Telecon
Elliot Richardson
3/12/70 2:25 p.m.

R: I’m trying to get some ideas for this afternoon as to what you thought was likely to come up.

K: They didn’t get the important papers done. I’m just going through a series of cats and dogs: freedom to MiGs (?), land mobiles, qualitative restrictions, and nuclear accidents. We have to have a meeting next week on MIRV, ABM and SAM upgrade problem.

R: When on negotiating options?

K: Next week too. We’ll have to have two meetings next week.

R: The ABM thing wasn’t enough finished?

K: They were going to do another.

R: I thought that paper that just came in was damn good.

K: It was good. We will have some discussion of negotiating options today.

R: That would be useful. I am jarred by the discovery in the last 10 days at developments in MIRV and ABM that I didn’t understand before.

K: Like what?

R: On the problem of upgrading an ABM system comparable to a Soviet threat to the Safeguard system in the US. The upgrade problem is really hairy once you have a system as big as the one we propose for ourselves. There’s the zzzg chance of degrading ________________.

K: What is hair-raising to me is a system as large as they have and to upgrade.

R: Before we negotiate ABM levels which give them enough for their area defense comparable to what we want, then the risk of upgrade seems important.

K: But supposing you have a low ABM level; then the problem of SAM upgrade becomes worse.
R: No it doesn't, because the SAM is then easier to detect.

K: Why?

R: Let me back up; I'm getting ahead of myself. I'm assuming there's some force in State's CIA's and ACDA's arguments regarding the risk of SAM upgrade.

K: That's right.

R: But I discover not even State or ACDA will offer reassurance against the prospect of SAM upgrade if the other side has enough radar capability so that if feed in more becomes undetectable.

K: What shakes me; I was at SAC for a briefing about war plans. They have some limited options—take out something with a few bombers and an enormous number of missiles, this number of missiles to take on the SA-5. They treat it as an anti-missile weapon. They were just showing me what they could do in a limited mode. I made them back up. They told me they've discovered some radars which make sense only with the SA-5.

R: My God!

K: That really shook me. They had no reason to suppose I would question the discrepancy between missiles and bombers.

R: I'll be damned. That's interesting.

K: And on this happy note I will leave you.