Recommendations of The Jeremiah Report

The problems collecting against and analyzing the India target raise a number of questions about how the IC has evolved in the broadest terms. Few of these recommendations, therefore, are India-specific. They are listed within the broad categories addressed in the report. The DCI can fix some of these problems using his existing authorities, but others would require that he be assigned greater authority than he now has.

Analytic Assumptions and Tradecraft

1. Add rigor to analysts’ thinking when major events unfold. Two mechanisms would help:

   A. Bring in outside substantive experts in a more systematic fashion.

   B. Bring in experts in the process of analysis when the IC faces a transition on a major intelligence issue. These analytic thinkers would serve, together with substantive specialists, as “Red Teams” on major analytic problems and work with analysts to study assumptions, mirror-imaging, and complex analytic processes.

2. Reexamine the effectiveness of the formal warning process with an eye to altering it fundamentally.

3. Establish effective mechanisms to guarantee stronger integration of regional and technical analysis and greater collaboration and coordination of intelligence agencies and disciplines.

Collection Management and Tasking

4. Realign collection priorities so that high-priority issues within individual countries, such as Indo-Pakistani WMD programs, compete more evenly with rogue states. Better optimize collection on high-priority targets when theater military assets can meet requirements.

Manning and Training

5. Address the imbalance resulting from the decline in analytic depth and the investment in collection systems that are expanding the amount of exploitable data.
6. Plan now to staff imagery analysis, and support analysts with adequate tools and training, to accommodate the greater technical capabilities envisioned for future imagery systems and the increased data those systems will collect.

Organizing and Integrating the Intelligence Community

7. Vest a community manager with the authority to demand accountability from across the IC for carrying out DCI decisions, directives, and priorities. The IC lacks an accountability process for follow-through on senior-level decisions, and too often the DCI and DDCI are the arbiters for decisions that should be reached and acted on at lower levels.

8. Install an overarching management structure to integrate collection systems and ensure better interagency allocation of resources. A cross-INT collection mechanism is needed, including modeling, to address this need to task collection as a "system of systems."

9. Empower an interagency group to offer specific recommendations on how to improve collection and analysis on the South Asia WMD problem, including both technical aspects and leadership decisionmaking. If such a group is established, the DCI should consider personally appointing a chairperson who has the DCI’s authority.

- Ensure that these types of collaborative, interagency groups are not hamstrung by compartmentation.

10. Scrub the current organizational plan to improve the clarity of the structure, fix responsibilities, eliminate redundancies, resource the staff with appropriate management and analytical tools, and balance workload. Once clarified, inform the organization.

CONCLUSION

Reviews such as this always spotlight and make more egregious problems that in retrospect might appear obvious. In fact, these events took place within a milieu of other events, all clamoring for attention and for increased resources and collection.

At the end of the day, there are issues here that should have commanded senior-level attention earlier in the
process. This cannot all be done by the DCI and DDCI. Addressing IC problems requires leadership participation by senior officers in the entire IC, and their participation should be focused on identifying and discussing critical intelligence requirements facing the nation, even at the expense of resource allocation and regulatory issues that unfortunately today dominate their attention.

To some degree, this means delegating and empowering senior levels within IC organizations to speak for the organization but also to free up senior leaders to focus on the needs of the nation. In order to accomplish this, there must be more risk-taking on the part of the IC’s senior leadership in pursuing what needs to be done, whether specifically directed or otherwise.