Absolutely concur with your reasoning behind by-naming folks. I'll work through the J2 to get these folks invited.

The J2 specifically mentioned [redacted] but I agree that we should get away from single source agencies.

We can talk tomorrow morning at the azimuth check [redacted] scheduled.

V/R

[Signature]
Based upon discussions with the J5 and guidance from the J2, the following final positions (recommended fills) have been identified as part of the JMC's Wargame, 14-17 June 99:

1. Should not play a role in the red cell, as we don't want to start involving in single-source producers. They have to start providing a balanced view to the table. We may have to start requiring requests by C6, per 53.
2. ...
Request sanity check of the above from addressees.

2. We will "by-name" request individuals present for the 29/30 April CENTCOM Intel conference to fill the slots from national level agencies. Who do you want?

3. Do not yet know composition for the rehearsal on 8 June but will let you know as soon as I do.

4. Will meet with J5 and BAH tomorrow morning (time TBD.) I'll attend the CINC brief tomorrow afternoon. Notes will follow.

y/r

bb

LTC, MI

Chief, J2 Plans

DERIVED FROM: multiple
DECLASSIFY ON: 300601

CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET

DERIVED FROM: MS
DECLASSIFY ON: X1

CLASSIFICATION: SECRET
CAVEATS: NOFON
TERMS: NONE
SUBJ: POST-SADDAM IRAQ INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE AND WARGAME MESSAGE FROM DAWS
1. (S//NF) THIS MESSAGE ANNOUNCES A WORKING-LEVEL CONFERENCE 29-30 APRIL 1999 TO ASSESS POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR A POST-SADDAM IRAQ. THE CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD IN THE CENTCOM J2 CONFERENCE ROOM, CENTCOM HEADQUARTERS AT MACDILL AFB, FL. ADDRESSEES ARE INVITED TO SEND THEIR LEADING ANALYTICAL EXPERTS TO THIS CONFERENCE.
2. (S//NF) USCINCCENT, GEN ZINNI, HAS DIRECTED CENTCOM J5 TO ESTABLISH A SENIOR-LEVEL "WARGAME" TO EXAMINE US POLICY OPTIONS AND POTENTIAL COURSES OF ACTION IN A POST-SADDAM IRAQ. THE WARGAME WILL BE CONDUCTED 14-17 JUNE 1999. GEN ZINNI HAS FURTHER DIRECTED THE "STARTING POINT" FOR THE WARGAME TO BE A "WORST-CASE" SCENARIO.
3. (S//NF) THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE 29-30 APRIL CONFERENCE IS TO DEVELOP THIS "WORST-CASE" SCENARIO. SECONDARY OBJECTIVES INCLUDE ASSESSING OTHER POSSIBLE SCENARIOS; DEVELOPING
"ROADMAPS" OF HOW WE MIGHT GET TO THOSE SCENARIOS; AND,
DEVELOPING INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS FOR EACH OF THESE SCENARIOS.
WE WILL ALSO EXAMINE LIKELY EVENTS LEADING UP TO SADDAM'S
DOWNFALL AND INDICATORS OF THOSE EVENTS.
4. (U/SANF) FOR
REQUEST A PRESENTATION OF
YOUR RECENTLY COMPLETED DRAFT
ON POST-SADDAM IRAQ
FROM ITS PRIMARY
AUTHOR, AS THE SCENE-SETTER FOR OUR
CONFERENCE.
5. (U) FOR USCENTCOM COMPONENTS: A VTC WILL BE HELD ON 30 APRIL
1999 AT 0700 EDT TO PROVIDE A MID-CONFERENCE UPDATE TO CENTCOM
COMPONENTS AND DEPLOYED JTF'S (CONFERENCE NUMBER 3081049.)
6. (U) ADMINISTRATIVE.
A. (U) REQUEST ADDRESSEES NOTIFY BELOW NAMED POC OF INTENT TO
SEND REPRESENTATION TO THE CONFERENCE NLT 27 APRIL 1999.
B. (U) ATTENDEES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING THEIR OWN BILLETING
AND TRANSPORTATION ARRANGEMENTS.
C. (B//NF) SCI CLEARANCES SHOULD BE PASSED TO SSO CINCCENT
//CCJ2-SSO//. PURPOSE IS TO ATTEND POST-SADDAM INTELLIGENCE
CONFERENCE.
D. (U) CONFERENCE WILL BEGIN DAILY AT 0930 EDT.
7. (U) POC FOR THE CONFERENCE AND THE VTC IS LTC
CCJ2 PLANS,
From:               
Sent:    Thursday, May 06, 1999 2:57 PM
To:                      
Subject:    RE: wargame

--- Original Message ---
From:               
Sent:    Thursday, May 06, 1999 10:14 AM
To:                      
Cc:                      
Subject:    RE: wargame

Yes sir, understand.
At the briefing to Booz-Allen yesterday, we had a J5 guy present
( ) and he seemed to like our scene-
setter. He took a copy of it with him, so J5 is aware of where we
are headed. In fact, they even participated in the conference last
week, so there should be no surprises.
Booz-Allen seemed happy with the information we gave them, and
they are taking copies back.
One important decision has been made regarding the game that
has made our scene-setter less important to the whole process:
both Centcom J5 and the Booz-Allen guys are strongly opposed
to gaming the NCA go/no-go decision to execute Desert Crossing.
The assumption at the start of the game is that the "go" decision
has already been made. That being the case, the scene-setter
will be a 15-20 minute brief at the start of play which will not involve
any interaction/decisions with the participants. Game play will
really start with discussion/decisions of issues beginning in Phase
I of the plan.
They have their reasons for doing this— I don't exactly agree, but the
J2 will need to engage at his level if he wants the go/no-go decision
gamed.
Bottom line: we've given J2, J5 and Booz Allen what they want. We
will come up later today to show both you and J5 the proposed DIdet
for the CINC which is currently scheduled for Mon 10 May.

--- Original Message ---
From:               
Sent:    Thursday, May 06, 1999 9:22 AM
To:                      
Cc:                      
Subject:    wargame
Importance:    High

Stop by J5 today and discuss coordination of scene setter/scenario with them. BG Johnson asked
DJ2 to ensure we were in full coordination before we briefed the CINC. hln
JTF-SWA/J2 Comments on Desert Crossing Wargame Scenario 5 May 99

1. Scenario/Wargame should be

2. Indicators will be very difficult to collect. Must sensitize our seniors that we are likely to get very little warning (if any) of a regime change.

3. Need to emphasize that while an "Exiled Opposition Takeover" is a nonstarter (per NIC memo), instability/revolt in the south/north could be the catalyst for a regime change.

4. Scenarios/Branches/Sequels are based on the NIC memo (coordinated intel community position) so we should be on firm footing.

5. Agree that the branches/sequels should be based on Worst Case for US.

I still have major problems with page 17 in light of the title and implications of a "Desert Crossing". The "bullets" are at best contradictory, when put in context of what it would take to be ultimately successful.

- Military involvement perceived to be supportive of a particular Iraqi political or opposition would be rejected by regional states.

How do we accomplish the first goal without direct support of some Iraqi political faction?

* Iraq's neighbors probably would acquiesce to US military involvement, if it were seen as a response to a humanitarian crisis.
* None of Iraq's neighbors would accept a prolonged US humanitarian presence, however, would want to see the situation stabilized and a quick exit of US troops.

Doesn't Kosovo give us a historical truth that everything may take longer and more effort (political will) to accomplish than originally planned for? In order for war gaming to be successful and meaningful shouldn't we make firmer assumptions on the Iraqi neighbor's support for "surge of forces" and more details on their support for US actions - necessary on a very "short-fused" basis in order to max the possibilities for success? While optimistic thinking is called for in war gaming - realism is also necessary, in my opinion, in order to truly be meaningful and most productive. "Desert Crossing" seems to be lacking in details about MNF support for US efforts and requirements.
DESERT CROSSING ISSUES and DECISION POINTS

Issues

1. If Iraqi leaders/military uses WMD or creates environmental hazards targeted against Iraqi civilians in a "scorched earth" strategy as they withdrew to central Iraq, what is our response? If this generates a huge humanitarian problem, are we willing and/or able to clean up the mess?

2. Will large numbers of U.S. casualties or the potential for such, undercut NCA commitment and Congressional Support for the Operation?

3. If the Coalition forces must fight Iraqi units on Iraqi territory, there is no place for them to run and therefore a potential for very high casualties among Iraqi units that resist. This is troubling, given the experience in 1991 when the Highway of Death undercut the will and commitment of the NCA. Would the NCA stop or modify the objectives of Desert Crossing following publicity of high Iraqi casualties?

4. Is the NCA willing to make an up front commitment to the entire concept of the plan—that is, to lead an effort to fight, conquer, and occupy Iraq— or will the NCA only bite off one piece at a time, seeking to modify the Operation after it begins execution to limit the scope of U.S. involvement and commitment?

Decision Points

1. Desert Crossing Go/No-Go?

2. Assume at the end of Phase 1, coalition cannot co-opt any Iraqi units. Is NCA prepared to initiate Phase II and fight our way into Iraq without any internal cooperation/invitation?

3. Assume that late in Phase 1 or early in Phase 2 a figure or group consolidates power in central Iraq and begins military operations to restore order throughout the country. Does the NCA halt or delay execution of Desert Crossing? Would regional players lose their enthusiasm and withdraw support?
   - What if the new regime is known to be hostile to U.S. interests—continue, delay, or halt execution?
   - What if the new regime's policies are unclear as they relate to U.S. interests—continue, delay, or halt execution?
   - What if the new regime appears to be friendly to U.S. interests, but is embarking on a particularly brutal and bloody campaign to consolidate power throughout Iraq—continue, delay, or halt execution?

4. Assume during phase 2, coalition forces co-opt southern RA units and begin moving north. As coalition forces approach Baghdad, no RG units can be co-opted. Is NCA willing to transition to fighting in order to continue moving north?
The primary objective of the 29-30 April conference is to develop the "worst-case" scenario to be used as the start point for the CINC's Wargame. Secondary objectives include assessing other possible scenarios; developing "roadmaps" of how we might get to those scenarios; and, developing indications and warnings for each of these scenarios. We will also examine likely events leading up to Saddam's downfall and indicators of those events.

These are the objectives the J2 gave us in a meeting last week and were listed in the message announcing the conference.

Any questions?
Subject: Objectives for the J2

J2 would like to see the objectives for Thursday/Friday's event.

Email to me is ok. Thanks.