MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: February 26, 1976
Time: 7:00 p.m.
Place: The Waldorf Towers

SUBJECT: The Secretary's Meeting with Prime Minister Bhutto

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Under Secretary Sisco
Winston Lord, S/P
Adolph Dubs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA (Notetaker)

PAKISTAN

Prime Minister Bhutto
Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State
Ambassador Yaqub-Khan
Ambassador Iqbal Akhund, Pakistani Permanent Representative to the UN

PM Bhutto (To Sisco) When will you be taking on your new responsibilities?

Sisco In July.

The Secretary The only reason I'm letting him go is because I'm sure he will be on his knees in six months asking to be taken back.

Joe suffers from the illusion that a university presidency confers power and influence. He will have more interesting conversations and infinitely more power in the State Department than as a university president.

PM Bhutto Mr. Secretary, I had lunch this afternoon with a group made up of journalists, editors and scholars. We wept for you.

The Secretary For us as a country or for me personally? Were you defending us or attacking us?
PM Bhutto

Well, the discussion started with the assertion that Kissinger was Spenglerian, that he saw the decline of the West as inevitable, and that he was trying desperately to hold back the inevitable. I heard a similar comment during my visit to Germany.

The Secretary

It was probably Brezinski who took this line.

PM Bhutto

I said I didn't agree with this line of reasoning. Kissinger, I noted, doesn't look at the West in such pessimistic terms. Actually, the whole world is in crisis. It is not simply a question of the West or East being in a critical situation. All are involved, and we have to combine our resources to cope with the crisis and try a few things in good faith. I believe that the theory of detente is unassailable. It's logic and necessity are without question. The query arose in the discussion whether Kissinger was simply the instigator of detente or whether he wanted also to complete the process. As I said, the theory of detente is unassailable. It is the process...
of detente which generates some complications. I noted in the discussion that Dr. Kissinger is a master of both theory and practice and that he is trying to marry the two. He wants to see events fit the theory. But anomalies arise. There are letdowns, treachery, setbacks, the demands connected with national elections, etc. An equilibrium is not established. But I recall that both Lenin and Mao threw theories overboard when they thought this necessary to deal with matters practically and effectively.

Now take Angola—and you know that we recognized it two days ago. Here is a situation in which a pip-squeak of a country like Cuba with some 10,000 troops (Kissinger: 12,000) has been able to have an impact far from its shores. This is unimaginable. Cuba evidently takes the view that it is more interested in pursuing the dictates of its ideology than its national interests. In any case, it seems that the initiative has passed into the
hands of the Soviet Union. And now we have a stalemate in Western Europe and the Middle East, where there is now nothing more that can be done. And the subcontinent of Asia is going to bear the main brunt of detente.

The Secretary

Mr. Prime Minister, I'm afraid the journalists were supplied with analogies which will only be directed in a critical fashion at the Administration. I'm surprised at the interpretation given to events. You are confusing detente with the internal situation in the U.S. and the power balance which followed because of domestic developments. Detente is not the cause of events in Angola. We wanted to resist developments in Angola. Brezinski and others were opposed to strong action there. It is not detente which makes Soviet intervention possible there. One should remember the objective situation which faced us in the past when we were mired in Vietnam and confronted a large peace movement and demonstrations on campuses and elsewhere. A domestic upheaval could have
resulted if all opposing forces had been able to unite effectively. Detente and our withdrawal defused the situation. Moreover, detente made it much more difficult to mobilize communist forces around the world against us. What has killed us is Watergate and the ensuing collapse of executive authority. What also has killed us is a Congress which has gone totally out of control. Our military assistance to Angola was stopped in midstream. In December we had Angola licked the way things were going. The Cubans could have been exhausted and beaten. They could not have withstood continuing casualties. It is a total misconception to believe that the final outcome was caused by detente. In pursuing detente we have tried to maintain peace through the maintenance of an equilibrium. What concessions have been made to the Soviets? We have driven them out of an entrenched position in the Middle East. Their influence
in Syria could be reduced significantly. Angola was easily manageable. We failed because of the Vietnam and Watergate syndromes. Despite these traumatic experiences we did not believe that we should cop out in Angola. But alibis were generated by those who resisted doing anything when we were resisting communist intervention. Our basic problem is conducting foreign policy without authority. There is nobody with less illusions about the Soviet Union than I. But without authority you can't do anything. Those who oppose detente will get us into situations which would only unite forces on the left. This would play into the hands of the communists. The Soviets can be handled. We had them on the defensive in the Middle East. They could have been defeated in Angola. If we had had the authority we had in 1971, they would have now been the ones embarking from Angola. It is senseless to rave against the Soviets without authority and means to carry out policy. The essence of foreign policy is to detect what geopolitical changes are in train and to

SECRET/NODIS
position oneself to resist possible adverse changes politically, physically and psychologically. But the erosion of central authority is our problem. If we can lick this everything else falls into place.

PM Bhutto

Certainly, the confrontation between the Executive and Congress is disastrous. How is it to be resolved?

The Secretary

What has given the Soviets opportunities? What are the alternatives that the U.S. should pursue? If we demonstrate strength, decisiveness we can lick any problem. The Soviet Union is still a crude state in many ways. What we need is a sound conception of our national interest. People/concerned whether or not the establishment of a Soviet naval base in Angola would have any importance. I don't give a damn about that. What bothers me is that Cuba sailed troops across the ocean to intervene against us and the U.S. didn't react. I almost resigned on this issue in
December, in all frankness. But it wasn't detente that stopped us. Indeed, prior to that we were searching for ways to ease our relationship with Cuba but she betrayed this attempt. In any case, I have suffered under Brezinski too long. Besides, Brezinski changes his opinions more rapidly than I.

PM Bhutto

What you have said indicates that the confrontation between the Executive and Congress is very dangerous. Could an amendment to the Constitution resolve the problem?

The Secretary

An amendment won't help. What we need to do is to fight the election on the issue of executive authority. Congress is now afraid of the security question. It has suppressed the report on intelligence. The mood in the country is changing. My whole effort recently is to preach this doctrine. Our classical approach to foreign policy was to pose the problem and then to devote the required resources to overwhelm the issue to resolve it. We must conduct our policy with our permanent interests in mind and work

SECRET/NODIS
toward a permanent equilibrium. Our duty is to maintain an equilibrium. Whether we do that in the name of detente or confrontation is unimportant. If we take the Dulles position, the left in Europe can be rallied to oppose us. If we pursue the Jackson-Reagan position, it will eventually lead to psychological disarmament. Our basic problem is gearing our policies to our national interests. This explains why we went so far in defense of Pakistan. I was convinced that if we didn't act it would have encouraged some in the Middle East as well as the Chinese to believe that a concerted defense against the Soviets was unachievable. If we had then been in the middle of detente, we would have reacted the same way. I guarantee that if the Soviets attack the Chinese, I would favor an all-out defense of the Chinese. But we must maneuver so as not to act in the name of a cold war. The Soviet Union is a power of growing strength. We can't have a total settlement with the Soviets which might end in alliance.
SECRET/NODIS

-10-

This is impossible. We would place present allies and friends in a vulnerable position. The question is how to balance off the Soviets. I would like to see Pakistan militarily strong. I would like to move with daring in the Middle East, but we are prevented from doing so. The theory is to maintain an equilibrium. Given differing problems in the U.S., Japan, China and elsewhere, it is not easy to harmonize interests. The theory that Jackson represents might be OK for a year but it will inevitably lead to moral disarmament.

Take the strategic arms race. Great attention has been focused on the margin that may exist between our strategic forces and those of the Soviets. I am convinced that a nuclear war would not be fought. If this strategic arms race continues, however, our resources will be put into an unproductive area, that is, the further production of strategic missiles. I would like to freeze the strategic nuclear race and to build up conventional forces.

SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS

-11-

In the crises ahead, we need conventional forces--aircraft carriers, tactical aircraft, and modern ground weapons. We need to put our money into those things. If we don't get that but place billions of dollars into strategic arms this will have no practical, concrete results. We will not be able to do anything with increased increments of strategic nuclear missiles. One should remember that the Soviet Union would have a monumental problem in attempting to conduct a first strike against our 1054 land missiles, our 433 bomber aircraft, 1000 aircraft overseas, and the 650 missiles aboard our submarines. To launch a successful attack against all these strategic weapons is impossible. It is said with respect to a first strike that the Soviets would need some 2000 missiles to strike against our 1054 land-based missiles. The task of launching 2000 missiles simultaneously is enormous. In practice, the Soviet Union has never launched more than 3 missiles simultaneously. No matter how accurate SECRET/NODIS
these missiles are, the whole plan must be based on the assumption that we would not launch a counterstrike when we detect 200 or 2000 missiles on their way toward us. I don't think this assumption is valid. Some calculate that at the best, a strike against land-based missiles might achieve an 80% success. But this still does not solve the problem of hitting our B-52s, our submarines and our overseas aircraft. I very much doubt whether Brezhnev would opt for a strike given these odds. The penalty would be that 120 million Russians would be killed in 24 hours. I don’t think a sudden attack is probable. Moreover, 85% of Soviet missiles are land-based. This compares with 40% for us. We must get the capacity or we must build the sound capacity for regional intervention. We need the capacity to intervene massively if necessary. I don't look at SALT as solving any permanent problem. If there is no strategic equilibrium, the Soviets can tie us up by simply building a few more strategic missiles every year.
PM Bhutto
Does this mean that a cold war is again in the offing?

The Secretary
Detente is a slogan. What do you think detente means?

PM Bhutto
It is not only a theory. But is more than a slogan. In any event, detente has given the initiative to the Soviets to strike in various places.

The Secretary
With all due respect, Mr. Prime Minister, that is not correct. It is our domestic weakness that provides opportunities to the Soviets. The best position that we were ever in was in 1973 after we had brought about an opening to China and defeated the peace movement. Subsequently, however, we were left with a President who couldn't govern. He was followed by an unelected President who had to establish himself. The 1972 election was fought on issues. I think that Nixon was a good President on foreign policy matters. The public in 1972 supported his line of moderate conservatism at home in the conduct of a strong foreign policy. Then, unfortunately, central authority collapsed as a result of Watergate. In the
last Congressional election only 40% of the eligible voters voted. Now we have a Congress that is completely unrepresentative of the public. That is what gives the Soviets opportunity to intervene abroad. If we had the authority that we had in 1973, we would now have the Soviets out of Angola.

Does what you say mean that the U.S. now has no policy?

We have a policy but we don't have the authority to carry it out. I am certain that we would have the necessary authority if President Ford wins the election. I think the situation as far as the domestic scene is concerned is improving. I believe that we would react if the Cubans tried something else in the next three or four months. If the Cubans did try something, the U.S. would have to respond.

I firmly believe that the Cubans have to be taught a lesson.

I have always been frank in my discussions with you. I must say that whatever the
rationale, I agree that the Cubans have to be taught a lesson before the public begins to think that matters are worse than they really are. I must say that the impression in the Third World now is that the U.S. is on the run as a global power. There is evidence for this impression. Portugal is a case in point. I know that there have been changes recently but the situation remains unclear. The situation in Spain will get worse. If Tito dies the Mediterranean will once more become a critical area. Problems revolving around Turkey and Greece remain. Our region, the Third World, sees the Soviets on the march. That is our perception.

The Secretary

Our people have to be convinced that the Soviets can be stopped if we have a strong executive authority. The question arises as to what resources we are prepared to devote to real situation. $100 million would have done it in Angola. The French were lined up and we had the support of

SECRET/NODIS
Zaire and Zambia as well as other African states. For less than $100 million we could have achieved a stalemate. A bit more would have been required for victory. I agree with your analysis of the results of the setback in Angola. They have been catastrophic. With due respect, if we could have your power the Cubans would be taught a lesson in three months. We cannot do it now unless they make a move.

PM Bhutto

Mr. Secretary, I should tell you that your representative at the UN created a lot of hot, unnecessary heartburns among Third World countries. Unfortunately, a lot of damage was done because of his rhetoric about the Third World. Even those who wished to support you found it impossible to do so in light of the attacks.

The Secretary

The rhetorical response from us was created by the situation which arose in the UN. There was a lot of provocation from Third World countries.
PM Bhutto

The Third World can only fire empty cannons but it is quite something different when the U.S. speaks. In any case, I don't think that detente should be changed. The question is how it should proceed. The Russians give the impression that things are going as the Soviet Union wants. We see this in Brezhnev's speech before the 25th Party Congress. He doesn't believe that there should be any letup by the Soviets in their support of national liberation movements.

Brezhnev's views don't surprise me. But detente was never meant to leave Soviet hands free to do anything they wished. I agreed with Brezhnev that competition would continue. Detente was in part designed to moderate this competition. It remains necessary to prevent Soviet expansionism. This is a duty we have. But we cannot resist simply with words. We need strength to pursue our course. Nobody is naive enough to believe that a declaration would make the Soviets exercise restraint. Such restraint would only be exercised when they...
see real risks for them in certain actions.
I believe that public opinion in the U.S.
is beginning to change. The problem is not
soluble, however, by strategic nuclear power
alone. The Soviets now have 2500 strategic
units. A strategic first strike against the
Soviets is no solution. Assuming we could
destroy 90% of their missiles, there would
still be 240, carrying several warheads which
could destroy our population. We have to
build up our capacity for local intervention.
I will be speaking on the subject on March 23
and will be emphasizing that it is absolutely
necessary to build up forces for local
defense. I don't think I will use the word
"intervention." If we don't get a SALT agree-
ment this will mean that we will be diverting
our resources to unproductive. I frankly
don't think that any strategic gap will be
decisive. As you know, we have asked Congress
for $112 billion for defense purposes. This
is larger than our total budget in 1963, even
making allowance for inflation.
PM Bhutto: Don't the Soviets already have an edge for regional intervention in a number of areas?

The Secretary: Not necessarily. Where there is a conventional edge, it may be possible to create a stalemate locally with the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

PM Bhutto: One can anticipate further situations in which the Soviets would be tempted to intervene. In Africa, Soviet intervention was facilitated by the intervention of South Africa. This was the kiss of death because it united many Africans in supporting the MPLA. In that situation, intervention also has to be the cause of the people directly concerned, and the Soviet Union feels it is supporting the cause of the people.

One can also visualize other areas involving noncommunist countries in which the Soviets may be tempted to intervene massively.

The Secretary: If we look around the world things may not be as bad as they seem. China, for example,
has the manpower necessary to resist the Soviets. What the Chinese need is equipment. If we and the Chinese cooperate, the defense of China can be handled. The Soviet position could be made extremely difficult by such cooperation. On the Subcontinent, the amount of force that the Soviets could bring to bear directly is also not infinite. In the Middle East we will have the upper hand in almost all foreseeable circumstances. The Soviet Union has a logistical advantage in Europe. Nuclear weapons would have to be used to offset this advantage. I make a distinction between the tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons. The Soviets look strong in the face of a moral collapse of western countries allowing them to act with impunity.

I don't think that a conflict will arise between China and the Soviet Union. The question is whether the Soviets will decide they want to eliminate China as a geopolitical factor.

PM Bhutto

The Secretary

SECRET/NODIS
PM Bhutto

The U.S. could not permit this to happen. However, I think the Chinese exaggerate the war threat as evidenced by their building of tunnels. But I don't see an all-out war. The Soviets will try to isolate China by means of the Asian Collective Security arrangement and they will seek to reduce Chinese influence in the Third World by their use of economic and military assistance. In our region, the Soviets will do a lot of mischief and we are very concerned.

The Secretary

That I believe too.

PM Bhutto

Since 1971 the circle has not been closed in our region. The Bangalees now want to come much closer to Pakistan. It's embarrassing. In 1971 the Soviets had no moral compunction regarding the dismemberment of Pakistan, although they denied any role in the situation. Now they tell us that it is not in Pakistan's interest to get too close to Bangladesh. I asked the Soviet Ambassador why he was getting so excited. If they had nothing to do with the separation of Pakistan, why should they now be concerned if there is a new reality. The Soviets
are pressing us hard on joining an Asian Collective Security pact. In his visit to Afghanistan in December, Podgorny promised more arms to Afghanistan. The Soviets are also continuing to give arms to India. The Soviets are also threatening us through subversion. We are making no headway.

Where?

With respect to building up a credible defense. We must have a credible defense to protect us from Indian and Soviet threats.

The Secretary

It is important that we are now making progress on arms supplies. We have delivered TOWs and other items. A Pakistani Air Force team will be visiting the U.S. to look at the A-7. This is about as much as can be done at the moment.

The trouble is that we are moving very slowly. One of the problems is that time is needed to assemble our resources.

Aziz Ahmed

I have here a letter from the Chief of Staff. (This was handed to Secretary Kissinger to read and keep.)

PM Bhutto

SECRET/NODIS
Sisco: On arms supplies to Pakistan, we are moving consistent with what Congressional and public opinion will bear.

The Secretary: In all frankness, I should tell you that we are having a mini-revolt in the State Department because I permitted your air force team to come over to look at the A-7.

Bhutto: Mr. Secretary, I am sure you like the role we played in the Middle East debate.

The Secretary: Yes. That was appreciated. If I spoke vehemently on the topic of detente, Angola, and the erosion of central authority, I did so because I believe you were one of the world leaders who understands us.

Bhutto: After that remark I don't want to provoke you by mentioning the subject of nuclear reactors.

The Secretary: I have handled the reprocessing question in different ways. What concerns us is how reprocessing facilities are used at a certain point. I told you last year that we appreciated that you were foregoing a nuclear capability. This placed us in a good position and gave us arguments to assist you in other ways.
Bhutto: The reprocessing agreement with the French has been discussed over the last few years. The French kept on changing the terms. Conditions were made ever more stringent. I said that safeguards should be applied.

The Secretary: The trouble with binational safeguards is that if the side with the facilities breaks the agreement there is not a hell of a lot that the other side can do.

Bhutto: But the London Group, including the Canadians and the French with whom we are dealing, will all have clubs in their hands which they can use against us. I am sure that the Soviets will be giving India the necessary collaboration to build a hydrogen bomb. Trudeau in 1971 got assurance from Indira Gandhi that India would not develop an explosive device. That agreement was broken. India has always gained by breaking promises. Pakistan is dealing with countries who can sit on us heavily if we break our promises. You could link up with the French and the Canadians to place an arms embargo against us, denying economic assistance, eliminating P. L. 480 and do other things. I am not going back on what I told you in Washington.

[At that point, Ambassador Yaqub showed the Secretary the following statements which were made during Bhutto's visit to the United States in February 1975:]
"Mr. Bhutto noted during his Washington visit that Pakistan's existing nuclear facility is subject to IAEA safeguards and Pakistan is prepared to agree to such safeguards in respect of its future nuclear facilities."

"In developing its nuclear technology, Pakistan would not divert any of its urgently needed development resources to the expensive efforts required to produce a nuclear explosion provided its defence in the conventional field is assured."

"In order to safeguard its security against any nuclear threat, Pakistan will continue to pursue its efforts for adequate security assurances."

The Secretary: I am not so interested in words but concerned about realities.

Bhutto: Reality is still the same. Pakistan should have a reliable conventional defense. In that situation, obviously, Pakistan does not need to proceed along nuclear lines. When I was in Canada I noted that there were a number Pakistan nuclear scientists working there. When I asked why they were there, they said they had nothing to do at home.

The Secretary: I am not opposed to nuclear technology. Our concern revolves around national reprocessing capabilities.
Bhutto: I know that you are interested in exploring regional reprocessing facilities. Under such circumstances, why should India agree to a nuclear free zone in the Indian Ocean. India will only agree if it discerns that another country has a future nuclear capability. We are not embarking on a new policy. If Pakistan has an embryonic capability this may prove helpful. We don't want to explode a bomb. In any case, this couldn't be done in ten years, given all the time required to build the necessary facilities. In any event you can always clamp down on us. I told Trudeau to work out any safeguards the Canadians want and Agha Shahi remained behind in Canada to work on this problem.

The Secretary: We have no objections, obviously, to safeguards. What does concern us is the binational character of an agreement which could be abrogated by the party with the facilities.

Bhutto: On another subject, tell me after all these years how you size up the Indian policy. While in Germany, got news of a cut-off of aid assistance to India. I don't want to be critical, but I wonder whether this is the way to handle India. The point is to come to the central issue. It is not what she says in Madras or Chandigarh, You have said that you have now come to a mature relationship with India. But the central issue is whether India
will stand with you rather than the Soviets where any important matter to you is at issue. Indira will not deviate from her support of the Soviet Union on any issue where you and the Soviets have differences. I would plead with you not to get upset with bad words. She is going into the quagmire more and more. Soviet and Indian interests seem inextricably woven together. If you give the Indians P. L. 480 assistance, they will forget the posture in a few weeks. Incidentally, there is an antipathy toward the U. S. in India. The axis between Kabul and Moscow is growing strong and stronger.

The Secretary: Possibly; I don't give a damn what she says. We used her recent statements as good excuse to move away from India. My basic perception of India is that she sooner or later will have another go at Pakistan, regardless of Soviet viewpoint, although the Soviets would certainly come to the assistance of India. As long as this Prime Minister is in office, the danger exists. I myself heard her say that the Northwest Frontier Province really belongs to India, and there is no way to get to them except through the Punjab.

Bhutto: India has already attacked us three times. If you look after our interests reasonably well, I tell you I would welcome a move by Indira against us.

SECRET/NODIS
SECRET/NODIS

The Secretary: It is important that we manage affairs so that Congress does not pass resolutions on arms sales which would inhibit us from doing the things we want to do. We will move with all the speed that we can in the direction that we want to go. But the going will be slow.

Bhutto: The primordial factor, of course, is time.

The Secretary: One of our problems is that we have some maniacs in Congress. They are violent anti-communists but at the same time reluctant to give arms to friends. Attempts are being made to place severe restrictions on arms sales. I believe that the mood is changing and that if we play things well we can be back in the position that we were in in 1972. Congress has just returned from a recess and I have now testified before two House committees where international events were discussed. I warned the committees that we were going to have a massive collapse of our position if things do not change. Even the Democrats seem much more cautious now. In the past I have usually been assaulted by Solarz, Wolfe and others whether I testified in executive or open session. They now appear more subdued.

Bhutto: I am thinking of Pakistan, the case is always weighted in terms of India. But India is only one-half of
the picture. The other side of the picture relates to the Persian Gulf. If Pakistan collapses, India will not only achieve supremacy over Pakistan but will extend its power beyond to the Persian Gulf and open the way to further Soviet penetration.

The Secretary: I have to educate the Foreign Service to understand this conceptually. If Pakistan collapses, Iran will be forced to seek greater accommodation with the Soviet Union, as will Iraq and others.

Bhutto: Why doesn't the President take the bull by the horns and take up the foreign policy issue on the campaign?

The Secretary: The first problem is that the President cannot at the time say that the situation is bad. This would play into the hands of Reagan and Jackson. But he is beginning to take issue with Congressional obstructionists.

Bhutto: I hope the Administration will not permit the decline of the United States to take place through a constitutional crisis. I believe that the President will win public opinion if he if he tackles the foreign policy issue.

The Secretary: One has to understand that the President is
now appealing to a minority of a minority party. He
cannot create an impression of an international crisis until
Reagan is defeated. Then he can go after Congress. The
President is now in a precarious position. If he can
win the primaries in Florida and Illinois then he will
be safe. Then he can turn on the Democrats and that is
his strategy. I believe, contrary to a lot of others,
that Ford will be elected. I don't see the Democrats
winning since they have neither foreign policy nor
domestic issues to campaign on.

Bhutto: I believe the North-South dialogue is proceeding
well.

The Secretary: I haven't been following the detailed work
of the Commissions in Paris. Much of the Commission work
has involved matters relating to procedure but things are
moving along, and the Pakistanis are active on the two
Commissions. Lord is all for you except where reprocessing
matters are concerned.