WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

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The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Special Asst for Research & Intelligence
Document Date: APR 16, 1948
Document Type: Note/Notes
From: Humelsine
To: Jack

Subject: I'd like to talk...

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination.

NND: 41170
Withdrawn: 01-23-2006    by:

RETRIEVAL #: 41170 00019 0001 2
Jack:
I'd like to talk to you about this. I'll give you a call to fill-in on Hickenlooper's comments in my potential visit to you.
Upon entering Admiral Hillenkoetter's office, he said to Mr. Armstrong: "Well, I kept you off the spot, didn't I?" To this Mr. Armstrong replied, "Perhaps, but you certainly put the State Department on it." Admiral Hillenkoetter admitted this.

Admiral Hillenkoetter then described the circumstances of the hearing before the Committee headed by Congressman Clarence Brown on the preceding day. He said that the statement which he had made before the Committee had been shown to Admiral Leahy (and indicated that the President had been consulted in the matter) and that he had then shown it to Secretary Forrestal. He stated that Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal had told him to go ahead with the statement even if it involved a public hearing. Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that the hearing before the Committee had been first in executive session, but that upon its completion, the Chairman had called in the press and required him to read his statement again to the reporters.

Mr. Humesline requested Admiral Hillenkoetter to explain his references in his testimony to the CIA report allegedly "censored" by a Mr. C. J. Libert at Bogota. Admiral Hillenkoetter picked up a memorandum, a copy of which is attached, and read it.

The
The memorandum had been prepared, he said, by the CIA Agent
in Bogota and was an explanation of the Agent's
instructions to CIA in Washington that the message he sent on
March 23rd should not be forwarded to the State Department.
Mr. Humelsine and Mr. Armstrong noted that the statement did not
indicate that Ambassador Besulac had interposed any objection
to the message being transmitted to the State Department and that
the CIA Agent had accepted unquestioningly the authority of an
administrative officer of the Information and Public Relations
Division as sufficient to block the transmission of the message. Mr. Arm-
strong asked why the Agent had not gone back to the Ambassador
and urged the sending of the information, if he thought it was
important. Admiral Hillenhoetter responded that the Agent had
to "live" with the Embassy and therefore could not afford to
antagonize the personnel there.

Mr. Humelsine then said to Admiral Hillenhoetter, "It is
inconceivable to me that you personally could have had the in-
formation to which your name was attached such importance and not
have sent it to the Department regardless of your subordinate's
instructions from Bogota." Admiral Hillenhoetter replied that
in hindsight he felt he should have done so and that, in fact,
when the information was received, on or about March 23, he had
suggested doing so. However, in a discussion of the matter with
his Deputy, General E. K. Wright, his Executive Officer,
Captain Piotr and Colonel Galloway, the Deputy Director for
Special Operations, he had been advised against doing so on the
grounds that their man in Bogota would be placed in serious trouble
vis-a-vis the Ambassador and the staff.

Admiral Hillenhoetter went on to indicate the general
difficulties which the overseas covert operations
have encountered at various

Admiral Hillenhoetter then recited the history of the efforts
CIA has made to obtain departmental agreement to the enlargement
of its overseas staff and said that since July 1947 he had been
trying to get an additional number of agents

without success. He stated that he had talked to Mr. Porrufcy
about it last fall and had at first found him sympathetic to his
request and to the CIA's staffing problem. After a further delay,
Mr. Porrfcy had written him to the effect that the additional
assignments
assignments not only would not be granted, but that by January
lit the overseas force would have to be reduced to no more than
200 agents. He recalled that Mr. Faurifoy had subsequently told
him that he had signed this letter only with "great reluctance";
Admiral Hillenkoetter recounted conversations which he had had
with Mr. Armour, Mr. Neal, Mr. Havindal, and others on the subject
in which the divergence of views on the function of CIA in the
field became apparent. He stated that he had also talked to
Secretary Forrestal and that the latter had talked to Mr. Lovett.
It had been agreed between them that the Committee surveying
CIA operations headed by Mr. Allen Dulles would attempt to
resolve the impasse.

Admiral Hillenkoetter said that the CIA had been unjustifi-
ably, in his opinion, put on the spot by the State Department's
failure to release publicly the information which had been given
by Lincoln White at a Thursday evening, April 15th, press conference
and that he thought the Department deserved whatever heat might
now be on it. Mr. Humesline pointed out that the State Depart-
ment looked upon this situation as being the responsibility of
the Executive branch of the Government, not one of the depart-
ments which could disclaim responsibility by shifting the burden to
another. He asked the Director why he had not informed
the Department that CIA was under pressure and requested its coopera-
tion. Mr. Humesline recalled to the Director that he had tele-
phoned him, at Mr. Lovett's request, when he first heard that
there would be a congressional investigation and had asked him
if there was anything the State Department could do to help.
Mr. Armstrong said that he too had telephoned the Director in
the same vein and noted that in neither case had the Director
indicated that the CIA was under disturbing pressure or that
the State Department could, or should, do anything in the cir-
cumstances. Admiral Hillenkoetter referred to the fact that
the newspapers and radio had continuously indicated that CIA
was being held accountable for the alleged intelligence failure
at Bوطع and said that the Department should have known that
the only corrective would be to issue a statement on the
quantity and quality of information that had been available.

Admiral Hillenkoetter then reverted to the difficulties
he has encountered in getting his program implemented through
the State Department and the Foreign Service and said that he
would much prefer to have relations with the Department cen-
tralized in one office and that if he could do all of his
business
business with Mr. Armstrong's office, he thought that better results would ensue. He emphasized that his relations with Mr. Armstrong and the substantive side of intelligence were satisfactory, and that he hoped that the Department would take steps to make his relations center in one place. Mr. Rumelsine said that he thought this was essential and should be carried into effect and he would so report to Mr. Lovett.

In closing, Admiral Hillenkoetter stated that if relations with the Department did not improve in the near future, he intended to inform the President and, if necessary, the Congress, that they could not hold him responsible for obtaining the intelligence information that he is charged with at present. He stated that he would have to bring the blocking of his plans by the Department to public notice, since not, in some cases, he is able to get only 60% or less of the information that he should and would get if his program were fully put into effect.
1. On or about 15 March 1948, a request was received from the

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Ambassador, Mr. Edward Crick, and to Mr. O. J. Libert, an officer of the Division of International Conferences of the State Department, identified to me as the advance agent for the U.S. delegation.

2. The Administrative Officer and Mr. Libert were both advised of these circumstances and requested to supply my office with the necessary information for transmission to the police. Since there was some uncertainty as to the exact arrival dates of General Marshall and the U.S. delegation, these gentlemen were unable to supply the precise information needed, but indicated that they would pass this information to our office when known.

3. Several conferences were held thereafter with Mr. Libert on the subject, during the course of which it was stated that General Marshall be apprised of the gravity of the situation so that he might advise the embassy of his specific plans for arrival at the conference. It was decided that a cable to the State Department, no matter how highly classified, would pass through too many hands and would, in his opinion, cause alarm. He felt that if it were necessary to communicate with General Marshall on this subject it would be better for him to direct an airmail letter to General Marshall which would be seen by the secretary only. He concluded therefore that he would like the privilege of advising Mrs. Marshall himself if it felt necessary in the circumstances.

4. Immediately thereafter I requested three proven sources to report at once, any confirming information. On 23 March 1948, I received a report that the Communists had devised plans to demonstrate against
Secretary Marshall and the U.S. delegation upon their arrival, and that these demonstrations would involve possible personal molestation of ... personalities. Since this information confirmed the report we had earlier received ..., I felt obliged to urge upon Mr. Libert the necessity of supplying us with information on the Secretary’s arrival. Even at that late date, it was not known specifically what General Marshall’s plans were and since Mr. Libert still felt that notice to General Marshall might cause undue alarm, I elected to send a cable to Washington Headquarters outlining the situation as stated above, and indicating Mr. Libert’s position in the matter. My purpose in sending the cable was to indicate that the information was in our hands and that we had done everything within our power to make the information available to the ambassador and to the State Department’s advance agent for the delegates. Mr. request that the information be not passed to the State Department was made solely because of Mr. Libert’s expressed wishes that any communication of this matter to Washington be handled by him.