In Attendance - Friday, March 26, 1976

Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman

D  Mr. Ingersoll
P  Mr. Sisco
E  Mr. Robinson
T  Mr. Maw
M  Mr. Eagleburger
AF  Mr. Mulcahy (Acting)
ARA  Mr. Rogers
EA  Mr. Habib
EUR  Mr. Armitage
NEA  Mr. Atherton
INR  Mr. Saunders
S/P  Mr. Lord
EB  Mr. Katz (Acting)
S/PRS  Mr. Funseth
PM  Mr. Vest
IO  Mr. Lewis
H  Ambassador McCloskey
L  Mr. Leigh
S/S  Mr. Springsteen
S  Mr. Barbian
hospital. The police, fortunately, provided very good protection and there was no serious difficulty or incidents. And apparently Malik was pretty well satisfied -- at least, on that occasion -- with the kind of response he got.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Are you finished?

(Addresses Mr. Armitage.)

MR. ARMITAGE: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Bill?

MR. ROGERS: The chief negotiator in Panama has resigned. It looks as though for personal reasons he's going to be succeeded, in all probability, by Guerra, who's a former Foreign Minister.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think Taccia is such a great loss, is he?

MR. ROGERS: No, sir. It wouldn't seem that way -- even in Panama.

In Argentina, although the junta has had some pretty good success, we're trying to make whatever estimates we can about what's going to happen. We've asked both the Mission and Washington to do their own visualizations -- to compare them. But I think the preliminary estimate has got to be that it's going to go
downhill. This junta is testing the basic proposition that Argentina is not governable, so they're going to succeed where everybody else has failed. I think that's a distinctly odds-on choice.

I think we're going to look for a considerable effort to involve the United States -- particularly in the financial field. I think we're going to see a good deal --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but that's in our interest.

MR. ROGERS: If there's a chance of it succeeding and if they're not asking us to put too much up on the table. What we're going to try to do, when and if they come up with such a plan, is what we were prepared to do about six months ago. We had worked out as intermediaries a sensible program for international assistance, using the private banks and monetary institutions.

Whether we can pull that off again, I don't know; but I think we're going to hear from them very early on in terms of financial programs.

I think also we've got to expect a fair amount of repression, probably a good deal of blood, in Argentina
before too long. I think they're going to have to come down very hard not only on the terrorists but on the dissidents of trade unions and their parties.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But --

MR. ROGERS: The point I'm making is that although they have good press today, the basic line of all the interference was they had to do it because she couldn't run the country. So I think the point is that we ought not at this moment to rush out and embrace this new regime -- that three-six months later will be considerably less popular with the press.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But we shouldn't do the opposite either.

MR. ROGERS: Oh, no; obviously not.

MR. McCLOSKEY: What do we say about recognition?

MR. ROGERS: Well, we're going to recognize this morning a formal note in response to their request for recognition -- as have virtually all the other countries of Latin America. But beyond that, Hill will keep his mouth shut.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes, but what does that mean concretely? Whatever chance they have, they will need
a little encouragement from us.

What is he telling them?

MR. ROGERS: What? Oh, nothing. He has not been talking with them yet. He has not been invited to talk with them. He's ready to go in and talk with them when and if they request a meeting. But the Generals who are now presently occupying the Ministerial posts are there very temporarily -- probably for the week -- until the junta can make its final decisions as to whom they're going to appoint. They will make decisions on who they will appoint within a week.

We think we know who's the Foreign Minister -- which is the key appointment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who?

MR. ROGERS: Probably a fellow named Litella, who we have worked with in the past. And if he is appointed, then I think we're in a position to work with him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But can I see some instructions on what you're going to tell Hill if somebody should come in --

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- because I do want to encourage them. I don't want to give the sense that
they're harassed by the United States.

MR. ROGERS: No. What I was basically concerned about in the first instance was the public posture.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I agree with that.

MR. LEWIS: There are going to be informal consultations this afternoon at the Security Council about this Angolan debate, which has been appearing on the horizon for the past two weeks. There will be lay representatives in New York. Most of the Africans don't want to have the debate, but there's still some pressure to have it by members of the Council. There could conceivably be an informal debate after the discussion this afternoon.

The Chinese want to have a debate; the Russians obviously don't. Most of the Africans don't; some so. So it's a mixed bag.

Do you, Mr. Secretary, want us to express any preference, in the informal consultations, as to whether a debate would be useful or not?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't see anything we can gain by a debate.

MR. LEWIS: The South African troops are to