TIMOR

I took advantage of contacts with them over New Year's Day to discuss the Timor situation with Messrs. Djasjadinrat, Sudio Gandarum, Kusuma Snamoro and Adenan. I told them that we had tried to do our best for Indonesia in the UN and that I thought that we had successfully managed to keep the heat out of the Timor business in New York. I thought, however, that it might be very difficult to keep the temperature down after 1 January when the composition of the Security Council would change, not, I thought, to Indonesia's advantage. It was therefore important that Indonesia should do what she could to help her friends. I was concerned about reports which had reached me that all had not gone according to plan in Dili and that there had been a number of nasty incidents involving members of the armed forces. I thought that sooner or later news of this was bound to leak particularly when representatives of the foreign press went to East Timor in the wake of the Secretary-General's emissary (some anti-Indonesian East Timorese was bound to nobile some reporter and provide an anti-Indonesia story). It was important that the Indonesians should prepare for this eventuality.

If it was true that there had been atrocities by individual 'volunteers' then I thought that the obvious course of action was for the acting Government to say so publicly, to express regret that some of their supporters had thus offended, and set up some form of Court of Enquiry or Tribunal to ascertain the facts and punish the offenders. If the acting Government acted in this way it would take the wind out of the sails of those who wanted to trumpet atrocity stories to discredit the Indonesians; moreover it would make it easier for Indonesia's friends to react properly. At the moment we were taking the line that the reports coming out of Australia could not be verified and that the best thing was to withhold comment until the Secretary-General's representative had got to Dili and was able to carry out his remit there. It was always much easier to refuse to comment if a situation was sub judice. I added that the Indonesians should not react loudly to statements by left-wing elements abroad. For example, I thought it was a great mistake that there had been a reaction to the resolution of the left-wing elements in Parliament before Christmas. Words like 'go to hell' were only too likely to hit the press headlines and thus give added publicity to the situation. Much the best course of action was not to react at all in public.

2. To Mr Kusuma I also said that I had been very interested to hear from our Embassy in Washington how the Congressional Hearings before Christmas had gone. From what I had gathered, these had gone well from

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Indonesia's point of view and Mr Boediono had been somewhat torn apart. I gathered however that Mr Newsom had not been nearly as helpful as might have been expected. For the time being the situation appeared to be quiet in Congress, but I thought that there was a danger that, it might be resuscitated again. This made it all the more important that the Congressional visitors now about to visit Indonesia were given careful treatment. (I mentioned this because I had heard that the US Embassy were having the greatest difficulty in getting the DFA to focus on the visit and arrange a programme.) Mr Kusumo said that the Defence Committee of Congressmen were in fact going to be handled by Ali Murtopo and the CSIS who he thought were probably the best people to deal with them.

3. To Mr Adenan I added that I thought that a great mistake was being made by the UDT in not releasing the Portuguese prisoners. The Portuguese had behaved outrageously in not expressing any concern for all the refugees who had had to flee from East Timor; but that was all the more reason why the UDT should score a point and pour coals of fire on the Portuguese heads by showing maximum humanity to their prisoners by releasing them to rejoin their families. I mentioned that I had raised this before Christmas with Sudjo Gendarum and Mr Senaga who had promised to register the point in HANKAM before he went on holiday. Mr Adenan said that one of the troubles about the Timor situation was that the DFA really did not know what was going on and HANKAM had all the information. I said that in that case perhaps he would like to report to HANKAM what I had said and referred to my earlier conversation with Mr Senaga.

4. The Papal Pro-Nuncio told me that he had raised the question of the prisoners with Mr Malik at his New Years Day Reception and he had promised to look into their fate and see what he could do when he went to Dili early in January. I told the Nuncio about the representations which we had made and our lack of success so far.

5. I told Mr Woolcott about my conversation with Mr Djadjiningrat and Mr Gendarum. He mentioned that he had heard from the Australian Embassy in Peking that the PRC had issued a statement about South African intervention in Angola which by implication indicated that the PRC thought the Russians worse imperialists and a greater danger to Africa than the South Africans. I commented that I thought that the PRC declaration about ASEAN indicated that here too the Chinese were obsessed with Soviet danger. Apropos the Fretilin delegation's visit to Peking and the Chinese ostensible support of Fretilin the Chinese had apparently commented to the effect that too much notice should not be paid to their support of Fretilin: there were occasions when cannons needed to be fired even if only paper balls were shot.

J A FORD
2 January, 1976