THE SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING
- Wed., Oct. 8, 1975
SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

In Attendance - Wed., October 8, 1975

Secretary of State Kissinger - Chairman

D  Mr. Ingersoll
P  Mr. Sisco
T  Mr. Maw
C  Mr. Sonnenfeldt
AF  Mr. Davis
ARA  Mr. Rogers
EA  Mr. Habib
EUP  Mr. Lowenstein (Acting)
NEA  Mr. Atherton
INR  Mr. Hyland
S/P  Mr. Lord
EB  Mr. Enders
S/PRS  Mr. Anderson
PM  Mr. Vest
IO  Mr. Buffum
H  Mr. McCloskey
L  Mr. Leigh
S/S  Mr. Springsteen
S  Mr. Bremer
S  Mr. Adams

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PROCEEDINGS

(The Secretary's Staff Meeting was convened at 8:08 a.m., Secretary of State Kissinger presiding as Chairman.)

MR. INGERSOLL: I'm going to leave shortly to go to the EPB meeting.

Yesterday we had the first rejuvenated meeting of the Secretary's luncheon group.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think this was started by Elliot Richardson back in '69.

MR. INGERSOLL: Well, they met for a while, but I wasn't aware of it until Phil Campbell called me and said we'd like to be interested in it. We had a good meeting, and we're going to continue this now on a monthly basis.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On an agenda or --

MR. INGERSOLL: No. Just sort of an informal, free-wheeling discussion. I discussed the 200 million bill yesterday with them and LOS and some of the fisheries and the Sinai.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I didn't think we were going to prevail on them.

MR. MAW: It's going to be a rough one.
MR. INGERSOLL: Well, we certainly ought to get the least vote.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What would happen if they extended the operative date to January 1st, '77?

MR. MAW: It would stall the conference.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why would it stall the conference? (Laughter.)

MR. MAW: It would affect a lot of people who really want to have a treaty.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you do about the argument that having this would put a fire under the conference?

MR. MAW: Well, that argument has been made for a long time. And there's no question that the pendency of the bill has a certain pressure on the conference. But the enactment of the bill would change the factual situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And if the bill said that it will go into effect on January 1st unless there is a Law of the Sea agreement, then why wouldn't that reflect what we are trying to do anyway until next year?

MR. MAW: Well, because it would be doing unilaterally what should be done --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But it won't be done --
unless there's some agreement.

MR. MAW: But in that case it's still unilateral.

MR. INGERSOLL: Then you'd have it hanging over the whole conference.

MR. MAW: Note yesterday that Echeverria announced that Mexico was going to declare a 200-mile zone based on the growing consensus of the treaty negotiation. And the Law of the Sea had advanced to the point where he could justify a 200-mile extension of a fishery zone.

He carefully did not declare for a proprietary sea or a territorial sea.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we're not doing that either.

MR. MAW: No. But there is a movement in this direction -- no question.

MR. INGERSOLL: Certainly the House is going to pass it overwhelmingly.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the Senate is going to pass it too, and we have to ask what we can do. I think we have a chance of getting amendments that would help the Law of the Sea Conference.
MR. MAW: The Senate bill is a more reasonable bill than the House bill -- no question about that -- but it's the effect that would have on the conference and other nations that is the critical issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I tell you, I made that argument at the leadership conference.

MR. MAW: I understand you had an attentive audience. (Laughter.)

MR. INGERSOLL: The ones I talked to.

MR. SISCO: The debate on the Sinai accord begins today. Congressman Findley has submitted an amendment would limit the resolution approving the presence for two years. He submitted this amendment in the committee, and it was defeated in the committee.

I had a talk with --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You're talking about the House now.

MR. SISCO: The House. And I talked to him yesterday, and he feels that he and Zablocki, who's a co-sponsor of the amendment -- I think he's going to submit it on the floor today. But I talked to several others, and they've taken a nose count and they say there's really no chance of the thing being adopted and it will be
defeated. I explained to them why the two-year cutoff is contrary to the open-ended aspect of the agreement, but it will be defeated.

Bob, I think you agree with that judgment; don't you?

MR. McCLOSKEY: I wrote it last night in a memo.

MR. SISCO: You did? Well, that's fine. (Laughter.)

The other thing is that we'll have for you today a suggested scenario on the question of the Security Council consultations on the renewal of the United Nations Emergency Force. Waldheim has in mind a little different approach.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He wants to do it shortly before the 24th.

MR. SISCO: Yes. But rather than add a new contingent, what he'd like to do is add 100 or 200 to each of the present contingents -- which I think would be less difficult. And, also, he thinks that it might be possible to expand the UNTSO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not a bad idea.

MR. SISCO: That's not a bad idea. And I think
maybe we can proceed in this way.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Maybe what -- about a thousand?

MR. SISCO: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But to get a new contingent would be to go to a new nation?

MR. SISCO: A new nation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it's better to go to Israel if we do it. Does the Security Council have to vote on that?

MR. SISCO: Well, on that we're going to suggest the following: that he really put in his concrete plans on augmentation in his report. Then the Council either has to take note or approve his report -- rather than the Council having to specifically approve the augmentation of the 100, 200 or 300. That would be a little easier.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That would be done on his authority.

MR. SISCO: On his authority.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the agreement.

MR. SISCO: That we will try to work out, because we've got a device there which we think --
SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it's the best way of doing it. O.K.

Have we told the Egyptians?

MR. SISCO: No. We've got a cable coming to you tonight on this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We'd better get the Egyptians lined up.

MR. SISCO: Yes.

The other thought which came out yesterday, which I think is very important -- and that is: that rather than to go the letter route, what we're going to suggest to the Egyptians is the following scenario. He should instruct his Ambassador to go in and see Waldheim and say, "I'm instructed to tell you I want a one-year extension." Then three days later we can get the Israelis to go in and Waldheim will say to the Israelis: "The Egyptians have asked for a one-year extension. Do you agree?" And, obviously, we agree. And then in this way he can put it in his report.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can't he just say he wants the UN to be in basic conformity with his agreement?

MR. SISCO: Sure he can, but then he'd reflect that in his report rather than both of us making the
requests.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But we ought to tell the Israelis too.

MR. SISCO: Yes. We ought to tell the Egyptians in this cable today, Bill. (Addresses Mr. Buffum.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, that's an IO responsibility NEA doesn't draft those cables?

MR. SISCO: No. IO and NEA both met.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did you see the Moynihan thing this morning?

MR. BUFFUM: Yes.


MR. BUFFUM: The summary of the Echeverria speech doesn't bare it out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What he was trying to say is it's half as important as what it will read like when it gets public.

MR. ROGERS: When it's to be put in the record.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. You're going to bring the Third World together again. (Laughter.)

MR. SISCO: Yes. I guess the United States.
MR. INGERSOLL: Certainly the OAU. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the OAU we already have. Now we need the OAS.

MR. INGERSOLL: '77.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Anything else, Joe?

MR. SISCO: No.

MR. INGERSOLL: There's one thing there I would like to raise, and that's the matter of the ILO withdrawal letter. John Dunlop has been after me --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look, I signed something last night which was possibly a stall. But we have basically nothing to stall about. We're committed in meaning to do it.

I don't think it was such a brilliant idea. I was never for it, to begin with.

MR. SISCO: If you're committed, then obviously we have to go ahead. But the one significant development is this resolution, which was adopted by the AFL-CIO, which does not indicate that Meany has the support of his resolution.

MR. BUFFUM: It didn't call for a withdrawal as it did last summer. And you do now have, as you may have
noticed, Mr. Secretary, a letter from the Congressional Advisory Group appealing against such a step. And they're also adding the President in the same degree -- Gale McGee and his group, the service advisors.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought everybody here knew were were going to tell Meany to do it. That was the time to tell me. I mean, I'm always told two weeks after the event about mumbles that may go in the bowels of the Department.

MR. BUFFUM: That came around after we were going to do it. This is a backfire that's been pulled out of. I saw McGee on this yesterday. He feels very strongly that Meany should not be allowed to dictate foreign policy decisions if we don't think they're right, and he doesn't thing he's justified in pulling out of the ILO.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But he had the votes to cut it off for the ILO. Therefore, we would have been out anyway.

MR. BUFFUM: That's the critical judgment to be made.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was told that Meany had the funds to get us out of the ILO. I heard no one who was defending it. So now suddenly I'm told that we
have Congressional troubles.

MR. BUFFUM: Well, the troubles have just developed over the last ten days. Once the word got around that we were going along with Meany's --

MR. SISCO: I wonder how many would talk to Meany -- I mean, on the Hill.

MR. BUFFUM: No. Meany launched an attack against the UNDP appropriation last night, and people stood up and attacked Meany personally -- like Bingham.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was told to work with the ILO to get a change and then withdraw -- and then to withdraw the notice on that two-year interval on the basis of changes they have made.

MR. BUFFUM: That can still be done.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because I was told that was the way we were going to proceed. And the other course would have meant a cutoff of funds now and, therefore, would have gotten us out immediately, unconditionally.

Now, that was the analysis that I received. Now, if anything has changed in that, then we have a new situation. But if nothing has changed in that, then we are again wailing to no avail.
MR. BUFFUM: The critical judgment is whether we can get appropriations.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you can't pronounce a "w" like me, it sounds the same. (Laughter.)

MR. BUFFUM: The critical thing is if we can still get appropriations. We've asked Jack if he can get us a fine-tuned reading on that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The answer to that is "No."

MR. McCLOSKEY: You can't get that out of my office.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think that Burton can get a fine-tuned reading. Whatever we are going to be for, they're going to be against. You start from that.

The minute we stay in the ILO we're "Communists." So if we're in the ILO, they'll all jump on us for softness on the PLO, softness on the Communists and so forth. The minute we pull out, it goes the other way. So you can't assess how they say they're going to vote after we have filed our notice of withdrawal or they think we're going to file our notice of withdrawal. I got no assessment, other than that the House would pass that bill. I was told that by October 15th they'd
pass that bill. That was the marker.

Now, if I was wrong in that, if I was told incorrectly about that assessment, then the whole basis of the decision was wrong.

I wasn't afraid of taking on Meany and defeating him. After all, what is one more opponent? (Laughter.) But --

MR. SISCO: Well, there was no one who thought that it could be defeated.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But there was no one who gave me that opinion.

Then we have no problem. The only choice then is whether we're going to be thrown out of the ILO by the Congress without the possibility of negotiation, or whether we give ourselves two years to get into a more benign Congressional climate.

That's my understanding of what the problem is. My understanding is that if the ILO behaves halfway sensibly, that this way we have two-years appropriations assured -- that if they then give us some reassessment, then we can withdraw our withdrawal. Can't we do that?

MR. BUFFUM: Yes. This is not a definitive withdrawal; it's a notice of intent to withdraw.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then I think McGee ought to understand that. Can you brief him like that, as he's a sensible man?

MR. BUFFUM: Yes.

MR. INGERSOLL: John Dunlop wants to know whether we can talk to people on the Hill to --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which way are we going?

MR. INGERSOLL: The notice of withdrawal. Meany thinks you've committed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is right. This was checked with the President. It was checked with all of you (pointing to Mr. Sisco). I had received no contrary advice.

MR. BUFFUM: Right.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In fact, that was your advice. If I had thought we could win the vote, I would almost certainly have taken on Meany.

MR. SISCO: There's no need to talk to people on the Hill other than those who express an interest, wanting to know what's going on.

MR. INGERSOLL: That's what John wants to do, just to be sure that we covered the Hill; and he wanted to talk to us about the tactics of it.
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then we better talk to John jointly.

MR. INGERSOLL: All right. I'll talk to John because I'm going over to the meeting.

(Mr. Ingersoll leaves.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did you have a point (to Mr. Sonnenfeldt)?

MR. SONNENFELDT: No. Someone was pleading with you to do it -- is Callaghan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Magecki.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Magecki. That's right.

The British reaction on the producer-consumer thing is in the press this morning. It will have repercussions in other aspects of British-French relations, no doubt, as well as on the conference.

MR. ENDERS: The British told us sometime ago in private that what they wanted to do was to get the French committed -- at least, acquiesce -- and, hopefully, from their point of view, implement the minimum safeguard price of whether they went along with the single Community representative.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, they haven't told this to Callaghan. He really thinks he's going there. I had
the impression, by talking to Callaghan, that this is not a negotiating device.

Wouldn't you say that, Hal?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes. He was --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mean, if he had said that to us, that would have been one thing.

How are we doing on the IEA program, incidentally?

MR. ENDERS: Pretty well. I think the chances are no bad at all that we put it off.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you want to give me a memo by the end of the day --

MR. ENDERS: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- on where it stands?

Well, what's going to happen if the British persist?

MR. ENDERS: Well, I think, as Callaghan has pointed out, the likely result would be to have somewhat larger numbers in the meetings.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Then you can't have a Community.

MR. ENDERS: You can't have a Community.

I think then you have the major industrial powers,
plus with the Commission somehow in the background, and then a few other countries. You go from 27 to 40 members maybe of the conference, and the thing looks somewhat more like UNCTAD.

I don't see that we have very strong interest, one way or the other --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

MR. ENDER: --- in this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

MR. ENDER: On the other hand, I don't think that -- if, in fact, the British can be, will follow through on the notion of insisting on the minimum safeguard prices as a reason for going ahead with this, that's fine.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not the impression that that's the slightest interest.

Hal, I want by the end of the day a Government instruction on how to prepare for the Economic Summit.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not want it done on a free-wheeling basis of caucuses -- of no one knowing who's doing what. No caucuses. I want to know who's meeting with whom, and I want us to keep some control --
MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- over the political side of the Treasury, a few economic ones.

MR. HABIB: It looks like the Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor -- Portuguese Timor. It would seem to me clear that the Indonesian troops crossing the border would attack -- the pro-Indonesian forces in the area -- and have not done very well since the beginning of this thing. And this is quite something. There's an earlier case where the Indonesians are being forced to move to hold on to what they obviously are going to hold on to -- that is, they are not going to let Timor become independent, sitting on the end of the Indian Archipelago.

I think what we are doing is like Jack -- keeping our mouth shut about the thing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is that conceivable?

MR. HABIB: We've been doing it, so I think it's quite conceivable.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No moral --

MR. HABIB: There's not that much interest. I think they'll probably be --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are no moral lessons
to be learned from this?

MR. HABIB: Yes. The moral lesson is that we have
the guns to go in. (Laughter.)

We're getting a few requests for validations
of passports to go to South Viet-Nam. I just wanted to
check with you. These are coming fast --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'm assuming you're
going to really keep your mouth shut on this subject.

MR. HABIB: On what?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On this subject, on
Indonesia.

Also, at the UN, Bill, will you make sure
that the U. S. Mission doesn't make a statement
on how the members of the 77 --

MR. HABIB: They might support it. (Laughter.)

MR. BUFFUM: Aren't they going to call us
"murderers"? (Laughter.)

MR. HABIB: We're getting some requests for
validation of passports to go to South Viet-Nam on the part
of people who have family there, and there are just a few
of them. We don't think the South Vietnamese are going
to issue visas, but we do believe we should issue passports
on family business.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Americans?

MR. HABIB: Americans with family in Viet-Nam who want to travel to see if they're all right. And it's a question of whether we validate them or do not validate them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we should validate passports in those cases. If Adams wants to go there, I won't give him a return visa. (Laughter.)

MR. BREMER: If he wants to go there it must say something about his job. (Laughter.)

MR. SISCO: Jerry, you're not going to last long.

MR. BREMER: I'm going with you. (Laughter.)

MR. MAW: They don't need a validation to come to Viet-Nam.

MR. HABIB: Their passport is invalidated for travel. Therefore, we validate it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are we going to start being nibbled to death again by ducks here?

MR. HABIB: No. The South Vietnamese are not going to get the visa.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is the next step going to be we all belong to the Family of Man? (Laughter.)
MR. HABIB: I happen to know all the Family of Man. (Laughter.)

But, in any event --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We approved humanitarian aid. The next thing we knew, factories were going there as "humanitarian aid."

MR. HABIB: No factories. Rototillers are issued. (Laughter.) I'm not sure I know what a Rototiller is (laughter), but it sounded good.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Have you sent other tillers that aren't Rototillers -- tractors?

MR. HABIB: No. A Rototiller is not a tractor, but nobody explained that to you I don't think. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And, therefore, you're approving tractors.

MR. HABIB: No, no. We've not submitted any. The only one we submitted that you rejected was a Rototiller. You didn't like a Rototiller. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You had a machine-tooled factor.

MR. HABIB: Not a machine but a couple of machine tools for a church-run thing -- a technical or workshop
training operation. That's what it was. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Employing 200,000 people. (Laughter.) Making anti-aircraft guns. (Laughter.)

MR. HABIB: Well, that was by the order of Bangkok.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. I'm glad you're raising issues of such significance at these meetings.

MR. HABIB: Well, if you didn't hear about validating passports, then I hear about it.

MR. ROGERS: We worked out a set of talking points for Harry Shlaudeman on the Venezuelan nationalization problem that was raised a couple of days ago. He's seeing Carlos Andres Perez this evening. The telegram that was written ought to be on your desk before the end of the day. It might be there now.

You ought also to know that we played an eventually active role in trying to avoid a breakdown in talks between Argentina and the IMF. It came close to the brink. And the consequences would be very serious. As of 11:30 last night, it looked as if the two had come close together, so that they're arguing now about matters of language in the letter. It may be that people
will be able to work out a deal.

On Chile, I had a long meeting with the Pentagon yesterday. They want to get cracking on the sales program. They want to consult with the Congress beforehand. The question is that they --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's another six weeks, right?

MR. ROGERS: No. It shouldn't be anything like that. There are just really three key people with respect to the issue who spoke to it on the floor during the debate on the Continuing Resolution -- McClellan and Brooke, primarily -- McClellan, who was for, having said the Continuing Resolution continued to furnish sales -- and an erroneous statement. But the Pentagon feels, quite properly, they've got to consult with him.

Now, the packages that we have worked out --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you know damn well that Brooke is going to say "No."

MR. ROGERS: Not if the Pentagon press is right -- and they will. What we want to say is to clear the books of previous sales committed -- sales which we were committed to.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why do I have the uneasy feeling that you guys are euhing me step by step into an arms embargo on Chile?

MR. ROGERS: Well, you shouldn't. There's nothing malevolent with what we're proposing here.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. But you're going to propose the arms cutoff on the 502, right?

MR. ROGERS: No, not on the 502.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But that's how it's going to be leaked. Then you're going to say you're clearing the books on sales. After that, nothing will be done; then we have an embargo -- right?

If the only reason you're going to sell is on the ground that it's already been committed, if you're not going FMS on the ground -- which I'm sure will get around -- that it's the first victory for 502(b), how are you going to resume? That's what's going to happen, you know.

MR. MAW: You're not cutting off sales entirely.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the ground that these were things that were ordered before.

MR. MAW: No. Sales generally.

MR. ROGERS: Sales generally.

Let me restate what I was saying. What is going
forwards is, (1), to clear the books of all the stuff that had been ordered beforehand and to propose an additional package. Clearing the books is 60 million dollars' work. It's a helluva lot of stuff. It's reconfiguring the F-4s. It's all the munitions for the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What -- so they don't shoot?

MR. ROGERS: They don't now. That's the problem. And it's also the --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I had the impression that Chile is being thrown to the wolves. I do not know why I do have that impression.

MR. ROGERS: If anybody was trying to play ducks on this measure, they would have leaked the issue long ago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, not as long as they've got it blocked in the bureaucracy -- which seems to have happened for a month.

MR. MAW: It's still sitting --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right.

MR. MAW: -- until you release it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I've been releasing it since July once a week. (Laughter.)
MR. ROGERS: The Pentagon is prepared to go. They want to talk to the Congress with respect to the past sales --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you think Brooke is going to say? I'll tell you what Brooke is going to say. That's a mental riot. What do you think Brooke is going to say? Do you think Brooke is going to say: "Good. That's exactly the proposition I've been waiting for" --

MR. ROGERS: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: -- or he'll rush out on the Senate floor? I'll tell you what his constituency wants him to say: "That's a great way to get campaign votes for nothing."

MR. ROGERS: And the alternative is to go ahead with consultation on that, and the Pentagon is vigorously opposed to that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But why didn't they consult six weeks ago, two months ago? This issue is not new. Why did we wait for three months, only to conclude that now we've got to start the process of consultation?

MR. ROGERS: No. Part of the reason was --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know it's unfair of me to
think there's foot-dragging when things like that go on.

MR. ROGERS: Look, the bureaucratic decision of getting the foot-dragging settled has been settled. It's part of the problem of getting that whole package through.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But part of the package was turned down. Who was in favor of the FMS thing?

MR. ROGERS: To give FMS credit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What time did it take not to give them FMS? If I judge the bureaucracy correctly, two seconds.

MR. MAW: It was not settled until your talks with the Chileans.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But it didn't take time, for God Sakes. It wasn't settled. I didn't want it. I was sort of maneuvered into it. It's totally against my policy and you know it.

MR. MAW: Once you got maneuvered into it, then it came out of the papers --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You know it's against my policy. I really resent Bureaus maneuvering me that way.
And if you may think it's wrong, then state a different view. I do not believe it is proper to use our military -- our military sales are either because they for our security or they are -- if we once get into other criteria, we're licked.

MR. MAW: And they're doing the same thing now on economic aid, and someone is approving that bill up there on human rights grounds.

MR. ROGERS: The issue is, very simply: Do you want to take the Congress on with respect to credits on farms or on Chile?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In fact, you could make an equally good case that if you let them win on FMS that they've got their pound of flesh. They're going to get their pound of flesh.

Do you think that Chile will sneak through the Congress? There are only two ways. (1), we can say that we've dropped them from FMS because we find their human rights things are repugnant. "Therefore, you've got your pound of flesh. Therefore, don't take any more" -- that's one way of doing it -- or to say our position on FMS is given on the grounds of security. Therefore, let them link it to human rights as their responsibility and knock it out.
If we don't, do you not think we're going to have a human rights thing on Chile up on the Hill?

MR. ROGERS: Of course they are. My own assessment is as a matter of straight, raw politics: You have a better case of keepign the sales program alive if you don't go for credits. That's what it comes down to.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's an argument that's perhaps possible, but not the way this thing is going to wind up being played.

MR. ROGERS: But we don't play it that way. The only thing that we're proposing to do now with respect to the credit issue is Chile. That's going up in the next day or so.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's not going up with my approval.

MR. ROGERS: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There should be absolutely no misapprehension about it. And I am perfectly capable of sitting on it for six weeks.

MR. MAW: It holds up the Mideast and everything. The Portuguese will be pulled out. We're trying to send some papers through separately, and OMB is raising hell
about it this morning. But we've got to release our Mideast package. We've got to release a lot of others. We're getting a lot of flak, and the only unsettled question at the moment is Chile.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Which I never had a chance to focus on.

MR. MAW: Well, last Monday we stopped it when it was going through with no FMS. You said you wanted another look at it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But I ought to be in on these decisions much earlier.

MR. ROGERS: No decision was made. It hadn't matured, really, until a couple of days before you and I talked about it in New York. Nobody was trying to do anything behind your back. No decision was made.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How did it mature? What's the definition of "mature"?

MR. ROGERS: Well, it's only by then that all the relevant Bureaus of the Department came together in a proposal to you, which was made available in a memorandum to you last week. You and I talked about it in New York.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The relevant Bureaus can just as well get together six weeks earlier, because all they do
is weep around with each other so that they can finally make a compromise.

MR. MAW: All Bureau work had been done on every one of these items, holding it up on Chile to make a decision.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what inspiration were we looking for, and what was it that we gained by waiting six weeks on Chile? What fact was missing that we needed?

MR. MAW: Because we couldn't go with Chile until the Mideast package was settled, so everything was held up at once.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why was everything held up at once?

MR. MAW: You have to have a number that adds up to the total budget approval.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The fact that OMB can't decide earlier doesn't mean --

MR. MAW: We've got money in various other corners, which we allocate to Chile -- if that's the decision. It would still add up to the total number, but we have to go forward this week with that package. We're having trouble now getting the Portuguese cleared.
MR. ROGERS: My basic argument is you go and propose 20 million for credits and Chile and I think you're really closing the door with respect to possibilities. I propose zero for Chile to go with the sales, and I think we have a fighting chance of getting it through.

I'm meeting with Carvajal this afternoon. I talked with Trucco; on Monday I went over the ground with him again. I said, "Look, we want to be sure what your opinion is. Do you want politically for us to take that fight on with respect to credits now, or do you feel that that's a less attractive alternative to you than just sticking with the sales -- the cash sales?" He said his judgment is -- and I'm talking with Trucco and Carvajal again on the telephone -- that he would just as soon avoid the fight with respect to the credits. I said, "O.K. I want you to understand this, and let's talk about it again."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would we threaten to cut off PL 480 if they didn't? (Laughter.)

MR. ROGERS: I will see him 4 o'clock again this afternoon, and I will give you a report on that conversation.

MR. MAW: As soon as you have that, let me know
what the answer is so I can send it over to the White House.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't seen it.

MR. MAW: Yes, you've seen it, except with respect to Chile.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Did you check with Silveira?

MR. ROGERS: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is his view?

MR. ROGERS: He says it's 95 percent O.K. at this point.

You have a problem with the Thai Prime Minister, I guess it is, who you're meeting on Monday -- is that right?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That wasn't checked with me either. Couldn't he come Tuesday?

MR. HABIB: We can take a look and shift the time. You remember you told him in New York.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That doesn't mean he could come.

MR. HABIB: No, but we got a date and the time. The Thai Foreign Minister -- yes. It was shifted around.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we have to see when
when the President's Summit works and when Rabin is going to come. I would sort of like to go to Latin America in November, so that I could go to Africa in January.

MR. HABIB: That's an old one -- that has been cancelled a long time ago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I now move it to January, will people get another shift of a date?

O.K. Roy?

MR. ATHERTON: After four days of relative violence going up in Beirut, a lot of what seems to be spontaneous outbreaks of shooting by probably many cases of groups, individuals who aren't really under anybody's control, just a general breakdown: We tried to get the barricades down and security forces in. We are just going to see this kind of deteriorating situation--

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "Deteriorating"?

MR. ATHERTON: Yes -- going on, with a little appearance of putting the lid on.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But who wants what?

MR. ATHERTON: Well, I mean it's really getting very close to almost just a chaotic situation. There are trouble-makers from outside; there are some outside
elements in the country. There's a sense of a lack of any real control, and this has led to some talk, the seriousness of which is hard to judge, of trying to remove Franjiyah with a stronger President. Franjiyah is a disaster.

I think a letter should be sent out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Except with Israel, where we couldn't restrain our missionary zeal here. I mean to give such a long analogy of the Christian situation. The Israelis know what we're doing if we tell them not to exacerbate the situation.

MR. ATHERTON: Well, I think the Israelis are doing perhaps more harm than good in the situation. They're really encouraging the hard-nosed elements of the Christian community.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But we sure are not going to get that done by going alone with a hand grenade.

I approved them yesterday -- except they went to Israel.

MR. ATHERTON: Yes, I know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I want to see them today. And the first two paragraphs of the one to Israel are all right. It's the one where we give our political
science lecture.

MR. ATHERTON: I'll get that out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So we went off the deep end.

MR. ATHERTON: O.K. That's all I have, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Tom?

MR. ENDERS: Yesterday we were able to get clearance from -- acquiescence from--Talmadge, Bellmon and Curtis on the approach that we will make to the European Community on the 2 problem, which is still there and threatens a conflict.

This should enable us to try to settle that particular trade complaint with the EC sometime in the course of this month, but the general problem of our trade relations with the EC --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what I've asked for six weeks ago and have not yet managed to get is I want a meeting within the week with Simon to discuss this whole issue. There are a number of other issues I want.

MR. ENDERS: That's the purpose of our raising it -- that the memorandum is still, I guess, somewhere in
the system.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw the memorandum. It did not call for a meeting; it just listed all the problems that exist.

MR. ENDERS: We'll go ahead and set that up. I'll set it up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I marked on it --

MR. ENDERS: It's important for you to have that meeting.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I marked on it that I wanted a meeting again. That was my response to the memorandum. My request for a meeting triggered the memorandum. The memorandum triggered another request for the meeting.

Have we now gone through the procedures?

(Laughter.)

MR. ENDERS: O.K.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I perfectly understand the problem, even if I don't know all the details. I'm not interested in the details. I don't know which provisions apply until there's a meeting. Once we have a meeting, then I can go through the provisions and see how we can handle them. There's nothing I do about them.

MR. ENDERS: O.K.
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: And would every Bureau tell me what their troubles on economic issues are so that I can take them up on that occasion?

MR. ROGERS: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have this with Brazil. Bob?

MR. McCLOSKEY: I read a very learned piece in *The Economist* yesterday on SALT. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Don't mention it to me. (Laughter.)

MR. McCLOSKEY: I gather you have.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You have my copy, Hal. Can I get it back?

MR. SONNENFELDT: Yes. I want to hold on to it today.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. I've read it. It's the whole Defense position, and they sure as hell didn't get it by themselves. Did you see it? (Addresses Mr. Hyland).

MR. HYLAND: I read it yesterday.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What do you think?

MR. HYLAND: It obviously came from the Defense Department.
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: It obviously came from the Secretary.

MR. HYLAND: There's some language in there that suggests it came from him or someone very close to him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Like what?

MR. HYLAND: It's near the end. I can't remember the words, but it's a phraseology that he supposedly had issued on cruise missiles. He's the only one in the whole United States apparently who has that strategy.

MR. McCLOSKEY: I'm sorry I mentioned it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, no. I've read it.

MR. SONNENFELDT: I'm going to call today.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's an absurdity. It even makes it tougher to get a better position out of the Russians.

MR. HYLAND: The Russian press has been writing on cruise missiles too in a strange way. I can't quite understand whose missiles ought to be limited -- or that the Russians ought to have cruise missiles.

MR. SONNENFELDT: They have the other briefing from Clamand, Garber and the rest of them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Dobrynin says the big debate
is whether they should go to cruise missiles.

MR. HYLAND: That's why I was wondering whether these articles were saying, since they're in the military journal --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Dobrynin said SALT is taking a whole new turn in Moscow because they had proposed putting a ceiling on defense and now they're proceeding on getting into a whole new area.

MR. SONNENFELDT: Over the long run it's more advantageous to them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right. For a country which for ten years has no defense to fly things like airplanes (laughter) -- and then under conditions in which it's absolutely impossible to have any inspection. If we try to run this inspection past Jackson when the Soviets have cruise missiles, he'll kill us.

MR. McCLOSKEY: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Would you like to tell the Soviets they can have six -- 200 -- cruise missiles between 600 and 2,000 kilometers-- even though the 2,000 ones look like the 600:ones, so that all of them --

MR. SONNENFELDT: And above that only conventional.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And above that only conventional.
except in a different way where you screw something on -- which takes five minutes.

Now, what was it you said to the Pike Committee yesterday about Portugal?

MR. HYLAND: I said we missed it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why? Now, goddam it, I absolutely resent this sort of -- any time there's a coup, you start with the assumption that the home government missed it; right?

MR. HYLAND: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why the hell should we know better than the government that's being overthrown?

MR. HYLAND: I said that. I said Caetano was taken by surprise. But the fact that they want to know -- did we predict it -- the answer is "No."

MR. SONNENFELDT: How can they?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The answer is in every case of a successful coup the chances are 10 to 1 that we missed it. The chance is also a hundred to one that the government would have missed it or the coup could not have succeeded.

I mean, what request is it to make of our intelligence agencies to discover coups all over the world?
I mean, I don't want our people to go up there and beat our President and say we missed another coup. If we didn't miss it, then I'd be accused of conniving it.

What do we do -- run an FBI in every country? They have their own internal security service. On the one hand, we say they're a dictatorship with internal security measures. The goddam internal security measures couldn't find the bloody coup, so why the hell should we find it?

MR. HYLAND: That's supposedly what we get paid for.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't accept that proposition. Are we in the business of finding coups all over the world? How about Malaysia -- is there a coup coming over there?

MR. HYLAND: There could be. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And are we supposed to find it?

MR. McCLOSKEY: Moynihan is going to take over Uganda. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But are we supposed to know coups all over the world?
MR. HYLAND: I know, but this record is bad. From the middle of March, when Spinola was fired, and when they had a revolt of an infantry regiment -- from the middle of March to the coup, nothing was reported.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because we had a tenth-grade outfit in Portugal.

MR. HYLAND: That's right.

MR. HABIB: That's right.

MR. HYLAND: And the Attachés were terrible.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Britain was there. Did they report a coup? France was there; Germany was there. Could we stop the bloody press-beating?

MR. SONNENFELDT: I think all the expectations were that they were going to canvass Spinola -- they were going to clean out the army.

MR. HYLAND: [That's what the CIA said.] They were more concerned about the Far Right taking over the Left.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Because that's the bias here.

MR. HYLAND: No. Because Caetano was getting weaker and Tomas was putting pressure to get rid of Spinola.
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SECRETARY KISSINGER: But on Cyprus we told Makarios we hard coup rumors, right?

MR. HYLAND: On Cyprus we had reports of a coup. We took some action. We talked to the governments involved in Portugal. There's no record at all.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we couldn't have been wrong twice; could we?

MR. McCLOSKEY: In the Congress you could be wrong twice.

MR. HYLAND: They picked the things when they knew there was no reporting and prediction. They picked it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But I don't want our people to go up and beat their brains because if we're going to have to predict coups in every coup in the world, we've got to run their goddam security services. If the governments that are getting overthrown can't protect themselves, how the hell are we supposed to know it? And if we do run their security services and if we do run a domestic espionage service there, we're going to get into trouble, (a), for running their domestic affairs, and, (b), for not running our business here.
I just thought these stories came across totally defensively.

MR. HYLAND: That's right, because we have no record; and it's not enough to tell them that we can't predict coups. And they say, "Why do you get four billion dollars a year?"

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Most people thought a coup in Portugal would be a good thing to begin with. There was no incentive to protect the goddam government. That's Point 1.

The last thing anyone thought was that a coup would go in a leftward direction. And if we had started a massive program to try to find out whether a coup was brewing in Portugal, we'd have been in the press of propping up Caetano.

MR. HYLAND: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where is he now -- in Brazil?

MR. HYLAND: Yes, sir. They're all in Brazil, I think.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He's working for the Shah -- plus Ethiopia? O.K.

MR. HYLAND: Well, that's the end of that phase anyway
accorded to Pike.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is he coming after me next?

MR. HYLAND: I think he's going into what he calls "risks of covert activities."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Did I understand that Church-Tower letter to mean that I should testify in open session about covert operation?

MR. HYLAND: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's out of the question. How can the Secretary of State --

MR. HYLAND: Well, not about the details. My understanding is they wanted you to talk about the theory of covert action.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But you must recognize that's an absurdity. The Secretary of State cannot testify in open session about covert operation.

MR. HYLAND: Of course not.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Unless I misread the recommendation, it was for the sake of my good relations I ought to do it.

MR. HYLAND: Well, I think if you agree to have a session with them, then you can get exactly the focus
of the session.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, no. I'm delighted to meet with them in Executive Session and to talk to them about covert operation. But I think it is a menace to the foreign policy of the United States to have the Secretary of State defend covert operations in an Open Session and explain how they are controlled and what they're supposed to accomplish.

I think that is very dangerous.

I'll be glad to testify in Closed Session on that.

MR. HYLAND: Yes, sir. But you can't make it clear -- the date they want--anyway.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. But I don't want to get the principle established. I think it's a very dangerous principle that I should defend covert operations. That has to be done by Colby. If I do that, I think it becomes a diplomatic incident. There's no government that can ignore the Secretary of State saying that we have a right to do that.

Jim?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: On Portugal, on the question of doubling the airlift, we thought the best thing to do would
to wait until Friday, and it could be announced along with the airlift. You'd have your meeting.

MR. SONNENFELDT: We still have a government in Portugal.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes. We can talk about that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What's the situation?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: The situation is that the disintegration of the army continues. There was a cable this morning from Carlucci that he was just absolutely fed up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I read it, but what does it mean -- "fed up"?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, that he's thinking of quitting; and it's very hard to pick what it means.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And that means the Left Wing will take over, after all?

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Well, their prediction is Left or Right. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And we are making sure it isn't the Right -- correct? (Laughter.)

MR. LOWENSTEIN: No, not correct. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: "Better Red than dead."

(Laughter.)

MR. SONNENFELDT: It does raise questions about
civil wars and the end of contingencies that we have put on the shelf for the time being.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

MR. SONNENFELDT: We are talking to Dennis Clift about an appointment with the President. That was at his initiative -- that was at Clift's initiative.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. That was at my initiative. Clift doesn't take his initiatives. We have to reach that point.

MR. McCLOSKEY: I thought I read that he took one. (Laughter.)

MR. SONNENFELDT: With the Italian Fascists.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Oh, no.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Senator Brooke is arranging a luncheon for him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look, I have to go to the British Embassy on 5 that day, so it's got to be at a time when I can be present with Atunes and the President.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: O.K.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Maybe Atunes should come to see me in the morning and the President in the afternoon.

MR. LOWENSTEIN: Yes, sir.

That's all.
SECRETARY KISSINGER: Or do I have something in the morning?

MR. BREMER: No. You can do it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Move him into my time with the President. In other words, until 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I will not give up the meeting for Vogbride, and I will not have an appointment at which I'm not present for this one. Therefore, it's got to be at 3.

Yes? (Refers to Mr. Davis.)

MR. DAVIS: Ethiopia has been going through some strikes, disorders --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where's Eagleburger? I saw another anti-terrorism thing which I totally disagreed with.

Go ahead.

MR. DAVIS: -- and it involved a shooting / incident of our Defense Attache.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What did they do?

MR. DAVIS: For which they have apologized. And it looks as if the situation is a little bit calming down in Ethiopia. But there will be continued disorders, continued troubles for the government.
Happily, the French have gone along with the commitment that will allow us to make our tripartite solution on the Namibia problem and go ahead as quickly as we can.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How did you go from Ethiopia to Namibia? That's a separate problem.

MR. DAVIS: Yes. Both in Africa. (Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What happened to Guinea-Bissau? We couldn't get through a meeting here without Guinea-Bissau. (Laughter.) Guinea-Bissau got an airplane from Gabon. (Laughter.)

MR. DAVIS: Your turn, Bill (addressing Mr. Buffum). (Laughter.)

MR. BUFFUM: The only other thing I have on the UN is Makarios gave quite a restrained speech.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. I noticed it.

MR. BUFFUM: That's all.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: O.K. Bill, can I see you a minute -- and Nat?

(Whereupon, at 9:03 a.m., the Secretary's Staff Meeting was concluded.)