MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Analysis of the SIOP for the National Security Council

For the critical examination of U. S. force levels which will be continuing throughout this year, I believe it is absolutely essential that we and the principal advisors to the President on national security matters have a thorough and comprehensive understanding of SIOP objectives and capabilities. We are going through a difficult period in which the Soviet threat is growing, while there are increasingly severe pressures to reduce the defense budget. We must ensure that our strategic force posture remains adequate. I am concerned that some of the President's advisors may not fully appreciate the relation between SIOP objectives, the strategic sufficiency criteria, and other criteria of potential importance in planning strategic forces, such as war-engagement capabilities and the visible capability to support our allies.

In order to make clear these relations and to plainly and forcefully spell out the impact of possible force changes on the ability of the United States to engage in a nuclear war if deterrence should fail, it is necessary to develop a paper which goes beyond General Holloway's excellent briefing on the latest SIOP revision for use in connection with Wednesday's meeting of the National Security Council. A more comprehensive treatment of these issues should also be prepared for use during further reviews of our strategic forces and sufficiency criteria as these issues are important to our long range goals.

The paper should include a detailed, comprehensive, and quantitative analysis of the SIOP forces, the war-engagement objectives embodied therein, the targeting criteria, current capabilities to meet specified objectives, and the impact that various proposed or possible force changes would have on existing objectives and criteria. This analysis must include the relationships between the SIOP objectives and capabilities and (1) the strategic sufficiency criteria; (2) possible other criteria of importance in determining our strategic force posture, such as the degree of flexibility to respond to various situations and the character of war outcomes, including quantitative measures for various situations; (3) the Triad concept, including the effects on SIOP targeting of the potential loss of one or more components; and (4) our ability to support our allies in a
nuclear war and reduce the threat to them. Our capabilities (and possible lack thereof) to inflict damage selectively or in combination on various countries and target classes therein should be clearly laid out and evaluated quantitatively in order that the effects of possible changes in strategy or budget levels can be assessed.

In order to make this picture clear and complete, I have asked my Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis Dr. Tucker and a few selected members of his staff to work closely with your staff in producing the necessary analyses and presentation. It is essential that no data be withheld and that the analyses be thorough and complete in order that we may understand fully the details and ramifications of this important issue as we go through the discussion of defense budget levels, strategies, and plans.

In particular, I propose that we create a list, by name, of individuals who will be cleared to contribute to and review the paper on this sensitive subject. A tentative list is attached and I would appreciate your adding to the list those individuals from your staff whom you deem appropriate. If there are any names on the list about whom you have a question or for which you would prefer substitutes, I would appreciate your informing me right away.

In light of the President's desire to have a thorough review of defense planning prior to submission of the FY 72 budget to Congress, it is important that we cover the issues discussed above in detail. We should obtain the best paper that we can prior to Wednesday's NSC meeting, although I realize that some areas cannot be treated as comprehensively as would be desirable by then. For that reason we should continue to develop a more comprehensive paper for further discussions.

I trust that this paper can be produced with the fine cooperation which has characterized all the other joint efforts between your staff and OSD in preparation for the National Security Council meeting on defense levels.

Attachment
The President of the United States

National Security Council

The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness

Defense Program Review Committee

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)
The Under Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

Advisors to the President

The Attorney General
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Principal Advisors

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis
The Assistant for Program Analysis, NSC Staff
Dr. John D. Christie (OSD Systems Analysis)
Cdr. James J. Martin (OSD Systems Analysis)