Links
Press
Release
Index:
A Quarter Century of U.S. Support for Occupation
The
Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project
"Timorese
Parliament Should Release Truth Commission Report Immediately"
International Center for Transitional Justice
November 28, 2005
In
the news
"Government
lied to cover up war crimes in 1975 invasion of island"
By Richard Lloyd Parry
The Times (UK)
November 30, 2005
"Documents
show Britain covered up murders of 5 journalists in RI's 1975 invasion
of E. Timor"
Associated Press
December 1, 2005
"Files
show complicity on Timor"
By Donald Greenlees
International Herald Tribune
December 1, 2005
"New
documents expose US backing for Indonesian invasion of East Timor"
Agence France-Presse
December 2, 2005
"Thirty
Years After the Indonesian Invasion of East Timor, Will the U.S.
Be Held Accountable for its Role in the Slaughter?"
Democracy Now!
December 7, 2005
Related
posting
East
Timor Revisited
Ford,
Kissinger and the Indonesian Invasion, 1975-76
|
Introduction
On December 24, 1975, British Ambassador John A. Ford told Britain's
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in a secret telegram that
Indonesian invading forces in Dili, East Timor had gone "on
a rampage of looting and killing." "If asked to comment
on any stories of atrocities," Ford advised the FCO in this
still partly withheld telegram, "I suggest we say that we have
no information."
A week later, Ford told Indonesian Foreign Ministry officials that
on "the Timor business," Her Majesty's Government (HMG)
"had tried to do our best for Indonesia in the UN." "Indonesia
should… help her friends" in return, Ford requested,
by helping to take "the wind out of the sails of those who
wanted to trumpet atrocity stories." Britain's effective, low-key
assistance to Indonesia in the wake of its invasion of East Timor
"paid off handsomely," government officials recalled,
by keeping East Timor out of British headlines and enabling the
British government to support East Timor's right - in principle
- to self-determination while maintaining cordial relations with
the Suharto regime as it waged a brutal war against the former Portuguese
colony.
As documents posted here demonstrate, the British role in Indonesia's
1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor was of critical importance.
Even while it acknowledged that the Timorese were being denied their
right to self-determination, the British Government was tacitly
supporting Indonesia's efforts to incorporate East Timor. At the
end of the Vietnam War, British post-colonial interests put it in
the position both of seeking closer relations with the Suharto regime
and of avoiding outright support for a denial of self-determination
that might hold damaging implications for Britain with regards to
the Falklands Islands and Belize, both still British colonies.
Today, as East Timor's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation
(CAVR) releases its final report on human rights violations committed
in East Timor between 1974 and 1999, British researchers are releasing
some of the documents they provided to assist the work of the Commission.
These documents provide the first detailed account of British policymaking
in the months leading up to and following Indonesia's invasion of
East Timor.
Getting
the Documents
These documents were released in response to a campaign by relatives
of British journalists killed in East Timor 30 years ago. The relatives
were assisted in that campaign by members of the British Parliament
(MPs) and by public access and human rights campaigners.
The British journalists were Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie. They
were killed by Indonesian troops at Balibo, East Timor, in mid-October
1975. So were three other journalists: two Australians and a New
Zealander. They are known as the 'Balibo Five'. (Note
1)
By 2002, the British relatives had the support of 150 MPs in their
campaign for the release of FCO policy papers on East Timor and
on the Balibo case. In that year the FCO released 17 of its political
files on East Timor, dating from 1975 and 1976, to the relatives
and, thereafter, to Britain's National Archives (TNA). Those files
are known as the 'Balibo Files.' (Note 2) With
the British relatives' agreement, independent researcher Hugh Dowson
provided many papers from the 'Balibo Files' to East Timor's Commission
for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR).
Twenty-eight papers in this selection are from the 'Balibo Files.'
The others are from an FCO file on official visits to Indonesia
in 1975, which was released to Hugh Dowson and then to TNA under
Britain's new Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, which came into
force in 2005. (Note 3)
Other requests from Hugh Dowson for Cabinet level documents on
East Timor from 1975 and from the period 1998 to 1999 have been
refused under national security exemptions to the FOI Act. (Note
4)
What the British documents say
When Britain's Labour Government took office in March 1974, it
sought to improve relations not just with the Suharto regime in
Jakarta but also with the Ford Administration and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, which had expressed a desire to bolster Indonesia's
regional role and expressed worries about Portugal's 1974 revolution
and the subsequent decolonization of its overseas territories
As indications of Indonesia's intent toward East Timor became more
ominous, in March 1975 the Southeast Asia Department of the FCO
began to formulate its 'line' on 'Portuguese' Timor, concluding
that, although the British government in principle supported self-determination,
Timor's eventual integration with Indonesia is probably the right
answer" in terms of regional stability. (Document
1) British officials judged that the UK had no direct interest
in the matter. Such apparent lack of interest casts an odd light
on secret talks between Indonesian and Portuguese delegations in
London on March 9, 1975. The Indonesians claimed, inaccurately,
that the Portuguese made major concessions at those talks, which
are regarded as among the most important discussions of East Timor
held by the two Governments. Indonesia's delegation, which included
the Ambassadors to London and Paris, was led by General Murtopo.
The FCO assisted with those talks. An FCO paper suggests, however,
that, until just before the event, some key FCO officials were not
aware of the talks. (Document 2)
By July 1975, UK Ambassador Ford had concluded that Indonesian
intervention in East Timor was inevitable. In a later widely circulated
memo Ford observed in a memo to FCO that though Indonesia was determined
to integrate Portuguese Timor into Indonesia, "within the territory
the signals at the moment are clearly set toward independence."
(Document 3) Ford also argued that "the
people of Portuguese Timor are in no condition to exercise the right
to self-determination," a position shared by many western governments.
Regarding British policy, Ford rather infamously declared that "Certainly
as seen from here it is in Britain's interest that Indonesia should
absorb the territory" of East Timor "as soon and as unobtrusively
as possible; and that if it comes to the crunch and there is a row
in the United Nations we should keep our heads down and avoid siding
against the Indonesian Government." Ford's letter was widely
circulated in government circles outside the UK and is understood
to have been highly influential. The letter achieved infamy after
it was published, unofficially, in 1980. (Note 5)
A secret British Embassy letter claims that on October 9, 1975,
Indonesia's Defence Minister General Panggabean stressed to Britain's
First Sea Lord that the "integration with Indonesia was the
only practical solution" for East Timor. (Document
10) Britain's then First Sea Lord, by contrast, sees his October,
1975 visit to the Indonesian Navy as a simple courtesy call (during
which, he is certain, no discussion of East Timor took place). (Note
6) Whatever the truth, Indonesia's Admirals would have viewed
the First Sea Lord's visit as evidence of Britain's tacit support:
on October 4, 1975, their warships had deployed, aggressively, "off
Dili." (Document 9) That covert deployment
was followed, on October 6 - 8, by the covert seizure of the village
of Batugade, a border post just inside 'Portuguese' Timor.
Sir Michael Palliser also visited Jakarta that October. It was
a brief stop, on October 20 - 21, on a 2-month tour of overseas
posts prior to his taking over as head of Britain's diplomatic service.
Throughout his tour, he held "substantive talks in Ministries
of Foreign Affairs." (Note 7) Three of the
briefings prepared for him are posted here. The first sets out HMG's
"Long-Term Interests" and "Short-Term Objectives"
in "UK/ Indonesia Relations:" (Document
6) The other two set out HMG's concerns on "External Relations
of Indonesia," including "Portuguese Timor." (Document
7) and (Document 8)
Palliser's visit took place almost a week into the 'Balibo Five'
deaths crisis. That crisis concerned the five television newsmen
killed in 'Portuguese' Timor near the border with Indonesia, including
the two British citizens. The British deaths at Balibo were not
raised with Indonesian officials by Palliser (who appears to have
been unaware that British citizens had been killed at Balibo). (Note
8) As a result of that British silence, Indonesian officials
cannot have avoided viewing Palliser's visit as a tactit endorsement
of their covert invasion of East Timor.
British officials shared the desire of U.S. and other Western officials
to keep the covert invasion hidden from the public. Hence the line
taken by Ambassador Ford in Document 13: "The
American Ambassador said at Sir Michael Palliser's dinner on 21
October that Timor was high on Kissinger's list of places where
the US do not want to comment or get involved. I am sure we should
continue to follow the American example."
In Australia, by contrast, the 'Balibo Five' deaths caused the
government's biggest crisis in its response to East Timor's tragedy.
(Note 9) The Australian press demanded that political
leaders take a stand on those killings. While waiting for the Australian
government response, journalist Jill Jolliffe has stated, the Indonesian
military advance into East Timor was halted. Had a clear and very
firm stance been taken on the deaths of the 'Balibo Five,' Jolliffe
argues, East Timor might have been spared 24 years of Indonesian
military occupation. (Note 10)
There were no such demands in Britain. That owed much to HMG's
response to HM Embassy's advice over the deaths of the two British
citizens involved: Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie. There was local
media coverage (in Bristol in 1975 and Glasgow in 1976) of family
grief over deaths in a 'civil war,' and publicity efforts, in 1976,
in London by Fretilin's Jose Ramos-Horta, the then MP Geoff Edge,
and others. HMG's role was crucial, as some of the FCO papers posted
here demonstrate.
The FCO insisted, until recently, that the Britons died in East
Timor's civil war. But, as the FCO and HM Embassy knew in October
1975, the 'continuing civil war' was a cover story for an Indonesian-led
covert invasion. (See Document 10, Document
11 and Document 13) On October 24, 1975,
HM Embassy told the FCO that it had "suggested to the Australians"
that it was "pointless" to raise the British deaths with
the Indonesians. Retrospective approval was sought for "avoid[ing]
representations" on the British deaths. (Document
14) FCO's approval took four days. (Document
15) Thus both HM Embassy, and the FCO, had central roles in
the 'Balibo Five' cover-up. The British deaths at Balibo gave HMG
an opportunity to halt the covert invasion in its tracks and, perhaps,
to prevent the overt invasion. That opportunity was not taken. (Note
11)
On December 24, 1975, Ambassador Ford reported to FCO on "Confidential
information" about "a rampage of looting and killing"
by the Indonesian military (ABRI) in Dili. Ford advised the FCO,
as Document 20 shows, that "if asked to
comment on any stories of atrocities I suggest we say that we have
no information." On January 2, 1976, in an Embassy internal
memorandum, Ford summarised the suggestions he had just made to
Indonesia's Foreign Ministry on how to avoid an international cause
célèbre over atrocities in East Timor. (Document
21)
The Embassy summarized its view of the East Timor crisis in March
1976. (Document 25) The Embassy's view, overall,
was that Foreign Secretary Callaghan's policy and that of U.S. Secretary
of State Kissinger's, "has so far paid off handsomely. The
lack of involvement has largely kept events in Timor out of the
British and US headlines and away from becoming a major public issue.
It was a pity that… the Australian Government could not follow
suit."
HMG had many dilemmas over 'Portuguese' Timor in 1975 and 1976.
The first was that good relations with Indonesia, established by
HMG after 'Confrontation' and the overthrow of President Sukarno,
were to be maintained despite an Indonesian takeover of an overseas
territory of Portugal: Britain's oldest ally. (Note
12)
HMG may have hoped to follow Ambassador Ford's advice to "keep
its head down." But when Indonesia invaded East Timor in December
1975 Britain was chairing the UN Security Council. (Document
18) To HMG's irritation, Indonesia continued to insist that
no invasion had taken place. (Document 25)
Indonesian likewise ignored UN Security Council Resolution 384 of
December 1975 - a product of British chairmanship - which called
upon Indonesia to withdraw from East Timor.
The FCO, acting in its own post-colonial interest, helped to block
the legal recognition of the takeover craved by the Indonesians.
It also strove to convince the Indonesian Government that HMG had
not 'sided against' it. (Document 30) The FCO's
purpose, it appears, was to protect British interests at the UN
while avoiding upset to the Indonesians (and to the U.S. and Australian
governments). Those interests concerned Belize (claimed by Guatemala),
(Note 13) the Falkland Islands / Malvinas (claimed
by Argentina), (Note 14) and Gibraltar (claimed
by Spain). (Note 15)
The FCO expected that Indonesia might seek for East Timor a UN-approved,
but fraudulent, 'Act of Free Choice' similar to that which it had
organized in 1969 for the territory of West Papua. (Document
1) In May, 1976, an FCO official report alleges, UN Secretary-General
Kurt Waldheim commented bluntly to the FCO that Indonesia wanted
the U.N. to "legalize their 'anschluss.'" (Document
27) (Note 16) HMG also blocked an Indonesian
attempt to concoct a two-stage 'Act of Free Choice' in East Timor
in 1976. Ambassador Ford, who saw the 'People's Representative Council'
meeting in Dili on May 31, 1976, as a "fiasco," sought
the FCO's backing for UN involvement in the 'second stage' in June,
1976. (Document 29) HMG was very influential
in ensuring that wide participation in both those events was impossible,
FCO papers posted here indicate.
Documents
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
Document
1
March 5 and 17, 1975
Subject: The Future of Portuguese Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Memorandum
for Ministers
A paper, prepared by Bill Squire, head of the S.E. Asian Department,
after consulting other FCO departments, is forwarded by Peter Male
to the private secretary to Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the FCO Minister
with responsibilities towards S.E. Asia. Male is a senior civil
servant: Assistant Under Secretary of State responsible for FCO's
S.W. Pacific, S.E. Asian and S. Asian Departments. "The paper
recommends, and I agree," writes Male, "that… Timor's
eventual integration with Indonesia is probably the right answer."
Document
2
March 7, 1975
Subject: Portuguese/Indonesian Contacts
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Internal Memorandum
This memorandum from the S.W. European Department (SWED) to S.E.
Asian Department (SEAD) lists Portuguese officials who are about
to arrive for talks with an Indonesian team. (This paper appears
both to trivialise those talks and to validate an April 1975 claim
to the British Embassy in Jakarta that SEAD did not learn about
those talks until March 8. Other British officials were well aware
of these talks, which, it appears, were held at a different location
from the one stated here).
Document
3
July 14, 1975
Subject: Untitled Covering Letter to Mr Duggan's Report on his
Visit to Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Letter
Newly appointed British Ambassador to Jakarta, John A. Ford, advises
senior FCO officer Peter Male that "it is in Britain's interest
that Indonesia should absorb" East Timor "as soon and
as unobtrusively as possible; and that if it comes to the crunch
and there is a row in the United Nations we should keep our heads
down and avoid siding against the Indonesian Government." This
infamous cable was later leaked and published in Britain's New Statesman
magazine on November 21, 1980.
Document
4
August 25, 1975
Subject: My telegram 313 (not to all): Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
In August 1975, after Indonesian intelligence forces help provoke
a civil war in East Timor, United Kingdom, Australian and U.S. intelligence
concluded that Indonesia might launch an invasion of the territory.
In this document the British Embassy warns Her Majesty's Government
that the "Indonesians are now ready to launch an invasion"
of East Timor "at very short notice if they choose to."
This follows consultations by Mr Stuart (the Embassy's 'No 2') with
the U.S. and Australian Ambassadors. "The Indonesians have
promised the Australians as a concession, two hours notice if they
intervene," the telegram notes.
Document
5
September 15, 1975
Subject: Untitled
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret Letter
Ambassador John A. Ford writes to Bill Squire, Head of FCO's S.E.
Asian Department, about moves "towards intervention" in
East Timor. "The only limitation on clandestine activity now
appears to be fear of its exposure.… A particular hurdle to
be got over is a plane load of Australian journalists and politicians
who are due to visit Timor, apparently at Fretilin request, to investigate
allegations of Indonesian intervention." This visit by journalists
was authorised by the Australian government, which lifted its ban
on press visits to East Timor following the publicity generated
by Australian Channel 9's visit to East Timor in August 1975 during
the territory's civil war.
Document
6
September 26, 1975
Subject: Sir Michael Palliser's visit to Indonesia: 21 - 22
October 1975; UK/Indonesian Relations
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Briefing Paper
In November 1975 Sir Michael Palliser took over as head of Britain's
diplomatic service. Prior to this, Palliser agreed to a "lengthy
and intensive… familiarisation" tour of British overseas
posts, including the British Embassy in Jakarta. This briefing paper
prepared for Palliser's visit to Indonesia sets out "Britain's
Long-Term Interests" and "Short-Term Objectives"
for improving relations with Jakarta. One objective listed is "to
benefit from such defence sales as might be in our interest."
That objective resulted from a comprehensive review in the early
1970s of UK Defence relations with Indonesia, which led to a particular
effort to increase arms sales to the Suharto regime. In April 1978,
some two years after Palliser's visit, British Aerospace announced
its first sale of BAe Hawk 'trainer' warplanes to Indonesia; these
planes, which are suitable for ground attack, were delivered in
1983.
Document
7
September 26, 1975
Subject: Sir Michael Palliser's visit to Indonesia: 21 - 22
October 1975; External Relations of Indonesia
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Briefing Paper
This is the third of the three main briefing papers prepared for
Sir Michael Palliser's September 1975 visit to Indonesia. "Indonesia's
approach to foreign relations has been neatly summed up in her attitude
to recent events in Portuguese Timor. She is alarmed," this
paper states, but "concerned to preserve her reputation among
the non-aligned nations by not precipitately taking over the territory
by brute force (which she could easily do)."
Document
8
September 26, 1975
Subject: Portuguese Timor British Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
Confidential Briefing Paper
This Annex to the third briefing paper for Sir Michael Palliser's
visit to Indonesia does not mention any Indonesian role in the August
1975 outbreak of civil war in East Timor, but concludes that "Indonesia
is keeping her options open by harassing Fretilin with Indonesian
troops and freshly-armed UDT and APODETI supporters." (Note
17)
Document
9
October 4, 1975
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret Telegram
In the wake of the leftist and nationalist Fretilin party's victory
in East Timor's civil war, pressure grew on Indonesian President
Suharto to approve an outright invasion of the territory. In this
partially excised cable, British Ambassador to Indonesia John A.
Ford advises Her Majesty's Government that Indonesia's Chiefs of
Staff appear to be "preparing for early overt action. My Defence
Attaché believes it unlikely that these large troop movements
would have taken place unless HANKAM" (Indonesia's Defence
Ministry) believed that President Suharto "would authorise
early action." Ford reports, too, on a meeting today with General
Murtopo. "Timor came up," so Ford "stressed the dangers
of overt armed intervention particularly so far as Indonesia's position
in the UN and with public opinion in the West was concerned."
Document
10
October 13, 1975
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret Letter
In early October Indonesian troops began launching cross border
raids into East Timor from the Indonesian territory of West Timor,
hoping to provoke a response that would justify a full-scale invasion.
In this letter, Head of Chancery Gordon Duggan updates Lynton Jones,
of the S E Asian Department of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, on the progress of Indonesian attacks on East Timor. Duggan
reports on a meeting with Major General Akosah (Head, Asia-Pacific
Directorate, Foreign Affairs Ministry) in which Akosah remarked
that Panggabean had asked him "to prepare a paper justifying
Indonesian intervention; if the invasion had taken place 'say on
1 October' the paper would have been telegraphed to posts and published
the following day."
Document
11
October 16, 1975, 1730 Z
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Secret UK Eyes Alpha Telegram
In this Top Secret telegram, the FCO informs HM Embassy key officials
in Jakarta that Cabinet Office Assessments Staff have learned "in
confidence" from Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee representative
in Canberra that "Indonesia intends soon to intervene covertly
in strength" in East Timor. Three days earlier Harry Tjan Silalahi
told Australian Embassy officials that "the main thrust"
of the covert "operation would begin on 15 October… through
Balibo and Maliana/ Atsabe "(The use of the word "soon"
shows the British Cabinet Office to be a day behind events. Australian
documents leave little room for doubt that this was intended to
be the full-scale invasion of East Timor. But that, following the
deaths of the British and other newsmen at Balibo on October 16,
was delayed until December 1975).
Document
12
October 17, 1975, 0650 Z
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Priority Telegram
In response to warnings about an impending Indonesian invasion
of East Timor, the British Embassy in Jakarta agrees with Australian
intelligence assessments that the build-up should be viewed "in
the context of a stepped-up clandestine operation, in which Indonesian
participation continues to be limited and deniable." The telegram
notes that Generals Murtopo and Moerdani, the two military officials
heading up Indonesian operations in East Timor, "are out of
the country at the moment on separate visits to the United States.
It would be surprising if anything significant were to happen in
their absence."
Document
13
October 24, 1975, 0810 Z
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret UK Eyes Alpha Telegram
This top secret telegram from the British Embassy in Jakarta offered
a detailed assessment of Indonesian military plans in East Timor.
That assessment is incorrect in one important respect - as the m.s.
note from Cabinet Office Assessment Staff sources indicates. "The
aim" of the "stepped up clandestine operation," it
states, is "total encirclement of Dili by 15 November…
This bears out our previous assessment that the President would
continue to insist on a deniable operation which would cause the
minimum of international fuss. So far he is succeeding." The
telegram notes that the "Australians ... are in considerable
embarrassment at home," a state of affairs linked, to a large
extent, to the deaths of the 'Balibo Five' (two of whom are British
citizens). "The American Ambassador said at Sir Michael Palliser's
dinner on 21 October that Timor was high on Kissinger's list of
places where the US do not want to comment or get involved. I am
sure we should continue to follow the American example."
Document
14
October 24, 1975, 0835 Z
Subject: Journalists Killed in Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret UK Eyes Alpha Telegram
Although both the British and Australian governments publicly denied
having concrete information about the deaths of the five British
and Australian journalists in East Timor, both British and Australian
intelligence were reporting otherwise. In this partially excised
top secret telegram, the British Embassy reported that "British
born" Brian Peters and Malcolm Rennie are among 5 journalists
"killed, almost certainly inadvertently," during an attack
on Balibo, East Timor, on 16 October "by Indonesian/UDT"
forces. "We have suggested to the Australians that… it
is pointless to go on demanding information … Their Embassy
is inclined to agree but are apparently under pressure from Canberra
… I think we should ourselves avoid representations to the
Indonesians about them."
Document
15
October 28, 1975, 1700 Zulu Time
Subject: Journalists Killed in Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Unclassified Telegram
In this terse reply from the FCO, British officials state simply
"We agree" and authorize the British Embassy in Jakarta
to refrain from raising the deaths of British citizens Brian Peters
and Malcolm Rennie with Indonesian military or government officials.
Document
16
November 3, 1975
Subject: Portugese Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Letter
By the beginning of November U.K., U.S. and Australian intelligence
had all concluded that an Indonesian invasion was inevitable, though
each government continued publicly call for a peaceful resolution
of the decolonization process. Gordon Duggan, Head of Chancery,
informs the S.E. Asian Department of Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth
Office "that the Australian Embassy ... are showing a less
sure touch" on East Timor. He adds that Mr Woolcott, the Australian
Ambassador, "received instructions ... on 16 October to deliver
a clear message to the Indonesians that Australia could not countenance
Indonesian interference in the affairs of Timor." At the British
Ambassador's October 21 dinner for Sir Michael Palliser, Woolcott
had described how he had persuaded Canberra to modify those instructions
and of how he spoke as "softly" as his new "instructions
permitted" to Foreign Minister Malik on October 18, suggesting
that Australian officials had decided as a matter of policy not
to oppose Indonesia's pending invasion.
Document
17
December 5, 1975
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Guidance Telegram
As Indonesian forces prepared for their imminent invasion of East
Timor and President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
met with Suharto, the the FCO reminded British diplomatic missions
that "It remains our prime aim to keep out of the controversy
surrounding Timor as far as possible." This telegram states
that "The extent to which Indonesia is able to avoid international
opprobrium … will depend on her success in portraying an invasion
as a restoration of law and order… Indonesia's future plans
for any act of self-determination (which will have to be internationally
acceptable) will be crucial in deciding our response and that of
the international community."
Document
18
December 9, 1975
Subject: Portuguese Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Memorandum
Indonesia's invasion of East Timor posed immediate problems for
the British government, which at the time held the rotating chair
of the United Nations Security Council and was reluctant to condemn
the Suharto regime. In this memo Peter Male, the Assistant Under
Secretary of State responsible for the S.W. Pacific, S.E. Asian
and S. Asian Departments refers to an urgent telephone call noting
that the Australian Government "would be interested to know
the extent to which" the British "would be anxious to
protect Indonesia's interests… I told him that our object"
is "to get as little involved as possible" in matters
to do with 'Portuguese' Timor, "although our Presidency of
the UN Security Council made this less easy than we would wish."
Document
19
December 10, 1975
Subject: Early Day Motion No 17: Indonesian Aggression Against
Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Memorandum
Murray Simons, the new Head of S.E. Asian Department, advises senior
figures in the FCO that 105 Members of Parliament (including future
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook) are calling for a Parliamentary debate
on East Timor. Simons worries that a Parliamentary debate would
risk "widespread publicity" and might "have an unfortunate
effect on our overall relationship with the Indonesians." A
second official "strongly" recommends that the Leader
of the House of Commons attempt to block such a debate from taking
place since the British government's "attitude is perfectly
clear (and impeccable)."
Document
20
December 24, 1975
Subject: Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Secret Telegram
Almost immediately after the invasion of East Timor Western governments
began receiving reports of Indonesian atrocities. In this secret
telegram, the British Embassy in Jakarta reports to the Foreign
Office and the British Mission to the UN that "Confidential
information … suggests that the … assault on Dili ...
was badly mismanaged." The Embassy "gather further"
that once the Indonesian forces were "established…in
Dili they went on a rampage of looting and killing." If "asked
to comment on any stories of atrocities I suggest we say that we
have no information."
Document
21
January 2, 1976
Subject: Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Internal Memorandum
British Ambassador to Jakarta, John A. Ford, informs his Head of
Chancery, Gordon Duggan, about his advice to senior officials at
Indonesia's Foreign Ministry. The British Government "had tried
to do our best for Indonesia" at the UN but it "might
be very difficult to keep the temperature down" in 1976. So
"Indonesia should do what she could to help her friends."
It "would make it easier ... to react properly" to "atrocity
stories" if the "acting Government" in Timor expressed
"regret ... and set up some form of Court of Enquiry or Tribunal."
Document
22
January 20, 1976
Subject: The Siliwangi Division
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Internal Memorandum
Richard Gozney, a junior official at the Embassy, 1974-78, relays
a report that two battalions of 'green berets' from the crack Siliwangi
division, numbering some 2000 troops, had participated in the invasion
of East Timor.
Document
23
February 9, 1976
Subject: Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Internal Memorandum
Andrew Stuart, 'No 2' at Britain's Embassy in Jakarta, suggests
to HM Ambassador John A. Ford, and to Head of Chancery, Gordon Duggan
that the Embassy draft a report justifying U.K. policy toward East
Timor. "In the real world," Stuart argues, "it is
probably both inevitable and understandable that" East "Timor
should be incorporated into Indonesia. The Timorese as a whole will
not lose by this… If the Indonesians had achieved the takeover
quietly ... most of the world would have been relieved." As
it stood, Indonesia had suffered considerable diplomatic, political
and economic damage, expending enormous resources "for the
military operation, for the refugees, and for the cover up."
Document
24
February 10, 1976
Subject: Security Council debate on Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Letter
On December 10 1975 the UN General Assembly passed a strongly worded
resolution which "deplored" Indonesia's invasion and demanded
that Jakarta withdraw "without delay." The U.K. Ambassador
to the U.N. then co-ordinated the shepherding through the Security
Council of a watered down resolution calling on Indonesia to withdraw
from East Timor and requesting a UN fact finding mission. That resolution
was passed on December 22, 1975. S.E. Asian Department head Murray
Simons tells Britain's Mission to the UN that far from "taking
umbrage against the UK" over the UN "Security Council
vote…, the Indonesians were evidently much gratified at the
way the British delegation took account of their interests."
Document
25
March 15, 1976
Subject: Timor: Indonesia's Reluctant Takeover
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Despatch printed by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office for General (but confidential) Distribution
This lengthy report offers a post mortem on British policy toward
East Timor. Ambassador John A. Ford and Embassy officials Andrew
Stuart and Gordon Duggan observe to Foreign Secretary James Callaghan
"that East Timor was an area in which Britain was no longer
directly involved and that Britain's interests indicated a low profile…
Dr Kissinger did likewise. This policy has so far paid off handsomely.
The lack of involvement has largely kept Timor out of the British
and US headlines and away from becoming a major public issue:"
If East Timor's "crisis has any lesson for posterity,"
the Ambassador concludes, "that is the difficulty of developing
some acceptable and practicable form of international law and morals."
Document
26
April 28, 1976
Subject: Security Council Debate on Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Internal Memorandum
In April 1976 the UN Security Council once again took up the issue
of East Timor, passing another resolution which reiterated its call
for Indonesia to withdraw from the territory. S.E. Asian Department
official Lynton Jones recommends "capitalising now on the present
understanding being displayed towards our view point by the Indonesians."
He notes that although the British backed the UNSC's watered down
resolution opposing Indonesia's presence in East Timor, Indonesian
Foreign Minister Adam Malik wrote to the British Secretary of State
thanking him for Britain's "understanding towards Indonesia's
position and the support rendered by the [UK] delegation" in
the recent UNSC discussion.
Document
27
May 15, 1976
Subject: Summary Record of Conversation between Mr Luard, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, FCO, and the Secretary General of the
United Nations, over Dinner at the Excelsior Hotel, London Airport
at 8.30 pm on Saturday 15 May 1976
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Confidential Internal Memorandum
The meeting seems to have concentrated on Cyprus and the Middle
East. On East Timor, the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, allegedly
suggests that "The Indonesians clearly wished the UN to legalise
their 'anschluss'." Waldheim's view is that, "A process
similar to that employed in West Irian could be considered if the
Indonesians would accept it." (Caution will be wise until confirmation
of such suggestions is obtained. In March 1975, Bill Squire, the
then head of FCO's S.E. Asian Department, noted the potential for
such a strategy: see Document-01. In August 1975, Australian Government
documents show, Australian officials also considered just such a
strategy). (Note 18)
Document
28
May 20, 1976
Subject: East Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Internal Memorandum
On May 31, 1976 in Dili, thirty-seven hand-picked members of what
Indonesia described as a "Popular Representative Assembly"
unanimously voted to petition President Suharto asking for integration
with Jakarta. Few Western governments sent observers. Murray Simons,
S.E. Asian Department (SEAD) Head, summarises FCO's position, observing
that the Indonesians may use that event to "acquire a veneer
of respectability for a speedy takeover… by associating distinguished
foreigners with the 'act of choice'… The Americans and Australians
dislike being manipulated but would be likely to go." He notes
that SEAD is trying to "avoid the necessity of choice"
by encouraging all European Economic Community Governments not to
attend.
Document
29
June 4, 1976
Subject: My telegram No 174: Timor
British Embassy in Jakarta, Confidential Telegram
British Ambassador to Jakarta, John A. Ford, urges the Foreign
and Commonwealth Office to back a UN role in Indonesia's East Timor
takeover. The Indonesians, he concedes, "have once again proved
inept stage managers. From our point of view the most serious consequence
may be the loss of an opportunity for the UN to come to terms with
what has happened." He adds that, "From this end we shall
continue to urge the Indonesians privately to be flexible."
Others, he says, are doing likewise.
Document
30
June 11, 1976
Subject: Invitation to attend Second Stage of "Self-determination"
by the People of East Timor
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Internal Memorandum
Two weeks after the staged integration ceremony in Dili, Indonesian
officials held another ceremony in Jakarta where hand-picked East
Timorese representatives presented their petition for integration
with Indonesia to President Suharto. In this memo Murray Simons,
Head of S.E. Asian Department, deplores "the element of blackmail"
in an Indonesian Government invitation to attend the ceremony. "Partly
at our instigation," Simons notes, no European Economic Community
country sent representatives to the "'act of self-determination'
" in Dili on May 31, 1976. "W e do not want to fall out
with" the Indonesians, as "could happen if they got wind
of the fact that ... we ... acted as 'whippers in' for countries
declining their invitation." Though tacitly supporting Indonesia's
takeover of the territory, Simons observes that "There is an
important UK point here, connected with our attachment to the proper
conduct of self-determination exercises; we have Belize and the
Falklands in mind."
Document
31
July 19, 1976
Subject: Your Telegram no 138: Timor
British Mission to the United Nations, Confidential Telegram
In this telegram the UK Mission to the UN states its alarm at the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office's proposed "formula" on
the July 17 Indonesian incorporation of East Timor. The Mission
is alarmed that any FCO statement that "the question of recognition
does not arise" could "be taken to mean that we accepted
that the consultations conducted by Indonesia over the last two
months amounted to a satisfactory exercise ... This would be damaging
to us at the UN, and might have wider implications in respect of
our own disputed territories."
Notes
1. A UN police investigation into
the 'Balibo Five' deaths opened in August 2000. In February 2001,
UN police applied for three arrest warrants in this case, one of
those being for General Yunus Yosfiah. No warrants were granted
but the case remained open. Indonesia's authorities declined, repeatedly,
to allow the UN access to any of the 8 persons in Indonesia whom
the UN wished to interview regarding this case. In December, 2005,
or January, 2006, a Coroner's inquest will reopen in New South Wales
(NSW), Australia, into the death of British citizen Brian Peters.
Peters was the only one of the 'Balibo Five' who resided in NSW.
The other four were based in Melbourne, Victoria. Inquest and British
House of Commons information is at : <http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/article/230605/mps_demand_justice>
Please note, however, that while Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth
Office appeared to describe those deaths as "murder" in
2000 and 2003, the FCO asserted in June 2005 that it had not made
any such assessment.
2. The release of the FCO's 17 Balibo Files in
2002 appears to have been under the 'Open Government' scheme (introduced
in 1994 by the then Conservative Government). The FCO's Balibo Files
are available to the public at The National Archive (TNA), formerly
the Public Records Office, at Kew, UK. Its website is: <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk>
3. Britain's Freedom of Information Act came into
force on January 1, 2005. It is too early to say how well that Act
is working. For further information, see Britain's Campaign for
Freedom of Information website at: <http://www.cfoi.org.uk>
4. Those requests concern the British Government's
understanding of the role of various key Australian, British, East
Timorese and Indonesian figures in 1975 and in 1998-1999. Figures
of concern include Allan Taylor, Richard Gozney, Tomas Goncalves,
Joao Tavares and Yunus Yosfiah. In 1975, Mr Taylor was a leading
recipient of Indonesian advance information on their plans for the
takeover of East Timor; in 1976, he was the main author of the main
cover-up report on the Balibo deaths; in 1998-1999, he was Prime
Minister Howard's main advisor on East Timor. In 1975-78, Mr Gozney
was an official in the British Embassy in Jakarta (see Document
22); in 1998-1999, he was head of the Assessments Staff in Britain's
Cabinet Office. On Goncalves' role in 1975 and 1999, see Professor
Des Ball. "Silent Witness: Australian intelligence and East
Timor", in Pacific Review (Taylor & Francis Ltd.,
2001, Vol 14, No 1): 47-48. Mr Tavares, the commander-in-chief of
all East Timor's militas in 1999, currently faces a number of Serious
Crimes Unit indictments over crimes against humanity commited then.
On his role in 1975 and 1999, see ABC TV. "A Licence to Kill",
March 15, 1999: <http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/s20270.htm>
Yunus Yosfiah was a KOPASSUS Captain in 1975, in that capacity
he led the attack in which the 'Balibo Five' died; he was Indonesian
Information Minister in 1998-1999, in that capacity he presided
over very important press reforms See: "No Turning Back: Indonesia's
press strives to maintain its hard-won freedom" (Committee
to Protect Journalists, June 1999): <http://etan.org/et99/june/1-5/1cpj.htm>;
Australian intelligence leaks in 2002 show that Yunus Yosfiah helped
to organise the funding for East Timor's militias. See: "Australia's
bloody East Timor secret" (Sydney Morning Herald by
international editor Hamish McDonald, March 14, 2002): <http://www.jsmp.minihub.org/News/15_3-5.htm>
5. Munster and Walsh. Documents of Australian
Defence and Foreign Policy, 1968-1975 (Sydney, 1980): 193.
That book, famously, is one that the Australian Government tried
to ban.
6. Personal communications with Hugh Dowson by
the former First Sea Lord (in 2004 and 2005).
7. FCO memorandum of July 18, 1975, released to
Hugh Dowson in 2005.
8. Sir Michael Palliser, in personal communications
with Hugh Dowson (in 2004 and 2005).
9. James Dunn. Timor: A People Betrayed
(Jacaranda Press, 1983): 250. Pages 229-252 of that book are entitled:
"Murder at Balibo".
10. Jill Jolliffe. Cover-up: the inside story
of the Balibo Five (Scribe Publications, Australia, 2001):
5. Jolliffe has specialised in journalism on East Timor since 1975,
and has researched the 'Balibo Five' killings since the day that
those killings took place.
11. Had the British newsmen been held captive,
rather than killed, matters might have been handled very differently.
In mid-1975, then Foreign Secretary James Callaghan prevented the
execution of imprisoned Briton Denis Hills by flying to Uganda for
talks with dictator, President Idi Amin; in late December, 1975,
Britain's Ambassador was withdrawn from Chile in response to the
torture there, in November 1975, of British doctor Sheila Cassidy.
Callaghan served as Britain's Foreign Secretary from March 1974
until 1976. Then, following the resignation of Prime Minister Harold
Wilson, he was elected as Labour leader and became Prime Minister.
12. 1973 had marked the 600th anniversary of the
Anglo-Portuguese alliance.
13. Kenneth O. Morgan. Callaghan: A Life
(Oxford University Press, 1997): 443-444. Belize, formerly British
Honduras, became self-governing in 1964. On December 13, 1975 Callaghan
was asked by Kissinger whether a handover of Belize to Guatemala
was feasible. It was not, he was told. Callaghan continued to resist
U.S. pressure on the matter. Relations between Guatemala and Britain
over Belize almost reached war footing in 1976-1977.
14. K. O. Morgan. Ibid: 460-462. The Falkland
Islands / Las Malvinas dispute was a major issue for FCO in 1974-1975,
when Argentina made strong representations about their claim. In
May, 1975, Callaghan sent Prime Minister Harold Wilson a 17-page
report on Falklands issues. Callaghan stressed the benefits of British
co-operation with Argentina, on energy and conservation, and also
the need for Argentina to be made aware that an invasion of the
Falklands would be repulsed by British forces.
15. The FCO's 17 Balibo Files show that HMG had
similar concerns over the Spanish claim to Gibraltar.
16. These words from the FCO text should be treated
with extreme caution until verification is obtained. The role that
Waldheim, an Austrian, took in West Bosnia in 1943 as an officer
in Hitler's forces after Hitler's March 1938 anschluss remains as
one of the many serious questions about Waldheim's career at the
UN and elsewhere. See also Sue Rabbitt Roff. Timor's Anschluss
(Edwin Mellen Press, 1992): 123. It was "impossible",
in Roff's view, for the Australian Government to participate in
Dili on May 31, 1976, due to the publicity in April 1976 over claims
made about the 'Balibo Five' deaths by Jose Martins (a key East
Timorese defector from the pro-Indonesian side).
17. UDT: União Democrática de
Timor: Timorese Democratic Union party. UDT was formed in 1974.
From January - May 1975 UDT was in coalition with Fretilin. Apodeti:
Associacão Popular Democrática Timorense.
Popular Democratic Association of East Timor. Formed in 1974, Apodeti
was, at that time, associated with the ABRI policy of East Timorese
integration with Indonesia.
18. Australian Government, documents. Ibid: documents
174 and 175.
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