The Future Of Iraq Project

Defense Policy and Institutions

Working Group
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(*) Reflects consensus of the participants in the working group. Other papers
reflect the views of their authors.
A New Iraq:
Democracy and the Role of the Army

May 24, 2002

Currently, the predominant view of the Iraqi army is that it is a source of danger to civil society and democracy; that the army and democracy cannot co-exist. [However, this does not necessarily have to be the case. Under the proper conditions, which I will outline below, the Iraqi army can be an important tool to help build and sustain a democratic society in a new Iraq.]

What has happened in Iraq, as in many third world countries, is that a civilian group— the current regime— has essentially hijacked the army, transforming it into a tool to protect the dictatorship rather than allowing it to play its proper role and fulfill its patriotic duty to defend the country. Saddam’s gangs were able to seize control of key elements of the military institutions in Iraq. They have used various methods to maintain control over the armed forces, including the use of terror and bribery, as well as involving the army in criminal acts against Iraq’s own citizens. In addition, Saddam’s regime effectively undermined the legitimate Iraqi army by creating special institutions such as the Republican Guard, security forces, and Baath party organizations. In this way they were able to dismantle the armed forces in order to ensure easy control over them. The forces that remain are used to further the regime’s interests only.

Our vision for the future of Iraq is to build a democratic civil society. In order to make this vision a reality, we need to have an army that can work alongside this new society. The Iraqi army of the future cannot be an extension of the present army, which has been made into a tool of dictatorship. It will not be possible to rebuild the Iraqi nation and society on a foundation of democracy so long as the army is not prepared for or supportive of such a change. We therefore must work very hard to ensure that there will be strong cooperation between the army and the rest of society, in order to create a new political life for everyone and to paint a new, brighter picture for the future of Iraq.

The IFOM (Iraqi Free Officers Movement) is a democratic political movement with both military and civilian membership. It is part of the Iraqi opposition, and its aims are to topple and remove Saddam Hussein’s regime and build a new, democratic regime in Iraq. The IFOM’s views on the future role of the Iraqi army in such a regime are as follows:

1) All special military and security units that were instituted under Saddam’s regime must be dismantled and abolished. The size of the Iraqi army must be reduced and maintained only at the level necessary to meet Iraq’s future national security needs.
2) The budget for the military must be monitored by an elected parliament and must be made public to the fullest extent possible.

3) The army should be non-political and it must not be used as a political tool. Accordingly, the army must be distanced from political activities and must be non-discriminatory, i.e., there must be no preferential treatment given to members of the military on political, ethnic, religious or tribal grounds.

4) The army normally should be located within designated military zones, and must be used as a force to ensure the security of Iraq and regional stability.

5) The army must respect and protect democracy and constitutional life; meanwhile, ensure the continuance implementation of democratic and constitutional system in Iraq.

6) Revisiting and Revising the armed force attending guidelines, this guild lines should allow every Iraqi to join the army in any position based on their qualification and not on their race, religion, or their geographical location.

7) Reduce the gap of differences of life style level among the officers and soldiers, also support and increase the humane and friendly relationship among military attendees and also with civilians to open a new page based on respect, brotherhood and coordination.

Under these conditions that I have outlined, the Iraqi army can become an important tool for supporting democracy, rather than undermining it. The proper role of the army is to defend the nation – not the regime. Restoring the Iraqi army to its proper role is therefore an essential step in establishing a democratic government. However, once the necessary changes have been made, the Iraqi army be transformed from a threat to democracy to a pillar of democracy – one of many important pillars of democracy supporting a new, civilian regime.
الجيش العراقي حاضرا ومستقبلًا

علاقة الجيش بالمجتمع المدني

تحالف القبائل العراقية

واشنطن 27-2-2003
عندما تتواجد الجيوش العربية في بداية تأسيسها عام 1921 على ألسنة وطنية وسواقة تفاعل مع هذه الحالة، يتميز بعدم التقدم في تكوين جيوش حديثة وسريعه. في الحقيقة، فإن خططنا في الصحراء بضرورة بناء وتشكيل جيوش حديثة وسريعه، حيث تبدأ من خلال مدفعجولة، بلغته، وطريقة التنسيق، بدعوى إجراءات توظيف الموارد بطرق مختلفة.

- تعليمات الجيوش من جميع الجيوش المشتركة ويفتكرهم على التدابير.
- الاستعداد من الطباخين، والطباخين، كفاءة ويعتبرهم إلى الجيوش في الجانب.

1. الأعداء من الجيوش.
2. الأعداء من الجيوش.
3. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
4. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
5. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
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8. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
9. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
10. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
11. الاعتداء من الجيوش.
12. الاعتداء من الجيوش.

مع ذلك، يظل الرؤساء والضباط في الجيوب على الرهبة.
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY RELATIONSHIP:

1. IRAQ POST SADDAM WILL NEED MILITARY FORCES TO DEFEND THE COUNTRY AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES.
2. THE MILITARY FORCES MUST BE COMMENDED BY THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP ELECTED BY THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND BELIEVES IN DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM, FEDERALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS.
3. THE LEADERSHIP MUST REPRESENT ALL THE ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS OF IRAQ.
4. THE MILITARY FORCES HAVE THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHOULD TAKE CARE OF THEM. IN ORDER TO WIN THE PEOPLE'S CONFIDENCE, THEY SHOULD NOT INTERVENE IN THE POLITICAL ISSUES RELATED TO THE ADMINISTRATION.
5. EDUCATION OF YOUNG PEOPLE ON DEMOCRACY PRINCIPLES, HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE SCHOOLS IN ORDER TO HAVE A CULTURAL DEMOCRATIC BACKGROUND WHEN THEY JOIN THE MILITARY SERVICE. THIS WILL IMPROVE THE MILITARY AND CIVIL RELATIONSHIP.
6. THE MILITARY FORCES SHOULD HELP THE PEOPLE DURING THE NATURAL DISASTERS SUCH AS FLOODS, FIRE INCIDENTS, EARTHAQUAKES, STORMS...ETC.
7. FINDING JOBS FOR THE UNEMPLOYED INDIVIDUALS AFTER THEIR DEMOBILIZATION FROM THE MILITARY SERVICE.
8. FOUNDATION OF AN ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL AWARENESS AND EDUCATION AMONG ALL THE MILITARY UNITS AND FORMATIONS. THIS MUST BE IN THE SAME WAY FOLLOWED BY THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES THAT HAVE PERSONAL FREEDOM AND RESPECT THE HUMAN RIGHTS.

EDUCATION FOR DEFENSE:

1. THE IRAQI MILITARY FORCES HAVE BEEN USED AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR REPRESSION AND FRIGHTENING THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND THE NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. THE IRAQI MILITARY HAS ALSO BEEN USED FOR DESTABILIZING THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE REGION AND THE WORLD.

This policy has caused tremendous losses and casualties in Iraq. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, wounded, handicapped and missed. Also, thousands of villages and towns have been destroyed and marshes have been drained and the economic infrastructure has been broken down.

That situation has created a lot of social problems for the Iraqi society. The Iraqi people have no more confidence in the military forces and don't look at
THEM AS A NATIONAL FORCE PROTECTING THE COUNTRY'S INTERESTS. THEREFORE, AND IN ORDER TO BE A LESSON FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS, THE COMING POLITICAL LEADERSHIP SHOULD HAVE A POLITICAL PROGRAM TO CLARIFY THE TRAGEDY AND SUFFERINGS RESULTED FROM THE AGGRESSIVE POLICY OF THE REGIME AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE FUTURE.


3. EDUCATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES ON LOYALTY TO THE STATE AND COMMITMENT WITH A DEMOCRATIC, PLURALISTIC AND PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT AFTER CHANGING THE CURRENT REGIME. THE MILITARY FORCES MUST KEEP AWAY FROM EXTREMISM AND CHAUVINISM.

4. DELEGATING MILITARY PEOPLE TO DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES TO BE AWARE OF THEIR DEMOCRATIC SYSTEMS AND MAKE USE OF THEIR EXPERIENCE.

5. BUILDING UP A GOOD RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND OFFICERS TO REESTABLISH THE SELF-CONFIDENCE OF THE MILITARY FORCES AND IMPROVE THEIR MORALE CONDITIONS. THIS WILL BUILD UP A MILITARY IDEOLOGY AWAY FROM FactionsAL, TRIBAL, OR ETHNIC AFFILIATION. IT WILL ALSO MAKE ALL THE MILITARY PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY BELONG TO A STATE OF LAW, CONSTITUTION, STABILITY AND SECURITY, RECONSTRUCTION, AND BROTHERHOOD.

6. THE IRAQI ARMY NEEDS FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN THE SIZE, STRUCTURE, AND ARMS AFTER CHANGING THE CURRENT REGIME. THESE CHANGES MUST CONFORM TO THE MODERN MILITARY SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND STRATEGY FOLLOWED BY THE DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES.

THE DEFENSE POLICY IN THE REGION:

THE DEFENSE POLICY OF ANY COUNTRY IS MADE BY ITS POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. THIS POLICY MUST CONFORM TO THE INTERESTS OF THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS. THE NEW INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS AND TREATIES DON'T ALLOW ANY VIOLATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS INCLUDING CARRYING OUT AGGRESSIVE ATTACKS IN THE AREA OR
ANYWHERE ELSE. THEREFORE, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES ARE RECOMMENDED:

1. GETTING AWAY FROM ANY POLICIES OF FACTIONAL OR ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION. ALSO, RESPECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL FACILITIES OF THE STATE.

2. PROHIBITING PRODUCTION OR PROCURING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR THE OTHER UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPONS LIKE LONG-RANGE MISSILES. ALSO, DECREASING THE OTHER OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

3. AS BEING A DEMOCRATIC, PLURALISTIC, AND PARLIAMENTARY COUNTRY, IRAQ SHOULD GET INTO NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY TREATIES WITHIN THE NEW REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COALITIONS.

DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, AND RETRAINING:

1. IF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS DETERMINED TO RESCUE THE IRAQI PEOPLE, NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, AND THE WORLD FROM THIS REGIME, AND AN INTERNATIONAL COALITION HEADED BY THE U.S. HAS BEEN FOUNDED FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE REGIME AND ITS MILITARY FORCES CANNOT RESIST AND WILL COLLAPSE SOON.

2. ANY INDEPENDENT STATE NEEDS A DEFENSIVE MILITARY FORCE TO PROTECT ITS INTERESTS, CONTROL THE SECURITY SITUATION, AND ENABLE IT OF IMPLEMENTING ITS PROGRAMS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION.

3. THE IRAQI MILITARY FORCES MUST BE BUILT UP IN A MANNER CONFORMS TO GENERAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE CHANGES THAT TAKE PLACE IN IRAQ, THE REGION AND THE WORLD. THE IRAQI MILITARY FORCES SHOULD ALSO MEET WITH IRAQI DEFENSIVE NEEDS AND KEEP AWAY FROM AGGRESSIVE ACTS.

4. SINCE THE IRAQI REGIME HAS WIDELY USED THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AGAINST ITS PEOPLE AND NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND HAS BECOME A THREAT TO THE INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY, ITS WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION MUST BE ELIMINATED AND DESTROYED AND IT SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN ANY CHANCE TO HAVE SUCH WEAPONS AGAIN.

5. DECREASING THE MILITARY FORCES AND TAKING THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:
   - CANCELLATION OF THE SSO AND DEMOBILIZING ITS MEMBERS.
   - CANCELLATION OF THE RG AND SRG FORCES.
   - CANCELLATION OF THE POLITICAL GUIDANCE DIRECTORATE AND DEMOBILIZING ITS MEMBERS.
- The DMI should be re-annexed to the Ministry of Defense. It should not have any direct connection with the Presidential Office.
- Demobilizing the reserve officers, subordinates, and soldiers from the military service.
- Demobilizing those who are having service due to their age.
- Making use of the retired officers who have physical and loyalty qualifications and have been retired for not being loyal to the Ba'ath Party and the regime.
- Pensioning off the unneeded officers.
- Withdrawal of unneeded weapons and ammunition and the military equipment from the units to be stored or destroyed.
- Changing the professional establishments including productive factories that belong to the army or the military industrialization into civilian establishments.
- Reviewing the current military orders and regulations and changing them in a way to meet the requirements of the Iraqi military forces.
- Allocating an overt budget for the Ministry of Defense by the coming Iraqi Government. The budget should be approved by the elected Parliament of Iraq.
- Keeping the military forces in their barracks.
- Finding jobs for the unemployed demobilized people in order to re-integrate into the civil society.
- Providing modern training principles to the military forces and sending military delegations to some friend countries which have helped the Iraq people in getting rid of the regime.
- Distribution of the military posts fairly among the different components of the Iraqi people. The same thing must be done for admission in the military academies or colleges and the military training courses.
- It is necessary to rebuild the army out of volunteers and abolish the compulsory military service. Also, the volunteers should have the right to perform their service in their federal regions.
- The military forces should be involved in development and construction programs.
- The Peshmerga forces of Kurdistan region have struggled for a long time to have democracy and keep the interests of all the Iraqi people. They have resisted the repression and terrorism of the Iraqi forces to impose the dictatorship on the people. Also, the Peshmerga positions have been a stronghold for all the Iraqi opposition forces and groups to struggle against dictatorship and terrorism. These forces have
A LONG AND HONORABLE HISTORY IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE. THEY ARE WELL-ORGANIZED AND PREPARED FOR DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND RESPECTING THE CIVIL SOCIETY. THEREFORE, THESE FORCES SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF IRAQI KURDISTAN REGION.

STRUCTURE AND DUTIES OF THE MILITARY FORCES:

1. THE DUTY OF THE MILITARY FORCES IS DEFENDING IRAQ AND ITS CONSTITUTION AND THE ADMINISTRATION ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE.

2. IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL ORDERS, INSTRUCTIONS AND PROGRAMMES ISSUED BY THE ELECTED POLITICAL LEADERSHIP.

3. NON-INTERVENTION IN THE POLITICAL AFFAIRS.

4. EDUCATION OF THE YOUNG PEOPLE OF THE VARIOUS ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS -- KURDS, ARABS, TURKMANS, ASSYRIANS -- ON PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, PLURALISM, FEDERALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

5. THE AUTHORITY OF MOVING THE MILITARY FORCES SHOULD BE LIMITED AND CONFINED ACCORDING TO A CONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE THAT KEEPS SUCH MOVEMENTS AWAY FROM FACTIONAL AND PERSONAL INTERESTS.

6. THE MILITARY BUDGET MUST BE APPROVED AND CONTROLLED BY THE ELECTED ADMINISTRATION.

7. PARTICIPATION OF THE IRAQI MILITARY FORCES IN TRAINING AND MANEUVERS WITH ALLIED COUNTRIES.

8. ELIMINATION OF SUSPECTED TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WORKING AGAINST THE INTERESTS OF IRAQ, THE REGION, AND THE WORLD.

9. PARTICIPATION IN CONTROLLING EMERGENCY CASES AND NATURAL DISASTERS.

WITH REGARDS.
العلاقات المدنية العسكرية

1. نظرًا لأن العراق بعد تأسيس نظام صدام سيكون بحاجة إلى قوات مسلحة وأن يكون الواجب الرئيسي لهذه القوات الدفاع عن حدود الدولة العراقية ومؤسسات الدولة.

2. يجب أن تكون هذه القوات تحت قيادة السلطات المدنية التي تنتخب من قبل الشعب العراقي وتؤمن بالديمقراطية والتنمية وال自发ية والحماية حقوق الإنسان.

3. يجب أن تكون هذه القوات تعبر عن إرادات الشعب العراقي.

4. القيام بهذه الواجبات الرئيسيَة وعدم التدخل في أمور السياسة الداخلية التي تتعلق بإدارة الدولة وذلك ل họp ثقة الشعب.

5. نظرًا لأن أفراد القوات المسلحة هم أبناء الشعب ويشكلون الطبقة العراقية، لذلك يجب توزيع وتنقيح النشاط بالمبادئ الديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان وحرية الرأي في البرامج التصويرية في المراحل التعليمية كافة لكي يكون لديهم عقلية ثقافية ديمقراطية عند التعامل بالجيش، وهذا سوف يؤدي إلى تحسين العلاقات المدنية العسكرية.

6. على القوات المسلحة القيام بنطة وذاتية الشعب عند حدوث الكوارث، (العراقي، الفيضانات، الزلازل، المواصلات...).

7. يجب إيجاد فرص العمل لمسربين من أفراد القوات المسلحة، من ناحية لهم واستيعابهم في المؤسسات المدنية وذلك لفرض إجراءات تأهيلهم في الحياة المدنية.

8. بناء جهاز خاص للتنقيح والتنمية الوطنية على مستوى جميع الوحدات والتشكيلات والمؤسسات العسكرية، ونكة ذلك على غرار الحقوق العالمية في الدول الديمقراطية التي تحقق الحريات الفردية والجماعية وتعمم حقوق الإنسان.

(6-1)

UNCLASSIFIED
Education for Defense

التعليم من أجل الدفاع

1) استخدمت هذه القوات كأداة بين الحكام لبناء الشعب وترسيخه وتعزيزه وبناءه على الدول المجاورة.
2) تقدمت للمملكة الموحدة والمملكة. مما أدى إلى إصلاح القضايا وأضرار جسيمة بالعراق وبنيهته وتسبب في إصلاح ملايين الآلاف من الأشخاص وๆ. من أجل استعادة الآلاف بينما يتم تطبيق الأحكام. إنها دولة بليغة في الخدمات الاجتماعية وخلق المشاكل الاجتماعية لا تحدد ولا تحسن، التي يسمى منها الشعب العراقي الآن.
3) في المستقبل، فهذه الأ đáoب والمصممة الأخرى، قد تضم مقادير الموارد من قبل الشعب المستقبلي، وضع برنامج سياسيا بتوجيه الناساء والwagona التي خلقها السياسة المدنية الوجودية الهجاء، التي سلكتها السلطات السابقة وتأتي أنها على الحاضر والمستقبل، لكي تكون نتيجة وعبوة للأجيال القادمة.
4) إعداد أولوية التوجيه السياسي الحالي كمؤسسة وأفراد وتسريع ملءها واستخدام جهاز خاص للتعليم والتعليمية الوطنية على مستوى الجيش المستقبلي وثبت ذلك على ضرورية الجهود المبذولة في الدول الديمقراطية التي تحمي الحريات الفردية والجماعية وتعزز حقوق الإنسان والمجتمع المدني.
5) تقييم وتوجيه القوات المسلحة العراقية بعد تغيير النظام بالولاية للدولة أولاً والاتصال عند الأفكار المتطرفة والمنطقية والثورة بالمنطق الديموقراطي التصميم المدني.xlsx
6) إرسال البعثات من منتسبي الجيش إلى الدول الديمقراطية في العالم الحدودي لإطلاع على النهج الديموقراطي لتكمل الدول والاستماع من خبراتهم بعد عودتهم.
7) بناء العلاقات الإنسانية بين أفراد الجيش من قضايا وجدول، كذلك من أجل إعادة الثقة بالنفس ورفع العبوات إلى بناء جبارة مدرسة دفاعية تتزامن بالديمقراطية بعيدا عن التكتلات الحربية والعدائية والقومية، ويجعل من جميع منتسبي الجهد الجيد أن يعرفوا به وسيلة.
8) الجيش هو جزء من الهندسة الذي لا ينطوي على النواحي الخاصة (الحجم الترتيب، التدريب) وذلك وفق النظريات والمكالمات الفنادقة المدنية في العالم الديموقراطي الحر، بحيث يتلاحم مع النهج والتوجهات السائدة في العالم الديموقراطي الحر.

UNCLASSIFIED
السياسة الدفاعية في المنطقة

1) إن السياسة الدفاعية لأية دولة ترسمها السلطات الدبلوماسية للم.ctة وتثبز الد_FILENAME

الوطنية والقوانين والأعراف الدولية. إن النظام العالمي الجديد والتعاون الدولي جديد لا

تسمح بالخروج من الإجماع الدولي والقيام بالأعمال العدواني في المنطقة والعالم لذلك،

إعادة بناء الجيش العراقي وتقديسه، بما يتأتِ السياسة الدفاعية بعيد يلائم ظروف المنطقة.

وذلك تشكيل الجيش من المتطوعين لسهولة السيطرة والتضبب والتوعية.

ب) تحريم سياسات التمييز العرقي والقومي والولايات المتمتعة من الداخل والخارج واحترام

المؤسسات الدستورية المنتخبة من قبل الشعب.

ج) عدم السماح بالحصول على أسلحة التدمير الشامل أو تشبيهاً، وكذلك على الأسلحة التقليدية.

المفتوحة (الصواريخ البعيدة والتشابطة المدى) وتمثل كذلك أسلحة هجومية

2) يعد تغيير نظام صدام استنادًا إلى النظام السياسي الاجتماعي الإقليمي الفيسلرالي المنتخب

من لدن الشعب العراقي، ونظراً لأهمية موقع العراق الإقليمي والدولي الاستراتيجي، يكون من

الضروري دخول العراق سياسياً وعسكرياً في التحالفات الجديدة مع دول العالم الديمقراطي العربي.
تسريع ونزع السلاح وإعادة التدريب

Demobilization & Disarming & Retraining DDR

1. إذا قرر المجتمع الدولي تخليص الشعب العراقي ودول الجوار والمنطقة والعالم من قرار هذا النظام وتم تهيئة القوات الطلبة ضمن تحسين دولي بقيادة الولايات المتحدة، فإن هذا النظام وقواته ستنهار جلياً ويتفكك.

2. إن كل دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة إضافة إلى قوات مسلحة دفاعية تمثل مصالحها وأمنها وتمكينها من تنفيذ برنامجي للتنمية والأعمال.

3. من الضروري بناء القوات المسلحة العراقية بعد تحرير النظام على نحو سليم بما يناسب مع الظروف العامة والم奖学金ات على الصروح العراقية والإقليمية وفقا لحاجة العراق الفعلية والدفاع عن الوطن.

4. بما أن النظام العراقي وجيشه استخدمت أساليب النزاع الشامل ضد شعبه وجب أن ينطرق واسع الأيام الأمني والسلام الإقليمي والعالمي قطاع من الضروري جداً نزع أساليب النزاع الشامل العراقي وتمهيرها واعتماد قوى局部 لاستعادة بنائها واسترجعها تحت أيدي دودة ويكون ذلك واجب

الهيئات الدولية.

5. تلبية القوات المسلحة بما يناسب الحاجات الدفاعية وذلك كما يلي:

1. إقامة تنظيم جهاز الأمن الخاص كمؤسسة وأفراد ومعارض من تنبيه من الناحية الهيالية.

2. إلغاء تشكيلات قوات الحرس الجمهوري الخاص والعسكريفر من مكافحة الجريمة.

3. إلغاء مديرية الترويج السياسية كمؤسسة وأفراد من الجيش وتسريح متحدثة وبذلك إلغاء

4. منصب ضابط الأمن من الوحدات والتشكيلات.

5. إعادة حيادية الاستشارات العسكرية بوزارة الدفاع وقطاع ارتباطها برئاسة الجمهورية.

6. تسريح دورات الاحتياط من ضباط ومرابط وجنود من الخدمة العسكرية.

7. تسريح موالية الخدمة الإلزامية من الجيش.

8. الاستعداد من الضباط والضباط الصف المتقدمين من الذين يتوفر فيهم صفات الإخلاص واللياقة البدنية والذين أحبوا على التвойق بسبب عدم انسجامهم مع البصمة والسلطات الدكتورالية.

9. إحياء الضباط الزائد من المراكز وحاجة الجيش على الطلب.

10. تحويل المؤسسات المدنية من المساند والعمل الإنتاجية العابدة للجيش أو التسنيع العسكري إلى المؤسسات المدنية أو تسييرها.

11. تحميل الأسلحة والعتاد والأسلحة العسكرية المتوقفة من خلال التشكيلات لغرض خزائها أو إزالة بصورة كليّة.

12. إعادة النظر في القوانين والأنظمة والتعليمات العسكرية الحالية مما يلائم تأميم متطلبات

الجيش العراقي المستقبلي.

ل خيروم ميزانية عالية لوزارة الدفاع من قبل الحكومة العراقية المستقبلية ويجب أن يتم
مهمة القوات وتكوينها

1. إن مهمة القوات المسلحة هي الدفاع عن العراق والدستور والحكومة المنتخبة من قبل الشعب العراقي.
2. تنفيذ كافة الأوامر والتعليمات والتوجيهات والبرامج التي تصدر من قبل السلطة المدنية المنتخبة من قبل الشعب.
3. عدم التدخل في الأمور السياسية والأبتعاد عنها.
4. تأهيل الشباب من العرب والكرد والتركمان والآشوريين بتفتيش أبادتهم ونمثهم على الإنسان بالمبادئ الديمقراطية وحرية الرأي والتعدية والتفريدة وحقوق الإنسان.
5. تحديد سلاحيات تحرير القوات المسلحة واستخدامها بموجب نص دستوري بحيث يقيد هذا النص تلك السلاحات بعيدا عن الأهداف الشخصية والخليفة.
6. تكون المساحة على ميزانية القوات المسلحة وتدقيقها من قبل الهيئات المنتخبة من قبل الشعب.
7. اشتراك الجيش في التمارين والتدريبات والدورات مع جيوش الدول العربية.
8. القضاء على شبكات المنظمات الإرهابية المشبوهة التي تعمل ضد سلامة العراق ونقطة العالم.
9. الاجتماع في مواجهة حالات الطوارئ وإجراءات التي يتطلبها أشغال الجيش فيها.
Civil-Military Relations: Its Important Role in the Iraq of the Future

There are many things in the framework of building positive civil-military relations which indicate civilized behavior and mutual benefit, and they will enable the construction of an improved future Iraq. But, they require initial steps of democratic principles in the Iraqi armed forces for the elimination of the negative idea that the military establishment precedes everything else in Iraq, and especially the effect of that attitude on the Iraqi youth, who carry a negative idea of the Army because of its perceived sternness, violence, war militarism, and the loss of valuable years of their lives during their compulsory military service.

We must combine all of our operating procedures and suitable educational steps to correct movement to progress toward prominent civil-military relations on humanitarian and national grounds, such as:

- The review of the laws of military service and the gradual elimination of the law of compulsory military service, so that all armed forces members are volunteers and aim to be professional soldiers in the national service of Iraq

- The inclusion of civilians to work in the Iraqi military establishments and formation of a civilian advisory section in the Ministry of Defense, and likewise the insertion of military advisors in the important civilian ministries and establishments

- The assignment of military officers who are close to retirement into the ministries and civilian departments in administrative and technical positions so that they may provide beneficial services, for example, in municipal governments, administrative divisions, departments of public works, agriculture, industry, and department of roads and communications

- Providing military medical services to the benefit of the civilian population, and in conjunction with the civilian agencies and in designated locations

- The use of the Army's military engineers in improvement and paving of main and secondary routes of civilian communications and their participation, in cooperation with civilian authorities, in rebuilding and construction of the country

- The capability of military training establishments to train Iraqi youth in various specialized sports, such as parachute jumping, climbing, and other suitable military skills

- The possible participation of Iraqi Army aviation units (helicopters) in coordination with the civil defense authorities in rescue operations, and also for countering smuggling and pursuing dangerous criminals, etc.

- Establishing youth organizations in the secondary schools and the universities as friends of the Army, which organizations may inform and encourage the youth to volunteer for military service later in their lives
• Civilian celebrations on the occasion of commemorating the National Day of the Iraqi Army

• Priority importance of the annual Day of the Iraqi Soldier

• Expansion of the participation of Iraqi women in the Army and the Police

• Organizing combined celebrations between the military and civilians on suitable national holiday festivals and occasions

• Preparing joint programs for public information between the civilians and the military

• The Iraqi Army will be able to provide thousands of intermediate-skilled cadres to the civilian industrial and commercial establishments and they can assume leading mid-level positions in the agriculture, industry and service sectors of Iraq's national economy

• The removal of obvious armed military presence from the streets of Iraqi cities

• Minimizing past established fear from armed forces in the community, all regulation and laws concerning the authority of armed forces over civilians must transparently declared through the nation.

• Allowing civilian to tour and visit the headquarter of defense department or any other well know army establishments. It will help to build the bridge over the gap between civilian and military, meanwhile, it will give the civilians lucid view of what is Defense Dept., and how it operates to defend the citizens of the nations and it is interest.
مقترحات تحالف القبائل العراقية حول بناء القوات المسلحة العراقية بعد نظام صدام حسين

تحالف القبائل العراقية
القстат 10/12/2002

UNCLASSIFIED
مقترحات تحالف القبائل العراقية حول بناء القوات المسلحة العراقية بعد نزاع صدام حسين

1- ابعاد الجبه عن الحزبية وممارسة النشاط السياسي.
2- تطوير قوة الجيش إلى الحد الذي يكون بإمكانه الدفاع عن حدود العراق وسيادته.
وتحقيقه أرضيًا وشعبيًا.
3- رفع كفاءة الجيش من الكافية التقنية والتدريبية، والاعتماد على التكنولوجيا الحديثة.
4- العمل على بناء جيش دفاعي ذو خدمة دفاعية وخبرة منزوعة الحدودية التي.
رسخها فيه نظام صدام.
5- تعزيز التدابير في حجم الجيش بالعناصر الكونية.
6- وضع مستوى أقرارات قوات المسلحة العراقية علميًا وعمليًا معناها ومساهمة والأكمال على.
المطلوب من المؤهلين.
7- محاربة التمييز العرقي والديني والطائفي وفرعات ذلك أثناء تسليم المناصب القيادية.
8- أن يكون المقياس هو القيادة المهنية.
9- تطبيق أبعاد القبائل العراقية فيbuf المخاطر في صفوف الجيش، وابعاد العناصر.
المتطورة دينياً وقومياً.
10- القضاء التشكاكات الخاصة والمؤلفات كالحرس الجمهوري الخاص وجبش.
11- وتسيير وفادي صدام والتشكيلة الأخرى غير نظامية.
12- إعادة تشكيل قوة الخدمة الألزامية لأسكان الطلبة وتوفرهم للقدرة.
13- إعادة إعمار البلد.
14- ابعاد الحيق قد الأمكان عن التدخل في نزاعات الداخلية وتركمها للجهات.
المختصة.
15- إعادة تأهيل منتسبية القوات المسلحة السابقين من المتقاتلين ومعوقى الحرب.
ولأسرى العفو من الأمن، والأساتذة من خبراتهم في الحياة المدنية.
16- تقييم الجيش في مجال احتراز حقوق الإنسان واعطائهم دروسًا بهذا.
الخصوص.
17- تخصص ميزانية معينة للجيش محدودة وان يحق جميع مشرياتها من قبل.
لمجتمع من المتخصصين من البرلمان المختار.

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تهيئة الجيش ليكون جاهزاً للمشاركة في عمليات حفظ الأمن والسلام العالميين جنباً إلى جنب مع الجيوش العالمية.

العمل على ردم الهوة بين الجيش والشعب وإعادة الناقة بينهما.

تحويل الجيش من أداة تفعيل الحريات والشعب إلى أداة لدعم الحريات والدفاع عن الشعب وحمايته.

تحالف القبائل العراقية

واشنطن 10/12/2002

UNCLASSIFIED
DEFENCE POLICY WORKING GROUP

Defence Policy in a Regional Setting:

The re-building of the Iraqi Armed Forces will depend on:

1. The Political System and its Philosophy, which the government will follow, in dealing with the different issues it will face, and to reach their objectives.

If the policy, the government follows is based upon expanding and repeating its past status, then this will lead the government to build a large attacking military force, this will exceed in its need to defend the country and its sovereignty.

On the other hand, if the government’s policy is to concentrate on building the economy and the infra structure of the country and to have peace as its main principle, by way of negotiating verbally any differences with any country, then we will only need to build a logical size army for Defence Purposes against any outside aggression.

2. The size of armed forces and the quality of its weapons will depend upon the intentions of the surrounding countries, and their policies and treaties with other countries.

Only then, a feasibility study that will include, the social, economical and technological capability of the country will allow us to know the size of Armed Forces needed and its weapon capabilities.

The Saddam Hussain’s Regime from the time it came to power in Iraq in 1968, had adopted the idea of expanding and controlling the region, thus pushed Iraq and its neighbours to unsettlements and destruction by way of wars.

Accordingly, we think its essential that we should adopt the idea of living in peace and harmony with our neighbours and the world, in order to build a peaceful future Iraq.

3. Due to the debts that have accumulated as a result of the two wars and the bad economy that followed, this will make the expenditure
and the monies to spend on the army very unreasonable and difficult.

The Influences that will lead to the re-building of the future Iraqi Armed Forces:

Geographical influences:

1. Iraq is surrounded from the north by Turkey, from the east by Iran and from the south and west by friendly Arab Countries, smaller countries when compared to Iraq, thus they are unlikely to attack Iraq. Whatever differences, politically or economically we might have with them

2. There are differences with Iran. These are past difference which resulted from the Shah of Iran wanting parts of the Arabian Gulf and some of the Iraqi border land

This problem was dealt with in 1975 in the “Algerian Treaty”, where Saddam himself was its engineer. This ended the armed movement in Kurdistan Iraq with its head The Mullah Mustapha Barzani.

A new problem arised from this “The Exportation of the Islamic Revolution”. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, by the Mullah Khumaini, this pushed Saddam to wage war against Iran for 8 years, and as soon as it finished he ends up invading Kuwait in August 1990.

Thus, we will have to take into consideration the Iranian threat and as the situation in Iraq will not allow it to be an equal level with Iran. A defence treaty with the United State of America will level this equilibrium, just like the rest of the Gulf Countries.

3. TURKEY: The moderate Islamic country The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. Their constitution specifically concentrate on its Foreign Policy not to get involved in the internal situation of their neighbours and as Turkey is part of Nato, this will make the idea of Aggression an uneasy event and when Iraq enters
a Defence Treaty with U.S.A, then this aggression will be impossible.

4. The Arab – Israeli conflict cannot be ignored by any Strategical study that involves the Middle – East. Thus the ideal solution is the one suggested by President George W. Bush during the present "U.N. meeting for a peaceful ending to this conflict.

Therefore, we cannot include this conflict in the basis of the re-building process for Iraqi Armed Forces as its illogical under the present world state and the inclusion of weapons of Mass Destruction will not lead to anything by any side, but, to total destruction and the threat of world peace.

**The size of Armed Forces in Future Iraq:**

1. The size of the Armed Forces during peace will be between 0.5% - 1.5% in the ratio to the Iraqi Population (22 million approximately) = 150,000 - 200, 000 men in service.

2. We suggest the size of the Armed Forces should not consist of more than 3 corps

3. Supply the Armed Forces with the latest Equipments and Machinery.

4. The Weapons and Equipments are for defensive purposes and they consist of Infantry, Air Force, Air defence, Navy and …etc.

5. To cancel all units that was formed during Saddam’s Regime.

6. Close down and cancel the Military Production units and Mass Destruction units that were established during the Saddam’s Regime.

7. Cancel and closure of the Political Propaganda Establishment.

8. The Policy of Voluntary and UN - voluntary call to service should be followed. And the replacement of un- voluntary service call by way of paying a lump sum as substitute.

9. The distribution of Democratic understanding and knowledge in the Army and its status as not to get involved in the Politics and
parties of the country. This will also implement the idea of Army loyalty to the government and country and not to one person or group.

CONCLUSION:

1. Iraq should have a defensive Army and not an attacking Army with an offensive status. As Iraq will never in the future have any foreign intentions to expand against neighbouring countries.

2. The duty of the Army is to defend the country and its Sovereignty.

3. The Army’s responsibility will be to protect the constitution and not to allow any influences to affect it.

4. Protect and participate in the prevention of natural disasters when they happen.

5. To benefit all Army leavers, to build the infrastructure of the country and to assist the skilled workers by sponsoring them to start small projects.

6. To limit the privileges of the Armed Forces by way of a clause in the Constitution as a result of a law passed and accepted by the parliament, which was elected by the people.

7. To implement an annual budget for the Army and to concentrate on building the economy of the country. This budget will have to be passed by Parliament first.

8. The internal security and prevention of criminal activities will be the duty of the Police and Security Forces.

9. The prevention of any terrorist group to use the land of Iraq as bases to their activities to use against any regional or international country and to fight terrorism in all its types.

10. To limit the relationship between the Civil Bodies and the Armed Forces, which will insure that no Military Personal will be involved in any Political issues or differences and not to be under the control of a single person.
We should also prevent all Military Persons to be members of any Political Party.

11. Prevent and outlaw the production and licences of any form of weapons of Mass Destruction.

12. Prevent and outlaw any form of Racism whether religious, national or social inside the Armed Forces. As this was occurring during the Present Regime.
سياسة الدفاع الإقليمي

أسس إنشاء القوات المسلحة العراقية:

يعتمد إنشاء القوات المسلحة على الأسس التالية:

1- الظروف السياسية أو النظام السياسي الذي تتجه الدولة في تعاملها مع الأحداث وتحقيق الأهداف الرسمية لإدارة البلاد.

فإذا كانت السياسة التي تتبناها دولة ما تتوافق على نزعة توسعيّة وطروحات كبيرة مبنية على فكرة تاريخية، كإعادة الحُجُب التاريخي للأمة مثلاً، فقد تتوجه هذه الدولة نحو بناء قوة عسكرية شبيهة بحربية كبيرة تزيد عن احتياجات الدفاع عن الوطن وسياسته.

فبما تتبنى الدولة التي تتجه في سياساتها العليا نحو البناء وأعمالها وتحقيق النهوض والازدهار.

وتطور نحو الأفضل لرفاه الشعب، وتنفذ من السلم هدفًا استراتيجيًا ونهجًا حضاريًا، ومن الحوار والتفاوض وسيلة لحل الخلافات مع الدول الأخرى، فإن هذه الدولة تتوجه نحو دولة تشمل هذه القيادة إلى الاحتفاظ بقوة عسكرية مسلحة بحجم مناسب للدفاع عن أراضيها وسياستها.

2- أن تقدر حجم القوات المسلحة ونوعية الأسلحة الثلوجية والضخمة وقواتها المحيطة بها وفاعليتها السياسية، واحتمالات تفاعلها مع الظروف الخارجة ذات أبعاد سياسية واقتصادية وعسكريّة، الأمر الذي يتطلب إجراء تدريج متوسط استراتيجي سليم يضمن دراسة الحالة الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والتنموية، وتسارع القوات، وتسهيل تقدم وتحديث حجم القوات، وأنواع الأسلحة والآليات المتاحة للطلاب نوراها.

أن تكون نظام صدام حسين نفسه استالة السلطة في العراق عام 1968 النزعة التوسعيّة ومحاولة الهيمنة على دول المنطقة دفعت العراق ودول المنطقة إلى الكوارث وفُهم الاستقرار.

3- قصة الورد والاقتصاد المعرفي العراق والديون التراكمية بسبب الحربين سيجعل صعوبة الاتفاق على جيش بحجم كبير.

إذا لم تقتضي أن من الضروري جدًا تبادل هذه الخيارات لمصر القتالية مناخ القتال السليم مع دول المنطقة والمملكة العربية السعودية.
العوامل المؤثرة لإنشاء جيش الدفاع الإقليمي لعراق المستقبل

1- العراق - محاز من الشمال بتركيا ومن الشرق إيران ومن الغرب والجنوب الدول العربية الشقيقة، التي عبارة عن دول صغيرة عميماً في العراق، ولا يحتوي إقليمياً منها على العوائد ضد العراق فيما اختلفت معها سياسياً أو مصالحياً أو أيديولوجياً، متفقها أو مجتمعة.

2- إيران - توجد مع إيران مشاكل ودراسات مرايا تاريخية، تشكلت في أبعاد الشاه على شكل الالتباس لأجزاء من خط العرب والأراضي العراقية الحدودية. وقد ساهمت هذه المشكلة بإذاعة إثارة الجزر التي كان مصطفى مهدي فتحي صدام عبد القادر في إعلانها إنشاء حزب الكردستانية العراقية المسلحة بقيادة اللا مصطفى الكردي.

وقد برتزت مشكلة أخرى بين الدولتين الجارتين بإهانة الثورة الإسلامية عام 1979 التي رفعت شعار (تدمير الثورة الإسلامية) الذي اقتفى النظام العراقي ودول المنطقة وأثار حفيظة النظام العراقي وحدها التاريخي ضد إيران، مما دفع العراق إلى حرب شدته استمرت ثمانية أعوام، ما أن انقضت حتى اجتاحت قواته دولة الكويت في 2 آب 1990.

الذالك فإن التهديد الإيرانى يطلب أخذت بهذ الحذر الاعتبار، وعلى ما كانت ظروف العراق لا تتحمل الاحتياجات كبيرة ورأي ما لدى إيران، وعلى يمكن تحقيق ذلك الدوافع يعقد التفاوض أمنية مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية أسوة بدول الخليج.

3- تركيا - الجارة الشمالية، الدولة العثمانية السلمة.

ينصب ميولها الوطني منذ تأسيس الجمهورية التركية واستقلالها عام 1923، على حماية حدودها الحالية، وهي تركز في سياساتها الخارجية على عدم التدخل في الشؤون الداخلية للدول الأخرى، وعليه أن قوات السلامة التركية تستند على أسس دفاعية، وليس هجومية، وهي عضو في حلف الأطلسي (ناتو) لتلبية الحماية والدفاع عن كيانها جماهرياً ضد مخاطر الاتحاد السوفيتي السابق، والمشاركة في حلف السلام في مختلف بعثات العالم ضمن قوات حلف (ناتو) هذا فضلاً عن دخول العراق في تحالف آمني مع الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية سبعمها من ذلك.
4- الصراع العربي- الإسرائيلي

لا يمكن تجاهل الصراع العربي الإسرائيلي في أية دراسة استراتيجية تخص منطقة الشرق الأوسط. فنحن نرى أن الحل الأمثل هو ما طرحه الرئيس جورج بوش أثناء اجتهاد الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة في دورتها في العام المقرر لتسوية النزاع العربي الإسرائيلي حلاً سلبياً مثالياً.

لذلك فإن إدخال موضوع هذا الصراع ضمن حسابات تأسيس القوة العسكرية العراقية غير وارد منطقياً لدعم تكافؤ الفرص تحت ظروف الوضع الدولي الراهن، بما أن امتلاك الدول العربية لأسلحة الدمار الشامل سوف لا يؤدي إلا إلى زيادة التوتر فاستخدام هذا النوع من السلاح من أي طرف كان سوف يؤدي إلى تدمير المنطقة بأكملها وتهديد السلام العالمي.

حجم الجيش العراقي المستقبلي

1- يكون حجم الجيش الدفاعي أثناء السلام عادة بنسبة 5% - 15% من مجموع نفوس الشعب.

2- العراق 22 مليون نسمة، فيتراوح حجم الجيش بين 150 - 200 ألف فرد.

3- تزود القوات المسلحة بمعدات تكنولوجية حديثة.

4- يكون تسليح الدفاعي يشمل في قوات النهاية والدروع والدفاع الجوي وطيران الجيش.

5- الأسراب الساندة للقوات الأرضية والقوة البحرية والدفاع الفضائي.

6- إلغاء كافة التشكيلات الإضافية التي أجدها نظام صدام.

7- إلغاء مؤسسات التصنيع العسكري والنتهج لأسلحة الدمار الشامل.

8- إلغاء مؤسسة التوجيه السياسي.

9- إلغاء سياسة التجزين الزدبي (الطولي والأزرقي).

يعتبر المستوى الثقافي والإياب بالديمقراطية في صفوف أبناء القوات المسلحة من أهم العوامل المؤثرة لحماية النظام الجمهوري القادم وضمان الأمن والاستقرار في البلاد.

UNCLASSIFIED
التوصيات

1- أن يكون العراق جيش دفاعي وليد فكرة تأسيس جيش هجومي عدائي توسعي. ولأن تكون العراق مستقبلاً أي أطراف سياسية أو نوايا عدوانية مع الدول المجاورة.

2- أن تكون مهام الجيش بالدفاع عن الوطن وسياسته.

3- أن يعمل على حماية دستور الدولة وصيانته من الخروقات الاستثنائية.

4- السماحة في واجبات محاور الكوارث الطبيعية عند حدوثها.

5- الاستفادة من متى يعني الجيش المروحين لإبقاء البنيات التحتية وأعمال البلد ومساعدة الهجومين منهم يبقع مشاريع صغيرة خاصة بهم.

6- تحديد صلاحية استهداف القوات المسلحة بموجب نص دستوري يقتضي موافقة البرلمان المختص من قبل الشعب.

7- تخصيص ميزانية محددة للجيش واعطاء الأولوية للتنمية الاقتصادية على أن يتم السماحة عليها من قبل البرلمان.

8- يكون الأمن الداخلي ومكافحة الإرهاب من صلاحية الشرطة وقوات الأمن.

9- يجب عدم فتح المجال للإرهابيين باستخدام الأراضي العراقية ضد إي دولة إقليمية أو عالمية ومكافحة الإرهاب بكل أشكاله.

10- تحديد العلاقة بين المؤسسة الدينية والعسكرية بما يؤمن عدم تدخل العسكريين في النزاعات السياسية وعدم الرضوض لأي حاكم يعمل على استغلال العسكريين ومنهم من العمل السياسي أو الانتماء إلى الأحزاب.

11- تجريم إنتاج أو محاولة الحصول على أسلحة الدمار الشامل.

12- إزالة حالة التمييز القومي أو الطائفي داخل القوات المسلحة والعمل على إزالة التمييز العنصري بين أفراد القوات المسلحة وأبناء الشعب الذي أوجده النظام الدكتاتوري.
DDR

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of paramilitary forces in post
Saddam Iraq

Forward
Disarmament, Demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process is a prelude to the establishment of
a stable and secure environment in post Saddam Iraq that allows Iraq to return to normality. This
return to normality will involve the return of refugees (4 million outside Iraq) and displaced
persons (Kurds, forcibly displaced by the present regime in south of Iraq), the rebuilding of the
basic infrastructure and establishment of democratic governance. The presence of a large number
of arms and light weapons is a major threat to a stable Iraq in the future. Therefore, immediate
attempts must be made by the new Iraqi system in post Saddam Iraq to develop some form of
response to this threat, which can be interpreted into a major DDR process for all the paramilitary
forces created by the regime and all the fighting groups and parties in the Iraqi opposition that were
fighting against the regime. This process (DDR), should be part of the new government's efforts to
contribute to enhancing the stability and peace in the country after the departure of the present
regime from power. The basis for a successful DDR process will be dependent on the stability of
the country and type of system controlling it. However, the full success of a DDR process requires
the full cooperation of the entire affected population and the coordination of various governmental
and private institutes throughout the process.
It is often difficult to make the right assessment for the success or failure of any DDR programme
as the information regarding the concerned forces and parties is difficult to obtain, therefore,
programme planning and the ability to make sound management decisions becomes limited. It is
important that the appropriate information is collected in sufficient detail to enable sound and
possible judgments to be made. This means that an appropriate public information strategy
supported by the necessary means and resources should form an integral part of the DDR process in
post Saddam Iraq. This will also require the opening of information gathering centres south,
middle and north of Iraq. It also requires the recruitment of well informed and capable staff body to
operate the DDR process effectively. A successful DDR programme in the new Iraq will require
access to considerable amount of technical skills and institutional knowledge. This requires the
new Iraqi government to establish databases of expertise on disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration. The new Iraqi system must also recognize the usefulness of including DDR issues
into the national training programmes.

Planning Phase. In order to implement a successful DDR programme in the new Iraq, accurate
planning is required. Accurate information from all the parties that are involved in this process is
required. Information on the size and location of their armed forces, number, type and location of
weapons and agreement on the location of sites for disarmament and demobilization as well as on
the timing process. The planning process must also outline the responsibilities of the leading
national institutes in Iraq and other actors and organizations essential to the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration process and should also outline the basic approach to the problem,
including strategies and time frames.
Important steps. The DDR process for former paramilitary combatants in the new Iraq requires five interconnected phases for it to succeed.

1. **The political phase.** This requires political deals through continuous negotiations and fact-finding missions that will either lead to the integration of the former separated forces into a new military framework such as a new consolidated defensive Iraqi army or lead to the return of the former combatants to civilian life. This will require local and international political support.

2. **The military and Technical phase.** A military structure with expertise and technical support are required to secure stability in Iraq, leading from ceasefire to disarmament and discharge while a security mechanism is employed to prevent further conflicts. This military structure can be: a. The Iraqi military. b. The United States military. c. The United Nations. d. All the three.

3. **Security.** Maintaining security in Iraq after the departure of the present regime will create a climate in the country less prone to violence and vengeance and big reduction in small arms trade and increase in tolerance between the different factions of the people. Security will be implemented as mentioned in 2. by an option of the above military forces or joined together.

4. **Humanitarian phase.** This will require the new Iraqi government to establish a framework that will enhance the well-being of the former combatants from the various dismantled forces and reinserting them into society as healthy and stable citizens. This will include social, psychological and physical treatment. It also includes education and health care.

5. **Socio-Economic phase.** Which leads to the reintegration of the ex-combatants into the economic activities of their communities. Such measures require job training and employment, housing, credit, training, and transport to enable them to participate positively into the community.

It is essential that the planning and preparation of any DDR programme in Iraq after the change of the present regime include all the five phases mentioned above. If one strain is neglected, the others will be effected and by necessity suffer.

Disarmament

Disarmament in post Saddam Iraq means the collection of small arms and light and heavy weapons from feuding parties within the borders of the Iraqi state. This will include the following forces:

1. **Fidayeen Saddam.** A paramilitary force of over 10000 members with light and heavy weapons under their disposal. This force was created by Auday, Saddam’s eldest son in the beginning of the 90s from special forces and military intelligence units that come from tribes and families loyal to the regime.

2. **Al-jaysh Al-shaabi (the Popular Army).** A paramilitary army of Baath party members. The Popular Army is armed by the present regime with Russian light weapons such as AK47 automatic rifles, RPK light machine guns, BKC medium machine guns and anti-tank/infantry RPG7 rocket propellers. The Popular Army is estimated to have 120000 elements.

3. **Jaysh Al Qudus (Al Qudus Army).** It was formed lately of civilians who were forced to enlist in order not to loose their monthly food rations. It is estimated to consist of over one million elements armed with light weapons.

4. **The INC Opposition Forces.** The opposition forces must be included in the DDR programme in post Saddam Iraq. This will include all the armed factions in northern and southern Iraq.
5. **Armed tribes loyal to the present regime.** This includes tribes in the middle, west and south of Iraq that were armed by the regime in order to counter any insurgency by the civil population in their province. They are estimated to be over 150 families and tribes considered loyal to the regime.

6. **Al Forsan Regiments.** A Kurdish army created by the present regime to counter the Kurdish opposition forces fighting the regime in north of Iraq. They consist of 12 regiments of 1000 soldiers each, equipped with light Russian arms.

7. **Mujahideen Khalk.** An 18000 member army of Iranian origin created in the early 80s by the Iraqi regime as a form of opposition to the present Iranian Islamic government. They are well equipped and armed with light and heavy Russian made weapons.

Disarmament to the above forces must include monitoring of the collected arms, their safe storage and their final disposition, which may entail their destruction. Disarmament also include certain issues like the disposal of arms and ammunition, warehouses, and establishing a criteria or categories for weapons, like Landmines or unmarked or defaulted weapons. Disarmament and demobilization of the Iraqi armed forces should be done in a later phase when the first stage of the DDR process regarding the paramilitary forces is accomplished.

**Mine Action.** Iraq at present is a mine infested country. During the 8 years war with Iran, thousands of mines were planted and maps to their locations lost due to the events of war. In the north of Iraq there are estimated to be over 1 million mines planted through the years of conflict that has not been dealt with.

In post Saddam Iraq, there need to be developed a sustainable response to land mine contamination. The new government must prepare the basic requirements to enable it to plan, manage and execute mine action strategies to deal with the mine problem in the long term. Such requirements can be interpreted into the following:

1. Developing management tools.
2. Providing educational and training programmes.
3. Introducing sound administrative procedures.
4. Establishing special medical centres for the injured and the amputated.
5. Establishing a field network of offices with the ability to respond effectively to mine action around the country.

**Destruction of arms.** The destruction of landmines, old weapons, unmarked and defaulted weapons will be appropriate and desirable in post Saddam Iraq.

There is a number of types of destructive techniques that exist and could be applied. When deciding which method is more appropriate, certain measures and factors must be taken into account. These factors can be presented into the following points:

1. Numbers and types of weapons involved.
2. The urgency of the disarmament process.
3. The environmental impact.
4. The reliability of the technique.
5. The cost and availability of means and expertise.

**Demobilization**

Demobilization in post Saddam Iraq means that combatants of all the forces concerned begin to disband their military structures and begin the transformation into civilian life. This process
generally entails the registration of former combatants followed by some kind of assistance to enable them to meet their basic needs and then discharge and transportation to their home communities.

Demobilization is an advanced stage that will be launched with disarmament to convert combatants who pursue their objectives through force and violence to civilians who pursue their objectives through other means.

However, the present Iraqi regime has managed to militarize a large portion of the Iraqi population in the past 30 years. Military to many is the only trade or form of life they know and they will lose through demobilization their only marketable skill, social network and political influence.

Therefore, all combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be assured by their leaders and by the new government of their legal rights and that new prospects for work and education will be provided to them by the new system. Constant governmental and institutional attention must be given to the demobilization process with the requirement of a generous capital of resources. Training programmes, health care and housing projects are all essential issues that must be addressed in order to fulfill the requirements for a successful demobilization process. Short time savings like, limited staffing, non-existence of a mandate for human rights activities and the lack of institution building may come at a very high long-term price.

**Deterrent capacity.** A well-equipped operation with strong deterrent capacity can achieve its goals even in the most difficult environment. Deterrence should be on the following levels:

1. The military level where the involvement of the Iraqi army is required.
2. The political level where a common agenda is agreed on by all parties and observed closely by the United Nation and the international community.
3. The economical level where governmental and institutional support is required.

**Formation of a unified force.** Demobilization may be followed by recruiting some of the x-combatants who wish to continue in their military careers, into a unified defensive force. In other words, merging x-combatants into the Iraqi regular army. This stage should be achieved after the disarmament. Demobilization and redeployment of the Iraqi army is completed. However, this stage will be considered incomplete unless the following points have been defined by all parties involved:

1. The role of the Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq.
2. The composition of the Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq.
5. The military budget.

Once a unified armed forces is formed, further efforts may be required to ensure that it operates firmly under the new Iraqi civilian leadership as a professional institution with the necessary equipment available.

**Reintegration**

Reintegration is a number of training, and job and income generating projects that is created by the new system. However, nongovernmental organizations and foreign institutes can participate in the major projects and issues that handle humanitarian and national training programmes, housing, health, and education.

When members of the dismantled forces and their families are allowed to adapt, economically and socially to a productive civilian life in Iraq, then the Reintegration programme can be called a
success. If the reintegration programme is to become successful in post Saddam Iraq, then all the
former combatants of the dismantled paramilitary units must have strong faith in the new
government and that all the mechanisms of governance is accessible to their representatives. This
can be interpreted into the civil services in post Saddam Iraq that must become the neutral and
impartial servant of the state.
The justice system in post Saddam Iraq must also be restored through its main factors; Law
enforcement, The Judiciary system and The Penal system. They must be seen to function
professionally and with no prejudice.
Human rights must be developed with the help and coordination of the United Nations and the
various independent human rights groups. This will enable the new Iraqi system to accept
codifying international norm (with regards to human rights) into national law.
A government of national unity is required for the success of the reintegration process in post
Saddam Iraq. This means that the Political Structure in post Saddam Iraq must be defined and
accepted by all parties concerned. This will help avoiding the creation of a winner-takes-all system.
The new Iraqi government after Saddam must enhance the democratic process where majorities can
express their will, while recognizing the rights of minorities and help accommodating its people in
the new system in which multiple ethnicities can survive within a single state.

Conclusion.

The quest for peace, stability and sustainable human development in post Saddam Iraq is unlikely
to become successful unless the forces that have produced tension and conflict in the region are
brought under control in a climate of social and political tolerance, where human rights are
respected and where the need for social and economic change are shared by all the parties
concerned.
Essentially, political, technical and humanitarian support should be directed to the new system in
post Saddam Iraq that is represented by the new democratic government to enable it perform its
duties.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes in post Saddam Iraq can be an
ineffective and sterile process if the overall needs of the country are not addressed. The
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration process is only a part of the overall stabilizing
process in the new Iraq and it needs to be planned in strict coordination with other activities such as
institutional reinforcement, administrative reorganization and rehabilitation of social services like
education and health.
Strong economy and open enterprise backed by strong international support are major elements for
assuring the success of the DDR process in post Saddam Iraq.
In the long term, a strategic approach is required to define the main social, environmental,
regional and complex factors that have led Iraq to the violent conflicts between its people, and long
wars with its neighbours. It is essential to begin with a penetrating analysis of the root causes that
led to such tragic events in the past and to construct a road map towards a new stable and peaceful
Iraq.
This analysis should be elaborated jointly with the new government and other international agencies
in order to create a comprehensive framework for recovery in post Saddam Iraq.
Education and Its Important Role in the National Defense of Iraq

In a country such as Iraq, which has been susceptible to radical political, economic and social changes, and after its participation in several external wars with its neighbors and internal wars in the north, the south and even the country's central region, there has been a resultant intervention and haziness of the doctrine and philosophy of national defense. That doctrine requires a number of educational and training programs in accordance with a new strategy of defense that reflects the policy of a new government. These programs will include the following benefits:

- Education of the people, especially the new generation, in the doctrine of Iraqi patriotism and what Iraq means as a geographic region, a people, a political system, what are Iraq's international boundaries, Iraq's human resources, Iraq's rich popular culture (without chauvinism or fanaticism), and what are the rights and duties of the Iraqi citizen

- National symbols, such as the Iraqi flag and the Iraqi national anthem, and their importance

- Peaceful coexistence among the populations inside the Iraqi nation

- The principles of human rights under the auspices of a democratic and pluralistic government

- The meaning of Iraq's national defense, including moral and political defense by means of confirmation of love of Iraq and commitment to protection of its interests, its land, its resources and culture, and confirmation of its national unity and the cohesion of Iraq's people

In regard to military and civil defense, education and training can enable the following:

- A culture of change and transition from war to peace, including the conditions and requirements of such change

- Civil defense programs

- A culture of protective security and intelligence

- Educational and protective programs about wars of mass casualties, such as chemical, biological and nuclear wars, and training on the use of suitable specialized procedures

- Programs for basic military training of volunteers for limited time-periods and their introduction with recreational and educational programs
• Activation of scouting programs (Boy Scouts), young peoples' programs, and youth camps

• The priority importance of sports programs for physical fitness and readiness, such as programs for parachute jumping, climbing, rifle marksmanship, field navigation and map reading, individual combat, survival camping, etc.

• General awareness of the Iraqi people about wars in the world, their causes, their causes and methods, their results, how to avoid such wars, and the human and material lessons learned from such wars
Force, mission and structure

The mission of the Iraqi Army in post Saddam Iraq.

Objective:

To transfer Iraq to a stable democratic state means a major transition to the new world in every aspect of life including the Iraqi armed forces. This will require imaginative and determined leadership to create the foundation of the new Iraqi state. The transitional period in post Saddam Iraq require us to transform the Iraqi army into an educated and professional core that will play a responsible role in forming the future of Iraq. An army that will be able to protect freedom and defend the basic human rights of the Iraqi people.

A key objective to this document is to define the main requirements to build a new defensive army and determine priorities for the military issues that can be dealt with in post Saddam Iraq.

Elements of change.

The military component in a new Iraq as important and demanding as it is, would be a supporting but lesser aspect of a strategy that will be based fundamentally on diplomatic, social and economical leverage that will compel cooperation and assistance from the international community and the free world.

The role of the Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq will depend in both the short and long terms on the following elements:
- Internal elements - which includes the political stability and strong economy of the nation. In other words Social tolerance, free enterprise and effective use of Iraq’s resources (Oil) are key factors in Iraq’s future stability and economic boost which will consequently determine the future role of the Iraqi Army.
- External elements - which will depend on the size and the kind of support and expertise the new Iraq requires from the free world in order to move forward in it’s transitional period without hesitation or obstacles. The Iraqi Armed Forces will be in great need for reassessment in its goals and values, in reorganization and redeployment. This requires the assistance of Iraq’s friends and allies.
- Geopolitical element - which can be interpreted into the kind of political, economical and military relationships Iraq will have with it’s Arab neighbours and Israel. The role of the Iraqi army will also depend on Iraq’s future relations with its old enemy -Iran. The water and minority problems between Iraq and Turkey is also an essential matter that could determine the new role of the Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq.
Forces To Dismantle:

Since 1979, new military and paramilitary units were created by Saddam Hussein. All of whom were aliens to the regular Iraqi army in its ethics and values. These forces were created mainly to protect the regime, spread terror and fear among the people and to counter any insurgency by the regular army. Many of these units will disintegrate after the departure of Saddam but it must be seen that all the following units are dismantled in the future:

1- The Special Security Guards - Was created in 1984 mainly for providing security and body guards to Saddam and his family. The special security apparatus is estimated to have 7000 members all of whom come from Saddam’s tribe (al bunassir) or from the Sunni Arab triangle. Primary tasks of this apparatus is to provide security to the president and his family, securing presidential institutions and palaces, monitoring army commanders, buying equipment for the military industry and maintaining the WMD programmes.

2- The Special Republican Guards - And they consist of 16 regiments organized into 4 brigades of 3000 members each. The Special Republican Guards are used in order to counter any insurgency or rebellion by the regular army or the republican guards. The special security apparatus exercises operational control over the special republican guards. Both systems report directly to Saddam and his son Qusay.

3- Military security - Was established in 1992. It has its own military brigade. The head of this apparatus reports directly to the office of the president. The main role of the Military Security is to monitor the Iraqi regular army and to detect and counter any dissent from army units. The military security is also designed to spy on military intelligence personnel for dissent or corruption.

4- Fidayeen Saddam - established in the beginning of the 90s by Saddam’s eldest son Auday. Selected members from the Iraqi Special Forces and Military Intelligence (The 999 unit or The deep reconnaissance and special operations unit) were selected to form and organize the first regiment of Fidayeen Saddam. Their mission is to counter any civilian unrest or revolt in cities and towns. They have ruthless methods in terrorizing the Iraqi civilian population like beheading their victims in front of their families.

5- The Popular Army (Al Jaysh Al Shaabi) - A paramilitary army created by the Baath party in order to counter any coups by the army or revolts by the civilian population.

6- Al Quds Army. A ragtag army of civilians of different ages (12 - 70 years) who were forced to enlist in this army in order not to be deprived from their monthly
food rations. Saddam’s objective in creating Al Quds Army that is estimated to consist of over one million members is to liberate Jerusalem.

7. The Rapid intervention Military Brigades that are attached to civil security networks like The General intelligence (Al mukhabarat), The General Security (Al Amin Al Aam). Each brigade is estimated to consist of 2500 well armed members.

Forces to Reorganize:

1. The special forces - The regular Iraqi army has already highly trained special forces units. During the occupation of Kuwait the Iraqi army had (5) well trained and experienced special forces brigades - The 65th _ headquarters in Al-Souyera 30 KM south of Baghdad, 66th and 68th_ headquarters in Khalid base in south of Kirkuk, all belong to the Iraqi regular army and the 3rd and 16th of the Republican Guards and their headquarters in Alrashidya - north of Baghdad. Each brigade was 3000 strong and well equipped. The Special Forces school is situated in Al rasheed camp south of Baghdad. The role of the Iraqi special forces must be limited in the short term and must stay in their barracks. In the long term and after reorganization and training the special forces in Iraq will have different tasks than during Saddam’s regime. The new Iraqi special forces in post Saddam Iraq can be redeployed as peace keeping forces in areas of crises and would be a major participant in the war against terrorism and drug smuggling. The Iraqi special forces can also protect Oil installations and UIPS and participate along with US forces in defending United States interests in the region.

2. The military intelligence: The Iraqi military intelligence - headquarters in Khdamiya, Baghdad. Was created in 1932 and initially under the Ministry of Defence. In the 80s was reorganized to report directly to the presidential office. It has more than 26 departments and 7000 members. Most of these departments were made to spy, interrogate and dispose of Iraqi military and civil elements that are suspected in their loyalty to the regime. The military intelligence has also its own units of special operations that operate outside the country against opposition to the regime. It also recruits and trains non-Iraqis for various missions outside Iraq. The Military Intelligence School and its training camps are located in alazizya south of Baghdad. Training camps are also located in west of Iraq 18 km to the west of Hadeetha. All of the department in the military intelligence operate with direct orders from the presidential palace. The role of the Iraqi Military Intelligence in post Saddam Iraq should be limited to military security. The departments should be reduced to minimum according to the new (limited) role of the military intelligence in post Saddam Iraq and the training camps related to it should be restructured according to the new tasks the
military intelligence will perform. The main tasks of the Military Intelligence in post Saddam Iraq will be:
- Tactical and Strategic Reconnaissance of regimes hostile to Iraq.
- Tactical and Strategic Reconnaissance of Terrorist organizations.
- Monitoring Iraq's military development and presenting advice and studies regarding this issue.

3. The Republican Guards: Number 165000 elements. The Republican Guards is estimated to consist of 8 divisions - 3 armoured, one mechanized and 4 infantry including 2 special forces brigades. Each division is over 9000 soldiers well armed and equipped. After the departure of Saddam the (republican guards) title will be lifted from these divisions and replaced with the Iraqi Regular Defence Army. In other words, merging the Republican Guards into the regular army. The second step will be reduction, reorganization and redeployment of these forces in accordance with its' new defensive role in the future. The 3rd and 16th Republican Special Forces Brigades will be redeployed for peace keeping missions in areas of conflict.

4. The regular Army: Number 3500000 elements + 100000 reservists. The Iraqi regular army is estimated to consist of 3 armoured divisions, 3 mechanized divisions and 18 infantry divisions and 2 commando brigades and 3 special forces brigades. The fighting Force of these units (excluding special forces and commandos) were reduced to more than 50% before the 1991 Liberation of Kuwait war due to desertion which underlines the fact that most of the regular Iraqi armed forces are recalled reservists or compulsory conscripts with little fighting experience and no desire to fight for the regime. At present, all Iraqi divisions are at about 50% effectiveness and many of the Army's equipment lack spare parts. There will be no compulsory service in the new Iraqi army after Saddam is toppled. This means the suspension of thousands of regulars from the army. This will lead to the reorganization of one/two infantry division, one armoured and one mechanized division. They can be added to rest of the republican guard units that were reorganized and redeployed (like explained above) as the new regular army.

**Missions in The Short Term**
In order to maintain a strong national defence system in Iraq directly after the departure of Saddam and in order to preserve order and stability in the country we need to think in organizing and coordinating all the available resources that could help establish the new Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq. It is essential to study all the immediate and efficient planning and coordination of the following resources:
1. Administrative centre - The Iraqi army in post Saddam Iraq will require efficient administration in order to reorganize itself. This includes personal trained for a wide variety of tasks such as keeping accurate information for planning and managing army tasks. Also Iraqi military personnel trained in maintaining paper and electronic records on funds, personnel, equipments and supplies and other property of the Iraqi army. The new central Administrative Headquarters will be situated in Baghdad and will coordinate with its counterparts that are situated in the main big cities of Iraq.

2. Construction Core - This will include personnel trained to build or repair buildings, airfields, bridges, foundations, dams, bunkers and the electrical and plumbing components of these structures. This group is also required to help rebuild the destroyed info structure after the war along with the civil services.

3. Health Care - In the short term the Iraqi army is required to participate in treating victims of collateral damage. This means treating and providing services for patients. Also providing emergency medical treatment, operate diagnostic equipment such as x-rays and ultrasound equipment. Also Conduct Laboratory tests on tissue and blood samples, maintain pharmacy supplies and patient records.

4. Protective Service Personal - Protective Service centres can be established in big cities. Their main task is protecting the people from natural and man-made disasters. This requires the training of personnel to provide instant and emergency response to disasters such as Earthquakes, Floods, Burning of oil fields, pollution and spread of disease.

5. Media and public affairs centres - the new Iraqi army after Saddam would require a professional media core of personnel that will be able to present and interpret military information and events in the favour of the new system in Iraq. The Iraqis need specialists as interpreters and translators in order to convert written and spoken foreign languages into Arabic or other languages.

6. Human resource and development specialists - Immediately after the change of regime in Iraq the army would need specialists in recruiting and placing qualified personnel and providing the training programmes necessary to help the new army perform their various jobs effectively.

7. Guides and communication personnel - Maintaining contact between the American Forces and the Iraqi population is very essential in the short term. Well trained Guides can become middlemen between American Forces and Tribesmen and local leaders. Trained personnel on Radios, cable and satellite communication systems would maintain
Iraqi Opposition Forces in constant contact with the special operation units of the American Army for coordination purposes.

8. Transportation: Transportation and material handling specialities are needed to ensure the safe transport of people and cargo (there will be massive movements of Iraqi units retreating or left without command when the war is ended). Iraqi Railway personnel need fast recruitment and reorganization in order to follow with the immediate operation of the Iraqi railway system which will help lift pressure on Iraqi roads especially during the first months after the change of the regime in Iraq.

Missions in the Long Term
In the new stable and democratic Iraq the Iraqi Army’s main task will be to defend the constitution and the civil government that was chosen by the people. The role of the Iraqi Army in the long term will be for Democracy and freedom. Saddam’s army at present is protecting the people from Freedom, while in post Saddam Iraq the army will be protecting Freedom for the people.

Other tasks for the army in post Saddam Iraq
1. Peace keeping missions - Infantry and special forces.
2. Fighting terrorism - special forces and military intelligence.
3. Fighting drug smuggling - Border police and special forces.
4. Fighting natural disasters like floods and Earthquakes - engineering, protective service and medical.
5. Fighting manmade disasters like burning of oil fields - engineering, medical.
6. Participating in major agricultural and construction projects - infantry, engineering and construction.

The Navy The Iraqi Navy is very small by size if compared by its neighbours. It is estimated to consist of 6 Patrol and coastal combat vessels, 3 mine warfare vessels and 2500 personnel.
The Iraqi Navy in post Saddam Iraq needs to be developed into a sufficient force to enable it to participate with other nations in providing security and safe passage to the Persian Gulf.

Helicopters Iraq posses at present over 200 helicopters 80% operational. 60 operational attack helicopters and 100 support helicopters (Mi 25, Mi 8,17, SA 319, 316, 342, BO, Gazelle). Transport Helicopters (Mi 8, Mi 26).
In post Saddam Iraq attack helicopters will be minimized to special tasks such as fighting terrorism and drug smuggling while other helicopters can be converted for transport and rescue missions.

**Air force** The Iraqi Air force was considered strong in comparison to its neighbours. After the 1991 war it became weaker and less efficient. It still maintain over 300 aircrafts - 130 fighter ground attack (mig 23, mirage f1, su 20) - and 160 fighter planes (mig 21, 23, 25, 29, mirage f1). The air forces also has a number of bomber planes, 4 to 6 operational (Tu 22, H-6D) and a number of tankers and transport planes (IL 76, An 2, 12, 24, 32) which can also be used to deploy airborne units on the battlefield.
It is absolutely necessary to maintain a strong air force in post Saddam Iraq for the purpose of national security and defending Iraqi soil. A strong defensive army needs Counter Military Power for defence and deterrence - this will be the Air Force.

**Artillery** The Iraqi Army posses one of the strongest artillery units in the region. They consist of over 1900 pieces of Towed canons (105 mm, 122 mm, 130 mm, 155 mm). And 220 pieces of Self Propelled canons (122 mm, 152 mm, 155 mm). The Iraqi Army has over 200 Rocket Launchers (107 mm, 122 mm, 127 mm, 132 mm, 162 mm) and approximately 50 (Surface to Surface) FROG missiles (Free Rocket Over Ground). Also unaccounted number of Mortars (81 mm, 120 mm, 160 mm, 240 mm).
The Iraqi Artillery units played a ruthless role in suppressing civilians north and south of Iraq. Many cities and villages were reduced to the ground from the Iraqi Artillery. The reduction in artillery numbers and reorganization of its units according to the new defensive role of the Iraqi Armed Forces in post Saddam Iraq is very important.

**Transportation** A new framework for Army transportation should be designed according to the new tasks of the Iraqi Armed Forces in post Saddam Iraq. Tank transport can be done by railway system. Mobile artillery and tanks and armoured vehicles can be deployed by train. Fast deployment of army medical units and rescue missions to areas of disasters can be done through helicopters and transport planes. Transport boats and Hovercrafts can be used on both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to transport army personnel and cargo. Fast boats can transport medical supplies and food to disaster hit areas in Iraq.

**Air Defence** The Air Defence will be totally destroyed during the war of liberation from Saddam’s regime. A new system should be deployed after the war. It is essential to have a strong western defensive system in the future. Modernizing the Iraqi army
according to its new defensive role in the future means a strong and effective air defence system that can protect the Iraqi skies from its enemies.

The Military Industry Many institutes and factories of the Military Industry will be destroyed when the liberation of Iraq from the present regime is complete. But its members and scientists will still be there. It is important to see that the Iraqi Military Industry transform itself to civil use. Scientists that can produce Mustard Gas can very well produce medicine. And experts in Rocket technology can one day build aeroplanes and trains.

Military Education

The defensive Army Countries in areas of continuous conflict or that lies in a hostile region are required to establish strong defensive armies to protect their territory. The small Finish Army in the late 1930s when defending Finland against the Russian occupation forces is a perfect example of how a small well informed and organized army and with the effective use of the terrain managed to defeat an army 100 times its size. A good example in our time is the Israeli army that managed to stand against armies much bigger in size and territory but unorganised and badly equipped.

Basic requirements for a strong defensive army

1. Quality – Which can be interpreted into Education, organization and strong economy.
2. Solidarity – This is created when the army has a strong belief in the values that they are defending. Solidarity will increase the spirit of opposition in any army.
3. Professionalism – A strong professional army that is part of a democratic society will defend its own existence before anything else.

The Iraqi Military Academies
There would need to be substantial and determined efforts to reduce the environmental factors that feed ethnic and religious extremism and hate to America and Israel inside the Iraqi military. Thus, concentrating the efforts on Iraqi military schools should become a priority in post Saddam Iraq.
The Iraqi Military academies represent the heart of the Iraqi Armed forces. There are actually three Academies in and around Baghdad that graduate officers of the Iraqi Army.
The First Military academy is the main factory that produces professional officers after a 3 year course, were cadets graduate as second lieutenants with a Bsc in military and
social science. The academy itself is located south of Baghdad in AL-Rasheed Military Base. Students are accepted after finishing their Baccalaureate exams and succeeding in the physical and qualification test. The Arab Sunnis have the lion's share in the number of acceptance (as sectarianism is a deliberate policy of the present regime). The second academy is for the reserve military officers. It accepts University and College graduates and the courses take 8 months Long were cadets graduate as a reserve second Lieutenant in the Iraqi Army. The third academy situated in Khan Bani Saad North of Baghdad is a special institute that graduate cadets from Saddam's tribe and tribes and families considered loyal to the regime (from Tikrit, Haweija, Beyji, Shirkat, Rumadi, Samara). There are no educational or moral standards and conditions for acceptance in this college. Loyalty to the regime is the only condition required. Thus, most of the officers that graduate from the Third Academy take sensitive posts in the Iraqi military.

In post Saddam Iraq a professional army is important. Thus the 2nd and 3rd Military Academies are not required. The 1st Military Academy in Al Rasheed Base will become the main military institute were professional officers complete their military and social education. Professional officers with a new military career will graduate from the 1st Military Academy.

Enrolment in the military academy must exclude ethnic and religious backgrounds

**Basic requirements for enrolment** The requirements for acceptance in the Iraqi Military Academy will be as the following:
1. **Age**: at least 17 years of age
2. **Citizenship**: citizen of Iraq
3. **Education**: Baccalaureate exams (equivalent to college or A level exams).
4. **Trainability**: must have the ability to read, write and speak sufficient Arabic. Must succeed in the qualification test with minimum score of 6 out of 10 points.
5. **Physical**: Must be physically fit in accordance with army standards and regulations. Must test negative for drugs and viruses.

All applicants must be interviewed for any records of arrest or criminal background.

**Curriculum**: The following subjects should be added to the curriculum to be studied at the Military Academy:
2. Public Relations.
3. Law.
5. History of Iraq in the past 30 years.
Courses in foreign military institutes – Iraqi officers will be completing further studies in western military institutes were they can meet others from different countries and recognize new cultures and gain new ideas. American and British military institutes will be appropriate for Iraqis. They will be able to learn new methods and recognize freedom and democracy in its live form.

The Iraqi Soldier
Creating a professional Army means creating career opportunities for its soldiers. The following careers must be available in post Saddam Armed Forces:
2. Communication: Radios, Satellite, Cable and Telephones.
6. Administration: Journalism, Records, Accounting, Finance, Legal.
7. Data processing and Computers.
9. Transportation: Trucks, Buses and Trains.
10. Medical and Chemical Operations.
11. Military Police and Intelligence.

The new Iraqi Army must also offer tuition assistance which pays a percentage of college classes they take while in the Army. The Iraqi Army should provide housing, food, Medical care and insurance, Dental care, Transportation costs. The new Iraqi soldier should be offered free legal service and advice. The Army will offer opportunities to travel and meet new people from other cultures. It will be a dream come true to see the Iraqi Armed Forces (as part of the United Nations Troops) participate in peace keeping missions in areas of conflict around the world.

Training camps -
There are Training camps for enlistment and basic training in every major city in Iraq. These camps should be reduced to three main training centres - north, middle and south of Iraq.

Basic Training -
The new Iraqi soldier must learn values such as Duty, Respect, Honour, Selfless Service, Integrity, Teamwork and most important of all the values of Freedom, Democracy and
Human rights. Those values must be taught from day one along with the Basic Training that the new soldier will receive in the training centre.

Joint exercises - Joint exercises between various corps of the Iraqi Armed forces and the United States Army must take place in Post Saddam Iraq. The Joint exercise will enhance the capabilities of the Iraqi Army and enable the Iraqi soldier to meet people from other cultures.

The social structure of Iraqi Army Officers
The mass of the Iraqi officers does not differ much in class origin from the discontented elements of the people, they are on the other hand, far from representatives of the various sectors of society to which these elements belonged. The officers corps, it must be remembered, is predominantly Arab Sunni in composition. From the time of the Barazani Rebellion, that is from the middle forties, fewer and fewer Kurds had been admitted into the Military Academy or the Staff College. Moreover, the Arab Shi-ites (the majority of the people of Iraq) are only thinly represented in the ranks of staff major and above.

All the same, many of the Arab Sunni officers share, to a lesser or greater degree, the popular discontent, especially those who descend from families that are in a lowly condition or who have lost a member of their family to Saddam's regime. However, in order to change the above social formula of the Iraqi officers corps, then ethnic prejudice and sectarianism must be prohibited and considered a felony accounted for in the new Iraqi army after Saddam Hussein.

Other important issues
1. The role of the military Vs. the Police and the Civil Security Services.
2. The issue of finding job vacancies for the thousands of soldiers and officers that will be suspended after reorganizing the Iraqi army.
3. The issue of Rearming and supplying the Iraqi Armed Forces with new military hardware according to its new tasks.
4. The role of women in the new Iraqi military.
Conclusion
Maintaining a professional defensive army requires us to institutionalise the Iraqi military in post-Saddam Iraq. And to create a professional force requires us to take educational steps and scientific measures to reconstruct our military.
Accepting a civilian leadership for the Iraqi military requires us to reassess the role of the army in the past 30 years under a military leadership. A civilian leadership for the armed forces happens when the army becomes part of the democratic society it belongs to. The society of the rule of law and democratic principles. Such principles that will serve the Iraqi people for a better future as it served many countries before it
Free Officers & Civilian Movement

The Future of the Iraqi Military and Its Role in Civil Society

When we think about a new regime in Iraq and contemplate the horizons of a bright future, our high hopes oblige us to make an effort to formulate a way in which to sketch the features and the essential nature of the Iraqi military establishment, in a way that makes it a vital force which can share, along with the other social and national institutions, in the building of a new and democratic Iraq. At the same time, the military must be able to defend effectively Iraq’s national borders and to maintain Iraqi sovereignty and the unity of Iraq’s lands.

Iraqi National Security

Any group of nations, regardless of the differing nature of their regimes, will all work to guarantee their national security, which is simply an expression in which are enshrined the following fundamental values which nations strive to perpetuate and to protect:

1) the ability to survive and continue as a national entity and to guarantee political independence and the unity of the national territory.
2) the ability to attain a certain level of economic well-being.
3) the ability to perpetuate and maintain the national characteristics of the country.

In other words, national security means preservation of the manner of living in society, religion, culture, intellectual life, science, and the arts, among others. The effort that the state exerts in order to preserve these fundamental values is called “the national security policy of the state”. Every effort or step (and even refraining from taking action) that an individual or a group undertakes to attain or perpetuate these fundamental values is described as serving “the national interest”. In addition, the preparation by the state of steps that it will take to guarantee the above-mentioned goals is called “the higher strategy of the state”.

Further, the various lines of general action designed to attain the higher strategy are referred to by the term “strategy” and this term can be used to describe many things, such as: political strategy, or economic strategy, or military strategy, or environmental strategy, among others. In each case, the term strategy applies to all the lines of approach deployed in support of a given policy in any particular field, as well as the apparatus used to attain that policy, including all the variations and permutations of approach. On the other hand, something that is too often the case, the pursuit of this grand strategy should not lead to a situation in which a part of the overall strategy (“a branch strategy”) ends up harming the grand (overall) strategy or is in contradiction with the other strategies. In other words, it is imperative that in the future the political strategy for Iraq not conflict with the country’s military strategy.
At present, discussions about the future policy of Iraq (post-Saddam Hussein) are focused on the creation of a democratic regime, the development of a civil society and the adoption of a policy of openness ("infitah") to the world (and in particular the neighboring countries and the great powers, especially the USA), the settlement of disputes through peaceful diplomatic means, and the adoption of effective economic and social development schemes which would compensate the Iraqis for past backwardness. It is therefore natural that this state of affairs should be reflected in the military establishment in a clear and tangible way. The military should be made into an attractive establishment, well diversified and capable, which is self-controlled and compatible with the new democratic life and with the peaceful tendencies of the new state policy. The Iraqi military will need to make a commitment to adopt modern ideas and theories concerning national security. No longer will security be attained only by the strength of the army or by its size or by the advanced technology of its weapons systems, or by the militarization of the people and placing them in a perpetual mass mobilization.

At present, the concept of security has come to mean comprehensive development and the creation of an educated and aware citizenry which is civilized and liberated and has the power to make its will felt. Democracy is a strength. Economic and social development are strengths. All of these strengths serve to ensure the national security, which is tied to the freedom of the individual with an indissoluble bond, one complementing the other. It is not possible to violate the freedom and the rights of the individual on the pretext of protecting the security of the political regime or of the state from the threats and dangers which surround it, although many dictatorial regimes have used this argument as a justification. In other words, it is not possible to talk about national security in the context of a deprived citizenry which does not enjoy a certain degree of democracy or is living under a repressive regime based upon the denial of intellectual and political pluralism, where constitutional institutions, legislative and executive authorities, and the judiciary have been converted into empty forms. When the right of the citizens to share in political decision-making is undermined, when individual initiative is paralyzed, when justice is demolished, when human existence is distorted, when there is aggression against political, religious, and cultural freedoms, then there is no guarantee for the security or the stability or any political regime which rules under a police tyranny. There is no way to achieve national security other than through a democratic political system that respects the basic freedoms of the individual.

In this regard, the well-known American political expert Henry Kissinger commented that there cannot be a contradiction between the demands of national security and the demands of individual freedoms, because both depend upon the other.

The Military Establishment...and Development

The Iraq of the future is in need of comprehensive development in all aspects (the economy, services, sciences, human resources, and others). In addition, at present military expenditures constitute a terrible waste of the nation's resources, sapping the national strength and taxing currently ineffective human resources, while weapons, war materials, and equipment are imported at astronomical prices.
Iraqi military expenditure reached (as was reported in an article by Nidhal al-Laythi in “al-Hayat” on July 7, 1995) in the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 the level of 24.6, 25.1, and 25.3 billion dollars respectively. At the same time, the revenues from oil during the same three years were only 10.4, 10.1, and 7.8 billion dollars. This means that the ratio of military expenditure to oil revenue during these three years was 236.1%, 248.5%, and 324%. In addition, these figures are certain to be too low, because they do not take into account secret deals. Further, the level of military expenditures increased markedly during the following years from what it was in 1983. For one thing, the prices of weapons and war equipment have become much more expensive today for many reasons. We should not forget that the estimates of the losses which were inflicted upon the Iraqi economy exceed 600 billion dollars, in other words more than 60 times the real value of the gross domestic product in the year 1993. This figure includes the value of what was destroyed during the Gulf War, compensation paid during the two wars (Gulf and Iran), foreign loans, and the expenditures of the arms inspections committees. We point to the estimates of economic analysts who say that the future of Iraq will be black during the coming years unless the way of doing business is changed and comprehensively reviewed from the bottom up.

Necessity and logic dictate the setting of priorities that guarantee the appropriate level of the necessities of life, of education, and of development of human resources. This in itself will make extensive military expenditure unlikely, or at least military expenditure will take second priority, because development and construction will become the first goal of the state.

The Size of the Military Establishment

The size and capability of the Iraqi military establishment will be determined by many factors that are too numerous to mention in this summary study. There are three principal factors, however, which must be pointed out briefly:

First: We hope that the possible threats to the country, when we are seeking a peaceful democratic regime which will strive to handle its problems with neighboring countries by peaceful means and by good will, far from recourse to weapons and the desire for wars, will be reduced to the minimum through a peaceful and open political strategy.

Second: Iraq’s economic and human resources impose upon the country certain limitations that cannot be avoided.

Third: The resolutions of the UN and of the UN Security Council oblige Iraq to abide by certain limits for the armed forces. In addition, the efforts by UNSCOM are a continuation of this mandate to remove WMD and other prohibited weapons, including long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The UN resolutions, however, permit Iraq to maintain military capabilities and defensive missiles which will allow it to react to any aggression, within the restrictions on the size of the armed forces, the limitations on Iraq’s military industries, and Iraq’s ability to benefit from dual-use technologies. The issue of lifting the economic and political sanctions on Iraq in the future is tied to the extent to which a future regime is committed to execute the resolutions of the
international community. It has become necessary, however, to reexamine all of those resolutions, because they were imposed on an aggressive regime after its attack on and occupation of a neighboring country (Kuwait) and thus were the products of that attack, occupation, and aggression. Thus the removal of those resolutions has become a legitimate Iraqi goal, in the event that the aggressive regime is removed. In addition, the increase in armaments in the region, particularly in Iran and Turkey, makes it necessary for Iraq to have sufficient defensive capabilities to defend its territories and its vital interests and not to be weak. Weakness will only encourage those countries to violate Iraq's vital interests and even to attack Iraqi territory.

An Army for Defense or a Force for Attack

There is no clearly-defined boundary between an army committed only to defense of the country or destined for attacks outside the country. This issue depends on many factors, the most important of which are intentions and legitimate or illegitimate ambitions. The distinction can also be discerned from training programs, from planning, and from political strategies. In the end, the military establishment remains the tool of the policymakers for the attainment of their goals and plans. We can never imagine a defensive army under a regime committed to an aggressive political ideology, just as we cannot imagine the opposite. Indeed, there must be harmony between the overall strategy and its components (policy is the womb in which war grows; it is the political goal which becomes the strategic objective; war is the means to attain this political goal, but one should not view the means separately from the strategic objective.)

For these reasons, what we aspire to in the future is a defensive national army with a size and armament that conform with a policy of national defense and are consistent with the pressing demands of comprehensive development which our country requires and which does not involve of necessity any aggressive intentions. In fact, the size and quality of the Iraqi armaments at present, despite the losses that Iraq has suffered, are considered appropriate to serve as the basis for that defensive force. We will be able to compensate for deficiencies in some highly expensive areas of armament through more effective investment in Iraqi capabilities and expertise, in scientific planning, in sound use of economic resources, with concern for the individual and the development of his personal capabilities, through relationships based on humanity, justice, equality, and a recommitment to the Iraqi social fabric, which has been exposed to splits and breakdowns as a result of Saddam's dictatorial regime.

Volunteers in the Armed Forces

The army of the future must depend upon a significant number of volunteers (officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers), for they are the important nucleus and support for the military. These volunteers should be qualified educationally, professionally, and in terms of health to form that nucleus. The extreme importance of this element should be stressed to the military leaderships at all levels of the chain of command, because the most important elements in the command of the soldiers are the noncommissioned officers. In this regard, it will be necessary to treat an ingrained
problem in the Iraqi military establishment, because the soldiers and the noncommissioned officers come from certain governorates and locations, while the officers come from other governorates. I am referring here to discrimination between Iraqis, even though they serve the same country. This discrimination is based on unreasonable assumptions and springs from political, confessional, and racial persecution. For that reason, in the future, membership in the Iraqi military and security establishments should be based on national norms, far from any distinction based on any race, religion, belief, or region. This discrimination is no longer valid in the selection of officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers. Nor is it acceptable that key leadership positions be filled on the basis of discrimination concerning ideology, race, origin, or politics, as is the case at present.

Indeed, it is necessary for the Iraqi military college, the Iraqi staff college, and the rest of the other Iraqi military schools to include young men and officers of all the different types in Iraq, in a way that truly represents the demographic realities of the country. This point will become a virtual litmus test of the intentions of the new Iraqi political regime and will become a reflection of its true orientation, not only on the level of the military establishment, but also on other political levels. The extent of the regime’s seriousness in implementing these reforms will show whether it can move in a positive direction and whether it has a just and evenhanded attitude toward Iraq’s citizens. The opposite is true as well. Repeated experiences have caused Iraqis not to believe in promises and not to be satisfied with what is written in the constitution or in the laws or in political pronouncements. Instead, Iraqis look at what is happening concerning the practical implementation of what was published or announced.

What applies to these military training institutions should also be evident throughout the leadership structure of the Iraqi armed forces, for there are many ingrained problems in this area which cannot be solved other than by an evenhanded and egalitarian approach which puts all Iraqis on the same starting line. The regime of Saddam committed serious crimes against the people and favored one soldier over another and one officer over another, including even the positions filled by staff officers who were graduates of the staff college. There is discrimination...it operates in regard to the movement of troops, although it is not permitted in regard to work in the field of military intelligence. This discrimination becomes imbedded in the training process and prevents the exercise of leadership. All of this rises from irresponsible assumptions and is attributed to an anxiety about security. There should not be anything preventing an officer from graduating without restrictions into the armed services other than his competence and his absolute loyalty to the country (Iraq). In other words, his beliefs, his race, or his region should not stand in the way of the fulfillment of the legitimate aspirations of any person in Iraq, most particularly in the armed forces.

The Elimination of Artificial Formations

It has become necessary to review the military formations created to protect the regime, such as the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guards, and various other security elements. These units should be disbanded and their cadres should be dispersed,
because they were formed in the service of the dictatorial regime and according to discriminatory principles that should not be allowed to continue under a new regime that is committed to democratic equality and to human rights. All of the equipment and arms of these units should be returned to the united, national Iraqi military.

In addition, the persons in these units should be handled with caution. Do not attribute the crimes of Saddam in an overly emotional way to those belonging to all these institutions. These units include honest officers and nationalist elements who have committed no crime against the people. This makes it necessary to be precise and to be completely objective. Accusations should only be directed against active and effective elements who persisted in their support for Saddam. These should be singled out, but only as few as possible.

The Building of Nationalist Armed Forces

The Iraqi armed forces and the army should be rebuilt according to the tenets and programs of democratic life and the new political atmosphere, and should reflect as well the general situation in the country. There is considerable educational literature that has been published concerning how to remove the military mentality and hostile mind-set and how to develop the latent humanitarian impulse that is also present in each individual. There also must be remedies for the negative effects caused by the dictatorial systems and methods and the paralysis resulting from overly bureaucratised activity, which defined the nature of the forms of social interaction within the armed forces.

Compulsory Military Service

There must be a review of the laws pertaining to compulsory national service and to reserve duty in a way that is appropriate for the special situation in Iraq. The country is in need of comprehensive development, in a way that will mandate a reduction in the length of service to the shortest term possible, with no possibility of extending that term, no matter what the reasons. It is important to treat the problems and the frustrations that have afflicted the youth of Iraq as a result of erroneous policies. There needs to be a new emphasis on scholastic achievement for Iraqi youths, on teaching them various skills, on raising scientific qualifications. This needs to be done in tandem with a new system in the military for recruiting, for selection, and for training. This new approach must also be part of a system that is fair to all Iraqis and guarantees the most productive investment of effort and energy, making compulsory military service a humane and patriotic interval that takes place on an accelerated basis, is a known quantity, and is a positive experience for all.

Respect for Constitutional Institutions

An effort, based on a rapidly-introduced educational program, is needed which can inculcate in the armed forces a respect for democratic, constitutional institutions that represent the will of the people and a commitment to support the decisions of the people. The necessary measures should be taken to prevent a repetition of the old phenomenon of
military coups. In addition, instruction on human rights should be one of the primary topics in military educational institutions and in military units, so that the armed forces are in conformity with the prevailing humanitarian concerns of the country. Humanitarian concerns must be impressed upon all those belonging to the armed forces, from officers to soldiers. It is really embarrassing that officers and soldiers receive instruction in security and military intelligence without knowing anything about human rights.

Defining the Mission of the Army

The mission of the army is defined as the defense of the country, protection of national sovereignty, and protection of the constitution and the laws. The use of the army in the case of internal problems and disputes is excluded. The natural location for the army is inside the military barracks. The specific duties of the army are to be defense of the borders and protection of national unity. In addition, the army is to preserve the democratic regime and to protect the regime from the dangers of factionalism and from plots.

Political Inclinations and Party Tendencies

The armed forces are to be above political inclinations, party tendencies, and ideological currents, in order to protect their unity, their national identity, and the desired level of professionalism. The military must be removed from the causes of division and factionalism. It must be assured that there is no opportunity provided, that the atmosphere is not allowed to develop, for the formation or the proliferation of blocs within the military, which might be exploited under certain conditions in ways that to not serve the national democratic effort and the true interests of the country.

Indeed, the entry of the military into politics created a dangerous precedent in the political life of Iraq. The result of this intervention was a convulsion in the political stability of the country that exposed the unity of the armed forces to divisions, as well as the removal from the military of effective leaders and commanders. This led to the exploitation of the military and to its inevitable unpopularity, because it was involved in endless adventures, entered numerous wars, and was exploited as an instrument of suppression against the people and liquidation of political opponents. This was in violation of the rights of the citizenry and of the fundamental responsibilities of the military. For this reason, this is no justification for the politicization of the armed forces, which does not in any case accord with the fundamentals of democracy and the objectives for which the military was created.

The Defense Budget

The drawing up of a military budget must be in conformity with a well-considered program that takes into consideration the most pressing requirements for the defensive requirements of the military and the development of its technical and human capabilities. This must be done in a way that conforms to the requirements of comprehensive national
development. The size of the military budget should be announced yearly, along with the other ministerial budgets.

Military Manufacturing Enterprises

There should be an effort to make enterprises involved in manufacturing military equipment operate according to their productive capabilities. The programs of the enterprises should be defined according to Iraq’s defensive needs. All excess production capacity should be turned into civilian productive enterprises. These military enterprises should participate in meeting the requirements of the army and the armed forces in terms of maintenance and industrial production of traditional defensive items. These enterprises should be developed in a way that assures self-sufficiency within the military and contributes to the comprehensive development of the country.

Supervision of Military Affairs

It has become necessary to have complete supervision over the affairs of the military, to keep an eye on military locations, activities, and ranks. It is essential to make sure of the return of the Iraqi military to normal civilian life. In accordance with that goal, military personnel must be made ready to be effective elements who can participate in the new democratic life of Iraq and can contribute to its prosperity. On another important level, there should be a study concerning compensation for military men who were exposed to dire penalties because of their stands on national principles and policy. This study should examine how to guarantee their professional rights, their retirement rights, and their military accomplishments, specifically salary and military ranks, but also including other rights.

Modern Expertise

There should be reliance upon modern foundations in military education and training, which will cost less in time and money. Modern technical know-how among the military should be utilized and the military should become open to the world. Iraq should send military technical and cultural delegations to the advanced countries to develop and exchange expertise with the militaries of the modern world. The level of military and political culture of the Iraqi armed forces needs to be raised in a way that strengthens the humanitarian outlook and the desire for peaceful solutions to problems that arise.

The System of Mobilization and Calling to Arms

A new Iraq military of the appropriate size and armament requires a modern system for general mobilization and calling up the people to arms, as well as well-developed plans to call up the reserves. Such a system will save considerable expenses within the armed forces and will prevent damage to the national economy. Such a system will ensure that there is no popular anxiety or fear over the small size of the military during normal times. In addition, the speed and precision of a modern system of mobilization, something every nation is anxious to have, are considered elements of a
successful response to possible crisis, particularly under future conditions in Iraq, when economic development will take first priority within the operation of rebuilding and modernizing Iraq.

Intellectual and Morale Considerations

We will need in the future to exert considerable and sincere effort to restore an adherence to the national social framework within the Iraqi armed forces. The spirit of citizenship and brotherhood must be strengthened among those belonging to the armed forces. An Iraqi national identity needs to be created. In addition, it is essential to deal with any feelings of unreasonable discrimination among members of the military establishment. It is important that the loyalty of everyone in the military establishment be to Iraq, the military, and the constitution. The handling of any attempts within the military to form blocs, interest groups, or regional, confessional, or racial factions must be firm and decisive. The example provided by the national leadership in terms of applying the law with justice to all will be sufficient to lay a strong foundation for this new and lofty military edifice. It is incumbent upon us to foster civilized behavior in military interaction with the people. Sound citizenship depends upon that. Unhealthy attitudes of some military men toward civilians must be eliminated, and the opposite is true as well. A new page must be opened in which relations among Iraqis are governed by respect, decorum, poise, and self-control in relation to others.

The End

Nov. 1 2001
Free Officers Movement

New Iraq
National Unity
Army and Administration

National and social unity is an objective that every country seeks to achieve. Notwithstanding the difference among political systems and their plurality, national unity is considered one of the most important indications for a successful policy achieving national security. National unity requires an integration of all its ethnic, cultural, economic, regional and social dimensions. Integration does not mean conformity or exclusive agreement among the population; in as much as it means the existence of agreement of a sort of concord and consensus on a shared national culture as well as a framework of political, economic and social interaction between the political system and the different segments of the population. Therefore, national unity means the interaction between and fusion of all residents of the state, notwithstanding their ethnic (between majority and minority) and regional affiliations or their political and cultural backgrounds. It is not a condition that all these affiliations be identical or one for the whole residents of the state. Rather, there is a national culture for all, along with a right
for the minorities and ethnic groups to preserve their culture, tradition or lifestyles within the confines of the national culture.

It is important to indicate that the accomplishment of Iraq’s national unity is an important and necessary step toward building new Iraq, preparing the path to construct national inclusive institutions covering the activities of all Iraqis in accordance with these following dimensions:

1- Political Dimension: We mean by it the extent to which interaction between the political system and all Iraqis, whether they are majority or minority, has been accomplished. It is intuitive that the accomplishment of such an interaction cannot happen if it is not preceded by the Majority’s and Minority’s persuasion of the legitimacy of the political system.

2- Geographic Dimension: It is impossible for any population, big or small, to live without a designated geographic space, taking into consideration that the more the region is united and coherent the more it is easier to build strong relations among the people. The unity of the region is an essential element in defining the density of both interaction and fusion leading to unity, as well as the dimensions of national identity.

3- Employment Dimension: This requires the integration and fusion of the people on the basis of sharing economic employment, forming a principal mutual interest leading to deepening national fusion. The weight of such employment bond among the national ethnic groups creates a harmonious society filled with justice and equality. This depends
on the ability of the political system to create an open political authority expressing the truthful active force in society and translating it into nationalist terms characterized by their ability to reinforce the bond among all groups, leading to their fusion and integration within one political context. This means that all these groups be loyal to the nation; more specifically, that the loyalty to the nation precedes any local, regional, sectarian or racial loyalty. This must also be preceded by a deep feeling and sense of national belonging, for national unity might disintegrate and collapse without the existence of overarching national institutions according to the level of the geographic space of the nation.

No political authority can accomplish this condition for the people were the loyalty to the nation is not above any other loyalty. In return, this loyalty will ensure equal rights and duties, irrelevant to any secondary affiliation. In addition, the accomplishment of national unity means to develop the ability of the political system to practice its political authority throughout the space of the state, for any retrogression or diminution of the authority of the state will limit its ability to intervene and participate in the development of social, cultural, educational and economic life as well as national security. This will reflect negatively on keeping diverse national groups within one nation.

Within the framework of the future vision of new Iraq, the army and administration are considered as the most important institutions that could contribute to forging Iraq’s national unity, which we are seeing now as politically, geographically, socially and psychologically divided. Considered as a social institution, the army represents a special position than any other state institution. It is considered as the first institution dealing with the defense of people and country. It is the governmental institution that has more
than any other one disciplinary unity and power continuity. It provides expertise and
skills unavailable in many other institutions. It is an institution built on advanced and
competent administrative bases, because of its disciplinable and trainable nature and use
of advanced skills.

Most importantly, through its formative nature, the army has the ability to integrate and
fuse all individuals from diverse racial, tribal and religious backgrounds; if only because
it is a social institution capable, in the event it is built on national uniting bases, to
reshape the individuals entering it with the purpose of building their life and future. But
this is conditional on the premise that the army be built on national unity bases relying on
merit and honesty. This means relying on bases transcending secondary loyalties; only
loyalty to country and people. If the army is built on discriminatory bases depending on
preferring designated minorities at the expense of the majority, then it will contradict
with building a sound national unity. Indeed, it will become an element of divisiveness
as the case now with Iraq. Plurality of armies (special guard, republican guard, Saddam
commandos, Iraq’s army, security apparatuses, Intelligence, etc…) and the ugly practice
of discrimination points to a gradational plurality for Iraqi citizenship according to what
Saddam sees and not to what the country needs.

This negative picture must be eliminated from Iraq’s collective consciousness so that it
can never function as an element of confusion or agitation against the national army. It is
an adverse and perilous picture in the history of modern Iraq, that we Iraqis must
transcend toward what is positive and logical. We should comprehend these painful
lessons to prevent their recurrence.
The view of Saddam and his terrorist institutions must not reflect illogical generalizations that may hurt national interest. The ideal fashion to build a national army can be achieved through the army's embrace of all segments of Iraq's population with no exception, along with promoting officers in a way irrelevant of their ethnic, regional or social backgrounds. This will facilitate the process of integrating Iraq's diverse segments. Therefore, the sound voluntary and commissioned membership to the army will make it as a disciplinary framework filled with national spirit combining the Iraqi national identity.

A modern administration is an important requirement within the framework of achieving a solid national unity. The interaction between political authority and people does not generally take place but through the designated administration, for it is the link between individual national interest and common national interest. Therefore, the administration must be highly competent and capable of rightly executing political decisions and translating them into actual services fulfilling the citizens' interests and their individual needs. This means that the administration must be based on two principal premises, one of which is the criteria of competency, honesty and national spirit; and not that of social considerations or private interests. The other involves offering services for all without discriminating between majority or minority, i.e. freeing public employment from ethnic, regional, sectarian or tribal shackles, or anything that contradicts with Iraq's national unity or loyalty to the Iraqi state.
Iraqi Armed Forces after Saddam

Theoretical Contemplation

The Iraqi Armed Forces under Saddam were, to a certain extent, subject to the conditions of the security organization and structure. The regime imposed these conditions on the state and its institutions. Indeed it was imposed on all segments of Iraqi society.

For more than three decades, the security organization did not commit itself to liberating man from need or fear or to realize complete and just development. In fact, it became, through many frightening developments, a source of fright instead of protection. The same is true for the loss of life and confiscation of liberties, in the shadow of the state's lawlessness and ineffectiveness.

The meaning of security, its elements and regulation, and the reasons for its establishment were defined by the necessity to protect the regime, brought on by the suspicion of animosity of all others.

The Iraqi regime has a strange characteristic in this regard—not only in the abundance of its security organizations or the utilization of its human, economic, and military resources to protect itself and ensure its continuity, but also in imposing its special quality on the understanding of security.

The rules in civil societies and less civilized ones are that political institutions derive their strength and continuous security from a secure society—in other words, the security and stability of the society reflects positively on the nature of advancement, flourishing and continuity of the political entity. The Iraqi regime stole the Iraqis' security by all methods using a strange assumption that it utilized for more than three decades, which says, "The strength of authority is built on the self and social weakness of the Iraqis."

The authority conducted research and studies to fulfill this assumption, which seeks to shake the strong social structure and attempts to provoke its sensitive elements, and define the factors of conflict and draw confrontation methods among them.

In this regard it continued to play with the social fabric, sometimes in the name of sects or race and other times using tribalism or regionalism. It all contains motives for disloyalty and to doubt the strength of belonging to the nation, and to conspire against it for the benefit of foreigners.

The fact is that Iraqi security policy is a clear reflection of the philosophy of the regime and its tendencies in forming security and realizing the requirements for the success of security procedures.

Thus violent means of confiscation of liberties or murder became legal and protected by law. This was with the support of Saddam Hussein, because he personally lives a life of doubt and fear, trying to dispel the fear by war, the possession of weapons of mass destruction and numerous security organizations, and a variety of its specialties, giving it unlimited authority.
Saddam himself was fond of security work to the point of obsession and made it his duty to act as a security unit. For example, he does not feel comfortable with or confident in the security procedures for his personal protection unless he oversees it personally, adding to it, deleting from it or correcting it. The same is true in his choosing of the commanders of the security organization for he interferes to guarantee the option of loyalty to him. This made his relatives the commanders of the security organizations and its important subdivisions.

To complete the picture, the main security organizations (public security, special security, domestic intelligence and military intelligence) and its branches are tied to Saddam’s office as the chairman of the National Security Council in addition to being president of the state and chairman of the party (Quisia Saddam is the vice chairman of the National Security Council). Saddam meets regularly with the commanders of the organizations to know the details of security conditions through the meetings of the National Security Council.

The security obsession of Saddam was not stopped by establishing and developing the known public security organizations. The same was done to the military establishment by his continuous attempts to change it into a security establishment, subject in its actions and moves, to the security unit. This created confusion and a lack of satisfaction in the nature of military action, which is built on confidence among the members of the military unit, respect of military command and value of expertise and professionalism which does not mean anything to the nature of security action in Iraq; which is built on the basis of absolute loyalty to Saddam and accuracy of aim when pressing the trigger. The security obsession of Saddam was applied to the Baath party’s organizations. There was a department of security in each group and in every branch up to the High Command. This changed the party into a crowd of informers armed against one another and against the society with doubt, suspicion and lack of trust. Each one of them sees the other ready to conspire, commit treason and work with foreigners to destroy the regime. No one was safe from this plague including friends, relatives and members of the same family.

The experiment of security cells was carried to Iraq’s strong society sectors. Many of the tribes were made into security cells working for the benefit of the regime. These cells were tracking other tribes’ movements and any slips of their tongues. An office named the Tribal Office was created tied to the office of the Republic’s Presidency. Every two weeks, the informers, loaded with reports and notes concerning what happens in their tribes, will meet with the president. Thus began the disintegration, suspicion and hate even in the Iraqi tribes which is known by its solidarity, pride and its strong blood based relations. This was done by applying the content of the above principal, (assumption), which was improved by Saddam Hussein to obtain security for the regime through stealing the security of the Iraqi’s and breaking their elements.

In conjunction with the framé that we mentioned and for the purpose of this discussion, we thought it useful to divide the Iraqi Armed Forces into two main divisions:

First: The Army
Second: Special Forces.
The Army
We mean by this the decades old Iraqi Military Establishment which is part of the inheritance of the modern Iraqi State since its formation. Iraq saw a varied successive political regimes while the Army’s loyalty, on the whole, was for Iraq as a homeland with few exceptions, which cannot be considered as the rule. This is proved by the representation, to a great extent, of all segments of the society, racially or religiously in the army.

Saddam Hussein realized, with his sense of security, that he will not be able to earn the loyalty and trust of the army with its varied character in spite of the many attempts to purify or clean the army from the disloyal elements—as he called them—in order for the army to become (An army of ideology to protect the party and the revolution and defend the nation’s values).

These slogans were not real since Saddam usurped the party and the revolution for the benefit of the family. Thus the army remained a source of worry, suspicion and threat to Saddam; in spite of the fact that the army got into its many wars because Saddam desired it. There are some who think that the army was pushed into these wars to keep it continuously busy confronting outside aggressions. Saddam attempted, and by his usual method, to plant the seeds of suspicion and distrust among the elements of each military unit through the extension of military intelligence and making the following and observing of the army’s elements its task.

This was not enough for Saddam, thus an organization, “Military Security”, was established with its main elements tied to the “The Special Security” headed by Qusai Saddam to assure the rapid transfer of information and the direct response to it. These procedures increased the complaints and bitterness of the officers and soldiers. In the mean time the regime sharpened its procedures to pressure the army’s elements. Procedures like the decrease of salaries, which were not enough to fulfill the minimum of living requirement for both the officers and the soldiers; administrative negligence; poverty of new armaments; lack of challenges. The morale of these forces was low in comparison to the elements of the Special Forces this was true for both officers and soldiers.

It is known that the majority of the army, particularly the soldiers are conscripts who lost their youth in the army; the service was not limited but open ended, as a result of Saddam’s wars. They did not know the reasons or the goals of these wars. They consider their service in the army full of self, social and economic suffering accompanied with the loss of dignity and the future.

We can say that most soldiers, and perhaps a high percentage of the officers consider their mere discharge from the army a great gain. For they will be freed from their chains and they will be able to think of beginning their lives anew. We think that the hard and bitter experience lived by many of the soldiers and officers during their military service will not provide the desire to rejoin the army. Especially, as we mentioned, that the majority of the army are conscripts.

In any event we think it is necessary to keep the basic structure of the army, which can be easily rehabilitated, more so than the Special Forces, through the following and other means:
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It is possible to discharge those who do not want to continue to serve in this establishment; with the condition that proper procedure should be taken to provide work opportunities. This will not be difficult in a country like Iraq, which needs rebuilding and has the necessary resources for that.

Retiring the high ranking officers; helping some of them in obtaining suitable civil service jobs or in the private sector or helping them in managing some small projects.

It is necessary to utilize the services of the low and middle ranked officers especially those who want to continue to serve in the army, after their rehabilitation according to the new regulations of the army and its defensive ideology.

It is necessary to provide incentives to attract the youth to join the military service in order to turn it into high quality professional forces.

Re-evaluation of the conscription service law.

Issuing the necessary regulations to keep the military establishment away from politics.

The geographic location of Iraq together with domestic and outside threats should be taken in consideration in determining the size of the armed forces.

Second: Special Forces
These forces were established and used to defend and protect the regime in the first place. They are forces established by Saddam according to the nature and measures of his security obsession. Among the important forces:

The Republican Guards with its varied formations; Security organizations (Public Security, Special Security, Domestic Intelligence, Military Intelligence,) including its militia branches, “Fidai Saddam” militia and many of the emergency units which are spread out through most of the country’s regions, supported by an army of Baath informers. Saddam was obsessed with establishing military forces that are homogenous to a great extent in terms of race or religion. Thus the percentage of Sunny Arabs in the Special Forces was greater than 90%. This does not fit in any way with percentages of the various sectors of the Iraqi society. All that to insure its absolute loyalty as much as possible. Its capability and readiness was prepared to protect his regime from any domestic or foreign aggression. In addition to considering its capability to crush the army if it attempted to defy the regime. These are some of the main reasons for strengthening the Special forces in arms and training to the detriment of the army. In this regard, the elements of the Special Forces enjoy great material and intangible privileges in comparison with various other civil or military sectors in Iraq. They became to represent the authority of the regime and symbol of its power expressing its existence and continuity. They acquired a distinguished social position in addition to their enjoyment of wealth and authority. Many of the elements of these forces, no matter what happens, see that the regime is their first choice and their expectations for the future. Thus, from their viewpoint, they must protect and defend it by all means. Some may argue about some attempts to overthrow Saddam’s regime, by some elements of the Republican Guards or security organizations and consider it contradicting to what we said. This is logically true, but in actuality these attempts were trying to rearrange the roles within the regime and were not seeking a complete change of the regime or opening the door to freedoms or to guarantee political participation, and lifting injustice. For this reason these
attempts came from the sons of the big tribes which have influence in the regime such as “Al- Delim, Al-Jabour and Al-Abeed”.

Accordingly, we find it beneficial to look closely at the method of dealing with the Special Forces, both before the change of the regime and during the change. That will help us avoid expected and unexpected problems and crises and will lead to reduction of losses to a great extent and will reduce the size of the required force to toppling of Saddam’s regime. Consequently, these forces need clear and frank assurances that:

First: It will not be the focus of revenge, during and after the existence of Saddam.  
Second: It will keep some of its privileges at a level which guard its dignity.  
Third: Its role will not be completely abolished.

The means of dealing with the Special Forces

The forces of the Republican Guards and the Security Organizations which we called Special Forces is part of the regime and expresses its nature and tied, as far as its formation, continuity and authority to the Head of the Regime. Thus there are two conflicting methods to deal with these forces in post Saddam Hussein Iraq:

First Method:

This calls for its destruction and elimination wherever it existed and referring its surviving element to special courts to decide their fate because they committed crimes against Iraq, its people and its interests. They’re some who call for the destruction of these forces at the beginning of the change because it is a source of evil in addition of being the protective fence of the regime.

Second Method:

This method deals with the situation in a more practical manner. It considers the large number of people who work in these forces. Many of them think that they were serving Iraq in one way or another. Some of them found themselves in these forces because of the absence of the opportunities and choices in a political system; which made fighting, and war a profession with privileges, or they implement the policy of the regime similar to what the elements of the army do. They go to wars without realizing its reasons or its goals. Thus their destruction or the elimination of their roles completely, from the viewpoint of the proponents of this method, is a continuation of the circle of violence and injustice. For this reason they seek to deal with this situation in practical way which post Saddam Hussein’s Iraq needs. They depend on an assumption, which says: We must look at the Special Forces as a solid homogeneous mass. For it is different as far as size or quality or the nature of its formation and tasks. For example: it is impossible to place The Presidential Guards Forces or the Special Emergency Unit (about 37 fighters) with The Republican Guards Forces on the same level or grade. This is true whether we consider the nature of loyalty, the preparedness to defend Saddam, or the degree of trust that Saddam has in these forces or even the background and origin of these elements. For example: Most of the Presidential Guards Forces and Special Emergency Unit are Saddam relatives and members of his tribe, while the Republican Guards Forces are a mixture of varied Sunny tribes. By the same token, we cannot say that the “Public Security” organization is equal in its loyalty or the regime’s trust in it to the Special Security organization and there is no comparison in their tasks.
The same goes true for Domestic Intelligence and Military Intelligence for Domestic Intelligence has a more crucial role and enjoys a high grade of trust.

In spite of the fact that the "Special Forces", in general enjoys material and intangible privileges not comparable to the other sectors in Iraqi State, be it civil or military. Although the scale of privileges corresponds to the scale of loyalties and the grade of trust from the Head of the regime. The privileges of the Special Presidential Guards are not the same as those of the Republican Guards, also the privileges of Public Security are not the same as those of Special Security and finally the privileges of Domestic Intelligence are not the same as those of Military Intelligence.

**Methods of Dealing with the Special Forces after Saddam**

We mentioned, previously, that the discharge from the army would give the opportunity to many people to be released from their chains and help them to regain their freedom and dignity. Indeed it is a new window to a better life.

But as for the Special Forces, we see that the discharge has political, economical and social effects, which may not be temporary or easy on an Iraq, which seeks to regain its health after many illnesses and great sufferings. Especially if the discharge was compulsory, and contrary to the will or the desire of those forces, which will feel the weight of, the loss of their roles, positions and privileges. This will prepare the ground for instability and lack of security through direct or indirect confrontation between the forces and those who are in charge of post Saddam period. It is our opinion that those will not form groups based on their professional military or security background to oppose or pressure the new regime but will return to their families and tribes to move under the tribe cover. Thus they will be more effective and we think, in this regard, that most of them will move under a wider cover than that of the tribe, which will make them more dangerous and effective. This is the cover of the Sunny sect since more than 90% of these forces are sunny as mentioned earlier. The Sectarian atmosphere is ready for this to a great extent especially after Saddam's steering of the sectarian issue. Sectarianism was increased after many sheaa organizations called publicly for taking over the authority in Iraq. In this sense, the discharged elements will be extremely effective and dangerous, if they move under the sectarian cover. Under this cover they will not hesitate to use their expertise in provocation, preparation and destructive means, which they are good at. This may lead the new regime to use violence or force to confront this situation and thus retreat from principals such as the protection of public freedom and human rights. Principals that brought about the regime.

On the other hand, the discharge of a large number of these forces into the society will cause an increase in crimes such as murder and theft especially in big cities. The security organizations will have a big role in this situation for they are good and professionals in the art of crime, which they practiced under the law to protect the regime. They can do this by utilizing the atmosphere of freedom and openness.

Some of the elements of these forces will intensify the economic crimes and organize it. They will form mafias practicing extortion and violence in commerce and the national economy in general.

Thus we are not for the discharge of these forces especially a compulsory discharge. We are talking about more than half a million fighters whose fate and role in the future
cannot be ignored positively or negatively. In fact as long as these forces are in defined areas, observed and supervised their effect will be less harmful, especially if they were disarmed from heavy weapons. It is necessary, when dealing with the Special Forces, to deal separately with each organization and not to subject it all to the same treatment:

As for the Republican Guards Forces, the method of the regime change and the position of these forces from the change will directly reflect positively or negatively on dealing with them. We are of the opinion that the officers and soldiers of these forces, especially those who abandon resistance and the defense of the regime, should be given two choices. Either they continue with their service, provided they attend consecrated rehabilitation courses, or be discharged given material or intangible incentives, retiring them, helping them find a job or supporting them in finding some small projects.

As for those who committed crimes against Iraqis, they should be referred to special courts that will determine their fate.

The Special Forces contain organizations that are considered part of the Iraqi state inheritance, it was established more than five decades ago, like Public Security and Military Intelligence. These organizations have cumulative technical expertise that may be beneficial to the post Saddam period.

Public Security: - It has many departments concerned with economic and criminal issues. Others are concerned with technical, artistic or research sides. It is useful in all cases, for it represent tens of years of cumulative experience. Especially if we consider that the organizations and systems of security do not only depend on political inclinations with good intention, but it also require cumulative experience in the technical and practical domains.

As for the specialties that are concerned with political issues, and was established and developed on the basis of confiscation of liberties, chasing the opposition and opinion leaders and murdering them, it is not included in our direction. Knowing that those who work in what is called the departments of political issues have special qualifications related to the degree of their absolute loyalty to Saddam's regime, his trust in them, their self and physical preparedness for violence, cruelty and readiness to murder without hesitation. As compared to their colleagues who work in departments which deal with technological, artistic and expertise side.

As for the Military Intelligence, with the exception of some bad or criminal members and those who work in military security, it is possible to benefit from some of its members according to the conditions of the coming stage. Military Intelligence remains very important for the nature of the army.

"Special Security" and "Domestic Intelligence" and what branched from them, like Emergency (units) and Presidential Guards, Saddam's Fidaeens and special tasks units which came according to the needs of the regime's head and his philosophy in continuation and existence, formed and developed its expertise on that basis. It is not easy, from our viewpoint, to allow these elements to continue in the service or to rehabilitate them, and hence what remained of them is discharged under controlling
conditions, and refers the criminals among them to special courts to receive their punishment.

Finally

We may differ when defining the nature of the defensive policy or the nature of the military ideology of the future Iraqi Armed Forces. But we may not differ on the effect of the nature of the domestic or foreign threats on destabilizing the national security and on whose basis the number and quality of the armed forces is determined. The capability of the new regime to exist and continue will also be determined on the same basis.

Whatever happens, perhaps the matter in the coming stage will depend on the wisdom and political capability of the coming regime and on politicians more than anything else.