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From:
To: Executive Secretary, NSC

Subject:

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NND: 39031
Withdrawn: 07-26-2005  by: NWMD

RETRIEVAL #: 39031 00061 0001 2
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NSC

Subject: Atomic Energy Program of the USSR

1. As a result of discussion of a paper submitted by the Director of Intelligence, United States Air Force, it was informally decided by the Intelligence Advisory Committee that the attention of the National Security Council should be invited to the following conclusions regarding the intelligence concerning the atomic energy program of the USSR.

   a. Any estimate of the present or future military capabilities of the USSR which does not include the status of the Soviet atomic energy program will not meet the requirements for planning. The accuracy of the United States' estimate of the Soviet atomic energy program will depend upon the amount and quality of the intelligence that can be collected.

   b. It is generally agreed that Russian intent and plans to engage in aggressive warfare will be influenced by the progress she can make in her atomic energy program. In order that the United States may develop adequate defensive measures, including the preparation of counter offensive plans, it is essential that every means be utilized to provide a continuous and current picture of the status of the Soviet program, and to fix the precise location of major atomic energy installations in the USSR.

   c. It is recognized that our measures against an atomic attack, such as the setting up of radar networks, the improvement of fighter planes, the dispersal of key industries and the perfection of civilian defense plans will require time to perfect. In addition, plans must be finalized for the counter offensive destructive bombing of the Soviet atomic installations.

   d. In order to estimate the capability of the USSR to wage atomic warfare, it is necessary to know, not only the events that preceded the date when the first bomb is detonated, but also the capability for bomb production thereafter. In consequence, our intelligence should furnish a comprehensive picture of the Soviet program, including the means and methods by which weapons are produced, the capacity of the production installations, the stockpile and the rate of supply of uranium to the USSR.
more emphasis be placed on certain programs which appear to offer
definite likelihood of rapid fruition:

a. Special Intelligence

The most productive in the past and the most promising
method, and hence the one most deserving of priority, is Special
Intelligence. This source contributes reliable administrative
and organizational information which serves as the basic frame-
work for all other analyses, and furnishes a check on the
reliability of information from other sources.

b. Interrogations

Provide details which clarify information from
special intelligence.

c. Covert Operations

Provide a means for directed collection of specific
information not provided by other sources.

d. Research in Published Soviet Technical Literature

Soviet technical publications should be translated and
indexed to provide encyclopedias and dictionaries of Russian
technicians, institutes, technical nomenclature, trade specifi-
cations, etc., which will provide valuable working tools for
exploiting other sources of information. In fields where this
has been done, the information has been of great value, particu-
larly in the field of special intelligence.

3. In addition to the foregoing fields of collection, the
Research and Development Board is undertaking a scientific program
designed to produce detection devices to supplement the overall
program. In connection with the scientific program, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff recently advised the Research and Development Board that
there was a necessity to supplement conventional intelligence by
other methods, and that the receipt of positive and timely information
indicating that an atomic explosion in fact had been accomplished, by
a potentially unfriendly nation, is of great importance to our national
security.

4. In accordance with the above, the members of the IAC are
taking immediate action to implement the programs in paragraph 2b, c,
and d. Implementation of all recommendations, however, is beyond the
present resources of the IAC Members.
5. In order effectively to implement paragraph 2a above, an expansion of the COMINT effort is required. The present facilities of these agencies are committed, and the Services estimate that additional funds will be required to carry out this project properly. Such sums have not been included in the budget for the Fiscal Year 1950. The three Services of the NIE, in coordination with USCIB, are studying this matter with a view towards compiling a coordinated total sum necessary for this work. It is recommended by the DCI, with the concurrence of the IAC, that the NSC in the meantime note this study and submit the problem to the Secretary of Defense for any appropriate action he may care to take.

R. H. HILLENKOTTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence