THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP
TO REYKJAVIK, ICELAND
OCTOBER 9-12, 1986

ISSUES CHECKLIST FOR THE SECRETARY

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U.S.-SOVIET ISSUES CHECKLIST

HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE

Summit in U.S.

Soviet statements continue to focus on INF, nuclear testing as concrete outcome for summit.

Shevardnadze Meeting

Several new elements in Soviet positions, e.g., on INF, relationship of nuclear testing to SDI.

ARMS CONTROL

NST

Round VI started 9/18 in Geneva. Both sides introducing ideas developed in NST experts meetings.

START

Ron Lehman tabled new START position at opening of round. In experts talks, Soviets moved towards us on ballistic missile RV limits (they proposed 6400-6800), dealing separately with SLCM. New U.S. position moves towards Soviets on aggregation of SNDVs at Soviet-proposed level (1600), suggests RV-ALCM limit of 7500 (vs. Soviet-proposed 8000 limit for RVs, ALCMs, bombs/SRAMs). Soviets have introduced ballistic missile warhead limit (80-85%).
INF

U.S. working on text of draft interim agreement, lay table this round (OSD opposes). In experts talks, Soviets moved towards us on equal level of warheads in Europe (100), equal global ceilings. US countered with suggestion for 200 global limit (100 in Europe, no more than 100 in Asia); agreed to restrict deployments outside Europe to U.S. territory at level equal to Soviet level in Asia. Need to consider compromise outcomes on SS-20s in Asia, duration of agreement, PII/GLCM mix, SRINF.

Defense and Space

Soviets stressing that agreement on non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty is the key to offensive reductions; have softened position to say "up to 15 years", vice 15-20 years.

Nuclear Testing

Third experts meeting to begin 11/13 in Geneva. President told UNGA 9/22 U.S. favors fixing verification of TTBTPNET, ratifying treaties, considering further limits in parallel with offensive reductions. Soviets extended moratorium to 1/1/87. Starting to draw link between SDI, U.S. testing position.

Soviets applied in Sept. for visas to survey monitoring sites under private agreement with NRDC. We offered full itinerary to official group if it accepted President's offer to visit Nevada Test Site; otherwise, only restricted visa will be granted.

Interim Restraint, Compliance

Soviets raised subject in NST experts meeting in Moscow; no follow-up since then. Gorbachev may need assurance he won't be embarrassed by U.S. deployments above SALT II limits. Close hold interagency study underway on "mutual restraint" regime.
ABM Treaty Interpretation

Soviets will continue to challenge our interpretation of permissible activities under Treaty.

Sharing Benefits of Defenses

President should be prepared to explain to Gorbachev what he intends. In Moscow talks, Perle noted difficulty of foreseeing what form this would take, but noted that agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles would bring political/strategic transformation that would facilitate tech-sharing.

Verification

Except for CDE agreement to air/ground inspections, Soviets still reluctant to engage on verification issues, e.g., NST, CW, MBFR.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Have agreed to initiate negotiations in late October/early November. Centers would establish communications line to convey CBM notifications. U.S. preparing draft agreement, considering whether to provide to Soviets in advance of talks. Within USG, State will insist that NRRC line be located in State; OSD will resist.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation


CSCE

Review conference opens 11/4 in Vienna. Human rights at top of our agenda -- Soviets will push arms control, economic issues.

Conventional Force Reductions

NATO Conventional Task Force to report to NAC in December. Soviets say they will await results, hope they are positive.
MBFR

Blackwill-Mikhailov meetings in August, September unproductive. We pressed for Soviet movement on MBFR verification. Mikhailov made clear Soviets want to end MBFR, move on to "Atlantic to Urals" negotiation.

CDE

CDE resulted in Soviet acceptance of ground/air inspections, improved notification regime.

CW Treaty

In bilaterals with Lowitz culminating 9/10, Issraelyan raised possibility of bilateral verification regime to supplement multilateral controls in treaty; backed off later. Shevardnadze expressed greater openness to challenge inspection, cited UK proposal. Progress on other treaty issues. Next bilaterals October/November in New York. USG needs to consider next steps on inspection. OSD will strongly oppose progress toward a treaty. We should consider taking occasion of Oct/Nov bilats for Issraelyan call on VP Bush.

CW Proliferation

Soviets accepted in principle our language on specific measures at 9/4-5 Bern meeting (e.g., export controls, political steps). You, Shevardnadze agreed talks should continue; should aim at meeting early next year, after consultations with Allies in Brussels group. OSD may mount attack against continuation of talks (Perle has termed them "act of exoneration" of CW use in Afghanistan, SE Asia).
Hotline Upgrade

Sixth round of experts talks on implementing arrangements, 9/2-5 in Moscow. Upgrade should be complete by end of 1986.

Biological Weapons

BWC review conference 9/8-26 in Geneva. U.S. approach "critical but constructive", aimed at strengthening international "norm" of BWC without agreeing that convention itself can be made effective. Have accused Soviets of violating BWC through use of mycotoxins in Asia, criticized Soviet response to concerns about 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak.

REGIONAL ISSUES

General

Armacost-Adamishin "super-regional" talks 8/26-27 produced agreement on generalities, no progress on specifics.

Afghanistan

Meeting held 9/23 in Moscow, no movement in Soviet position. Soviets preparing for big public display, perhaps week of 10/6, of token withdrawals announced in Gorbachev Vladivostok speech.

Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>Proposed to Shevardnadze experts talks by UN cf year. No response yet. Soviets hinting at joint guarantees for Angola.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America/</td>
<td>Meeting held 5/20 - 21, Moscow. ARA wants modification of USG position to include specific injunction against L-39 trainers; EUR believes current US-Soviet understanding (from Reagan-Chernenko correspondence) serves our purposes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>East Asia/Pacific</td>
<td>Meeting held 6/10 - 11, Washington. Gorbachev 7/28 Vladivostok speech signals new Soviet diplomatic activism in the region.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Oakley, Simons and Sokolov discussed 8/19 in Washington; consultations took place 9/29 on margins of ICAO meeting in Montreal. Shevardnadze told you some possibility of cooperation in specific areas; said Soviets willing to act on specific threats if we give them necessary information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMAN RIGHTS</td>
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<td>General</td>
<td>Some progress on individual cases (e.g., Shcharskiy) but Soviets stalling on others. Bonner returned to USSR June 2; now incommunicado.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Representation List</td>
<td>Soviets making slow progress in resolving nearly 100 cases they have indicated will be allowed to leave. So far about 45 cases resolved.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Humanitarian Working Group</strong></td>
<td>We have proposed Dec 1 opening date for talks, following up Shevardnadze's tacit acceptance. We will review of rep list cases and be willing to listen to Soviet concerns.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Soviet Jewry</strong></td>
<td>Bleak. Given trends so far this year, 1986 will be among lowest since 1960s. Jewish groups in this country questioning &quot;quiet diplomacy.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>BILATERAL ISSUES</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SMUN Reductions</strong></td>
<td>Soviets currently at 198, including 11 on our September 19 list. We will review numbers with Shevardnadze in Reykjavik.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral Review Commission</strong></td>
<td>BRC (although the Soviets are not calling it that) concluded first session 7/31 in Moscow. Soviets still studying our proposed follow-on session early in 1987.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consular Review Talks</strong></td>
<td>Soviets have accepted our proposal for October session. Talks likely to begin 10/29.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consulate Exchange:</strong> Kiev and New York</td>
<td>Soviets have agreed to allow US radiation team to visit Kiev (key step in determining whether we can staff Consulate). Assuming radiation levels acceptable, next hurdle is US desire to buy Kiev consulate building, which Soviets say poses legal problems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health Cooperation/Chernobyl Studies</strong></td>
<td>Awaiting Soviet response to exchange views on long term cooperation with official U.S. representative.</td>
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Exchanges

**Cultural**

Academic and most other exchanges proceeding smoothly. Imbalance in performing arts. Many Soviet groups have completed or are planning visits to US. Except for Horowitz, no US performing arts groups have visited USSR, primarily because of expense. (Soviets can make money here off box-office receipts; U.S. groups can't there because of low prices.) We have suggested "receiving side pays" as way to redress imbalance.

**People-to-People**

First exchanges under these began in September. Chautauqua a major opportunity to reach Soviet audiences. Rhodes reached agreement on new programs in September visit, including break-through agreement to exchange visits of 300 high-school and undergraduate students in 1987 -- a major objective of President's initiative.

**Fusion**

Interagency working group preparing options ranging from experimental test reactor project to status quo. Soviets proposed during Shevardnadze visit trilateral meeting in October with French on fusion. Gorbachev will raise. Presidential decision needed on whether or how to pursue Geneva commitment to fusion cooperation.

**Civil Space Cooperation**

Experts negotiations revealed considerable agreement on specific areas of cooperation. Agreement in principle on treaty renegotiation reached. Awaiting Soviet response to U.S. proposal for 10/27 talks on agreement text.
Search and Rescue Satellites
Soviets have proposed converting "provisional" US-USSR-France-Canada Space Agreement into permanent accord; we said we're positive in principle. Soviets said they may have a draft.

Transportation Agreement
Both sides agree in principle on renegotiation. Soviets suggested October talks in Moscow; we prefer Washington, have proposed last ten days in October, await Soviet reply.

Energy Agreement
Soviets have proposed renewal of expired Energy agreement. We said have positive attitude but want more info on areas of cooperation.

Scientific Cooperation
Soviets have proposed renewal of expired Science and Technology umbrella agreement. DOD and OSTP oppose. OES will chair expert level group to consider best U.S. approach.

Other Exchanges
Other activities expanding. Housing Joint Committee Meeting (JCM) held in Washington 6/30. Atomic Energy JCM (a separate, more technically-oriented track from Kennedy-Petrosyants NPT channel) met in Moscow 9/17. Soviets want new working group on reactor safety. Environmental JCM in Washington in December. Under Health Agreement: Surgeon General Koop to visit USSR in October. NIH Director Wyngaarden in November; JCM agreed to for next spring.
Trade

US-Soviet trade declining. Urea dumping complaint, removal of fur skin ban pose problems. DOD more responsive on oil/gas license applications; most all tech data license applications have been approved under new policy adopted last January. First major USG trade promotion event in USSR since 1978 opened in early September; Joint Commercial Commission expected to meet here in December.

Defaulted Czarist Bonds

Soviets have tentatively explored USG interest in discussing defaulted bonds. Soviets settled similar claims with UK this summer. May want to clear way for Soviet sovereign bond issue in Europe. USG studying response.

GATT

Soviets bid to participate in GATT's new round defeated. We do not support due to incompatibility of Soviet economic system. Bid is part of larger effort for greater role in world trade.

U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary

Next round set for October 8-10 in Washington. At cordial April talks in Moscow, Soviets proposed interim arrangements. We are pushing for final resolution, may consider interim fishing deal later. USG still must address Wrangel Island issue: any final
WALK-THROUGH FOR THE REYKJAVIK MEETING

ARMS CONTROL

START

1. Ballistic Missile Warheads

   -- Heart of the matter. Want deep reductions.

   -- Soviets propose 6400-6800 ceiling on ballistic missile warheads. Constructive step, but too high. We've proposed 5500.

   -- Want Gorbachev's agreement that negotiators should arrive at a ceiling at lowest possible level between the two proposals on the table.

2. Stability

   -- Need to reduce in a way that enhances stability.

   -- Need sublimits on destabilizing systems, such as ICBM warheads, especially on heavy ICBMs.

   -- Also need to reduce throwweight.

   -- Negotiators should be instructed to work out sublimits to deal with special concerns, such as heavy ICBMs.
SECRET/SENSITIVE

INF

1. Asia SS-20s

-- Soviets offering 100 warheads in Europe, freeze in Asia (probably 500 warheads). Discriminates against Asian states.

-- We prefer proportional cuts; important for Japan.

-- Want to stress readiness to accept equal numbers at low levels (e.g., 100-100). Otherwise, proportional cuts.

2. Other Issues

-- SRINF: Hot issue, especially in FRG. Soviets previously have offered constraints. Should challenge Gorbachev: refusal to accept constraints now raises suspicions.

-- Verification: Agreed at Geneva to concurrent negotiation. Gorbachev has endorsed on-site inspection. Want him to agree his negotiators will get to work on this.

-- Duration: Soviet May 15 treaty proposes agreement should last until replaced. We agree. Should nail this down, agree to prompt follow-on talks on further cuts, elimination of SRINF.

DEFENSE AND SPACE

-- Soviets saying key to Geneva is agreement to "strengthen ABM Treaty", definition of permitted/prohibited activities.

-- Have softened position on period for ABM Treaty ("up to 15 years", vice "15-20 years").

-- Expect tough Gorbachev critique of your July 25 offer.

1. U.S. Proposal

-- July 25 offer took into account concerns Gorbachev expressed at Geneva.

-- Envision process in which we would be safer at every stage.

2. Offensive Use of Defensive Systems

-- SDI not for this purpose. Prepared to work with Soviets to resolve any concerns.
3. Elimination of Ballistic Missiles

-- Eliminate offensive missiles, and problem Gorbachev raised in Geneva concerning offensive use of defenses to facilitate a first strike doesn't arise.

-- Make clear this not our intention at all.

-- Ready to share benefits of strategic defenses, in conjunction with elimination of ballistic missiles. Prepared to agree to a treaty now to this effect.

-- Elimination of ballistic missiles, together with defenses, assures against cheating, third countries, accidents. Best way to ensure security of both countries.

-- Significant step, best for both countries. Should instruct negotiators to address concept with no holds barred.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- At an impasse. Soviets insist on test ban or CTB. We're not ready for either, want improved verification.

-- Gorbachev closely identified with issue. Good propaganda position. But, Soviets now ascribing linkage between SDI, continued U.S. testing.

-- Should offer a package deal with three elements:

  -- Agreement on improved verification;
  
  -- Ratification of TTBT/PNET;
  
  -- After ratification, prompt negotiations on further limits in conjunction with offensive reductions.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

-- Negotiations to establish centers should begin in next few weeks.

-- Centers would improve communications. Important to congress. Should be able to wrap up by a summit.
INTERIM RESTRAINT/COMPLIANCE

-- Gorbachev likely to criticize May 27 decision. You shouldn't hold back in pointing out Soviet violations.

-- But your main theme: It's time to move on to reductions.

-- He may ask about call in May 27 decision for mutual restraint regime. Could be important to summit scheduling.

-- May also mention Krasnoyarsk-Thule trade. Not a fair deal -- their radar a violation, ours is not.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

-- Have common interest here. Bilateral consultations excellent.

-- Negotiators can work out statement for summit, as they did last year.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Chemical Weapons Ban

-- Some progress over summer. Gorbachev says treaty a goal for 1987.

-- Key is challenge inspection. Press Gorbachev to agree Soviets will start to focus on this.

2. Proliferation

-- Don't want to deflect attention from treaty negotiations.

-- Two rounds of experts talks useful, should continue. If we ban CW, non-proliferation even more important.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

-- Should welcome CDE agreement, stress importance of full implementation of measures.

-- Soviets want to end MBFR. We should hold their feet to the fire, particularly on verification, and make clear: No token agreement.

-- Gorbachev may cite Warsaw Pact proposals, but Soviets seem content to wait for completion of NATO Study before seriously engaging on this.
REGIONAL ISSUES

AFGHANISTAN

-- Keys are withdrawal timetable; Kabul government with confidence of Afghan people.

-- Soviet 3-year timetable not serious; 6-regiment withdrawal gesture attempts to confuse issue.

-- We want to make clear we have no desire to exploit Soviet withdrawal.

-- We want independent Afghanistan and can guarantee comprehensive settlement.

-- In short, want to make clear our desire for a workable political solution.

-- Without settlement, will continue support for Afghan cause.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

-- We both say we want end to war. Agree Iran victory spells trouble. One of rare cases where we can agree to such an extent.

-- We've proposed joint statement opposing war; Soviets preferred parallel statements.

-- We're seeking to cut-off arms to Iran.

-- We'd like the Soviets to join us in cutting off arms flow to Iran. Their allies, especially North Korea, are a major, though not sole, problem.

-- We ought to press Gorbachev to come up with some ideas of his own.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- Soviets will press for prepcon where bilateralts can occur.

-- We favor direct negotiations; not hard over against international approaches, but skeptical.

-- We've insisted Soviets earn role in region; recent contacts with Israel positive step.

-- We want to push for more: Soviet-Israeli relations, Jewish emigration.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- We want to impress on Soviets that military victory impossible in Angola, and that continued fighting could precipitate South African reaction.

-- We can back negotiated settlement on basis of UNHCR 435. But need response to Pretoria's offer of August 1 withdrawal. Soviets have influence with Angola.

-- Soviets have raised joint guarantees of Angola's security. We could consider as final stage of comprehensive settlement.

-- But first need Cuban withdrawal formula and assurances on UNITA.
HUMAN RIGHTS

-- Human rights is the one area of relations where we have not made adequate progress. Jewish emigration is at record low levels, with deep and growing concern in the American Jewish community and the Congress.

-- Meanwhile, Soviets are trying to look good and avoid moving on emigration by resolving a small number of high-profile cases, such as Shcharanskiy and some divided family cases.

-- We need to emphasize that without substantial progress soon on emigration, other areas of our relationship will be affected. Conversely, with substantial increase in emigration we believe the American Jewish community would favor Jackson-Vanik certification.

-- We also need to press for a response to the short list of human rights cases we gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze during his Washington visit.

-- Finally, we want to press for resolution of the remaining (18) separated spouse cases.

HUMANITARIAN WORKING GROUP

-- We have been pressing the Soviets to agree to establishment of a Humanitarian Working Group to meet regularly to discuss human rights issues.

-- During our Washington discussions, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to set up the group along the lines of our expert-level meetings in other areas.

-- We have proposed December 1 as the date for the first session and are waiting for the Soviets to respond.

-- We should press them for a response.
BILATERAL ISSUES

BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION

-- We have proposed establishment of a Bilateral Review Commission to meet annually to review consular and administrative issues.

-- We held a useful meeting in Moscow on these issues this summer.

-- We have proposed another meeting for Washington in early 1987, but the Soviets have not responded.

-- We need to press them for a response.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS

-- We have agreed to hold Consular Review Talks with the Soviets in Washington beginning October 29.

-- The last round of these talks took place in 1984.

-- In this round we hope to negotiate an agreement protecting our dual nationals that we could sign at a Washington summit.

KIEV/NEW YORK CONSULATE EXCHANGE

-- Our radiation team is now in Kiev assessing safety for personnel we would send.

-- We have given Soviets a detailed proposal governing conditions for occupancy and construction of US facilities in Kiev. We are insisting on equivalence between Kiev and New York, where the Soviets own their building.

-- The Soviets owe us a response. We want to accelerate negotiations on implementing conditions and agree on target dates for an exchange of advance parties.

-- We need to press them for a response.
FUSION

-- One bilateral issue the Soviets are likely to raise at Reykjavik. They have proposed strong summit statement on fusion and US-USSR-French meeting in October.

-- Differences in USG on how to proceed. Tech transfer appears manageable and US specialists have had good results from existing fusion cooperation with Soviets. But DOE and DoD concerned about budgetary impact and worry we don't know where we are headed with an Engineering Test Reactor (ETR) project.

-- DOD and DOE want to cut back fusion initiative; shift cooperation back to the IAEA in Vienna.

-- We believe we should continue down the path you originally chose. Explore potential of ETR in further discussions with Soviets and other fusion players (EEC, Japan); carefully monitor tech transfer at every stage; final commitment on whether to build ETR some ways off. Suggest you tell Gorbachev we want multilateral meeting mid-November; will work with them on joint statement.

ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

-- Environmental Agreement is up for renewal next spring. It has been one of most successful agreements; good joint work, no tech transfer. We want to renew.

-- Want to urge the Soviets to agree to expand work under the agreement on the depletion of the world's ozone layer and global climatic change (the greenhouse effect).

-- After Chernobyl, we should point out to the Soviets how important our energy and environmental cooperation could be: atomic reactor safety, fusion, post-Chernobyl studies, and the ozone and climatic change problems. These issues are being handled in several agreements but joint summit statement could have dramatic impact.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

-- We are pleased with the progress we have made on these exchanges, particularly youth exchanges. For first time Soviets have agreed to substantial exchanges involving high school and undergraduate students.

-- Steve Rhinesmith at USIA should continue to expand and have implemented exchanges with his Soviet counterpart.
CULTURAL EXCHANGES

-- We are moving steadily ahead on exchanges, and are seeking to assure balance in our performing arts exchanges.

-- We think we should be able to announce at the summit the opening of each side's cultural exhibit in 1987. Ours is "Information USA."

CIVIL SPACE COOPERATION

-- In follow up to the successful September experts meeting in Moscow, we have talks in Washington the week of October 27th to begin negotiation of a new space cooperation agreement.

-- Soviets owe us an answer to our October 27th invitation.

-- If we can agree to mutually beneficial language, we could have a new space cooperation agreement ready by the US Summit.

ENERGY

-- The Soviets have proposed renewing the Energy Agreement which was allowed to lapse after the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981. We have asked them to tell us in what areas of cooperation they are interested.

-- They owe us an answer on possible areas of cooperation before we agree to experts meeting.

BASIC SCIENCES

-- Soviets have proposed to us renewal of umbrella Science and Technology Agreement which was allowed to lapse after Poland.

-- We feel that a Basic Sciences agreement would be of more value to us, as basic sciences are area of Soviet strength.

-- Soviets should respond to our request for more information on areas of interest to them, before we agree to experts meeting on Basic Sciences.

TRANSPORTATION

-- We have proposed to the Soviets the renegotiation of the transportation agreement sometime in October.

-- The Soviets have yet to respond to our proposal. They owe us an answer.