THE ABILITY TO PUT TOGETHER A WORKING COALITION WITH THE KOREAN AND DSF, PERHAPS ESTABLISHING A PATTERN FOR THE 1990S.

3. WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPACT ON U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS, AMERICAN SUCCESS REAFFIRMED JAPANESE CONFIDENCE IN OUR STRATEGIC ALLIANCE, BUT "BUSHING" HAS LEFT SOME SCARS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, THERE IS A GROWING THREAT HERE THAT AMERICA'S WEIGHED SELF-CONFIDENCE MAY DEVELOP INTO ARROGANCE DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN. IN PURSUING OUR INTERESTS HERE, WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSIVENESS AND FEAR OF ISOLATION IN THE WAVE OF THE GULF CRISIS TO GAIN GREATER GOJ COOPERATION.

4. IN TERMS OF THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF JAPAN'S POST-WAR FOREIGN POLICY, THE GOJ'S ESSENTIALLY PASSIVE APPROACH TO THE GULF WAR WAS NOT UNSUCCESSFUL. JAPAN'S ACCESS TO OIL WAS NOT DISRUPTED, AND THE PRICE EVEN FELL.
6. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE GULF CRISIS ENDED WITHOUT JAPAN REACHING A CONSENSUS ON ANY OF THESE BASIC ISSUES. IN PART THIS FAILURE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO POLITICAL DOMESTIC CIRCUMSTANCES: THE FIRST TIME THE UPPER HOUSE IN THE HANDS OF THE OPPOSITION. THE CRISIS, HOWEVER, BROUGHT TO THE SURFACE MORE FUNDAMENTAL OBSTACLES TO A MORE PACIFIST SENTIMENT IN GENERAL AND BUSTRUST IN THE JAPANESE MILITARY IN PARTICULAR REMAIN VERY STRONG, EVEN AMONG MANY SO-CALLED "CONSERVATIVES" IN THE LDP.

5. HOWEVER, THE GULF CRISIS AROSE AT A TIME WHEN JAPAN'S ROLE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD AND SERVED AS A CATALYST TO THIS DEBATE, RAISING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, SOME OF WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ADDRESSED SINCE THE END OF THE WAR. THESE ISSUES INCLUDE:

--- THE CONTINUED EFFICACY OF JAPAN'S RENUNCIATION OF ANY MILITARY ROLE BEYOND TERRITORIAL SELF-DEFENSE IN A WORLD MOVING TOWARD COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN JAPANESE SOCIETY.

--- DEFINING AND BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR A JAPANESE CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY BEYOND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.

--- FINDING A NEW EQUILIBRIUM IN U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS TO REFLECT THE SHIFT IN THE ECONOMIC BALANCE, AMERICAN
--- THE DIET DEBATE CONTRIBUTED ONLY MARGINALLY TO THE POLICY PROCESS. THE OPPOSITION TRIVIALIZED THE ISSUES BY FOCUSING ON FINE POINTS OF LAW AND THE GOVERNMENT STAYED LARGELY ON THE DEFENSIVE SEEKING TO AVOID ANY MISSTATEMENTS THAT COULD DISRUPT PROCEEDINGS, THEREBY MISTAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE DEBATE TO EDUCATE THE PUBLIC ON THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS AND PRINCIPLES AT STAKE. MUCH OF THE RESPONSIBILITY BELONGS TO THE RIGID PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICES BUILT UP OVER THE FORTY YEARS OF SINGLE PARTY RULE AND TO THE BUREAUCRATIC MENTALITY WITH WHICH THE GOJ, THE LDP, AND THE OPPOSITION HAVE TRADITIONALLY APPROACHED ISSUES.

LESSONS LEARNED

7. IT IS TOO EARLY TO SAY WITH ANY CONFIDENCE WHAT WILL BE THE LONG-TERM IMPACT, IF ANY, OF THE CRISIS ON JAPAN, BUT WE OFFER THESE PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS ON THE LESSONS JAPAN IS DRAWING FROM THE
ALERT

A UNCLASSIFIED INCOMING

ROUTINE

PAGE 01

TO: X[01]

INFO: 14/07/32 A1 0B1 (TOTAL COPIES: 3B1)

ACTION SS-89

INFO LOG-08 ASS-08 /0B1V

A 14/07/32 MA 91
IN AMBASSADORS' TO
TO SEESTATT MW330 5727
INFO RUEJUSD/AMBASSADORS BANGKOK
AMBASSADORS' JAKARTA
AMBASSADORS' BEIJING
AMBASSADORS' KUALA LUMPUR
AMBASSADORS' MANILA
AMBASSADORS' SINGAPORE
AMBASSADORS' SEOUL
AMBASSADORS' CASSERBA
AMBASSADORS' LONDON
AMBASSADORS' ROME
AMBASSADORS' PARIS
AMBASSADORS' ROME
AMBASSADORS' BOSTON
AMBASSADORS' BRUSSELS
AMBASSADORS' MOSCOW
USMISSION USKATU 7129
COMJSAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINPAC ROKULU 01

SECRET SECTION 04 OF 07 TOKYO 01532

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMJSAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINPAC

ROKULU 01

USCINPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12355: DECL-ODOR
TAGS: PREL, NAR, JA II, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND

LAST SEVEN MONTHS:

-- JAPAN NEEDS TO DO MORE THAN SEND MONEY. WHILE THE

VALIDITY OF JAPAN'S POSTWAR COMMITMENT NOT TO SEND

MILITARY FORCES ABROAD TO ENGAGE IN CONFLICT HAS NOT

BEEN SERIOUSLY QUESTIONED, THERE IS A WIDESPREAD

FEELING HERE THAT JAPAN CAN NOT SIMPLY BUY FRIENDS

WITH GOJUST AND FINANCE THOSE WHO ARE DOING THE DIRTY

AND DANGEROUS WORK INVOLVED IN MAINTAINING

INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. THERE IS NO CONSENSUS ON

EXACTLY WHAT TASK JAPAN SHOULD BE PREPARED TO

UNDERTAKE ABROAD. BUT FAVORITE SUGGESTIONS INCLUDE

LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR U.N. PEACE KEEPING ACTIVITIES,

PROVIDING MEDICAL ITEMS TO CRISIS AREAS; AND HELP IN

MOVING REFUGEES FROM AREAS OF CONFLICT. AT THIS STAGE

ONLY LIP SERVICE IS BEING PAID TO THESE IDEAS; BUT

THE UPCOMING DEBATE ON THE NEW PEACE COOPERATION LAW

WILL BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO FRESH OUT SOME OF THESE

PROPOSALS. MOFA OFFICIALS ARE LOOKING AT A

U.N.-SUPERVISED CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT AS THE NEXT

OPPORTUNITY FOR COJ INVOLVEMENT IN PKO ACTIVITIES.

-- JAPAN IS NOT A GREAT POWER OR HUNGRY TO BECOME

ONE. DESERT SHIELD/STORM WAS A VIVID REMINDER THAT

FOR ALL ITS ECONOMIC PROGRESS, JAPAN IS NOT IN THE

GREAT POWER LEAGUE. THE LEADERSHIP'S DETERMINATION,

DIPLOMATIC SKILL; AND MILITARY EFFICIENCY DISPLAYED BY

THE U.S. SHOCKED MANY JAPANESE WHO WERE BEGINNING TO

EGRESS OUR ECONOMIC PROBLEMS WITH AN OVERALL DECLINE

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ALERT

PAGE 01  TOKYO 04532  05 of 07 1406322
INFO. X2181  FAP(1)
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ACTION SS-08

INFO  LOD-08  AGS-08  8011V
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R 140627Z MAR 81
FM AMBASSADORS TOKYO
TO SEESTATE WASHIG 5568
INFO HUEHNE/AMBASSADORS BANGKOK
AMBASSADORS JAKARTA
AMBASSADORS BANGKOK
AMBASSADORS KUALA LUMPUR
AMBASSADORS KATHMANDU
AMBASSADORS SINGAPORE
AMBASSADORS SEOUL
AMBASSADORS CANBERRA
AMBASSADORS LONDON
AMBASSADORS ROME
AMBASSADORS PARIS
AMBASSADORS VIENNA
AMBASSADORS BRUSSELS
AMBASSADORS MOSCOW
USMISSION USHATD 7110
CONSUL JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCONSUS HOLOLU R1

SECTION 05 OF 07 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO CONSUL JAPAN YOKOTA AB JA AND USCONSUS
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CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECR: DADR
TAGS: PRL, MAB: JA: 12, US
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
8. THE IMPACT OF OUR SUCCESS IN THE GULF WAR ON
U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS HAS BEEN MIXED. ON THE POSITIVE
SIDE, THE UNITED STATES PROVED TO BE THE "ONLY
GANE IN TOWN," AND REAFFIRMED ITS WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO
COME TO THE AID OF FRIENDS ABROAD, A GREAT REASSURANCE
TO THE MAJORITY OF JAPANESE WHO FIND COMFORT IN THE
U.S. ORBIT, AND A USEFUL REMINDER TO THE FEW
OTHERS WHO MAY HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR STRATEGIC
OPTIONS. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, THE "B xting" FROM THE
CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN MEDIA OF THE LAST SEVEN
MONTHS OVER JAPAN'S INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE GULF,
WHILE VIEWED BY MANY JAPANESE AS JUSTIFIABLE
CRITICISM, HAS ALSO FUELED RESERVATION HERE. MANY
BUREAUCRATS AND CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERS
COMPLAINED ABOUT PERCEIVED U.S. INSENSITIVITY TO THE
COMPLEXITIES OF JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS;
PARTICULARLY WITH THE UPPER HOUSE IN OPPOSITION HANDS,
THAT MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOV. TO MOVE QUICKLY.
OTHERS, MOSTLY IN THE MEDIA AND OPPOSITION, COMPLAINED
ABOUT AMERICAN "HIGHHANDEDNESS" IN UNDERTAKING
UNILATERAL ACTION WITHOUT CONSULTATION WITH JAPAN
AND THEN ASKING THE JAPANESE TAXPAYER TO PICK UP A LARGE
percentage of the tab. THE BROAD INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORT AS EMBODIED IN THE UNSC

RESOLUTIONS AND OUR SUCCESS HAS LARGELY MITIGATED
these negative aspects, but there remain corners of
smoldering resentment, particularly in the foreign
policy bureaucracy.

Pursuing our interests

18. WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
JAPAN'S DEFENSIVESENSES AND SENSE OF INADEQUACY ABOUT
its performance

B1

CONFRONTATIONAL APPROACH RISKS PRODUCING AN
UNPRODUCTIVE BACKLASH. TO BE MOST EFFECTIVE WE WILL
NEED TO LAY OUT CLEAR OBJECTIVES AND AVOID INCISIVE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET SECTION 86 OF 87 TOKYO B16332

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCPAC

HONOLULU

CINCPAC ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12356: DECL: LOC

TAGS: PREL, MAR, JA, 12, US

SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND
"DEMOS" THAT COULD FEED THE GROWING PERCEPTION HERE
THAT THE U.S. IS MORE INTERESTED IN CATHERMIS THAN
ACHIEVING CONCRETE RESULTS.

11. WE ALSO NEED TO DEVOTE CLOSE ATTENTION TO TRYING
TO ENSURE GOJ FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES IN AREAS OF
MAJOR INTEREST TO US —
Alert

Page 01

INFO: X (10)  EAP (11)

ACTION: SS-89

INFO: LOG-80  AGS-80  1/01/87

R 1406321 MAR 61

FN AMBASSADY TOKYO
TO SECBIRW WASHDC 527B
INFO RUEIRK/AMBASSADY BANGKOK
AMBASSADY JAKARTA
AMBASSADY BEIJING
AMBASSADY KUALA LUMPUR
AMBASSADY MANILA
AMBASSADY SINGAPORE
AMBASSADY SEOUL
AMBASSADY CANBERRA
AMBASSADY LONDON
AMBASSADY ROME
AMBASSADY PARIS
AMBASSADY BONN
AMBASSADY BRUSSELS
AMBASSADY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO 7112
CONUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB JA
USCINCAP HONOLULU HI

SECRET SECTION 87 OF 87 TOKYO 04532

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO CONUSJAPAN YOKOTA AB AND USCINCAP
HONOLULU

CINCAP ALSO FOR POLNO

E.O. 12356: RC1L: OAA
SUBJECT: THE GULF WAR: IMPACT ON JAPAN AND

WE DO NOT EXPECT ANY

SURPRISES ON THE STRATEGIC LEVEL, SUCH AS A MAJOR.
CHANGE IN TERMS OF NORMALIZATION WITH MOSCOW. BUT WE
CAN EXPECT A TENDENCY FOR MORE INDEPENDENT INITIATIVES
ON ASIAN ISSUES AND PERHAPS TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST.
OUR BEST STRATEGY IS TO BRING THE COJ AS FULLY INTO
THE TENT AS POSSIBLE THROUGH ENHANCED WORKING LEVEL
EXCHANGES, ON REGIONAL ISSUES AND REGULAR POLICY-LEVEL
CONSULTATIONS.

12. IN SUM: WE HAVE A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFLUENCE
THE DIRECTION OF JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY AND TO POINT
JAPAN'S FINANCIAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE IN
DIRECTIONS SUPPORTIVE OF U.S. INTERESTS IF WE DEVOTE
THE TIME NECESSARY FOR CONSULTATIONS AND IF WE GIVE
THE COJ SOME ROOM FOR MANEUVER WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ACHIEVING SHARED OBJECTIVES,
AT THE SAME TIME WE WILL RUN REAL RISKS OF PUSHING THE
JAPANESE OFF IN A MORE INDEPENDENT DIRECTION IF WE DO
NOT GIVE THEM A FULL PLACE AT THE TABLE, WHETHER THEY
DESERVE IT OR NOT ON THE BASIS OF THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS
TO DATE.