Anatoly Chernyaev
Notes from the Conference with Politburo Members and Secretaries of the Central Committee.

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GORBACHEV: Regarding Reagan's decision to abandon SALT II. We anticipated such an action. But to do such a thing after Reykjavik! This is a discreditation of their own policy. The "Irangate" pushed them to do it - in order to save the President. I said in India that it was a mistake. But our reaction should also come from the government-to-government level, because we are talking here about a dangerous correction of policy. He is acting here in order to please the right wing, the military-industrial complex, which is acting here with an open face. They want to put us at the table of negotiations in Geneva in this situation. We should give a very serious assessment to this action. Destructive policy should be called destructive policy: not only that they are not doing anything in the spirit of Reykjavik, but they are removing all breaks from the arms race. We need a government statement ... And a letter to the Congress from foreign [affairs] commissions of our Supreme Soviet. We are expected to provide not only a statement but also a position. We will not make a step to announce that any further negotiations make no sense. But at the same time, it is not time yet to refuse to adhere to SALT II. Even though we have everything ready for it. It would be a present precisely for the kind of people who disrupt negotiations, and brush off public opinion. If we do this now, they will say that the Soviets were simply waiting for it to happen. The Chinese have already taken the bait--saying, we were right, the "superpowers" are playing their own game.

We should use all the political means to compel Reagan to return to SALT II. It is a very difficult stage. We should react of a big scale, but within the boundaries of political struggle. On our side, we should not provoke further arms race. This approach is justified. Reykjavik has confirmed that when we come out with positive proposals, it gives us big benefits.

We are getting through not only to the European, but also to the American public. There is a great interest [to us] in the U.S.--lines for meetings with our cinematographers, for
Moiseev (dance ensemble) [concerts], for Svetlanov (symphony orchestra) [concerts], for our children's delegations. They have felt it at the top—in the White House and in the Pentagon. It is not just a coincidence that the subscriptions to Soviet Life are being curtailed, and that the FBI got interested in those who subscribe. They are afraid, they are practicing the tactics of silencing information about our big speeches, statements. But there are forces in the United States, which want to bring the Soviet point of view over there. Therefore, we should not look at American as only black and white.

The group headed by Zaikov should give us a detailed analysis of what is going on in America in the sphere of armaments and about the prospects of disarmament.

We should not allow ourselves to get tired. The political leadership has no right to do it. We are obligated to calculate all our steps—the political, diplomatic and cultural ones—with precision. We should not exclude a possibility that as a result of the reaction to Reykjavik and to the "Irangate," the administration could undertake a risky venture in either Nicaragua or Seoul, in order to stop our peaceful advance. We are dealing with political scum. One can expect anything from them. We hate it, but we need a cold head. It is necessary and possible to influence the United States not directly, but via other forces, and especially via Western Europe. We should conduct affairs in a business-like manner.

Even with sharpest presentations, the overall tendency in our assessment of the situation should be optimistic, not hopeless.

DOBRYNIN: The U.S. is experiencing a crisis of the political leadership, of the administration. The Reagan administration's policy is treated with mistrust—there has never been so much criticism of a President.

GORBACHEV: Still, we have to act in a decent manner. I had a chance to attack Reagan at the press conference in Deli, but I did not do it.
LIGACHEV: Reykjavik significantly strengthened our positions. We came out of Reykjavik stronger. The U.S. positions got weaker—even if there was no Iranagate or the congressional elections. Because the Iranagate was started by those who were waiting for their moment. We should start from the strengths, which we received from Reykjavik.

VOROTNIKOV: International problems. The fact that we made significant concessions was received positively, it showed our true intentions. However, we should not make further concessions. They would think that the forceful pressure from Washington is working.

GORBACHEV: You probably understand that we have not made any concessions. It is the generals, who are trying to scare us - they are afraid that they would have nothing to do. There is enough work left for four or five generations of generals. We have not made any concessions—not one step.

VOROTNIKOV: We should not make a step away from Reykjavik.

GORBACHEV: I know, they are already hissing among themselves [generals]: what kind of leadership do we have? They are disarming the country.

Yes, in Reykjavik our proposals sounded like concessions. But in reality, they are no concessions whatsoever.

VOROTNIKOV: That's what the people think...
GORBACHEV: They say that [Marshal Nicholai] Ogarkov is very upset. To him it is just the more the better. Cannons should be longer. He gets 1,200 rubles a month, and he still growls. Meanwhile, 25 million people live under the minimum which we officially pronounced as poverty level.

They used to tell us that the United States was in crisis. But it seems like there is no crisis there. There are crises and crises.

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