Transcript of Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Talks
93WC0085A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian No 5, May 93 (Signed to press 2 Apr 93) pp 81-90

[Article: “From Gorbachev’s Archives (Talks Between M. S. Gorbachev and R. Reagan in Reykjavik, 11-12 October 1986): Second Session (Afternoon, 11 October 1986)”; continuation; for the beginning, see MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODNYE OTNOSHENIYA, No 4, 1993]

[Text] E. A. Shevardnadze and G. Schultz were present at the session.

[Reagan] This morning you handed over a document for our examination, which I have been able to look over. We would now like to have you look over our document, which ends in several proposals.

As I listened to you this morning I had to agree that arms reduction is a matter of the highest priority, and that the time for real action has come. I welcome the fact that the main attention in what you said was concentrated on ballistic missiles, and I recognize that reducing ballistic missile warheads is the central objective.

We have agreed on the matter of reducing ballistic missiles with the idea of a 50 percent reduction. The level of ballistic missile warheads we propose—4,500 units—is approximately half of your present level. Your proposal foresaw a reduction to 6,400-6,800 units. We felt that this figure is too high. Nonetheless, we are prepared to discuss smaller reductions as well. But let me repeat that we prefer a 50 percent reduction, as you yourself proposed this morning.

We are troubled by heavy ICBMs, and we are satisfied that you are offering significant reductions of these missiles. In response, we are ready to make the corresponding reductions of all ballistic missiles, including SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles).—Editor’s note), as you said earlier. In addition to this, we believe that there should be a reduction of throw-weight, establishment of additional sublevels and effective verification.

From our point of view, an agreement should lead to a twofold reduction in throw-weight in comparison with your present level. As far as verification is concerned, we feel that it satisfies the interests of both sides, and we believe that progress reached in this connection in matters such as intermediate-range weapons and some others should be reflected in the area of strategic arms reduction.

Within the framework of the overall package, we are also ready to come to agreement on some other issues. In particular we are ready to accept a limit on air-launched cruise missiles, but not any other bomber armaments. We are ready to limit air-launched cruise missiles by including them within the overall limit of 6,000 units of warheads on ballistic missiles and air-launched cruise missiles which, however, would not include freefall bombs and SREMs.1

We are ready to accept establishment of a ceiling for bombers. It must be said that these are slow-flying systems, which can be confronted by unlimited air defenses, and which therefore cannot be equated to missiles and warheads, as was done in former arms control agreements. However, we can accept establishment of an overall limit of 350 units for the number of bombers, which will serve as a ceiling on the quantity of bomber armaments.

As far as the overall limit on the quantity of bombers and ballistic missiles is concerned, we can agree with your proposal that this limit should be 1,600 units, including ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. If we reach agreement on this, then such agreement must not be made a hostage to progress in other directions.

As far as your proposal on intermediate-range missiles is concerned, I am disappointed with it. In your September letter you wrote that although some problems remain in this area, the positions of the sides have apparently come closer together; you also wrote that a mutually acceptable formula could be found in regard to the matter of Soviet missiles in Asia, and that you are ready to propose such a formula, if there will in fact be certainty that a preparedness to resolve the European issue exists. Now it seems that you are taking a step backward in comparison with this position.

We emphasize that this issue must be resolved on a global basis. As and it seemed to me, you and I had the mutual understanding that we will reach an interim, global agreement, which will include equal ceilings both in Europe and in the global aspect in regard to Soviet and American warheads on intermediate-range missiles. There must be no doubts as to the fact that we are insisting on a global solution. We can agree with your idea of a reduction to 100 warheads in Europe, if a satisfactory solution is found in regard to other elements. Let me repeat that we will be happy with 100 warheads in Europe if other aspects are resolved satisfactorily in the interim agreement.

The issue of verification is highly important. You said in your letter that verification is no longer a problem, from which I conclude that you are ready to participate constructively in a search for solutions that would eliminate our concerns in the area of verification.

I would like to remind you once again that you said that you have a formula for missiles in Asia. This formula has to go farther than what you offered in Vladivostok, and today as well. We cannot agree on a decision that would only freeze the level of SS-20s in Asia. We favor a proportionate reduction in Asia. Given a reduction to a level of 100 warheads in Europe, a proportionate reduction in Asia would produce a figure of 63 units. However, a reduction to 100 units in Europe and 100 in Asia would also be acceptable to us, but only in the appropriate context. The issue of lower-range systems would have to be resolved, it cannot be tabled. As a minimum, these systems must be limited to a level not exceeding the present quantity of Soviet lesser-range missiles. In this case the United States would have the right to the same quantity of missiles, and the lower the level, the better.

This is precisely what you proposed in your draft treaty on intermediate-range systems. This is why we are somewhat troubled by your reluctance to limit lower-range missiles at this stage. However, I welcome the fact that this morning
you touched upon the issue of these missiles, and announced a readiness to freeze their number.

I have to say that I will not accept an agreement that would include a ban on our Pershing-2 missiles. The only thing that can be discussed is the composition of missiles on our side—that is, the quantity of Pershing-2 missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. We cannot agree to having ballistic missiles in your forces and none in ours.

We feel that the interim treaty must remain in effect until it is superseded by another agreement. This proposal was contained in our 15 May draft of the treaty, and we support it.

So let’s agree to have 100 units each in Europe and Asia, and then we will be making some headway. We will not insist on proportionate reductions in Asia to a level of 60-65 units, we will agree on a level of 100 warheads outside of Europe and on freezing lesser-range systems in Europe at the present level, and then you and I will have a basis for an agreement.

I think that you and I can agree to instruct our diplomats to coordinate on the matter of limiting lesser-range missiles within the framework of an interim agreement, with regard for their combat capabilities and the need that the agreement must foresee equality between the USSR and the USA.

Let’s also reach agreement regarding verification measures. We believe that these measures should include comprehensive and punctual exchange of data both before the reductions and after they are carried out, on-site observation of the destruction of missiles being reduced to the agreed level, and effective observation of the remaining arsenals and corresponding structures, which would include on-site inspection.

Finally let’s put the issue of the treaty’s period of effectiveness to rest. We can instruct our diplomats to develop an agreement on this issue where Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles would continue to be limited by the regime of a legally binding treaty, until such time that the sides reach agreement on further reductions.

As far as your concern regarding SDI is concerned, I did take it into account in my July letter. First of all I noted that we recognize that the term of the ABM Treaty is indefinite. I proposed a mechanism by which we could move toward a regime based on high reliance upon defense. My proposal does not mean eliminating the ABM Treaty. New provisions that would replace some provisions of the ABM Treaty would be developed as the result of the negotiations I propose. Implementation of my proposal would reinforce strategic stability and ease the burden both of our countries are bearing in having to constantly modernize and enlarge strategic offensive arsenals. My proposal foresees a meticulously verifiable transition, possible under stable conditions, to a new balance of offensive and defensive weapons, and later on, to elimination of offensive ballistic missiles.

The apprehensions you voice fall into two categories.

First, you are concerned that defense could be used for offense. I can assure you that this is not the purpose of SDI. Yes, the concern was voiced that space-based weapons could be used to destroy targets on the ground. But there are no weapons that are more reliable, more effective and faster than ballistic missiles. We already have an agreement prohibiting deployment of mass destruction weapons in space. And if you have any additional concerns in this connection, we can work together to ease them.

Second, you voiced the concern that the United States might obtain a possibility for carrying out a first strike, and then avoid retaliation owing to defense. I can say that we do not have the capability for carrying out a first strike, and that this is not our goal.

The concern you voiced encouraged me to suggest drawing up a treaty eliminating all offensive ballistic missiles. In this case the question is to the combinations of offensive and defensive systems that would allow one of the sides to make a first strike disappears automatically. I am convinced that owing to this, the situation will become stabler, safer, and that all of this will cost us less. Armaments that reach their target in a few minutes and cannot be recalled would be eliminated, which would put an end to the instability generated by apprehensions regarding a disarming first missile strike. My proposal will make it possible to ensure stability by eliminating ballistic missiles and creating a defense which would provide a guarantee against cheating and the actions of third countries. What we want most of all is to replace ballistic missiles by defense, transition to which would occur in stages, with stability ensured at each stage of the disarmament process.

We are ready to share our accomplishments in strategic defense, and we could include a provision in the treaty which would make the quantity of defensive weapons deployed dependent upon the number of ballistic missiles remaining. Such a situation would be distinguished by high stability, since bombers and cruise missiles are unsuited to a surprise attack, in view of their slow speed and the absence of limits upon air defense systems.

We naturally need to examine the times and stages of transition to strategic defense. The principles of equality and stability would be observed at each stage of this process in this case. My proposal is a serious step, and we need to conduct serious negotiations. I am certain that its implementation will make it possible to place security upon a stronger and stabler foundation. As far as the proposal you made today is concerned, I do not fully understand what topics would be discussed in the negotiations you suggest. Will our proposals be discussed, including our idea of sharing the advantages of strategic defense, and the proposal to eliminate ballistic missiles?

[Gorbachev] I will answer this question later.

[Reagan] Regarding the issue of nuclear testing, we welcome the fact that you recognized the existence of an interrelationship between the need for possessing nuclear weapons and their testing, between the existence of these weapons and testing. I am certain that as a first step we need to improve the verification procedure pertaining to treaties on the initial ban of nuclear testing and on peaceful nuclear explosions. Correcting the shortcomings of these two treaties in matters of verification is a priority to me. If this can
be done by means of the "Korrteks" [transliteration] system, or some other system you might propose that is just as effective, we would be able to ratify these treaties.

I announced to the Congress that I would be submitting these treaties for ratification, and that this would be a reflection of the importance that I attach to this issue. I will do this when the new Congress convenes for its next session. If we reach agreement on improving verification procedures, I will ask the Senate to ratify these treaties, with the stipulation that ratification will become effective only after I am able to assure the Congress that the treaties yield to effective control. This approach is supported by the congressional leadership, and therefore you should not have any illusions regarding a split on this issue in our country. Therefore let's agree that we will correct the two mentioned treaties. Such agreement will be evidence of progress in the question of nuclear testing. This will be a reasonable and logical approach. Then we will take the next step beyond these treaties, and begin negotiations on a stage-by-stage parallel program under which nuclear testing will be limited and ultimately terminated in coordination with reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. I am striving for progress on this issue, but you must understand that the moratorium on testing or a total test ban are excluded in the foreseeable future. Perhaps some common ground could be found on the basis of your ideas and ours.

Regarding centers for reduction of the nuclear danger. I am satisfied with the progress that has been enjoyed in this matter. Let's now agree on the approach towards these centers. Considering the progress that has been attained, I see nothing that can keep us from setting the goal of drafting an agreement on this issue, to be signed during your visit to the USA.

Strict observance of existing agreements is a matter of special importance. I emphasize this time and time again. My decisions regarding the START-1 and START-2 treaties were adopted because of the Soviet Union's failure to comply with these treaties. Construction of a radar station in Krasnoyarsk is especially significant among the violations.

It generally appears to me that rather significant progress is possible. Therefore I propose that we instruct a group of experts to meet today at 8 o'clock this evening and discuss all of the issues identified by us in the areas of strategic arms, intermediate-range weapons, space and defense, and nuclear testing. Nitta, Kampelman, Perl, Pauni, Linard and Edelman [transliterations] will participate in the group from the American side.

[Gorbachev] Before I respond, Mr President, at least briefly to your statement and the numerous issues you have touched upon, I would like to ask a few questions for the purposes of clarification. As I understand, you share our goal of reducing strategic offensive missiles by 50 percent.

[Reagan] Yes.

[Gorbachev] At the same time if I understood you correctly, the figures you cited reflect options that were discussed in Geneva and which foresee a 30 percent reduction.

[Reagan] We proposed 6,000 units.

[Schultz] This level would include 4,500 ballistic missile warheads and 1,500 air-launched cruise missiles.

[Gorbachev] Much has already been said about these options, and you know that the matter reached a dead end. Our diplomats in Geneva can go on discussing all of these figures, levels, sublevels and so on forever. I have data here on American and Soviet strategic arms. I can give this table to you. And what I propose is this: inasmuch as we agree that strategic missiles should be reduced by 50 percent, let's reduce all forms of armaments in our strategic arsenals by half—ground-launched missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and missiles carried by strategic bombers. Thus the strategic arsenals would be reduced by 50 percent across the entire spectrum. The structure of our strategic arms evolved historically, you see, with such a reduction, not one form of armament would be wronged, and the level of strategic confrontation would be reduced by 50 percent. This is a simple, proportionate solution, one which everyone will understand. And then all of these debates, which have now been going on for so many years, about levels, sublevels, what counts or doesn't count, and so on, will be resolved automatically, since a 50 percent reduction is a 50 percent reduction. And there will be nothing to debate. Do you agree with such an approach?

[Reagan] But my proposal also includes all strategic weapons except freefall bombs carried by bombers. But even these are limited indirectly, since a limit is set on the number of bombers.

[Gorbachev] These are all particulars on which we can reach agreement. I think that the simple solution I propose accounts for your concerns regarding many issues. You are troubled by our SS-18 heavy missiles, and they will be reduced by 50 percent. All strategic arms will be reduced. Otherwise we will be like our ambassadors Karpov and Kampelman [transliteration], treading water for years on end, and getting nowhere. But if we agree on a 50 percent reduction, then it will be simpler to resolve all of the other issues, and agreement could also be reached concurrently on bombs. If we see that in the course of such negotiations you are trying to obtain advantages for yourselves in a round-about way, we will tell you so. And if we can meet you half-way in some issues, we will do this as well. But are you happy in general with the proposed approach?

[Reagan] This is something that can be discussed, if you consent to the meeting of experts we propose. I can't say anything definite right now, I don't know all of the figures. But it seems that you will have a certain advantage with a 50 percent reduction, since after all, you have more of everything now, and you will also have more left with a reduction by half.

[Gorbachev] But look at the figures for the total quantity of warheads. And in general, let's not slurp the soup that Karpov and Kampelman have been cooking for all these years. I propose a simple solution.

[Reagan] I see that according to your table we have 518 bombers. But many of them are old bombers, and they are not part of our force composition.
[Schultz] Well, even they will be reduced by half. It seems to me that this proposal is an interesting one, a bold one.

[Gorbachev] Does this mean that you are interested in it?

[Reagan] But do you agree to hold a meeting this evening at the expert level?

[Gorbachev] We'll talk about it.

[Reagan] We have discussed your apprehensions. But I want to remind you of the time when only the USA possessed nuclear weapons. And we offered then to make them international, to give up our monopoly. We could have dictated our terms to the world at that time, but we did not do that, we did nothing of the kind.

[Gorbachev] The next issue. Do I understand correctly that the US President no longer likes the zero option he proposed regarding medium-range missiles?

[Reagan] No, I like it very much, but only with a global resolution of the issue. If the zero is on a global scale, then this would be fabulous. But if intermediate-range missiles are eliminated only in Europe, while a significant number of missiles aimed, in your words, at Asia will remain on your side, I could not agree to that. Your missiles could reach Europe from there, after all, and in addition, they could be moved suddenly to other places.

[Gorbachev] But you have nuclear weapons in South Korea as well, at bases, aboard forward-based weapon systems, not to mention other nuclear arms. Because you had earlier stated concerns regarding the nuclear arms situation in Europe, we also propose eliminating all medium-range missiles in Europe. As far as weapons systems with a range below 1,000 km are concerned, we propose freezing them and starting negotiations, and as for weapons in Asia, we also propose starting negotiations with the objective of finding a solution pertaining to these missiles in Asia, and consequently a solution to the problem as a whole.

We have already opted to leave aside the strategic arsenals of Great Britain and France, and this is a concession on our side. Nor are we raising the issue of forward-based systems. Why has the United States not taken any steps in return? What we are now proposing, after all, is a simple solution: zero in Europe, and negotiations regarding Asia.

[Schultz] The problem is that....

[Gorbachev] I would like to hear the President's opinion.

[Reagan] As far as I know, we do not have any ballistic missiles in Asia at all. You are talking about sea-based arms. But both you and I have fleets in the Pacific Ocean. And yours is larger.

[Gorbachev] But what about airplanes? What difference is it to us whether we are threatened by a strategic bomber or a medium-radius missile? You have bases in Korea, on the Philippines. But let's discuss everything, let's seek a solution. I am certain that we will be able to find it.

And so we propose eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe, leaving aside the issue of English and French weapons, freezing medium-range weapons and discussing them in negotiations. As far as concerns Asia, where both we and you have concerns, this will become an object of negotiations, and I think that a solution will be found there. Perhaps our experts could discuss this option in the evening?

[Reagan] Good. I emphasized on several occasions in Geneva and other places that there is a difference between bombers, freefall bombs and missiles. Just press a button, and in a few minutes an entire region will be wiped off the face of the Earth. On the other hand an airplane is essentially a conventional form of arms. It is confronted by air defense, and it can be brought down. Nonetheless, as I said earlier when I was talking about bombers, we are moving in your direction when we limit the number of bombers to an equal level for both sides. But let me repeat once again that airplanes, which are conventional arms, cannot be compared to missiles.

[Gorbachev] But if we eliminate missiles, bombers will continue to fly as before. And they will fly more than before, because there will be no fear of retaliation by missiles.

[Reagan] Therefore it is important not to stop with what we are discussing, but to resolve the issues of conventional arms as well.

You're not the only ones with apprehensions. We also have apprehensions that you would still have missiles, supposedly only for Asia, and we would not have Pershings in Europe. In such a case we would not have the possibility for retaliation. Yes, we would still have bombers, but by the time bombers take off for their targets, you will have already blown up Europe. Is this any kind of retaliation? And this is not to mention your air defenses, interceptors, surface-to-air missiles and so on.

[Gorbachev] Your line has no logic to it. This problem arose in Europe. There are English and French nuclear arsenals in Europe also. We made a concession when we agreed not to consider these extremely sizable arsenals. You can't solve this problem by arithmetic alone.

The matter appears to be much simpler. You went into Europe with your missiles, and you don't want to leave it. If that's so, then say so. As far as our missiles in Asia are concerned, they will not reach Europe (...).

But what I want to ask you, Mr President, is this: If a solution is found for Asia, will you agree to the zero option in Europe?

[Reagan] Yes. We stationed them there only at the request of our allies, which my predecessor accepted and which I implemented in response to your SS-20 missiles. As far as your missiles in Asia are concerned, I have seen maps from which it follows that while they can't hit England, they can hit France, West Germany, Central Europe, Greece and Turkey. Plus the fact that they are mobile.

All of this emphasizes everything I discussed back in Geneva. Before we can work things out in regard to armaments, we need to try to clarify the causes of mistrust. If we are able to eliminate it, it will be easier to resolve the problem of armaments.
That's true. Which is why I am amazed that you dispute what I told you about our missiles in Asia. They cannot reach Europe. Specialists know this well, and therefore your position seems to be an obvious paradox. This is not to mention the fact that it could be stipulated precisely in an agreement that no missiles will be moved anywhere, and that everything will be subjected to the strictest inspection.

I think that we can instruct our experts to discuss your thoughts and my idea. But do I understand correctly? If a solution is found regarding Asia, will you agree to the zero option in Europe?

Yes.

Now about something else. If we begin the process of reducing strategic and medium-range missiles now, how will the leaders of our two powerful states be able to allow elimination of what is the last obstacle in today's dangerous situation. I am referring to the open-ended ABM Treaty. Can we really go and violate it, rather than strengthening it? If we are going to have reductions, it is very important for both sides to be certain that no one will create weapons during this time that would undermine stability and parity. Therefore the step which both you and I have proposed, though with different timetables in mind, appears totally logical to me—the pledge to continue to observe the ABM Treaty for, as we propose, 10 years while simultaneously making major reductions in nuclear arms. Then this reduction could be carried out with confidence. Otherwise when someone is doing something behind your back during the reductions, a dangerous situation is created.

And so, logic requires that we strengthen the ABM Treaty. In the meantime your SDI will be limited to laboratory research.

And one last thing—my proposal regarding cessation of nuclear testing. I believe that it is a compromise, since it takes in your ideas as well. We propose issuing instructions to begin negotiations that will lead to total prohibition of nuclear testing. It will take a certain amount of time to reach this goal. Therefore in the first stage of the negotiations we could discuss the questions you posed—regarding a yield limit of testing, the number of tests and the fate of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. All of this will also be the object of negotiations. In this case no one will be able to reproach us for deceiving ourselves and the world public and limiting ourselves to cosmetic measures in the matter of reducing tests, which are troubling to all mankind. We will be able to say that we are beginning full-scale negotiations on cessation of these tests, during which we will also examine the issues indicated above. Then it will be clear that movement which will lead to cessation of testing at some stage has begun.

This seems interesting to me. I think that the experts need to discuss this in the evening. Let me return to the ABM Treaty. We are convinced that you violated this treaty by your actions in the area of anti-ballistic missile defense and construction of facilities contrary to the treaty. As far as SDI is concerned, I feel certain that this is the best possibility for ensuring peace in our century. We do not intend to eliminate the ABM Treaty. We propose adding provisions to it having to do with creating specific defensive weapons that both sides will have. We propose writing it into the treaty that we will share with you the defensive weapons we are able to create.

Let's agree on this: We will accept your proposal for a meeting of experts at 8 o'clock this evening. Let them discuss today's proposals and the thoughts expressed by the General Secretary and the President. I will instruct our people to find real solutions and serious agreement in all directions, including verification. Now that we are discussing specific stages in nuclear arms reduction, we'll be fighting for verification, something that we need three times more than the USA.

Listen, we are two civilized countries, two civilized peoples. When I was growing up—that was before your time—countries had rules of warfare directed at protecting the peaceful population. But now that an ABM regime exists, both countries have terrible missiles aimed at each other that can annihilate countless numbers of people, and primarily noncombatants—women, children. And the sole defense against this possibility is the threat that we also are in a position to carry out such mass extermination. This is an uncivilized situation. I propose a system which both countries will have and which will not put anyone in a disadvantaged position, and will make missiles obsolete. Concurrently it will provide a guarantee against the actions of any madman like Qadhafi who would probably use missiles if he had them. I think that the world will become much more civilized if we, the two great powers, demonstrate this example, create defensive systems and eliminate terrible modern armaments. I think that we would then be able to look proudly into the eye of the entire world.

I would prefer to reply in a less philosophical spirit, more on the practical plane, which is dictated by the subject itself of our discussion. Our proposal is this: Let's strengthen the ABM Treaty for the period in which we will be starting reductions of nuclear potentials—strategic and medium-range. We feel that 10 years is the minimum period for strict observance of this treaty. Meeting the USA's position half-way, we are ready to agree with the proposal for laboratory research, which will allow you to see whether you need a full-scale, three-echelon anti-ballistic missile system, or something else. By the way, this corresponds to our possibilities in the practical aspect as well. Before, even you weren't able to do anything, except perhaps for a few components. During this entire time, you and I will still be left with huge nuclear arsenals, ABM resources and so on, and no terrorist or madman will be able to do anything.

As far as SDI is concerned, it is not evoking concern among us today in the military respect. We are not afraid of a three-echelon ABM system. If your laboratory research motivates you to create such a system, considering that obviously America has a great deal of money, our response will be different, asymmetrical. What actually troubles us is that it will be difficult for us to persuade our people and our allies as to the possibilities for beginning reductions of nuclear arms in the absence of the ABM Treaty. There would be no logic in this, and nothing could be built on this basis.
[Reagan] We have absolutely no desire to eliminate the ABM Treaty. This treaty is defensive, but you capitalized on its provisions to create a powerful defensive potential. We did not do this.

In this situation all we can say to the Americans is this: If the other side destroys us, we will destroy it. But people are not sleeping any easier for this. We propose supplementing the ABM Treaty with provisions on specific defensive weapons being created not for a first strike or to obtain advantages. We want this to be available to all the world.

[Gorbachev] We will not deploy SDI. We have another concept.

[Reagan] We do not intend to eliminate the ABM Treaty.

Regarding the 10 years you propose, I can say that judging from the way things are going here, we will not need 10 years to demonstrate something. I would not have said several years ago that this was possible, but now I think that we will soon be able to demonstrate something.

[Gorbachev] I am taking your statement under advisement.

And so, we agree with your proposal on conducting a meeting of experts this evening.

[Reagan] There are still some regional, bilateral and humanitarian issues to be discussed. We have been so engrossed in the problems of armament that we did not touch upon these issues, and I think that they can be discussed beneficially. On our side the group will include Ridgeway, Simons, Matlock, Rodman and Perris. If you have people on your side that could take part in such a discussion, the group could meet today as well, since tomorrow is the last day of our meetings, and perhaps they could look at what we can come up with in regard to these issues.

[Gorbachev] Good, I agree. As for who will participate in these groups from our side, I'll tell you later.

[Reagan] A couple of words in conclusion. You said that you don't need SDI, but then we would be able to carry out our programs in parallel, and if you find that you have something a little better, then perhaps you could share it with us.

[Gorbachev] Excuse me, Mr President, but I do not take your idea of sharing SDI seriously. You don't want to share even petroleum equipment, automatic machine tools or equipment for dairies, while sharing SDI would be a second American revolution. And revolutions do not occur all that often. Let's be realistic and pragmatic. That's more reliable.

[Reagan] If I thought that SDI could not be shared, I would have rejected it myself.

To conclude, I would like to give you lists of several persons. These are humanitarian matters, problems concerned with divided families, and so on.

[Gorbachev] We will examine these lists carefully, like we always do.

[Reagan] I know that.

Footnotes
1. American low-yield attack missiles
2. A verification method used to record the parameters of a nuclear explosion with a yield above 50 kt.

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