In the negotiations which have taken place with the Canadians and British with respect to the use of and facilities for atomic weapon strikes in the event of war the objective has been to secure their agreement to those necessary measures short of actual strikes which would improve our posture in the event of hostilities. In the case of the Canadians, we have secured their agreement that training missions may overfly Canadian territory with non-nuclear components on a service-to-service notification basis. Similarly, the Canadians have agreed that non-nuclear components may be stored on Canadian territory on the basis of service-to-service notification. When the deployment of nuclear components to or over Canadian territory or the use of Canadian bases for actual strikes is involved, the Canadian Government requires that it be approached on a Government-to-Government basis. As far as the British are concerned, they have evidenced no worries about the construction of storage facilities and deployment of planes and non-nuclear components to the United Kingdom (the question of deployment of nuclear components has not yet come up) on the understanding, however—as set forth in the Joint Communiqué of the Truman-Churchill talks of January 9, 1952—"that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision by His Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time." This commitment was also given to the Canadians at the same time. It seems clear that so long as these Governments have firm commitments from the United States that actual strikes from their territories will be a matter of joint decision, they
are prepared to permit the United States to engage in various deployment and pre-positioning operations involving their territories and facilities. It should be noted that the commitment of the Joint Communique is deliberately couched in general terms without highlighting atomic operations.

As to France, it will be recalled that on April 8, 1952 Presidential approval for the deployment of non-nuclear components to bases in French Morocco was granted subject to the following considerations:

"1. That this deployment and storage take place without informing the French authorities at this time;

"2. That the method of handling this specific case shall in no way prejudice the manner in which any future deployments of nuclear components to, and storage at, these sites should be handled with the French;

"3. That current and prospective negotiations for storage facilities and other sites in Metropolitan France be conducted in such a way as not to raise the question of the storage of atomic weapons in Metropolitan France in advance of the generation of a firm requirement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for such storage;

"4. That the Department of Defense will have assured itself as to the physical security of the storage sites in Morocco in terms of the possibilities of sabotage, espionage, and local uprisings.

"The Department of State recognizes that it may be necessary in due course to give the French Government assurances, analogous to those given to the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments, that their facilities will not be used for military operations in the event of an emergency without their consent. The Department of State feels, however, that the United States should not take the initiative in raising this problem with the French Government but should leave this matter to be decided at a later date and in the light of the situation as it may develop."

Under condition 3 above, it was understood that the atomic question would not be raised in connection with the negotiation of a technical annex for the Chateauroux storage even though restrictive language was
involved. Similarly, even though restrictive language is involved in
the airbase agreements it is felt that the present negotiations on these
agreements should proceed as rapidly as possible, leaving the resolution
of the atomic question to a later date.

It is felt that high level discussions with the French could more
fruitfully take place later on this year when solutions to some of the
current problems presently preoccupying the French such as relations with
Germany, the question of a Big Four meeting, and similar problems have
been further advanced.

The short term objective of the procedure set forth in the draft
telegram is to secure speedy conclusion of the airbase agreements while
leaving to a later date the problem of securing a more realistic attitude
on the part of the French to such preparatory operations and pre-positioning
as may be required by war plans.

It is important that the question of the use of French bases for
atomic and other missions should not be settled by negotiations in relation
to air bases agreements as such, but should be handled at the highest
diplomatic level. From an approach at this level it is hoped to secure
French agreement concerning atomic operations along lines similar to
those arrangements which have been worked out with the British and the
Canadians.

It must be noted that the North Atlantic Treaty reserves the rights
of member states to determine what action they will each take to assist
other NATO nations in case of armed attack. Therefore, we cannot, without
becoming involved in political level agreements, assume the right to use foreign bases for any purpose without the permission of the host country. The proposed procedure does no more than recognize that fact.

Although we realize the effect of this on SHAPE emergency and alert plans, nevertheless we fear that premature discussion of this issue either bilaterally with the French or multilaterally in NATO, would deter, rather than facilitate, the grant of the rights we intend ultimately to obtain and would also serve to hold up the construction of airbases urgently needed.