Transcript of Reagan-Gorbachev Reykjavik Talks: Part 3
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[Transcript under the rubric “Pages of History”: “From the Gorbachev Archive (M.S. Gorbachev’s Talks with R. Reagan in Reykjavik on 11-12 October 1986): The Third Conversation (Morning of 12 October 1986)”]

[Text] G. Shultz and E. A. Shevardnadze were present during the conversation.

[Gorbachev] This is our third meeting, Mr. President. Our representatives who took part in the meetings of the two groups on preparation of directives—the group on arms control questions and the group on bilateral issues, regional problems, and humanitarian questions—have reported the results of their work to me. You too have probably received such a report from your representatives. Let’s begin with an exchange of opinions. I propose that you begin.

[Reagan] Good. I have a more or less clear picture of how the meeting of the arms control group ended. Concerning the other group, where Ridgeway from our side was presiding, I do not have a complete picture. But I think, let’s begin with arms control.

The report of this group, which worked yesterday evening and this night, generally disappointed me, with certain exceptions. But let’s take things in order.

On strategic nuclear weapons we can establish a certain degree of agreement, and it is significant. Both sides showed a desire to compromise. In general this is understandable, because this is an area where we have already been working for a long time, have accumulated experience, and know what we are talking about. We agreed to apply the formula of 50-percent reductions across the whole spectrum of these weapons. This approach can move the talks in Geneva ahead, and both parties can be proud of this.

On intermediate-range nuclear weapons. The parties discussed a number of questions, including missiles of shorter range, the effective period of an agreement, and the problem of monitoring. These questions can be discussed further at the talks in Geneva. The parties were not able to resolve the problem of reducing intermediate-range weapons in Asia, although they discussed it in great detail. As we see, this is not a technical matter. I will remind you that the American side at the very start made a proposal for a global reduction of these weapons to zero, that is, elimination of an entire class of weapons. We continue to think that solving this problem requires a global approach, a global agreement. All this is not news to you, but we cannot ignore the existence of a problem if we want to move ahead toward arms reduction. I cannot permit the creation of a situation where we would reduce these missiles to zero in Europe and not make proportional reductions of similar Soviet missiles in Asia. This is a question of the SS-20 missiles. They are mobile and can be moved easily from one place to another. Their presence exerts an influence on our Asian allies, not to mention our allies in Europe. This is not news to you either. But we cannot disregard the desire of the European and Asian governments to reach a global solution of the problem of intermediate-range missiles. They completely support this position and insist on it in the interests of their own security. In your letter to me you said that a solution to the question of Soviet missiles in Asia could be found if we would reduce or destroy our intermediate-range missiles in Europe. So you also recognize that a solution can be found on a global basis.

If the global, zero-level option does not suit you, we proposed an intermediate agreement which would envision equal limits on these missiles of the USSR and the United States in Europe if we count warheads, and equal limits on a global scale. We are ready to agree to a figure of 100 warheads each for the USSR and the United States in Europe if we can agree on other aspects of the problem, among them proportional reductions of warheads on Soviet missiles in Asia, and the United States would have the right to deploy the same number of warheads in its territory. We can talk about the number, 100 warheads in Asia, or we can talk about a smaller number, for example somewhere around 63, if we figure the proportion of the reduction from the reduction of these missiles in Europe. I am ready to accept the figures 100 in Europe and 100 in Asia and to order the participants of the talks in Geneva to work out the details of the agreement.

[Gorbachev] I want to establish the American position precisely. You agree to 100 and 100 American warheads on medium-range missiles in Europe, 100 warheads on Soviet IRM’s [intermediate-range missiles] in Asia, and the right of the American side to deploy a similar number of warheads in U.S. territory. Do I understand you correctly?

[Reagan] Yes, that is right.

The issue of space and defensive weapons. Here we have differences, we recognize that. The sides were not able to reach agreement. I am convinced that I cannot retreat from the policy I have declared in the field of space and defensive weapons, I simply cannot do it. Therefore, in this we could order the participants in the negotiations to concentrate on three critically important questions. Two of them have to do with the present, while the third relates more to the future. In each of these questions we are ready to consider your concerns, but we expect that you will take ours into account. The first question is, how can we synchronize actions in the area of creating strategic defense while implementing the goal of eliminating ballistic missiles? The second questions is, what are the conditions and time framework for the transition to a situation where the sides would rely on strategic defense? The third question is, what actions and what mutual understandings could lead to a gradual transition
from the ABM Treaty to a new system based on strategic defense? I understand that our positions on these questions are far apart. Therefore, at a minimum we could order additional talks and try to bring the positions closer.

Nuclear testing. I am disappointed with the report of the group working on this question and I only hope that the result reflect a lack of imagination on one or both sides. We agreed yesterday that negotiations should be started without delay. We also agreed on the agenda, procedures, and final goal. The sides could not even agree on how to start these talks. I propose that we present the understanding that we reached and agree to begin talks immediately on questions of nuclear testing. These talks should be coordinated with solving the problem of eliminating nuclear weapons and their final goal should be stopping testing. During the talks such important matters as monitoring, other questions, and existing treaties in this area could be discussed. As for the name of the talks, let each side call them what they like. That is not so important when we have an agreement on the agenda and final goal of the talks. Let's give the appropriate directives.

[Gorbachev] I do not exactly understand what you have in mind.

[Reagan] On this question the sides could not work out a single, acceptable formula. The positions of the sides still differ.

[Gorbachev] Could you state how you see the final goal of talks on this question.

[Reagan] The United States and the USSR begin negotiations on questions of nuclear testing. Their agenda would include all aspects of testing, including the unresolved questions, existing treaties, monitoring, limits on power of explosions, and others. These talks could occur together with stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons and would ultimately lead to stopping nuclear testing.

That is what can be said about the work of the arms control group. In the second group, concerning those questions which I am aware of we have reached understanding, and the desire of the parties to work on thermonuclear synthesis looks especially positive.

[Gorbachev] I can state our preliminary attitude toward the questions posed in all three of the problems you have mentioned, Mr. President. You reviewed the work of the two groups overall, concentrating on the arms control group. I want to briefly recall our approach to these problems. We think that our new proposals that we brought to Reykjavik are formulated with a substantial constructive element, and not on the philosophical level, but on the real, practical level. We have made major concessions to the United States in the hope that it will be possible to get the arms control talks moving and work seriously on reducing nuclear weapons. It is my impression that the American side is not taking this position of ours into account or, at least, as we see, carries on the discussion in the same tone as was done in the talks in Geneva. I have already mentioned this, and I will repeat it now: discussion of the problem in negotiations and other contacts between the two sides did not provide a way out of a deadend situation. The Soviet leadership is convinced that the problems must be looked at with a broad view and we must demonstrate political will power and readiness for large-scale decisions to get out of this deadend. We think that our major proposals, which are based on the principle of equal security, are appropriate to this. We expect the same of the United States.

As I see, we can establish the existence of agreement on the problem of strategic nuclear weapons, to the effect that the principle of 50-percent reductions should apply to all components of strategic forces, both platforms and warheads. We took the concerns of the United States into account here.

Regarding intermediate-range missiles we are discussing a sphere in which we have been engaged in negotiation for a long time, and we are going over all the problems that concern the United States, the Soviet Union, and our allies, carefully. It seems to me that we have taken account of all the concerns of the American side in our proposals. What do I have in mind? First, we are setting the English and French nuclear forces aside. Second, we agree to freeze missiles with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers and enter negotiations concerning these missiles. Third, we recognize that a problem of deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the Asian part exists although, strictly speaking, this question does not relate to Europe. But we considered that the American side persistently raises this question and is ready to resolve the question of intermediate-range missiles in Europe in coordination with intermediate-range missiles in Asia. We decided to meet the American side half-way and are ready to sign a document that says we have entered into negotiations on these missiles.

When you listen closely to the American positions you get the impression that the U. S. President and administration are beginning from false premises. You and your people think that we have a greater interest in nuclear disarmament than the United States does, that if you put a little pressure on the Soviet Union it will raise its hands and surrender. That is a dangerous mistake. It is not going to happen. You talk of some kind of intermediate agreement, to which we do not agree. We will not accept palliatives. We want a solution to the problem.

As I understood your position, Mr. President, if we could find a concrete solution to the problem of intermediate-range missiles in Asia—I mean not just a protocol of negotiations but a concrete solution too—you would agree to complete elimination of Soviet and American missiles, to a zero-level solution in Europe. Do I understand you correctly?
[Reagan] That will depend on what figures we adopt for missiles in Asia. They are mobile weapons, it is not hard for you to move them from one place to another. But with the zero-level option the United States would be left without means of deterrence in Europe from such an outcome. You would be left with 100 warheads in Asia, while our missiles would be brought back to the United States. So you would have a 2:1 advantage, no more, an absolute advantage because we would have no deterrent in Europe. You understand that we have friends in Asia and we have friends in Europe. Among them are some countries with whom you are also trying to establish better relations. What is wrong with the idea that no weapons at all would be aimed at these countries?

[Gorbachev] Mr. President, in your reasoning you appear to have forgotten the existence of the English and French nuclear forces, but they exist and can be built up. When we talk about a zero level in Europe, we are in fact talking about a zero level for ourselves, for the Soviet Union. But if you think about it, what kind of zero level would this be for the United States if its allies continue to have nuclear weapons and we eliminate all of ours? Are you aware of the step, the risk which we are taking in order to reach agreement on intermediate-range missiles?

As for the Asian missiles and the possibility of moving them to Europe, I will say frankly, Mr. President, that I actually find it a little awkward to hear that in a conversation on our level. If we reach agreement on intermediate-range missiles, we will be able to ensure a situation so that this understanding is not violated. Our sides have adequate capabilities for inspection and monitoring to establish the fact of a violation. We can include in the text of the treaty that the transfer of just one missile from Asia to Europe would be grounds for abrogation of the treaty. I did not want to say this, but I have to. These are not serious arguments, let’s agree not to waste time.

[Reagan] We do not consider the English and French forces a part of NATO. Those forces exist for the defense of those countries, their governments have stated that clearly. It appears that they will not be activated in a case such as an attack on West Germany. Moreover, against these forces you have your own deterrent means in Europe, strategic weapons.

[Gorbachev] Mr. President, you say that the English and French missiles are not defending West Germany. Well, who will defend the GDR? And Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria? Who will defend them? That argument does not work. That is the first thing. Second, I remember my talk with M. Thatcher on the question of the English forces, when she tried to convince me of roughly the same idea, that these are forces independent of NATO. I cited her letter sent to the head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff where it says that she appreciates the work done by the American side to re-equip and modernize the English forces and thanks you for that. The English do not hide the fact that their forces are integrated into NATO. That is known in the Soviet Union, and it is known to you. We are not at a press conference, but rather in a small group in conversation, Mr. President, and we should not engage in banalities. We know everything about the participation of England and France in NATO and we know which targets these weapons are aimed at, and by whom. I say this to you so frankly because we are talking about exceptionally serious, important matters.

[Reagan] You and I are the leaders of the two largest nuclear powers in the world. Our nuclear forces are located in all parts of the globe. In comparison with us the forces of the other countries are purely defensive. If you and I come to an agreement to begin reducing and ultimately eliminate nuclear forces, if we stand side by side on this issue and tell the other nuclear powers that they have to eliminate their own nuclear weapons, I do not think that any of them will refuse us.

[Gorbachev] I have the same opinion. I want you to understand that a unique situation has now been created for the American administration. A year ago it was not the case that the Soviet Union had advanced major compromise proposals, and certainly not 2-3 years ago. I simply did not have that capability then. I am not certain that I will still have it in a year or 2-3 years. What will happen if we do not make use of this opportunity? Reykjavik will just be mentioned in passing, nothing more. A shame that all that was missed.

[Reagan] I am in the same position. It is possible that before long I will not have the powers that I do now. Why not use the time that we have and make a contribution to the creation of a world free of the nuclear threat?

[Gorbachev] I believe that now, when I sit opposite you, opposite the President of the United States, I can look you in the eye with a clear conscience. We have brought far-reaching proposals. I ask you to appreciate this. One thing is needed to reach agreement, a desire on your side.

I will repeat myself once more about intermediate-range missiles. We are ready to begin negotiations on missiles in Asia. We are ready for a zero level of Soviet and American weapons in Europe without counting the English and French nuclear forces. We are ready to freeze short-range missiles and begin negotiations on them. We are taking into account all factors, practically all of your positions, including those concerning Asia. We are ready to look for solutions right here.

[Reagan] We have gotten a little carried away. You said that you are ready to reduce missiles in Asia too. I am glad to hear that.

[Gorbachev] I just summarized our position: elimination of all Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles in Europe, disregarding English and French forces, a freeze on and conversation about missiles with range of less than 5,000 kilometers, and a start to negotiations on missiles in Asia. I will even say more. You put forward the formula of 100 warheads on Soviet missiles in the
Asian part of the USSR and 100 warheads on U.S. missiles in America. For us this means a several-fold reduction of our missiles. But okay, if the United States is unable to offer us anything else, we agree even with that version. We agree, although we see what the situation is in Asia, what is happening in Japan, and what is happening with your own presence in the Pacific. But we are taking this final step to show that we are serious. In this case will you be ready for a Soviet and American zero level in Europe?

[Reagan] We agree with that.

[Gorbachev] Good. I have been waiting for you to start making concessions to me. On both the first and the second problems I was the one who made the concessions. Now I am testing you on the third question, the question of antimissile defense, and I will see whether the United States intends to move ahead to reach agreement.

So, the ABM Treaty. It can be considered that we have agreed in principle on a 50-percent reduction of Soviet and U.S. strategic nuclear forces. We have agreed to eliminate intermediate-range missiles in Europe, to freeze missiles with range of less than 1,000 kilometers and begin negotiations about them, and to have 100 warheads on missiles in Asia, several-fold less than today, and 100 warheads on intermediate-range missiles in America. These are unprecedented steps from the Soviet side. They demand a very responsible, honest approach in the realization state. They will demand very strict, rigorous controls. I will tell you directly: we will fight harder for controls than the United States does. We are beginning steps of real disarmament. We need control, and we will not agree to reduce strategic arms and intermediate-range missiles without confidence that the other side is fulfilling its obligations strictly.

If we have agreed to work on deep cuts in nuclear weapons, then we must create a situation where there should be no doubt either in fact or in mind that the other side wants to shake up the strategic stability and bypass the understandings. And from this we should have confidence that the open-ended ABM Treaty will be preserved. You, Mr. President, must agree that if we are going to reduce nuclear weapons we have to be confident that the United States is not doing anything behind the back of the USSR, and the USSR is not doing anything behind the back of the United States that would threaten the interests of the other side, degrade the agreement, or create difficulties. It follows that strengthening antimissile defense conditions is a key challenge. We propose to take on the obligation not to use the right of parties to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and during this time to strengthen the ABM Treaty. When we were working up this proposal, we gave special consideration, Mr. President, to your adherence to the idea of the SDI [Space Defense Initiative]. We are agreeable, when deciding the question of not using the right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, to make a note that laboratory testing in the SDI area will not be prohibited, in other words we do not touch the SDI program within the framework of laboratory experiments. I do not think that this point would greatly limit you. We know what state the corresponding development projects in the United States are in, and we know that in two or three areas you have had some breakthroughs. We know, and we ourselves are doing a few things. So the laboratory phase should not constrain you. But the 10 years of not exercising the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty are essential to create confidence that, when deciding the problem of arms reduction, we are preserving the security of each side and are not allowing any attempts to obtain one-sided advantages by deploying space systems. In political, practical, and technical terms there is no loss for either side here.

[Reagan] The United States never violated the ABM Treaty. We did not deploy a single antimissile allowed by this treaty. But the Soviet side did more than allowed under the ABM Treaty. As for SDI, when we put forward a program of strategic defense we are pursuing the objective of preserving the peace and achieving disarmament. We propose to conclude the agreement of which I spoke a great deal yesterday for the purpose of helping prevent the restoration of weapons. We are proposing a binding agreement. In our law an international obligation has priority over domestic law, and becomes American law. We will be ready to assume the obligation to share technology with the Soviet Union if SDI research reveals the possibility of building such defensive technology. We think that this will help eliminate nuclear weapons if it moves in parallel with the elimination of these weapons. Understand me, I cannot retreat from my positions, renounce what I promised our people. I am serious about sharing this technology with the Soviet Union. You see, according to our position there is no sense in viewing this technology as a threat. After all, if everyone has it then no one will be able to threaten anyone else. This system is also needed to defend against a threat from a third party or nuclear maniac. Why can't we make this part of the ABM Treaty?

[Shultz] I would like to ask a question. When you, Mr. General Secretary, speak of complete elimination of nuclear weapons, as far as I understand you are tying this to a 10-year period of non-exercise of the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. In other words, do you think that this 10-year period will be enough for complete elimination of nuclear weapons? If you have in mind such a connection, this timetable even exceeds your plan for strategic arms and intermediate-range forces. Do you think that not a single ballistic missile should be left after 10 years?

[Gorbachev] I confirm that statement made on 15 January 1986. These questions—the 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear weapons and the question of intermediate-range missiles—relate to the first phase of our program. The next phase envisions further reduction of nuclear weapons with participation of the other nuclear powers. But the first steps, the most important and decisive ones, must be made by the principal nuclear
powers in the course of 10 years. We will not retreat from this. But here is what alarms us. If we want to reach agreements—and everyone has an interest in that—then we should be determinedly interested in strengthening the ABM Treaty and consolidating the ABM rules. That is so, of course, if there are no secret intentions. The Soviet Union is in favor of this, while the United States in fact wants to weaken the ABM Treaty and revise it. That does not seem logical to us. The one who proceeds in that way will be accused by the whole world of trying to develop a large-scale antimissile system for its own egotistical purposes. I cannot go before my people with such a position, nor before the whole world. Therefore, we propose to strengthen the ABM Treaty by adding an obligation not to use the right to withdraw from it for 10 years with simultaneous large reductions in nuclear weapons. If we are talking of the possibility of SDI research in a laboratory setting, we are going to meet half-way the President who bound himself with the corresponding obligation before his people and before the world. We are giving him this opportunity to show that his idea is alive, that we are not burying it, that the United States can continue laboratory work on SDI, but cannot go beyond the framework of research. As for the nuclear maniac, we can handle this issue somehow within the framework of the ABM Treaty too.

[Reagan] I am not sure of that. And anyway, damn it, what kind of agreement are you defending? The ABM Treaty in fact permits each party to deploy 100 antimissiles in one place, leaving all the rest of the territory undefended. Our defense today is the threat of retaliation against the other. That is not defense in the direct sense of the word. If we agree not to exercise the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 10 years, we will in fact force the world to live for 10 more years in fear of destruction in nuclear flames. I do not understand the charm of the ABM Treaty, which in fact it signifies guaranteed mutual destruction. We are holding a talk about elimination of missiles, about how we should no longer be threatened with the danger that some gloomy day someone will push the button and everything will be destroyed. But even when we destroy these missiles we must have a defense against others. The genie is already out of the bottle. Offensive weapons can be built again. Therefore I propose creating protection for the world for future generations, when you and I will no longer be here.

[Gorbachev] Mr. President, the question of antimissile defense has a long and complex history. This idea, which was formulated in the 1972 ABM Treaty, did not arise accidentally or suddenly. It was the result of many years of debates among the leaders and experts of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries. They recognized that construction of a large-scale antimissile defense cannot be permitted—this would spur on the arms race in offensive weapons. If it is built, then there cannot even be talk of any kind of decision to reduce nuclear weapons. The conclusion that the ABM Treaty is needed at the foundation of strategic stability followed long debates. We cannot set aside this conclusion.

The next point is the question of a full ban on nuclear testing. When we were thinking over our proposals, we also took the concerns of the U.S. President into account. This resulted in a formula which considers your interests and ours and combines them. What is our plan? We could give orders to our representatives to begin full-scale negotiations on a complete end to nuclear testing. During the talks each side could act as it considers necessary, in other words even conduct nuclear blasts. We tried to consider the posture of the American side here. In the first stage of the negotiations the questions of a limit on the power of the explosions and their number could be discussed, plus the 1974 and 1976 treaties and questions of monitoring. I repeat, all the time we kept the American side's position in mind and tried to combine our approaches.

And what have we heard from you? The only thing that has sounded in these considerations is the United States' own interests. You suggest talking about the problem of testing, but not about conducting negotiations on a complete end to testing. You must agree that we cannot accept arguments that consider the interests of just one side. We have reached the stage in our talks when the American side needs to meet us half-way on the questions of antimissile defense and nuclear testing. It is important for you to determine that the true interests of the American side lie in finding mutually acceptable solutions to the problems. We said that President Reagan is a man who does not like to make concessions. I am now convinced of this. But, as the American saying goes, "It takes two to tango." And it takes two to control arms, to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. Our national interests will not be preserved if we retreat from consideration of the interests of the other side. Therefore I invite you to a male tango, Mr. President.

[Reagan] If you remember history it will be understandable why the United States does not want to ban nuclear testing without establishing proper control. There was a time when we worked side by side on this issue. There was a time when a moratorium on nuclear blasts was in effect. If was in force for 3 years. But then the Soviet Union broke the moratorium and began testing with unprecedented intensity. And then it became clear that the United States, which had observed the moratorium, was not prepared for this turn of events. Our President Kennedy stated that the United States would never again let itself be caught in such a situation. You certainly remember that the moratorium was started under Eisenhower, and ended under Kennedy. It took us a very long time then to catch up to the Soviet Union and restore our position, which we had surrendered voluntarily. But the Soviet Union used the period of the moratorium to prepare to create new types of nuclear weapons. To avoid a repetition of this situation we need to ensure reliable control. This work is not completed yet. You say that you are ready to accept appropriate controls. We are ready to help you, to join you in this. But only after finishing the development of controls will we be ready to stop testing. There is a good saying to this effect: "Once burned, twice shy."
In our talk yesterday we made a concession to you when we agreed to write down a formula to the effect that the USSR and the United States will begin negotiations on nuclear testing with an agenda that should include the remaining questions of control related to the treaty. In the process of the negotiations the United States and the Soviet Union will move toward stopping nuclear testing along with a gradual, stage-by-stage reduction in nuclear weapons.

[Gorbachev] That wording does not suit us. We propose to solve this question as a package, that is to begin negotiations—full-scale negotiations—on banning nuclear testing. In the first phase of these negotiations we could discuss questions of control, the fate of the 1974 and 1976 treaties, thresholds and number of blasts, but our goal should be to reach an end to all nuclear blasts. The American side, as we see, does not want to designate the topic and goal of the negotiations. It treats them as endless and puts off a solution to the problem of nuclear testing for decades. It is unacceptable to us to use negotiations as a cover for the United States, which wants to keep its freedom of action to conduct as many nuclear blasts as it wants. We are having doubts about the honesty of the U.S. position. A concern is even appearing that the American side has planned something that may damage the Soviet side. In such conditions it is necessary at all to take up the whole package of eliminating nuclear weapons, what is there to agree about here? After all, the United States is setting the goal of perfecting its nuclear weapons.

[Reagan] It looks like some kind of misunderstanding has come up here. We proposed the wording in English, but obviously the translation into Russian means something else.

[Gorbachev] This is not a matter of words. You know that we are talking about different things.

[Reagan] No, I don't think so. Would it suit you if we changed our wording and said that the United States and the Soviet Union are beginning negotiations whose final goal is a complete end to nuclear testing? Parallel with this the United States and the USSR would carry on a reduction of nuclear weapons, and this activity would occur in such a way as to be combined with a reduction of and end to nuclear testing.

[Gorbachev] I do not object to having our experts sit down and work out a formula. The main thing is for it to be clearly reflected that the USSR and the United States are beginning negotiations on a complete and universal end to nuclear testing. Any possibility of circumventing maneuvers here must be precluded. A complete ban on testing as the subject of negotiations and the right of the parties to conduct testing during the negotiations. During the negotiations it would be possible to decide the questions of controls and all the other components part of the problem—thresholds, the 1974 and 1976 treaties, and number of blasts. That is in the first stage. But in the final stage we are already reaching right up to a ban on nuclear testing. I am saying all this openly and directly. The question is too serious for us to try any tricks here.

[Reagan] Judging by what you just said, the foundation of all the problems that we are running into is your conviction that we are trying to gain some kind of advantage for ourselves and that we feel hostility toward you, and even that we have in mind some kind of hostile actions in relation to you. I say this with regret, but I have to refute you: it is not true. We do not have any hostile intentions toward you. We recognize the differences between our systems, but we think that our countries are entirely capable of living in the world as friendly rivals. I understand that you do not trust us, just as we do not trust you. But I am convinced that historical facts are on our side. Long ago Karl Marx said...

[Gorbachev] Well, earlier the President referred to Lenin, and now he's moved on to Marx.

[Reagan] Everything that Marx said, Lenin said it too. Marx was the first, and Lenin was his follower. And they both said that for the success of socialism it must be victorious throughout the world. They both said that the only morality is that which is in keeping with socialism. And I must say that all the leaders of your country—except you, you still have not said such a thing—more than once stated publicly, usually at party congresses, their support for the proposition that socialism must become worldwide, encompass the whole world, and become a unified world communist state. Maybe you have not managed to express your views on this yet, or you do not believe it. But so far you have not said it. But all the others said it!

And how can we overcome our mistrust of you if even during World War II when we were fighting together, you did not want to allow Allied bombers flying from England to land in your country before making the return flight?

And what happened after the war's end? Beginning in 1946 we made 19 proposals at various international conferences to eliminate nuclear weapons. At that time we were the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. But you did not want to participate in the realization of our proposals. A little later the USSR deployed missiles on Cuba, 19 miles from our shores.

I could continue, give other examples of similar steps in a policy which illustrates your conviction of the world mission of socialism. Naturally, this cannot help but arouse our suspicions that you have hostile intentions in relation to us. You, however, have no facts that indicate that we, our people, are yearning for war. There could not be anything more untrue. No one in our country wants our world and freedom to be disrupted by war. I am sure that your people do not want war either.

[Gorbachev] So you are talking about Marx and Lenin again. Many people have already tried to bring down the
founders of this well-known line of social thought. No one has been able to do this, and I advise you not to waste time on this.

It is better for us to recall what you and I talked about earlier, and it seems that we have the same opinion on this. We recognize that the American people have a right to select their own social system and their own values. We also have our own system, which we like, while some do not like it. But each people and all peoples have the right to decide how to manage things in their own country, what kind of government to have, and what kind of president to elect. I am sure that any other approach would not get us far. And therefore I was very surprised when I heard that just before our meeting in Reykjavik you stated in your speeches that you remained loyal to the principles set forth by you in your speech at Westminster Palace. And in that speech you said that the Soviet Union is the Evil Empire, and called for a crusade against socialism in order to drive socialism onto the scrap heap of history. I will tell you, that is quite a terrifying philosophy. What does it mean politically, make war against us?

[Reagan] No.

[Gorbachev] But that is exactly what you said as a kind of introductory word before Reykjavik. What kind of hint is that to me? I did not want to recall this at all, but you were the first to start talking about that kind of problems.

[Reagan] The difference between us has always been and still is that we in the United States have a Communist Party whose representatives can vote in elections and even hold certain elected positions and propagate their philosophy, while you do not have anything like that. Instead of trying to convince people that your ideas are right, you impose these ideas and therefore groups of people in the “third world” now and then seize power and the communist party gets a monopoly of power. In our country you can set up any party; it will operate legally and put forward its own candidates. You do not have, say, the Democratic or Republican party; you have one party, and a minority of the people belong to it, for you do not let the majority join. That is our difference. We think that only the people themselves can determine what kind of government they would like to have.

[Gorbachev] Mr. President, if you want to carry on such a broad debate on political, ideological, and ethical issues, I am ready for it. And I want to tell you that what you said is very far from the true state of affairs and testifies to enormous differences in our initial ideas. But still you and I agree, in my opinion, that each of our countries can have its own political system and its own ideological ideas; we do not infringe on your religion, and so on. Therefore, wouldn't it be better to stop this argument and return to the issues which we did not complete.

[Reagan] Yes, I think so. Let's return to the question of wording.

[Gorbachev] I do not want to argue with you, and I respect your independent nature, and your views and ideas. And I am convinced that if you and I have different ideological ideas, that is not a reason for us to shoot at one another. On the contrary, I am convinced that in addition to political relations purely human relations between us are possible also.

[Reagan] Unquestionably. And I would even like to try to convince you to join the Republican Party.

[Gorbachev] An interesting idea. Incidentally, before the revolution in our country, and after it too, there were many political parties. But today there is indeed just one. That is the result of a definite historical process.

Let us return to the wording. Let's see if we can't find something that would bring our positions together.

[Shultz] I think that we have the beginning of a statement—this is the wording on which our representatives worked during the night and which reflects our agreement on the question of strategic arms, which was reached in principle between the two leaders. I think that similar wording can also be found in relation to intermediate-range nuclear weapons. As for questions from the areas of space, antimissile defense, and SDI, in these we have not reached agreement but have, I think, held useful discussions.

[Gorbachev] Perhaps we can write it this way: the parties recognize and affirm the conditions of the unlimited ABM Treaty and obligate themselves to observe its propositions strictly.

[Shultz] We did not reach agreement on this question, but we to some extent identified the nature and areas of our disagreements. This does not touch the question of observance of the treaty—incidentally, we are observing it completely—but rather raises other aspects, including time and others.

[Gorbachev] But you know, in the context of our understanding on a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms and a reduction in intermediate-range missiles, a statement of the parties that the parties will strictly observe the permanent ABM Treaty simply suggests itself.

[Shevardnadze] I have a question. Is your approach to the question of time of withdrawal from the treaty still in force? I understand that you and we place different interpretations on what would happen within the time when we did not use our right to withdraw from the treaty. And different time periods are being proposed. You are proposing 5 or 7 years, while we propose 15. But in general, is your approach still in force?

[Shultz] The President in his letter proposed a two-stage approach to this issue. And the President’s proposal remains in effect.

[Gorbachev] So, as I understand it, you do not agree with the 10-year period?
We have proposed wording which would make it possible to reflect the situation that has developed. It has three aspects. We propose that the two leaders instruct their delegations to study carefully the following substantive questions in order to overcome the disagreements that now exist. In the first place, this means the question of how study of the possibility of creating a long-range strategic defense can be synchronized with realization of our common goal: elimination of ballistic missiles. Both sides say that these questions are interrelated. We propose that this question be studied more thoroughly. In the second place, this means the question of the conditions and times within which the two sides could examine the possibility of a transition to greater reliance on strategic defense.

We know that you plan to deploy SDI. But we do not have such plans. And we cannot assume an obligation relative to such a transition. We have a different concept.

I would like to mention also the third question, which we included because you emphasize it so much. This is the situation which would exist until the time when the conditions indicated above were realized. The question is: what general understanding can the parties reach relative to the restrictions imposed by the ABM Treaty on activity related to creating a long-range strategic defense?

The President stated to you and the whole world that he will not renounce the SDI program. You do not agree with that. But as I understand it, you recognize his problem and that he is trying to meet your concern half-way.

But I think that I am even helping the President with SDI. After all, your people say that if Gorbachev attacks SDI and space weapons so much, it means the idea deserves more respect. They even say that if it were not for me, no one would listen to the idea at all. And some even claim that I want to drag the United States into unnecessary expenditures with this. But if the first ones are right, then I am on your side in this matter, but you have not appreciated it.

What the hell use will ABM's or anything else be if we eliminate nuclear weapons?

Absolutely right. I am for that. But the point is that under the ABM Treaty the parties do not have a large-scale antimissile defense, and you want to deploy such a defense.

But what difference does it make if it is not nuclear weapons? What difference whether it exists or not?

On the other hand, you know that even in this situation we will not be able to guarantee that someone will not begin to make nuclear weapons again at some point.

Mr. President, you just made a historic statement: What the hell use will SDI be if we eliminate nuclear weapons? But it is exactly because we are moving toward a reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons that I favor strengthening the ABM Treaty. In these conditions it becomes even more important. As for your arguments about the madman who decides to resort to nuclear weapons, I think that we will be able to solve that problem. It is not that serious.

It appears that the point is that I am the oldest man here. And I understand that after the war the nations decided that they would renounce poison gases. But thank God that the gas mask continued to exist. Something similar can happen with nuclear weapons. And we will have a shield against them in any case.

I am increasingly convinced of something I knew previously only second-hand. The President of the United States does not like to retreat. I see now that you do not want to meet us half-way on the issue of the ABM Treaty, which is absolutely essential in conditions where we are undertaking large reductions in nuclear arms, and you do not want to begin negotiations on stopping nuclear testing. So I see that the possibilities of agreement are exhausted.

It seems to me that we have agreement on the question of nuclear testing.

I would still like to return to the question of the ABM Treaty. Perhaps we can set aside certain issues that I would call ideological and agree to set times within which the parties would not exercise their right to withdraw from the treaty.

It seems absolutely axiomatic to me that if the parties are undertaking deep reductions in nuclear weapons, there must be an atmosphere of confidence, and to achieve that the conditions of the ABM Treaty must be toughened.

And periods of mandatory observance named.

If we were to agree that such a period would be 10 years, it would be possible to carry out major reductions of nuclear potential during this period.

This is the fundamental question, for if we do not have agreement on periods of non-withdrawal from the treaty, there will be no agreement on nuclear weapons either. Then it will come out that we have not agreed on anything.

I proposed a definite package and would ask you to consider it as such.

I do not think that a link has to be established between reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty which only restricts defense against such weapons. Incidentally, we believe that you are violating this treaty. You have built more than is allowed under it. At the same time we are fully complying with it and have not built more than allowed under the treaty.
[Gorbachev] So on two issues you and I now have a common position. On the others we have had an interesting exchange of opinions, but did not reach a unified opinion. I think that we can conclude our meeting with this. It still has not been in vain. Granted that it did not produce the results which were expected in the Soviet Union and the United States, which I expected, but we must take account of the realities. And the reality is that we are unable to work out agreed-upon proposals on these issues. You and I talked about the possibility of major reductions in nuclear weapons; but if the fate of the ABM Treaty is unclear, then the entire conception collapses and we return to the situation that existed before Reykjavik.

Perhaps you will report this to Congress, and we will report to the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet. I do not think the world will stop. Events will unfold, and neither will our relations stop. But we will not succeed in taking advantage of the present opportunity to give a strong impetus in the main areas of our relations.

[Reagan] I thought that we had agreement on the 50-percent reduction and on intermediate-range missiles. In addition we can continue discussion of the question of ABM’s and restricting testing. On this issue we think that as nuclear weapons are reduced we would come to stop nuclear testing. How could it not be? How can we go away from here with nothing?

[Gorbachev] Unfortunately, we in fact can. Of course, we have not discussed humanitarian issues yet. Perhaps we should talk about them? In addition there are the regional problems, in general the problems which the second working group discussed.

[Reagan] Yes, it is my understanding that this group reconciled the proposals which were delivered to us.

"Having examined the state of affairs in a number of important areas of bilateral Soviet-American cooperation, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the United States agreed to assign their ministers of foreign affairs to give an additional impetus to mutual efforts to achieve agreements in those areas where the positions of the two countries have a common foundation. Among these areas are nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, creation of centers to reduce the nuclear peril, bolstering the safety of the nuclear power industry, peaceful use of space, the fight against international terrorism, and international cooperation in the area of thermonuclear synthesis.

"Humanitarian problems and questions of human rights were also discussed. The parties presented their corresponding positions and expressed willingness to continue the exchange of opinions on these issues.

"The leaders of the two countries discussed regional problems, including their impact on relations between the USSR and the United States. The parties expressed their support of peaceful political settlement of regional conflicts. They assigned the ministers of foreign affairs to continue and broaden the dialogue on these problems."

"The parties agreed on the following:

—continue regular consultation on the question of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons;
—"in the near future begin negotiations on the establishment of national centers in Moscow and Washington to reduce the nuclear peril and their functions;
—"continue bilateral contacts within the IAEA framework to facilitate the Agency’s work to ensure safety in the development of nuclear power engineering;
—"intensify practical efforts on a bilateral and multilateral basis to establish cooperation in the development of thermonuclear synthesis, a promising energy source. Instruct each side’s experts to meet by 1 November of this year to review the results of each side’s study of the possibilities of cooperation in this area and discuss subsequent steps;
—"give instructions to each side’s delegation to develop and prepare for signing the text of an intergovernmental agreement on cooperation in the peaceful development of space;
—"agree no later than 20 October of this year on the time and place for preliminary discussions relative to renewing the agreement on transportation or concluding a new one and, possibly also the agreement on power engineering and pure sciences, as well as the agreements on search and rescue at sea and cooperation in the field of radio navigation;
—"discuss the concrete possibilities of bilateral cooperation as well as participation in international activities aimed at eliminating all forms of terrorism and ensuring the safety of ground, air, and maritime travel; hold bilateral consultations to prevent terrorist acts;
—"resolve practical issues linked to the opening of general consulates of the parties in New York and Kiev, respectively;
—"instruct the delegations of the two sides to step up work to achieve a mutually acceptable understanding concerning border lines in the maritime spaces of the Arctic and Pacific Oceans and the Chukchi and Bering Seas;
—"instruct their representatives to work out common positions to give the status of an agreement to the existing understanding on the CAPCAT search and rescue system;
—"resolve through diplomatic channels the question of setting up a commission to examine bilateral issues;
—"determine the practical possibility of discussing humanitarian questions within the framework of the expert consultations being conducted between the two countries."
It is true that nothing is said here about one issue, human rights. I do not want to make any demands on you relative to reunification of families, emigration, the status of believers, and so on. But I would like you to understand that this is a fundamentally important factor in determining the degree to which we will be able to cooperate with you in important areas. Our public opinion, owing to the ethnic roots of our people, attaches enormous importance to this, and that is a reality that must be considered. That is why the reduction in the rate of emigration causes such concern in our country. We are giving you a list of persons who we know have expressed a desire to emigrate, but have not received permission. We hope that you will soften the restrictions. We will not brag that we got this done; we will just thank you for such a decision.

[Gorbachev] It is a shame, Mr. President, that you and I do not have enough time to discuss humanitarian issues. We have concrete ideas on this which we simply are not going to have time to discuss. I have to say that people in the Soviet Union are very concerned about the human rights situation in the United States. There is one other important subject. This is the importance of mutual information in our day. The situation now is this: the Voice of America broadcasts around the clock in many languages from stations that you have in various countries of Europe and Asia, while we cannot present our point of view to the American people. Therefore, to achieve parity, we are forced to jam Voice of America broadcasts. I propose the following: we will stop jamming Voice of America and you will be able to broadcast what you consider necessary to us, but at the same time you will meet us half-way and help us lease, from you or in neighboring countries, radio stations that would allow us to reach the American people with our point of view.

[Reagan] The difference between us is that we recognize freedom of the press and the right of people to listen to any point of view. This does not exist in your press. Today in Washington there will be a press conference, and Americans will see it, and newspapers will publish the text of it. It is not that way in your country. Your system envisions only a government press.

[Gorbachev] But I asked a concrete question. I proposed that we can stop jamming Voice of America if you will meet us half-way and give us an opportunity to lease a radio station from you or lease or build a station in one of your neighboring countries.

[Reagan] I will consult about this when I return to the United States, and I will take a favorable position.

[Gorbachev] We are for parity in general. In the information field, for example, or in film. Almost half of the movies showing in our theaters are American. Soviet movies are hardly ever shown in the United States. That is not parity.

[Reagan] We do not have any ban on your movies. The film industry is a free business, and if someone wants to show your films he can do it.

[Gorbachev] I see that the President avoids this question and goes into talk about business.

[Reagan] Our government cannot control the film market. If you want to inundate us with your movies, go right ahead. How our movies get to your country, I do not know.

[Gorbachev] It is an interesting situation, simply a paradox. In your country, the most democratic country, obstacles arise to showing our movies, while in our country, a totalitarian country, almost half the movies being shown are American. How can you reconcile this, that the Soviet Union is an undemocratic country but your films are being shown?

[Reagan] There is a difference between free enterprise and government ownership. You have no free enterprise, everything belongs to the government and the government puts everything on the market. In the United States we have private industry, and other countries have the right to sell their goods, movies, and so on. You have the right to set up a rental organization in our country to distribute your movies, or to lease some theater. But we cannot order it.

[Gorbachev] One more question. There were two television bridges between the USSR and the United States recently. One involved the participation of the communities of Leningrad, Copenhagen, and Boston, and the other had Soviet and American doctors. In our country they were watched by 150 million people, but in the United States they were not shown.

[Reagan] The only thing I can answer is that the movie theaters and all belong to your government, and you show what you want to in them. But our government cannot compete with private business.

But I want to tell you that your performing groups, such as the Leningrad Ballet, draw an enormous crowd in the United States, and they are shown on television too. But if you want to show other things too, please do. We have leasing companies, and theaters which show foreign films.

[Gorbachev] Mr. President, we have quite a few complaints about the United States. Here is the last question. For 30 years now you have refused to let our trade union figures enter the United States. Mr. Shultz simply does not give them visas. Where is the parity here? You know, your trade union figures come to the USSR and have interesting professional contacts and meetings with workers. But you do not let our people in. In your country, which is so self-confident, they are viewed as subversive elements.

[Reagan] I would like to look into this. Maybe I will have some proposals on the film problem that you mentioned.

[Gorbachev] Good.
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

[Reagan] One more thing. I cannot return home and say nothing to our farmers on the issue that is so important to them. Why didn’t you fulfill your obligation relative to grain purchases from us?

[Gorbachev] It is very simple. You can tell them that the money with which the Russians could have bought grain ended up in the United States and Saudi Arabia because of the sharp drop in oil prices. So the United States already has this money. 

[Reagan] The oil business in the United States suffered greatly from the drop in oil prices. Many countries suffered because of the OPEC actions.

[Gorbachev] We know that. We knew who began this process of cutting oil prices, and whose interests it is in.

[Reagan] This point is that the oil industry in most countries of the world is private, but in the OPEC countries it belongs to the government. They want to dominate the market and drive others out. That is why they resort to such actions.

I have one more question. I received a letter from the prominent cellist, your former citizen M. Rostropovich. In it he included a copy of a letter sent to you by ordinary mail. It appears that you did not receive it. He asks you to help his sister and brother travel to the West for 2 months so that they can participate in the celebration of his birthday.

[Gorbachev] I read that letter and gave it to the appropriate organs with a request to help Rostropovich’s relatives travel to his birthday. I think that this matter has already been resolved.

[Reagan] You see, you have your own bureaucracy, just like I have mine. In any case, he did not receive an answer.

[Shevardnadze] His relatives know that their trip has been authorized.

[Gorbachev] I remember his letter. One more thing he wrote there was that he did not know if it would reach me.

Well, Mr. President, “X-hour” is approaching. What are you going to do?

[Shultz] I have tried to write a text here that reflects what we agreed about, on strategic weapons and intermediate-range missiles, as well as our disagreements on the issues of space and ABM’s. In this area I suggest that we write that the President and the General Secretary discussed issues related to the ABM Treaty, long-range strategic defense, and its interrelations with the levels of offensive ballistic missiles. The discussion was intensive and thorough. They are instructing their delegations in Geneva to use the materials from their discussion to move ahead in their work.

[Gorbachev] That is not acceptable to us. What else do you want to write?

[Shultz] Something also on the issue of intermediate-range missiles.

[Gorbachev] But on that issue everything is clear.

[Shultz] But the understanding needs to be set forth.

[Gorbachev] Maybe, if the President does not object, we will declare a break for 1-2 hours and during that time, possibly, our ministers will try to propose something. I think that we can slow down a little. After all, we do not want everything to end with a facade.

[Shultz] I think that we can reach agreement on nuclear testing, find some formula.

[Shevardnadze] I think so too. But the main thing is that we need a fundamental decision concerning a period of non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.

[Gorbachev] It is exceptionally important to reaffirm the ABM Treaty. Then we can substantiate the risk that we are taking in questions of strategic weapons and intermediate-range missiles. And so, if the President does not object, we will take a break until 1500 hours.

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Former Boss on Life, Work of Russian Spy Rudolf Abel

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[Article by Nikolay Dolgopolov, first installment of Saturday series of articles, including interview with Dmitriy Petrovich Tarasov; date and place not given: “The Truth About Colonel Abel”]

[Text] What made this article about the Soviet illegal espionage agent possible? First of all, it has been several years since all of this took place, and there is a statute of limitations even in a foreign intelligence agency that is absolutely closed to the outside world. The second and main reason is that the illegals themselves have family celebrations and birthdays. On 11 July 1903 a little boy was born into the family of Russified German Genrikh Matveyevich Fisher. Because Genrikh Fisher, a professional Bolshevik revolutionary, was living in exile in England at that time, his young wife Lyuba had to give birth not in her native Saratov, but in the British city of Newcastle-on-Tyne. The boy was named William by his parents, who adored revolution and the great Shakespeare.

The boy was not fated to become a writer, however. Director J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of Investigations came up with the best description of his professional caliber: “The persistent hunt for master spy