talks" -- in European capitals or Moscow. Soon after this meeting, officials from the NSC, State Department and Pentagon began to consider possible sites.63

While the decision on venue was made, there was still some debate about whether an announcement for proximity talks should be linked with a country-wide cease-fire. To the Holbrooke team, getting a cease-fire was a sine qua non for announcing proximity talks. Holbrooke believed that there could not be peace talks if the parties were still fighting on the ground. He was concerned that if the fighting continued, talks would inevitably be delayed -- and possibly postponed -- while the parties jockeyed for military

60 Details of meeting from VERSHBO interview, December 17, 1996 (VERSHER was the only notetaker at this meeting). See also Christopher interview, October 22, 1996; Holbrooke comment, Dayton History Seminar; and Kerrick notes from "PC debrief: From TL (Tony Lake)."

61 In the meantime, others had already begun thinking about other possible sites. For example, Dan Spiegel of the U.S. UN office in Geneva wrote Tom Donilon on October 3 that if Geneva was chosen, he would need to know soon in order to secure several large villas in and around Geneva, as was done for the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev talks. See "Venue for Bosnia Peace Conference," memorandum to Donilon from Spiegel, October 3, 1995.

62 See notes of October 4 Principals meeting, EUR/SCE electronic files; and Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996.

advantage on the ground. Moreover, the Bosnians might begin to lose, weakening the relatively strong negotiating position they currently had.\(^{64}\)

The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense were sympathetic but less categorical about linking the two. Perry argued that “we should push like hell to get it,” with Christopher explaining that a cease-fire would be beneficial but not essential. “We should not rule out proximity talks if we don’t get it,” Christopher said. Curiously, Tony Lake, who only days before had pressed Holbrooke to flash “red lights” to halt the Bosnian-Croat offensive, was strongly opposed to making proximity talks contingent on a cease-fire. “We should press for [a cease-fire],” he said at the October 4 PC, “but not make it a precondition.” Indeed, according to the “Summary of Conclusions” from the October 4 PC, the Principals in fact decided to support Lake’s recommendation.\(^{65}\)

**Negotiating a Cease-fire**

By October 2, the military situation in western Bosnia had begun to take a turn for the worse. In a counter-offensive, the BSA retook land conquered the previous month by Federation forces. To use Holbrooke’s metaphor, the Muslim-Croat “tennis ball” had reached its apex and was on its way down. Despite Washington’s sentiment to de-link a cease-fire and proximity talks, Holbrooke was determined to forge an end to the fighting that could be announced simultaneously with a decision to convene a peace conference. Indeed, he had told Washington that if he were unable to get a cease-fire, he would hold off on announcing proximity talks and instead continue shuttle diplomacy.\(^{66}\)

When the Holbrooke delegation sat down with Izetbegovic and Mo Sacirbey the afternoon of October 2 in Sarajevo, they raised these setbacks, pressing the Bosnians to consider an immediate cease-fire. Izetbegovic and Sacirbey were reluctant, but reiterated that they might be interested if the Serbs could meet the terms they outlined several days before. Believing that he was on the brink of another military success, Izetbegovic requested that they wait another ten days before agreeing to a cease-fire. Holbrooke countered that to let the fighting continue would be a “big risk,” and that the Bosnians should accept that they’ve gained all they could. The Sarajevo leadership remained noncommittal. On his way to Zagreb that night, Holbrooke told the press that while the “two sides remain in significant disagreement over the type of cease-fire... the talks will go on.”\(^{67}\)

The team spent October 3 in both Zagreb and Belgrade negotiating with the Croats and Serbs on the terms for a possible cease-fire. Meeting with Croat Defense

\(^{64}\) Holbrooke later explained that he was influenced in this decision by a similar situation concerning negotiations over Vietnam. In March of 1968, President Johnson had announced that he was ready to convene talks with the North Vietnamese, but the two sides wasted valuable time deciding when and where to meet as the fighting raged on. For details, see Clark Clifford’s memoirs (which Holbrooke co-authored), *Counsel to the President* (Anchor, 1992), pp527-533.

\(^{65}\) Details of meeting from Vershbow interview, December 17, 1996; Holbrooke interview with author (notes), December 20, 1996; Hill interview with author (notes), December 19, 1996. Also see memorandum for Christopher from Kornblum, “October 3 Principals Committee Meeting on Bosnia,” October 3, 1995; and October 4 “Summary of Conclusions.”

\(^{66}\) See Kornblum to Christopher, October 3, 1995.

Minister Susak and Milosevic, the American team searched for a way to stop the fighting. To Milosevic, Holbrooke said that the U.S. was ready for a cease-fire. The Serb leader agreed that the time was right. The Croats, who only days before Holbrooke had advised to press forward and support the Muslims militarily, were easily convinced that the fighting should now end. The key, then, was the Sarajevo government. Holbrooke was pessimistic about the outlook for success, explaining to Tony Lake that the chances of a cease-fire were 20% at best. Publicly, the Holbrooke team played down the prospects for getting a cease-fire -- but they planned to return to the Bosnian capital the next day to make a strong push for an agreement.

On October 4, the U.S. delegation arrived in Sarajevo. In addition to the meetings that day, Holbrooke would swear-in John Menzies as the first U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia. For almost a year, Menzies had been the U.S. charge in Sarajevo, pending Senate confirmation to be Ambassador. When the Senate vote came through, Holbrooke decided that he would swear Menzies in during a special ceremony held at the Bosnian Presidency. Although the decision to hold the event was routine, Holbrooke saw its possible utility: swearing-in the first U.S. Ambassador to Bosnia with much fanfare might help to reassure the Bosnians that the U.S. was on their side and, more immediately, convince them to agree to Holbrooke's proposal for a cease-fire.

Throughout the day in Sarajevo, the U.S. delegation, joined by EU negotiator Bildt, pressed the Bosnians on the need for an immediate cease-fire. In response, the Bosnians said that while they agreed on a cease-fire "in principle," their problems were over the implementation date. They only wanted to commit to stop fighting once their preconditions -- such as opening roads and gas lines to Sarajevo -- were fulfilled. Izetbegovic sensibly argued that without gas and open access, peace would mean little to Sarajevans. Holbrooke and other delegation members believed that despite such remarks, the Bosnian President still held out the hope for further military gains.

To quell this view, Holbrooke and Don Kerrick met with Izetbegovic privately after the Menzies swearing-in at Konak House. Holbrooke wanted to utilize Kerrick's intelligence background (although the Brigadier General was the NSC representative on
the team, he was loaned to the NSC from U.S. Army Intelligence) to explain to the President that further military action was ill-advised. Although Kerrick was then privy only to the same information as other team members, Holbrooke theatrically emphasized his experience as an "Army intelligence specialist" to explain to Izetbegovic that the Bosnians had surpassed their military culminating point, the Croats would no longer support them, and that further action would debilitating their ability to consolidate gains already made. They discussed not only specific intelligence but the common tendency of Generals to go too far -- "[the Bosnians] armies were tired, they weren't well trained, they didn't have the support and Banja Luka for them would be that one battle too far, which would turn the momentum back to the Bosnian Serbs." Also playing up his connection to the White House and his role as President Clinton's "representative" on the team, Kerrick described for Izetbegovic the President's "strong desire" for a cease-fire. Holbrooke, never shy of the melodramatic, laid it out for Izetbegovic plainly: "Mr. President," he said, "you're playing crap with your nation's destiny."  

Izetbegovic agreed to meet the U.S. half-way: he would accept a cease-fire, but only if it took effect in several days. The Bosnian Serbs, he said, needed to prove that they would comply with the cease-fire terms in good faith. The fighting would not end until Sarajevo had gas and a road was opened to Gorazde. Izetbegovic asked that Holbrooke go to Belgrade to get Milosevic's commitment. While Holbrooke, Clark, Kerrick and Owen met with Milosevic that night in Belgrade, Hill and Pardew negotiated in Sarajevo with Izetbegovic and Sacirbey on the final language of the proposal. As the these last terms were being discussed, Holbrooke and Hill worked together for over three hours on an open phone line, and Holbrooke called back to Washington to consult with both Christopher and Lake. The result of these discussions was an agreement with the Bosnians on a cease-fire that would take effect in five days. If gas supplies were not turned on by then, the agreement would not take effect. A road to Gorazde would opened, but since mine-clearing would take a few weeks, this condition would not be linked to the cease-fire (though the Bosnians did make the opening a requirement to attend a peace conference). The cease-fire would last for sixty days or until the completion of proximity talks and a peace conference, whichever came later.  

In Belgrade, Holbrooke got Milosevic to agree to the cease-fire as a "witness," who in turn got Karadzic, Krajsnik, and Mladic to sign the document. Also, Milosevic

74 In addition to what the Croats had told the U.S., Federation President Zubak had told Bildt that day that the Croatia "had stopped their offensive in Bosnia but the Bosnian Government forces had not." Yet, "Croatian forces could not stay in their current defensive posture long, without a cease-fire." See Geneva 7579.  
76 According to State Department Operations Center Phone Logs, Holbrooke informed both Christopher and Lake of his progress in Sarajevo that day including two conference calls with both (743 and 2222 EDT). During one of the calls with Christopher, Milosevic approached Holbrooke (who was calling from the Presidency in Belgrade) as though he wanted to speak to the Secretary. Holbrooke said, "Chris, I'm talking to the President of Serbia here," as Milosevic half-reached for the phone. The Secretary apparently did not want to talk to Milosevic. See Holbrooke interview. Details of progress in Sarajevo from "Read-out from Sarajevo: October 4, 1995, 1:55am," memorandum from EUR/SCE files. Attached to this memo was the draft cease-fire agreement (as of October 4, 1350 Sarajevo time) and the draft proximity talks agreement. Further details on Sarajevo-Belgrade negotiations from Holbrooke interview; Kerrick notes, October 4, 1995.
approved a written agreement to convene proximity talks in the U.S. (as the Serb negotiator for peace talks, he approved on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs). During the team’s negotiations over the past four days, all three parties had agreed in principle to the terms to convene peace talks; when a cease-fire resolution seemed near, the U.S. team had prepared a document on a conference for the parties to agree to formally. The draft document stated that talks would commence “on or about” October 25 in the U.S., and that the parties would commit to three terms: each delegation would be empowered to negotiate a final settlement; the talks would be continuous and threats to leave were not allowed; and the talks would remain isolated from the media. Holbrooke informed Washington of Milosevic’s approval of these two documents early the morning of October 5, although he warned that they had been only verbally agreed to by the Bosnians. They reserved the right for revision and, as Holbrooke explained in a message to Christopher and Lake, “any changes in Sarajevo could cause a serious last minute problem.” At noon that day, Holbrooke arrived in Sarajevo to get the Bosnians’ signature.77

The Bosnians had no problem with the proximity talks agreement, but remained uneasy with the cease-fire. As shown over a week ago in New York, the Bosnians suffered cold feet when the endgame was near. The U.S. had been able to get Serb agreement to the Bosnians’ terms. Sarajevo would get electricity and gas and a road would be secured to Gorazde. But Izetbegovic remained reluctant to sign. From the shuttle team’s perspective, the agreement ended the conflict. From Izetbegovic’s perspective, the agreement ended his chance for retribution — the momentum had shifted in Bosnia, NATO was finally willing to act against his adversaries, and the Bosnians Serbs were on the run. His enemies were now enduring a taste of the suffering that they had meted out to his people. As Jim Pardew later reflected, “it takes a lot of courage for these men to pick up a pen and sign something that we had negotiated with their arch enemies.”78

Placing a final roadblock in the way, Izetbegovic said that he agreed in principle, but refused to add his signature to the cease-fire document alongside those of his Bosnian Serb enemies.79 Unrelenting, Holbrooke had a photocopy made of the agreement with the Bosnian Serb signatures removed, and said to the Bosnian President that now he had no excuse not to sign.80 Izetbegovic tried one last tactic, saying to Holbrooke, “I don’t see your signature on this, Mr. Ambassador.” Holbrooke dramatically grabbed his pen, signed the document, and pushed it back to the stunned President. He told Izetbegovic that the U.S. had to leave Sarajevo to get to Zagreb and Rome. He either signed now or the war would continue. With five minutes to spare, Izetbegovic, his hand shaking, signed the paper. The parties had agreed to a cease-fire.81 At 11am Washington time, President Clinton announced from the White House that a cease-fire would take effect on

77 Holbrooke faxed the latest texts of both the cease-fire and proximity talks agreements early the morning of October 5 (7am Belgrade time). See handwritten note to Secretary Christopher and Tony Lake (apparently also delivered to Talbott, Tarnoff and Kornblum) from Holbrooke, October 5, 1995.
78 Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.
79 Kerrick interview; Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.
80 Holbrooke judged that since the agreement would not have formal legal standing anyway, it wouldn’t matter if the parties didn’t sign the exact same document, as long as they had agreement.
81 Details from Holbrooke interview, July 10, 1996; Kerrick interview; Pardew interview, July 31, 1996.
October 10, and that the parties would convene in the U.S. around the end of the month for proximity talks. Following a quick stop in Zagreb to finalize plans with Tudjman, the U.S. team landed in Rome for an important meeting with the Contact Group. The Europeans had been briefed about the cease-fire and venue issues, but had not been fully consulted. As a gesture to the Europeans, the team had decided that the proximity talks would be followed by an "international peace conference" in Paris. The Principals in Washington had decided at the October 4 PC to leave this issue open, but Holbrooke went ahead and made it part of the formal announcement, effectively locking-in some sort of European event. Although described as a "peace conference," the U.S. intended to have the detailed negotiating done at the proximity talks. In Holbrooke's view, the agreement would be formally blessed in Paris, but not reached there. In this way, the U.S. could maintain control of the negotiating process while keeping its European partners behind the process. "We concluded that there could be a ceremonial event in Paris as a way to give recognition to the European role and the sacrifices Europe made in contributing to this endeavor over the years and would contribute in the future," Christopher recalled. The President had announced this in his statement on October 5, and Christopher called his German, French, and British counterparts to inform them of the decision.

While these key U.S. allies supported the cease-fire and pushing the negotiating process to the next level, the British were angry that Paris had been chosen as the conference site without their consent. Foreign Minister Rifkind told the Secretary on October 5 that his government had assumed that a peace conference would be held in Geneva or another "neutral" location, and that the President had acted too hastily by announcing Paris. In a conversation the following morning, Christopher explained to Rifkind that the decision was in part based on one made at the original conference on the former Yugoslavia held in London in August 1992, where an agreement had been reached that Paris would be the site for a peace conference. Moreover, French Foreign Minister de Charette had told Christopher that Chirac personally "placed great importance hosting the peace conference." Rifkind tolerated this explanation, but hinted that London might want to host an "implementation" conference after a signing to discuss issues related to IFOR, coordination of international organizations, naming a senior implementation coordinator, and the particulars of a reconstruction package. Explaining that President Clinton would be amenable to such an idea (as such follow-on events had been considered), Christopher agreed that the two should explore this issue further. The next day, he called Rifkind back to confirm U.S. support for the idea.


Christopher interview, October 30, 1996.

On October 4, Christopher had talked with the French Defense Minister and Ambassador about having a peace conference in Paris. He discussed this with Foreign Minister de Charette the next day. See "The Secretary and French FM de Charette, October 5, 1995," Cable, State 238061, October 6, 1995. For Germany's response, see "The Secretary and German Foreign Minister Kinkel, October 5, 1995," Cable, State 238062, October 6, 1995.

"The Secretary and British Foreign Secretary Rifkind, October 5, 1995," Cable, State 238063, October 6, 1995.

"The Secretary and British Foreign Secretary Rifkind, October 6, 1995," Cable, State 238692, October 6, 1995; and "The Secretary and FS Malcolm Rifkind, October 7, 1995" Cable, State 240785, October 11, 1995.
When the Holbrooke team returned to Washington, they had accomplished what they had set out to do — get a cease-fire and set the timing for proximity talks. Yet problems remained. Although a cease-fire had been agreed to, the fighting continued during the five days before scheduled implementation. It soon became obvious that while Izetbegovic had asked for extra days to verify Serb compliance, his unspoken agenda was to give his generals a few more opportunities to win some territory back. After the Bosnian Serbs attacked UN troops and refugees, NATO jets were called in again — this time, hitting a BSA command post with laser-guided missiles. As if this wasn’t enough, by October 10, gas lines had not yet been opened to Sarajevo. Ambassador Menzies and UN civilian representative Antonio Pedauye conducted final negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs at the Sarajevo airport, and in two days, they finally agreed to implement the cease-fire. This was the 35th nationwide cease-fire since the Bosnian conflict started in April 1992. It was hoped that it would be the last.

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87 This occurred despite the positive response in Belgrade, in which the official press hailed the cease-fire (and, expectedly, Milosevic’s role in achieving it). The U.S. embassy in Belgrade commented that "Belgrade is signaling its commitment to carrying out the provisions of the accord fully. Milosevic clearly believes he has Karadzic, Mladic and company completely on board or he would not have identified himself as so personally responsible for achieving not just another cease-fire, but an historic step finally to bring the conflict to an end." See "Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs Hail Cease-fire Agreement for Bosnia and Praise U.S. Mediators," Cable, Belgrade 4955, October 6, 1995.
