Joint State/Defense Message

1. US has always distinguished sharply between question of introducing nuclear weapons into given foreign country and question of possible presence nuclear weapons aboard naval vessels paying courtesy visits to that or any other country. In first case, as for example in NATO stockpile program with certain allied countries, we would of course take no steps to bring in weapons without full cognizance and approval host country authorities. In second case, we say nothing about nuclear weapons and have relied on fact that by long practice and tradition, armament of visiting warships has not been subject of inquiry by host country authorities in process their deciding to grant or deny approval for visit. By and large, this distinction and US policy of neither-confirm-nor-deny re visiting warships have been success-
fully maintained. There seem to be comprehension and tacit acceptance of this distinction within the Alliance and by friendly countries generally, and not even France has attempted a push/wall on question of whether nuclear weapons are aboard visiting ships. In analogous manner,

2. Against this background, REFTEL indication that Danish policy on stationing of nuclear weapons in Denmark may be formally extended to cover harbors and territorial waters is very disturbing. We would not wish do anything cause such policy extension to be hardened further than it may already be, but agree entirely that an early discussion with PM Krag of this summer’s planned visits is in order. In that connection, while we recognize force of arguments presented REFTEL, we cannot agree to deviation from US general policy, for reasons indicated above, as helpful as such deviation might be in accomplishing port visits to Denmark.

3. In raising matter with Krag, you should explain that validity and importance to US of neither-confirm-nor-deny policy have comparatively little to do with question of whether weapons may or may not be aboard
any given ship. Fact is that for overriding security reasons, partly involving precedent this would set, US simply cannot be put in position of stating publicly and unequivocally that weapons are not aboard warships, even when that may be accurate statement in particular case.

4. In view special situation in Denmark, you authorized provide PM Krag, on confidential basis, with substance Para 3 DepTel 14644, if you consider this would be useful. However, we cannot permit use this language in response public inquiry. While we would like be more flexible, cannot go beyond neither-confirm-nor-deny statement in response such queries, and would hope Danish Government spokesmen would support this public posture.

5. Depending on course conversation, you might wish make clear to PM that if this general rationale and course of action is not agreeable to his government, or if he considers, on reflection, that it cannot contain pressures from news and other sources, it might be preferable that visits not occur at all. From State-Defense point of view, it would be much better cancel visits now than run risk of major press campaign this summer on nuclear weapons questions, especially if Danish Government were thereby led to state that its non-nuclear policy embraces visiting warships and that US understands and accepts
this. Without specifically querying Krag or other Danish officials, you should attempt to learn whether in fact FLO's oral emphasis including QTE harbors and waters UNQTE (Para 1 REFTE) reflects literal Danish Government policy. If this should prove to be case, and Danish Govt insists on US assurances that would conform to it, we think it most unlikely that visits can be carried out.

GP-3.

END

RUSK